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In 2013 it is 15 years ago that the era of Indonesian Reformasi started. The 
transformation from the New Order political regime to the Reformasi political 
regime was marked by riots and violence in which religious (and/or ethnic) 
identities played a role. In some regions of Indonesia thousands of people, 
Muslims as well as Christians, died. Reconciliation has been achieved resulting 
in the absence o f bloody conflicts between the two parties. However, as was 
voiced by the research participants in this study, feelings of suspicion are still 
around. In some specific cases they explode into severe tensions. Moreover, 
more conversation and dialogue are needed to reach mutual understanding. For 
this reason I hope that this study will contribute to enhance of inter-religious 
understanding between Muslim and Christian.
Many individuals have contributed in one way or another to the study which 
culminated in this book. I would like to thank all o f them. But because of lack 
o f space only few individuals will be mentioned. First of all I would like to 
thank all the research participants in Solo (Surakarta) who voluntarily involved 
themselves in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Some of these discussions 
were held in participants’ houses. Next, I also want to thank my two field re­
search assistants, Muhammad Ishom and Andita Hayuningtyas who worked 
very hard to organize twenty-four FGDs.
An important person to whom I would like to express my deepest gratitude 
is my supervisor Prof. Frans Wijsen, Radboud University Nijmegen (RUN), the 
Netherlands, who has made me a part of his innovative project on the narrative 
study of religion. He guided my thinking and writing and helped me in non- 
academic affairs. Moreover, my special respect goes to my co-supervisor Dr. 
Wening Udasmoro, Gadjah Mada University (GMU), Indonesia, who not only 
gave fruitful suggestions for the revision of this work but also inspired me to 
finish this study. Additionally I would like to express my gratitude to Ms. 
Marcelle Manley who improved the English language in which this book is 
written.
For conducting this study I am indebted to Prof. Irwan Abdullah, the former 
director of Graduate School GMU who was willing to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Graduate School and the Faculty o f Religious Stud­
ies at RUN, which is now part of its Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Reli­
gious Studies. I extend this gratitude to Prof. Hartono and Prof. Suryo Purwono 
(the director and the vice-director of the School) and to Dr. Zainal A. Bagir (the 
director of Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at the School) who 
supported my study and offered to set me free during my period of study.
Furthermore I would like to devote my sincere gratefulness to some scholars 
at GMU and at other universities in Yogyakarta such as Prof. Bemard Adeny- 
Risakotta, Prof. Johannes Banawiratma, Prof. Gerrit Singgih, Prof. Mark 
Woodward, Prof. Achmad Mursyidi, Dr. Arqom Kuswanjono, Dr. St. Sunardi, 
Dr. Budi Subanar, Dr. Noorhaidi Hasan, Dr. Nur Ichwan, Dr. Fatimah Husein, 
Dr. Siti Syamsiyatun, Dr. Jeanny Dewayani, Dr. Dicky Sofyan, Dr. Budiawan, 
Dr. Syamsul M a’arif, Dr. Iqbal Ahnaf, Dr. Zuly Qodir, Dr. Hasse J., Mr. Yoyo, 
and Ms. Emil Karmila after all. I also express my gratefulness to Prof. Merle C. 
Riclefs and Prof. Gavin Jones as other important scholars who influenced my 
development as an academician. I would also like to thank two religious 
leaders in Solo, K.H. Dian Nafi’ (Muslim) and Pdt. Uri C.S. Labeti (Christian).
I honour my colleagues and friends at Radboud University Nijmegen such 
as Dr. Carl Sterkens, Dr. Jorge Castillo Guerra, Prof. Chris Hermans, Dr. 
Marie-Antoinette Willemsen, Dr. Thomas J. Ndaluka, Fr. Ambrose Bwangatto, 
Mr. Frans Dokman, Mr. Solomon Dejene, Mr. Handi Widananto, Mr. M. 
Yusuf, Mr. Tri Subagya, Mr. Cahyo Pamungkas, Ms. Agnes Camacho, Ms. 
Agnes Nauli, Mr. Ary Samsara, Ms. Jennifer Voss, Mr. Didi Rustam, Mr. 
Ahmet Kaya, Ms. Fatma Agca, Mr. Ichsan Kabullah, Ms. Miranti I. Mandasari, 
Ms. Menandro S. Abanes, Ms. Dona Sanctis, Ms. Haryani Saptaningtyas and 
Ms. Kenei Neipfe. We had inspiring discussions and cheerfulness gatherings. I 
also thank Ms. Miep Beuving, Mr. Alfred Bollen, Ms. Godelief de Jong, and 
Mr. Frans Wolswijk who helped me in dealing with various administrative 
affairs. I keep warm memories o f my housemates at the Dominican house and 
the Catharina house in Nijmegen.
Besides being lecturer at the university, I also got involved in a pesantren 
and in social activism. My special appreciation goes to Kyai Hasan of Mlangi, 
and three kyais from Pandanaran: Kyai M u’tashim Billah, Gus Jazilus Sakhok, 
and Kyai Dr. Imaduddin Sukamto. I would also like to thank Mas Farid Wajidi, 
Mas Hairus Salim, Mas Jadul Maula, Mas Ahmad Fikri, Mas Nur Kholiq 
Ridwan, Mas Ahmad Shidqi, Mas Budhy Munawar Rahman, Mas Ahmad 
Suaedy, Mas Luthfi Assyaukanie, and Mbak Elga Sarapung.
My greatest gratitude goes to my father (the late Bapak H. Cholil Shidiq) 
and my mother (the late Ibu Istianah), my beloved brothers and sisters in Kediri 
East Java, my parents in law, and my brothers and sisters in law in Blora Cen­
tral Java. And last but not least I also would like to dedicate my sincere love to 
my nuclear family -  my wife Niswatin Faoziah and to my beloved three kids 
Bunga Rufaida Adya, Azril Najli Adya and Zanadin Khrisna Adya who were 
motivating me and patiently accompanied me in accomplishing this study.
i n t r o d  n e t le e n
During the election campaign for the govemorship of Jakarta in 2012 there 
were scores of posters bearing the slogan: ‘Vote for the leader of the same faith 
and aqidaV' Similar messages were proclaimed at Muslim religious meetings 
and on flyers. They referred to the candidates for the positions o f govemor and 
vice govemor, Joko Widodo (a Javanese Muslim) and Basuki T. Pumama (a 
Christian of Chinese descent). Previously Joko Widodo was mayor of Sura- 
karta (Solo). F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, a Roman Catholic, was vice mayor of that 
city.
Some Muslims who participated in my research project in Surakarta voiced 
the same message three years before the Jakarta govemor’s election campaign. 
They were worried about the vice mayor of Surakarta being a Roman Catholic. 
In fact, after Joko Widodo was elected govemor o f Jakarta Rudyatmo replaced 
him as mayor of Surakarta. Thus a Roman Catholic now leads Surakarta. Po- 
litical experts are surprised about the return of religious sentiment to politics, as 
the membership of Islamic parties is very small. Their votes declined in the last 
three elections at both local and national level.
In a broader context scholars have recently noted a resurgence of religion 
more than a century after religion or gods were declared dead. ‘God is dead! 
God remains dead! And we have killed him,’ says a madman who mns into the 
marketplace one bright moming in Nietzsche’s The gay science (1882). One 
recognizes the power of this idea in the course of the 20th century. In another 
version Hölderlin proclaims that the gods have absented themselves from hu- 
man affairs (Flood 1999: 221). However, the turn o f this century has seen a 
resurgence. Despite predictions of its decline, religion has revived around the 
globe. It has not died out in our modem world, as secularization theory antici- 
pated; on the contrary, it is blossoming. Some scholars call the 21 st century 
God’s century (Toft et al. 2011).
Most political scientists divide post-independence Indonesian history into 
three periods: the Old Order (1945-1967), the New Order (1967-1998), and the 
Reformasi era (1998 onwards) (Cribb & Kahin 2004). Under the New Order 
religion was relegated to private homes, and religious institutions and interre­
ligious conflict were subsumed under the ideology o f unity in diversity (bhi- 
neka tunggal ika). Religious identity did not feature in the political arena.
Pilih pemimpin seiman seakidah.
However, in the Reformasi era it has returned to the public domain (Samuel & 
Schulte Nordholt 2004; Sterkens, Machasin & Wijsen 2007). This socio- 
religious transformation could cause tension and even conflict between Mus- 
lims and Christians, but it could also promote cohesion and solidarity.
This book studies the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) 
social cohesion. In this respect Indonesia is an interesting case. It has a long 
tradition of peaceful co-existence, supported by the ideology of Pancasila, 
which is largely conducive to harmony and tolerance, but it also has a long 
history o f ethnic and/or religious violence and conflict.
Scholars record a series of violent collisions in diverse regions of the coun­
try after the collapse of Soeharto’s regime in 1998 and the subsequent period of 
Indonesian Reformasi. Muslim-Christian clashes in the Moluccas resulted in 
about 5 000 deaths, while hundreds of thousands fled to neighbouring regions. 
In other parts o f Indonesia bloody inter-ethnic clashes (e.g. Dayak and 
Madurese) occurred (Hüsken & De Jonge 2002: 1). Similar conflicts happened 
in Jakarta, Tasikmalya, Situbondo, Celebes, Lombok and many other parts of 
Indonesia. In the present era there have been riots and outbursts of violence in 
Solo in 1972, 1980 and 1998 (Baidi 2010: 18).
In this doctoral thesis I study the religious transformation process in Indone­
sia after the Reformasi era, focusing on Surakarta. More particularly I examine 
social identity construction through Christian-Muslim relations (research ob­
ject) from the theoretical angle of communicative practice (research perspec- 
tive), namely the power of language to make and unmake groups, thereby gen- 
erating convergence or divergence between Christians and Muslims. The hy­
pothesis is that language use is shaped by and shapes broader social and cul- 
tural processes. Following Norman Fairclough (1992: 1), I consider critical 
discourse analysis to be an appropriate method for studying social change.
1 Project fram ew ork
Indonesia, with its vast expanse (almost 2 million square kilometres), insular 
geography, large population and linguistic and ethnic diversity, is predisposed 
to religious diversity and fragmentation (Goh 2005: 57). In contemporary In­
donesian history the two political events that fuelled interreligious fragmenta­
tion inevitably happened between Muslims and Christians. They were the 1965 
mass killing o f hundreds of thousands of people suspected of being members or 
sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the 1998 Refor­
masi movement which toppled Soeharto’s 32-year presidential regime.
After the 1965 massacre Muslims and Christians engaged in fierce competi- 
tion to proselytize the remaining communist members or sympathizers, aban- 
gan (nominal) people and adherents of kebatinan/kepercayaan (local mysti-
cism/beliefs) in the name of Islamic dakwa or Christian mission. After 1965 
Indonesian citizens had to choose among five (since Wahid, six) state recog- 
nized religions. The following table shows the statistical picture.
Table 1
Percentages of Indonesian population based on religion 1971-20102
Religion 1971 (%) 1980(% ) 1990 (%) 2000 (%) 2010 (%)
Muslim 87.51 87.94 87.21 88.22 87.18
Protestant 5.82 6.04 5.87 6.96
Catholic 2.98 3.58 3.05 2.91
Hindu 1.94 1.83 1.81 1.69
Buddhist 0.92 1.03 0.84 0.72
Confucian 0.82 3.26 - - 0.05
Other 1.42 0.32 0.20 0.13
Not answered - - - - 0.06
Not asked - - - - 0.32
Total population 118.367.850 146.082.023 179.247.783 201.241.999 237.641.326
The 1998 Reformasi movement encourages free discourse, including freedom 
of religion or belief, and equality among citizens (Cholil 2010: 120-122). On 
the one hand it promotes reconciliation between Muslims and Christians after a 
series of interreligious conflicts in some parts o f Indonesia. On the other hand it 
encourages religious identity construction such as the implementation of 
Syariah in local districts, the idea of a biblical city, the appearance o f Muslim 
or Christian paramilitaries, acts by religious radicals, the emergence o f new 
waves o f Islam and Christianity, and so forth.
In this section I explain the project framework: the concept of agama, Islam 
in Indonesia, Christianity in Indonesia, the relation between Muslims and 
Christians, and the study of religion in Indonesia. This clarifies the general 
picture of Muslim-Christian encounters in Indonesia and how to study those 
relations. I do not explore the history of Muslim-Christian relations, since it has 
been adequately covered by other scholars (Shihab 1996; Steenbrink 1998; 
Aritonang 2004; Hussein 2007; Bagir & Abdullah 2011). The discussion is not 
exhaustive; it merely provides background information.
1.1 The cosucept o f agamraai
In Indonesia Islam and Christianity are classified as agama (religion). The old 
and new systems of local beliefs are categorized as kebatinan/kepercayaan 
(local mysticism/beliefs). The concept of agama in Indonesia, like that of relig­
ion worldwide, has to do with the creation and preservation of boundaries
Census o f BPS 1971, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010.
(Smith 2004; Picard 2011). So we need to clarify the concept of agama before 
we can discuss Islam and Christianity in Indonesia.
Jonathan Z. Smith (1982: xi) writes: ‘Religion is solely the creation of the 
scholar’s study.’ It is created to further scholars’ analytical purposes by way of 
imaginative acts o f comparison and generalization. ‘Religion has no existence 
apart from the academy.’ So religion is not some ‘thing’ that exists ‘out there’, 
but is a construct in the scholar’s mind. The construction of religious concepts 
entails a process of ‘othering’ (Masuzawa 2005: 14).
The notion of religion originated from the Roman worldview. It was appro- 
priated by early Christian theologians, who fundamentally altered its sense and 
orientation by uprooting it from its ‘pagan’ framework. To the Romans religio 
was all about tradition, a set of ancestral practices evolved by a people and 
transmitted over generations. Because there are diverse peoples, there are di­
verse traditions. By claiming to be the true religio Christianity contrasted its 
doctrines with popular practices, which were rejected as false beliefs. This 
classification into true and false religions marks a semantic change character- 
ized by orthodoxy or orthopraxy (Picard 2011: 1,3). Here we see the sifting of 
the meaning of the word ‘religio’, comparable with that of the word ‘agama’ to 
be discussed below.
The fïrst Christian author who systematically wrote about religion was St 
Augustine, although the proper translation o f ‘religion’ in his case would be 
worship (Smith 1963: 28-29). After Augustine the word ‘religion’ was not 
much used. In the Middle Ages the word ‘religious’ referred to monastic life. 
Religious were members of orders who were distinguished from lay people. 
Thomas Aquinas used the word ‘religion’ in this sense. Throughout the Middle 
Ages, the most religious era in history, no one ever wrote a book about religion 
(Smith 1963: 30-32).
The modern meaning o f the word ‘religion’ or ‘religions’ came with the 
Renaissance and the Reformation (Smith 1963: 32). Whereas Luther’s central 
category was ‘faith’, Zwingli and especially Calvin adopted the word ‘religion’ 
in their book titles. For Zwingli men must not put their trust in false religion 
(read: church, pope), but in God. For these Reformers the closest English 
equivalent for true religion would be piety. From the 17th century (the Enlight- 
enment) onwards the meaning changed. Religion was no longer personal devo- 
tion but a belief system, and these religions became true or false in an intellec- 
tual sense (Smith 1963: 39). There was reification, exteriorization of religion, a 
development from personal piety to systematic extemalization. Thus religion 
became an entity.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1963: 48) concludes that the concept o f religion is 
vague. It has not been criticized much and is used in naïve ways. It may be too 
vague to meet scientific requirements. Smith suggests dropping the word 
‘religion’ and using the word ‘faith’ instead. Hence one must question whether
the word ‘religion’ as a Western construct has analytic value -  science must 
move from a participant’s view to an observer’s view -  and whether the word 
‘spirituality’, so popular nowadays, would not suit the academic study of relig­
ion better.
Smith (1963: 63) maintains that Hinduism conceptualizes the beliefs of the 
faithful in India. The very term ‘Hindu’ was unknown in classical Hinduism. 
The word ‘Hindi’ refers to the great river in the northwest of the subcontinent, 
known in the West by its Greek transliteration, Indus. The same applies to Af- 
rican Traditional Religion. This was not an indigenous concept but an invention 
o f British missionaries and scholars of religion. O f course, this is not to say that 
there was not something similar to religion in Africa and Asia. However, Afri- 
can and Asian authors claim that the word ‘spirituality’ is closer to their ances- 
tral traditions.
The colonial encounter with other peoples broadened the category ‘religion’ 
from a very specifïc meaning located in Christian revealed truth to a generic 
concept with universal applicability (Fitzgerald 2007). In Indonesia colonial 
anthropologists and administrators created the category of Indonesian religions. 
Roughly, the translation o f the word ‘religion’ in bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian 
language) is agama.
When the indigenous peoples wanted to preserve their ancestral traditions 
the Dutch missionaries distinguished between custom (‘adat’) and religion 
(‘agama’), the Sanskrit word for ‘tradition’, teaching or post-Vedic text (Smith 
1963: 58-59). Michel Picard (2011: 3) argues that agama covers a much nar- 
rower semantic field than ‘religion’. It is the unusual combination in Sanskrit 
guise of a Christian view of what constitutes a world religion with an Islamic 
notion of what defines a proper religion: divine revelation recorded by a 
prophet in a holy book, a system of law for the community o f believers, con- 
gregational worship, and belief in one divine Lordship. We may wonder how a 
Sanskrit loanword heavily loaded with Indic reference could have come to sig- 
nify an Islamic idea of what ‘religion’ is about. However, in Sanskrit agama 
signifies ‘a traditional precept, doctrine, body of precepts, collection o f such 
doctrines’; in short, ‘anything handed down as fixed by tradition’ (Picard 2011: 
3).
The word ‘agam a’ in Indonesia is used widely in public administration, 
education and theological studies (Islamic, Christian, Hindu, etc.). One state 
ministry is Kementerian Agama (Ministry of Religion) and major national and 
local laws use the word agama. In the educational sector pendidikan agama 
(religious education) is an obligatory course from elementary to university 
level. One example of how the word ‘agama’ is used in Islamic studies is an 
important book by Amin Abdullah (1996), former rector of UIN Sunan Kali- 
jaga Yogyakarta: Studi Agama: Normativitas atau Historisitas? (Study of 
agama: normative or historical?). It underscores the need to study Islam his-
torically as opposed to mainstream normative Islamic study in Indonesia. By 
way of comparison, KiSwahili, the national language in Tanzania, prefers to 
use the Arabic loanword ‘dinV to refer to religion (Wijsen 2007: 21).
If we look at Javanese and Balinese Hindu texts about agama, we start to 
see a shift of meaning. The term ‘agama’ in ancient Javanese and Balinese 
Hindu texts was ‘used to refer to a range of texts dealing with moral, religious 
and legal sanctions and practices’ (Picard 2011: 4). The foundation of Hindu 
law is the notion o f dharma, which relates both to the natural order of the uni- 
verse and to the tasks and privileges of each person according to his status 
(varna) and stage of life (ashrama) (Picard 2011: 4). In Bali the word ‘agama’ 
retained a sense comparable to that of dharma well into the 20th century.
In India the word ‘dharma’ changed its meaning among the educated Ben­
gali elite early in the 19th century (Picard 2011: 4). Wilhelm Halbfass (1988: 
340) writes that ‘the self-definition of Hinduism as a religion, as a dharma 
which confronts and asserts itself against the dharma of the Christians ... is 
largely due to the fact that the missionaries in Bengal laid claim to the concept 
and the term dharma, using it to proclaim Christianity as the true dharma (sal- 
yadharmaY . In its turn, as mentioned by Jan Gonda (1973: 500), the term 
‘agama’ signifïes the religious knowledge of a Brahman, as well as that o f a 
high Buddhist functionary. In adopting the term agama Muslim leaders were 
influenced by Shivaist and Buddhist leaders who had led the way into the ar- 
chipelago, so did Christian leaders. Nowadays agama in bahasa Indonesian 
means religion.
The construction and production of the concept of agama was followed by a 
further process of classification. Following the Dutch anthropologist Snouck 
Hurgronje, Dutch colonial administrators used adat (custom) for ‘real’ Indone­
sian folk beliefs as opposed to the (dangerous) agama, Islam. The colonialists 
used the discourse o f adat to challenge Islam. The opposition o f adat and 
agama reflects a polarization between adat and Islam (Bowen 2003: 50) to 
further Dutch colonial interests.
Soon after the Dutch surrender in March 1942 the Japanese occupation au- 
thorities attempted to win over Indonesian Muslims by means o f anti-Westem 
propaganda based on the defence of Islam. To this end they established Kantor 
Urusan Agama (Office for Religious Affairs) (Picard 2011: 4). Several months 
after the Indonesian declaration of independence in January 1946 the new In­
donesian govemment imitated that policy by creating the Kementerian Agama 
(Religious Ministry), which still exists today.
A presidential decree (no. 1 of 1965) on religious blasphemy triggered a 
debate on what constitutes contemporary Indonesian agama. It states that the 
living religions o f Indonesia are Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism. These six religions (agama-agama) receive state 
protection. Other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism and
Taoism are not prohibited, but they do not receive the same protection as the 
other six religions. This law is supportive of the world religions, but not of 
local religions. The local religions -  mysticism and spirituality -  are classified 
in the decree as ‘sects/organizations of mysticism or beliefs’.3 Thus in Indone­
sia the state also plays a role in defining what is agama and non-agama.
H.2 IsDam Sun Sradoraesiai
Islam is considered a pan-Asian religion alongside Buddhism and Hinduism. It 
represents the beliefs and practices of millions of Asians from Central to South 
to Southeast Asia, whereas Buddhism is mainly confined to the Far East and 
Hinduism to the far south (Lawrence 1999: 395). As shown in table 1 above, 
the percentage of Muslims in the Indonesian population is 87.18. The Indone- 
sian Muslim population is recognized as the largest in the world.
According to historians Marco Polo encountered a Muslim kingdom of 
Aceh on the north coast of Sumatra in 1292, more than a half century before 
the landing o f Ibn Battutah, the oceanic voyager, in the same region. Tome 
Pires, the Portuguese explorer, wrote the earliest ethnographic record o f Aceh 
in the early 16th century, in which the rulers of Aceh were described as ortho­
dox Muslims holding power over a large court (Lawrence 1999: 422). Merle C. 
Ricklefs (2007: 2) writes that the first evidence of Javanese converts to Islam is 
found on gravestones at Trowulan in East Java, dated 1369 CE.
One of the features that distinguishes Indonesian Islam from Middle Eastem 
Islam is its complex relationship with local traditions. The history of Islam in 
Java reflects a ‘mystic synthesis’ with living local traditions. The Sufï move- 
ment was dominant in the early Islamization of Indonesia. By the late 18th, 
early 19th century religious consensus had been reached on three general char- 
acteristics of Indonesian Islam: (a) strong sense o f Islamic identity; (b) obser- 
vance of the five pillars of the faith; and (c) acceptance o f the reality of multi­
ple local spiritual forces (Ricklefs 2008: 115). Nevertheless the synthesis has 
not been stable throughout the history of Islam in Java and different places in 
Indonesia. Sometimes there was tension between the formal Islamic authorities 
and representatives o f indigenous traditions.
The concept of mystic synthesis signifies acceptance of worldwide Islamic 
rituals by Javanese Muslims. No longer were the dead cremated, as in the 
Hindu Javanese era. Now they were buried as Muslims. The archaeological 
evidence o f the Tralaya and Trawulan graves tells us that this had been happen­
ing since at least the 14th century. Youths were circumcised as a sign of Is- 
lamic identity. Javanese went on hajj to Mecca and kept in touch with other 
Muslims there. Prayer five times per day, the fast and other Islamic rites were 
practised. Ricklefs (2008: 223-224) does not interpret these transformations as
3 In bahasa Indonesia it is ‘aliran atau organisasi kebatinan/kepercayaan
rejection of earlier cultural forms or older ideas about the supematural. Pre- 
Islamic early Javanese literature was now perceived as Islamic.
If daily religious life and culture reflect a complex relationship between 
local traditions and Islam, this cannot be said of the law. Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje (1857-1936), a Dutch scholar and advisor of the colonial govem- 
ment, invented an approach to the administration o f ‘native Muslims’ in the 
Dutch Indies. He suggested a categorical separation of syariah from adat (cus- 
tom) in the legal realm. The Dutch colonial govemment, under the influence of 
Van Volenhoven and his prominent student B. ter Haar, officially established 
adat law as formal legal policy in the East Indian colonies in 1927 (Feener 
2007: 54, 71).
Clifford Geertz (1960), an anthropologist, notes the cultural polarization of 
Islam and local traditions. He distinguishes between three categories, a very 
popular distinction in academic circles: santri, abangan, and priyayi. Santri are 
Muslims who adhere strictly to the ritual and legal constraints of Islam. They 
are likely to pray five times a day, fast during the month of Ramadan, give 
alms (zakat) and, if possible, go to Mecca on pilgrimage. For these Muslims 
Islam is a focal if not definitive part of their lives. Abangan are nominal or less 
orthodox Muslims, whereas priyayi are people o f a high social class that can 
follow either abangan or santri religio-cultural tradition.
More recent analysis by Greg Fealy (2006: 40) divides the santri into two 
subcategories: traditionalist and modernist. The division is primarily based on 
doctrinal differences, but it overlaps social, economic and political issues. Tra- 
ditionalists seek to preserve the legacy of medieval Islamic scholarship and 
tend to be more open to local customs. In practice this requires, first, strict ad- 
herence to one of the four classical Sunni law schools and, second, enthusiasm 
to combine local mystical and spiritual practices with more orthodox aspects of 
Islam. The largest traditionalist institution in Indonesia is Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU, Awakening of Ulama). Other smaller traditionalist organizations include 
Mathlaul Anwar, Jamiyatul Washliyah and Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
(Perti).
By contrast, modemists (reformists) tend to consider the traditionalists’ 
theology and ritual impure and a deviation from authentic Islamic precepts. 
Modemism as a movement began in the Middle East in the late 19th century 
and only spread to Indonesia in the early decades of the 20th century. It 
claimed that the way to revitalize Islam and make it relevant to the contempo- 
rary world was to cleanse the faith o f impurities and return to the pristine teach­
ing found in the Qur’an and the example of the prophet Muhammad. The pri- 
mary modernist organization in Indonesia is Muhammadiyah. Other modernist 
institutions include Jami’yyat al-Islah wal-Irsyad and Persatuan Islam (Fealy 
2006: 40). Inheriting the spirit o f its early movements in the Middle East (e.g. 
competition with the Western Christian world), Islamic modernist organiza-
tions in Indonesia tend to compete with Christian organizations in dakwa, edu- 
cation and health services.
As the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, NU leaders often claim to 
have 35 to 40 million members, while the leaders of Muhammadiyah, the sec­
ond largest one, claim a membership of 25 to 30 million (Fealy 2006: 40). A 
new survey by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and the Asia Foundation 
(TAF) in 2010 gives more convincing information. Respondents were asked 
whether they were members or sympathizers of traditionalist/ modernist/ other 
Islamic organizations/ non-members/ sympathizers of any Islamic organization. 
The survey defines traditionalist organizations as ‘NU, Nahdlatul Watan, Al 
Wasliyah, Perti, etc.’ and modernist organizations as ‘Muhammadiyah, Persis, 
etc.’. The result is quite interesting: 55.1% identified themselves as ‘traditional- 
ists’ and 10.8% as ‘modemists’.4 This might indicate that members or sympa­
thizers o f NU (and other traditionalist organizations) in fact far outnumber 
those of Muhammadiyah (and other modernist organizations).
The tension between modernist and traditionalist Muslims sometimes enters 
the political field. In the early years o f independence NU and some modernist 
Muslim groups could form and work together in one political party, Masyumi, 
but soon afterwards NU withdrew from Masyumi and established a new politi­
cal party. The main cause appeared to have been frustration with modernist 
domination in Masyumi (Isaacson & Rubenstein 2009: 7).
In the first Indonesian election in 1955 the nationalist party (PNI) got 22.3% 
of the votes, Masyumi 20.9%, NU 18.4% and the communist party (PKI) 
16.4%. So the two Islamic political parties obtained more than 39.3% of na- 
tional votes. After Reformasi in 1998 the votes o f Muslim political parties in 
the 1999 and 2004 elections were much the same as in 1955. The Muslim po­
litical parties got 37.7% in 1999 and 38.7% in 2004 (Barton 2010: 134-135). 
After Reformasi Muslim political parties split into two groups: those with an 
Islamist vision and those with a nationalist (non-Islamist) vision. Non-Islamist 
political parties such as PKB and PAN have a clear nationalist vision and are 
open to non-Muslims participation in their administration. Islamist political 
parties -  the three largest being PPP, PK (PKS) and PBB -  on the other hand, 
adopt an exclusive Islamic position to preserve Muslim interests. But the PKS 
in its turn has followed a more open, moderate line since 2004. Leaders of 
Islamist political parties promoted the Jakarta Charter (Syariah) in the constitu- 
tional amendment in the early 2000s. Some Muslim organizations such as Ma- 
jelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) expressed 
strong support for Syariah and the Jakarta Charter. When the inclusion of
4 Number o f respondents is 1850 in 33 provinces (whole provinces in Indonesia). The survey 
was conducted in August 2010. It claims the margin of error is ± 3%.
Syariah articles in the national constitution failed, the proponents promoted it at 
local (provincial, district) level and in some regions they succeeded.
There is no comprehensive database cataloguing all the regional regulations. 
Robin Bush (2008) records around 78 regional regulations {perda) in 52 dis- 
tricts/municipalities (kabupaten/  walikota) out of a total o f 470 districts/ mu- 
nicipalities in Indonesia that are considered to be ‘Syariah influenced’. Tempo 
magazine (6 September 2011) reports more than 150 such regulations spread 
over diverse regions. They can be classified into several distinct categories: (1) 
those relating to public order and social problems (prostitution, gambling, alco­
hol consumption, etc.); (2) religious skills (e.g. reading and reciting the Qur’an) 
and obligations (e.g. giving zakat [alms]); and (3) religious symbolism (primar- 
ily Muslim dress, mostly for women) (Salim 2007: 126; Bush 2008: 176).
The orientation to Syariah ideas also features in the economic field, espe- 
cially the banking system. In the early 1990s Muamalat Bank Indonesia was 
the country’s only Islamic commercial bank. It began trading in May 1992. 
Then, in 1998, the Indonesian govemment passed a banking act which facili- 
tates the development o f a dual Islamic and conventional banking system by 
allowing state, private and regional banks, as well as one foreign bank, to offer 
Islamic banking services. The law defines an Islamic bank as a commercial 
bank that complies with Islamic law (Syariah), one prohibition being payment 
of interest (riba). Since then Islamic banks have mushroomed. Two other Is- 
lamic commercial banks were established in 2008: Syariah Mandiri Bank and 
Syariah Mega Indonesian Bank. Unlike the Islamic banking units, which are 
institutional units within an existing conventional bank, the Islamic commercial 
banks are separate legal entities.
In 2008 there were 26 Islamic banking units and 144 Syariah People Sav- 
ings and Loan Banks (BPRS, Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah). Islamic bank­
ing is escalating in Indonesia, but from a low base. The Islamic banks’ share of 
total banking assets was only 1.7% in 2007. But the central Indonesia Bank 
projects that Islamic banking assets will rise to 10-15% of total banking assets 
by 2015 (Juoro 2008: 229-231). The Islamic banks are more lenient than con­
ventional banks in providing finance.
The Reformasi era is also marked by the re-emergence of jihad  discourse in 
the public sphere. Laskar Jihad (the jihad  paramilitary) and Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council), both using the jihad  label in their 
names, were launched in Yogyakarta in 2000. These two groups have great 
influence in Solo (Noorhaidi 2005; Azka 2009). Why do I call it a re- 
emergence? Because in fact long before the Reformasi era some religious 
groups also used jihad  rhetoric in a different sense against the Dutch colonial 
authorities, as in the Banten peasants’ revolt in 1888 (Kartodirdjo 1966) and 
the jihad  resolution (resolusi jihad) o f Nahdlatul Ulama in Surabaya in 1945 
(Bush 2009: 42).
After the Reformasi era proponents of jihad  used the term against ‘Zionist 
and Christian’ international powers and Indonesian Christians. In the Ambon 
Muslim and Christian conflict the jihadist leaders asked for support (e.g .fatwa) 
from religious authorities in the Middle East. They produced ‘a new collective 
identity as heroes for their religion and fellow faithful and as patriots for their 
beloved state’. A further complexity is that huge youth jihadist movements 
seem to use the slogan not only to demonstrate their dedication to Islam, but 
also to express their anger and frustration in the face o f rapid modemization 
and globalization (Noorhaidi 2005: v-vi). This attests the polyphonic character 
o f acts of jihad.
In the past decade terrorism and radicalism relating to Islam or Muslims 
have been a lively issue in Indonesia. Around 240 people died in four major 
terrorist acts from 2002 to 2005: the bombing of two discos popular among 
foreigners on the crowded tourist island of Bali in October 2002, the bombing 
o f the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, the bombing of the Aus- 
tralian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, and three suicide bombers in a 
Balinese restaurant in October 2005. In all, seven suicide bombers were in- 
volved in those acts, whereas before 2000 it would have seemed implausible 
(Abuza 2007: 37). Acts of violence, mostly by Muslim paramilitary groups, 
have been occurring on a massive scale. The targets of violence are places of 
worship, mostly Christian churches, and Islamic splinter groups such as 
Ahmadiyah and other more local Islamic groups (Cholil et al. 2009). Syiah 
followers were attacked by Sunni mainstream groups in Sampang Madura in 
2012.
A 2001 Gallup poll found that in non-Arab countries jihad  is mostly per- 
ceived as fighting opponents o f Islam or sacrificing one’s life for the sake of 
Islam/ a just cause. The majority of Indonesians understand it in this way. 
However, in four Arab states (Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco) jihad  is 
mostly interpreted as duty to/ worship o f God, with no warlike connotation. In 
Indonesia, although a majority of Muslims associate jihad  with violence, an 
LSI survey (2006) showed that 80% refused to say that the Bah bombing was a 
form of jihad', only 10% did so.
The Gallup poll also showed that the majority in most Muslim countries 
wants Syariah as a source of legislation. Interestingly, Indonesia and Iran have 
the lowest percentages (Egypt 66%; Jordan 55%; Indonesia 14%; and Iran 
13%). The Wahid Institute (WI) conducted a national survey in Indonesia, 
which confirmed the Gallup poll finding that the majority (63.3%) refuses to 
implement Syariah in local govemments. Almost the same percentage also 
wants the govemment to regulate religious life and things such as the building 
o f houses of worship, marriage and religious education. This last finding indi- 
cates that Indonesian Muslims refuse to include Syariah in the existing consti- 
tution, but agree to limited state interference in Muslim affairs.
In the Reformasi era Islamic ‘liberalism’ has also grown (Assyaukanie 
2002). The most prominent liberal Islamic group is Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL/ 
Liberal Islamic Network) that was formally established in Jakarta in 2001. 
Munawar-Rachman (2010) identifies many (but not only) NU and Muham­
madiyah young thinkers and activists as the spearheads of Islamic liberal think­
ing and movements. Some of them -  especially the more radical and conserva- 
tive ones -- refuse to be labelled ‘liberal’, partly because it would entail rejec- 
tion by Muslim communities. Yayasan Paramadina, an Islamic neo-modemist 
foundation based in Jakarta, published a controversial book Fiqh Lintas Agama 
(Interreligious Islamic law) (Sirry 2004). It is considered very permissive com- 
pared to mainstream fiqh. For instance, it permits interreligious marriage that 
was forbidden by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). Ulil Abshar Abdalla, 
an Islamic liberal activist, was threatened with death by radical Muslims be­
cause o f his popular article in Kompas (18 November 2002). Quite often mem­
bers of radical and liberal groups are involved in heated, abusive public de- 
bates.
1 3 . Christianity in Sndlonesia
Christianity is a substantial minority religion which has grown progressively in 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Christianity in Southeast Asia is in many 
ways a relatively recent phenomenon, the most momentous events taking place 
from the late 19th century onwards. It has undoubtedly started to have a cul- 
tural impact in the Southeast Asian context of late. lts influence is by no means 
insignificant and it has played quite a major role in shaping some elements of 
Asian modemity, especially in the areas o f education, medicine and social 
work, and in laying the foundation for large global networks in an era o f Asian 
diaspora and globalization (Goh 2005: 1). As may be seen in table 1, the per­
centage o f Christians in the Indonesian population is 9.87.
The first signs of Christian presence in Southeast Asia date back to the 7th 
century. Archaeological fïnds show that there were a number o f Christian set- 
tlements in the Malay peninsula and parts o f Sumatra and Java. However, his- 
torians know little about these settlements and they certainly had no lasting 
influence on Southeast Asian cultural development at that time. Christian mis- 
sion entered Southeast Asia to make a sustained impact only in the early 16th 
century. To some extent it was because Christianity went hand in hand with 
commercial and military interests. The earliest area of Catholic impact in 
Southeast Asia was Malacca, a harbour which the Portuguese occupied in 1511 
(Goh 2005: 1-2).
Catholic influence started after the early Franciscan missionaries came to 
Sumatra in the 14th century and Portuguese Christian missionaries began to 
work in Malacca. There was a shift from Portuguese to Dutch mission in 1619, 
including missionary activities in Java, but the primary motive of the Dutch
was commercial and political (Moffett 2005: 60-61, 214). In their turn they 
were embroiled in conflicts with local Muslim rulers. The confrontations were 
triggered by a complex mix of Dutch colonialism, trade and mission.
The Portuguese brought Catholicism to parts o f Indonesia in the 16th cen­
tury, especially in the Moluccas. However, when the Dutch established their 
dominance over the islands in the 17th century they were intent on suppressing 
their old enemy, Catholicism. The biggest number o f Christians in the 16th 
century lived in the Ambonese peninsula of Leitimor and on the small Lease 
islands o f Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut. Hence the history of the various 
Moluccan Christian communities begins there, and then moved to the central 
and northem Moluccas. When Francis Xavier landed at Hative on the west 
coast of the bay of Ambon in 1546 he was welcomed by Ambonese Christians 
from a few villages. Some 8 000 Christians lived around Hative and in six 
other villages. They had requested baptism a few years earlier (1538) when 
Portuguese stayed among them (Heuken 2008a: 35-36). In 1562 three Domini- 
can missionaries from Malacca launched the first period of their missionary 
work in Nusa Tenggara, which has continued uninterrupted to the present day 
(Heuken 2008b: 75).
The first translation of the complete Bible into Malay was the work of Mel- 
chior Leijdecker (1645-1701). That translation was used in Protestant circles 
for almost two centuries, especially in eastem Indonesia. In 1814 the Neder­
landse Bijbelgenootschap was established in Amsterdam, which soon began to 
translate and distribute the Bible in various Indonesian languages. Catholics 
translated the annual series of scripture texts then used in the Sunday liturgy, 
reproduced in the form of typed or mimeographed documents for use by local 
clergy and village catechists. During the 19th and early 20th century they were 
invariably in the vemacular (Prior & Hoekema 2008: 750). These translations 
of the Bible and scriptural texts into the vemacular were a significant early step 
in Christian indigenization in Indonesia.
The history o f Christian mission started in the eastem parts o f Indonesia. 
More systematic Christian mission in Java came later after William Carey, a 
missionary from Britain, established the British Missionary Society in 1792 
and within a year opened an office in Calcutta, India. From there he organized 
his mission and sent workers to various comers o f Asia, including Java. After 
Consulting Lt Thomas S. Raffles, British interregnum governor of Java (1811- 
1816), Carey sent William Robinson as the first Baptist missionary to the is- 
land o f Java. He arrived in Batavia in 1813. The Baptist mission centre in India 
sent two more missionaries to assist Robinson in 1814 (Sumartana 1991: 9-10).
Two early indigenous (Javanese) missionaries merit mention. The first was 
Sadrach Surapranata in central Java. He was bom circa 1835-1840 with the 
name o f Abbas and he not only received the basic training in reading the 
Qur’an common among Muslim children, but also studied at severalpesantrens
(Islamic boarding schools). Possibly his first encounter with Christianity was 
the Gospel of John in a Javanese version that he obtained from an evangelist 
who preached a sermon in the marketplace; he came into contact with the 
Dutch missionary Jelle Selesma in East Java and the Javanese Christian evan­
gelist and mystic Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung near Japara. Sadrach became leader 
of a more or less independent church that some Protestant missionaries consid- 
ered rebellious and heretical (Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 641). This caused 
tension and polemics between Sadrach and European missionaries.
Sadrach’s congregation comprised mainly villagers; most o f its members 
came from an abangan (nominal Muslim) background, hence adat remained an 
important part of societal life. In his endeavour to harmonize Christianity and 
adat Sadrach took over many elements of rural Islamic tradition, for example 
the paguron education system with its guru-murid (teacher-student) relation- 
ship. He preserved such Muslim customs as separate seating for men and 
women in church and veils for Christian women, and continued to use the 
terms ‘mesjid’ (mosque) for church and ‘imam’ for its leader. Sadrach also 
proclaimed Jesus Christ as Ratu Adil (Queen o f Justice/messiah), a Javanese 
myth, which aroused awareness and hope o f emancipation among the Javanese 
population (Partonadi 1988: 207, 209). Nowadays Sadrach only has a limited 
following in central Java, but the idea of his local church is continually revived 
by some Christian groups.
The second noteworthy pioneer o f indigenous mission in Java was Albertus 
Soegijapranata S.J., the first indigenous bishop in Java. Whereas Sadrach’s 
concern was Christian enculturation in Javanese culture, Soegijapranata fo- 
cused on fostering nationalism among Indonesian Catholics. Among his popu- 
lar statements was: ‘If  we are really good Christians, we should be real patriots. 
Therefore we feel that we are 100 percent patriotic, since we are also 100 per­
cent Catholic... We should love the state as well, with all of our hearts’ (Ari­
tonang & Steenbrink 2008: 705). In 1955, at the proposal of Soegijapranata, the 
Indonesian Bishops’ Conference promulgated a Catholic manifesto that repudi- 
ated communism and supported the national Indonesian ideology of Pancasila 
(Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 706). To some extent Christian leaders’ advo- 
cacy o f the national independence movement helped to counteract the Identifi­
cation of Christianity with the religion o f the colonizers.
Indonesian Christians have been interested in politics since the early 19th 
century. In 1923 Javanese Catholics established their own political association, 
Pakempalan Politik Djawi (Association of Javanese Politics), which in 1938 
transformed from a socio-cultural movement into a political one entitled Per­
satuan Politik Katolik Indonesia (PPKI, Political Union of Indonesian Catho­
lics). Indonesian Protestants founded the Partai Kaum Masehi Indonesia 
(PKMI, Indonesian Christian Party) in 1930. The party agitated for the auton- 
omy of Indonesia and the need for an autonomous govemment based on Chris-
tian principles (Latif 2008: 194). So some Christian political leaders had a Vi­
sion comparable to that of Muslim political leaders: an Indonesia based on their 
respective religions.
Soon after the declaration of Indonesian independence the Protestants 
founded Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party, Parkindo) in 
November 1945 and the Catholics established Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) 
a month later. In the 1955 general election Parkindo won eight seats in parlia- 
ment (2.6%) and the Catholic Party six (2.0%) (Intan 2006: 74). The votes for 
these two Christian political parties decreased in the 1971 general election, 
leaving them with no significant voice at the national level, until the New Or­
der regime forced them and other political parties to fuse in the Partai De- 
mokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratie Party) in 1973.
After the 1998 Reformasi Protestant and Catholic politicians established 
Protestant and Catholic parties, but only the Protestant party, Partai Damai 
Sejahtera (PDS, Prosperous Peace Party), had significant support. In the 2004 
general election it obtained 2.14% of the total votes at national level, giving the 
PDS 13 seats in parliament, but because of new threshold regulations it did not 
win parliamentary seats at national level in the 2009 general election. Currently 
the PDS only has seats at local level, especially in areas with a significant 
Christian population. The establishment o f Christian political parties in the 
Reformasi era evoked criticism from Christian themselves. For example, Za­
karia Ngelow, a theologian from Celebes, claimed that the founding o f Chris­
tian political parties revealed theocratie tendencies among Christians (Sirait 
2008: 211). However, Christian leaders usually accused Muslim leaders of 
similar ambitions.
There are three main institutional church orientations in Indonesia: Catholic, 
Protestant and Orthodox. The number of church institutions or organizations 
has grown and expanded rapidly since Indonesian independence, especially 
those of the Protestant churches. In 1993 the Ministry of Religion recorded 275 
Protestant church organizations and around 400 Protestant para-churches (De- 
pag 1993).
Protestant churches are classified into six main church organizations or de- 
nominations: Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia (PGI) for mainstream 
Protestant denominations such as Calvinist and Lutheran; Persekutuan Baptis 
Indonesia (PBI) for Baptist churches; Persekutuan Injili Indonesia (PII) for 
Evangelical churches; Gereja Masehi Advent Hari Ketujuh for Adventist 
churches; Bala Keselamatan for Salvation Army churches; and Persekutuan 
Gereja-gereja Pentakosta Indonesia (PGPI) for Pentecostal churches. The 
Catholic and Orthodox churches have only one central church organization 
each: Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia (KWI) for Catholics and Gereja Ortho­
dox Indonesia (GOI) for Orthodox churches. The PGI, the largest mainstream
Protestant institution, is an umbrella organization comprising 88 synods spread 
throughout Indonesia.
Pentecostal/charismatic churches have burgeoned since the Reformasi era in 
1998. At the beginning of the 20th century some Pentecostal missionary agen- 
cies from the USA, Australia, South Korea and elsewhere started work in vari- 
ous parts o f Indonesia. Nowadays these churches have grown from splinter 
groups into ‘main strength groups’ (Prior 2007: 1). Lewis quotes David Barrett, 
who puts the membership of Pentecostal churches in Indonesia at 1.9 million in 
1980. He points out that this is a conservative estimate: the actual number is 
higher (Lewis 2007: 79).
The Pentecostal churches emphasize direct personal experience of God 
through baptism in the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues and divine healing. 
They often conduct healing services in a public square, which are attended by 
thousands of people. For instance, a Pentecostal site claims that the healing 
services in Senayan Jakarta in June 2010 were attended by more than 100 000 
people daily (www.mediapemulihan.com). Some new members of Pentecostal 
churches have a Muslim or nominal Muslim background, but most were proba- 
bly non-Pentecostal Christians who joined the Pentecostals. This situation 
sometimes causes friction and conflict between charismatic/Pentecostal and 
mainstream churches.
Whereas Muslims in many provinces and districts asked for the implemen- 
tation o f Syariah through local govemment laws after Reformasi, only one re- 
gion asked for the implementation of biblical law and regulations based on 
Christian communal interest (Perda), namely Manokwari province in West 
Papua. The initiative started in February 2007, when tens of thousands o f peo­
ple met to commemorate the arrival of German evangelists Carl Ottow and 
Johann Geissler in Mansinam island in 1855. It is a landmark in the Christiani- 
zation o f Papua, popularly known as the Land of the Bird of Paradise. A big 
banner was displayed publicly, which read: ‘Welcome to Bible City’.
The provincial govemment asked church leaders and academies to confer on 
proposed bylaws, which resulted in the formulation of 40 articles. Some arti- 
cles regulated general matters like bans on prostitution and drugs. But there 
were also prohibitions of headscarves, calls to Islamic prayers, non-church 
activities on Sunday, and air travel on Christian holy days. Crosses in govem­
ment offices became compulsory (Tempo Magazine, 6 September 2011). This 
regulation has not yet become law because o f controversy among the West 
Papuans themselves.
It is difficult to prove and there has been no research, but there is a feeling 
that Christians’ economie power is quite disproportionate to their number. A 
popular book such as Indonesia Handbook mentions that ‘Christian, in Muslim 
eyes, is often equated with rich’ (Eliot 2001: 961). Andreas A. Yewangoe 
(2001: 104), a Protestant theologian and leader o f PGI, argues that the feeling
is a kind o f ‘dramatization’ and ‘generalization’. According to his observations 
there are many poor Christians in remote parts of Indonesia from Nias to 
Papua. Based on Yewangoe’s brief explanation, the feeling that Christians are 
rich might be a Javanese bias. Another explanation might be that it was a colo­
nial bias against wealthy Dutch Christians as opposed to poor indigenous Mus­
lims, as well as the current influence of international issues in Islam and West­
ern Christianity.
However, Christians are undeniably the trend setters in the mass media. 
Both Indonesia’s leading newspapers, Kompas and Suara Pembaruan, are 
owned and controlled by Christians. Kompas was launched in 1965 by some 
Catholic intellectuals and businessmen and it has become one of the most in- 
fluential Indonesian newspapers. It employs not only Christians but also Mus­
lims. Prominent Muslim public figures publish their opinions in Kompas, such 
as Said Aqil Siradj (leader of NU), Din Syamsuddin (leader of Muhammadi- 
yah), Azyumardi Azra (scholar o f UIN Jakarta), and many others. To some 
extent Kompas plays a role in propagating moderate Muslims voices.
The churches or Christian groups also established good schools and univer- 
sities throughout Indonesia. The Jesuit congregation started schools for indige­
nous pupils in the colonial period and has developed them under a central Kan- 
isius foundation since 1954. Then, in keeping with the Indonesian development 
context, it was subdivided into smaller educational foundations spread across 
huge regions bearing names like Marsudirini, Pangudi Luhur, Tarakanita, St. 
Yoseph, De Britto and many others.
In Papua Catholics manage Yayasan Pendidikan dan Persekolah Katolik 
(YPPK), which has many schools. Chinese Christians established Badan Pen­
didikan Kristen (BPK) in West Java and nowadays it has spread to Bandung, 
Jakarta and Lampung Sumatera. Yayasan Pendidikan Kristen (YPK) also runs 
schools in Minahasa. Satya Wacana in Salatiga, Atmajaya in Yogyakarta and 
Jakarta, Pelita Harapan in Jakarta; Sanata Dharma and Duta Wacana in Yogya­
karta are good Christian universities.
1 .4 Muslim-Christian rellations in Indonesia
When Dutch missionaries came to Indonesia and introduced Christianity in the 
17th century, Muslim communities had long been established in this archipel- 
ago. The history of Christians’ arrival in Indonesia influences their image and 
their relations with Muslims. Christianity came from the West as part o f the 
process o f colonization, so it symbolized ‘colonial religion’. However, Islam 
was a symbol of the pribumi (indigenous people) who were colonized by West­
ern Christianity. The image of Christianity was influenced by the colonialist 
image (Husein 2005: 264). Decades after the end o f Dutch colonial rule that 
image persists.
Activists o f the Indonesian national movement have displayed different 
political orientations since some years before Indonesian independence. They 
can be divided into nationalists, socialists, communists and Islamists. The con- 
flicts were most pronounced in debates on the constitutional basis of the state 
and its legal model (Feener 2007: 54). The Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) 
was promulgated on 22 June 1945 and became the preamble to the constitution. 
It was drafted by a Committee o f Nine comprising five representatives from the 
nationalist faction eager to preserve a state free from religious influence and 
four from the Islamic faction, who advocated an Islamic state. The leaders of 
the Islamic faction agreed to withdraw their Islamic state proposal, on condi- 
tion that the Jakarta Charter included Pancasila and was preceded by seven 
words in its first sila (principle): ‘dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam 
bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya’ (the obligation to implement Syariah for adherents 
of Islam) (Indrayana 2008: 13-14).
The day following independence, 18 August 1945, resistance to the Charter 
resumed. Christian areas in eastem Indonesia threatened to leave the new re- 
public if  the seven words were not scrapped. There were also objections from 
Balinese Hindu, who insisted on a neutral wording of the first principle o f Pan­
casila (Platzdasch 2009: 109). Finally Mohammad Hatta, a Muslim political 
leader and co-proclamator of Indonesian independence, proposed deleting the 
seven words from the draft constitution. Hatta’s proposal was accepted, and the 
constitution was ratified with some amendments (Indrayana 2008: 14). The 
seven words in the Jakarta Charter were replaced by the phrase ‘ Yang Maha 
E sa ', so the first principle became ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’ (Belief in One 
Divine Lordship).
Soon after that consensus the first pillar of Pancasila, ‘Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa', became a polemical issue between Muslim and Christian theologi- 
ans. The phrase is difficult to translate into theological terms. How did Mus­
lims and Christians understand it? Without the seven words, Muslims tried to 
give the Pancasila an Islamic meaning by interpreting ‘ Yang Maha Esa ’ as the 
Islamic concept of monotheism. Hamka, a Muslim theologian, argued that the 
phrase necessarily renders the Islamic concept o f monotheism (tawhid). So 
according to him the first principle of Pancasila derives from the Islamic idea 
of tawhid, which recognizes four other principles (pillars 2 to 5 of Pancasila): 
humanism, national unity, democracy and social justice. They are also intrinsic 
in Islamic theology (Mujiburrahman 2006: 118). This interpretation corrobo- 
rates the view that Indonesian state ideology is based on Islamic theological 
principles.
For Christians, on the other hand, the word ‘Ketuhanan’ (Lordship) permits 
the interpretation o f the first pillar of Pancasila in terms of the religious plural- 
ism of the country. Helmut Rosin, a Protestant missionary of Swiss origin 
working in Indonesia, argues that unlike the word ‘Tuhan’ (God), ''Ketuhanan'’
is a vague term referring not to God as such, but to something divine (yang 
ilahi) and divine power (kuasa ilahi). Rosin concludes that ‘it cannot be denied 
that the formulation of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is a compromise between 
Islamic, Javanese, and modem assumptions of religion that in turn opens op- 
portunity opportunities for various interpretations’ (Mujiburrahman 2006: 119). 
In addition Driyarkara, an Indonesian Jesuit scholar, maintains that the Pan- 
casila state is a secular state in the sense that it is not a manifestation or em- 
bodiment of religion, but it is not secular in that the state is not opposed or in­
different to religion. He writes: ‘We acknowledge one risk, that is, the Pan- 
casila state will sometimes pay less attention to religion and sometimes wants 
to intervene more than it deserves’ (Mujiburrahman 2006: 121).
To reduce tension among Indonesian intellectuals on the national ideology 
Soekamo introduced the hybrid ideology of nationalism, agama and commu- 
nism (Nasakom). He assumed that such a compromise could unite nationalist, 
religious (Islamic) and communist groups for the sake of the revolution and the 
nation-building agenda. That is why the Ministry o f Religion, according to 
Nieuwenhuijze’s analysis, positioned itself as a de-confessionalizing mecha- 
nism which removed the sharp edges of exclusiveness (Ichwan 2006: 15, 75).
Some Muslims such as the Darul Islam or Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII, 
Islamic State or Indonesian Islamic Army) movement tried to make Islam the 
state ideology. The Indonesian govemment clearly perceived political Islam as 
a serious threat to the future of a diverse Indonesian society, and made numer- 
ous efforts to limit, if  not restrain, its activities (Husein 2005: 227). Under the 
Old Order and for roughly the first two decades of the New Order the state 
firmly repressed Islamic political emergence. Instead Pancasila became the 
most effective ideological tooi for govemment to manage national diversity in 
regard to sukn (ethnicity), antar golongan (intergroup), ras (race) and agama 
(religion), popularly abbreviated to SARA. In the late 1970s Pancasila featured 
more and more prominently in rhetoric and in the early 1980s the New Order 
regime imposed it as azas tunggal (the sole basis) o f all socio-political -  in­
cluding religious -  organizations.
Islamic and Christian organizations had to change their ideology or organ- 
izational base in order to give Pancasila a prominent place. Big Islamic organi­
zations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and Christian organizations like the 
Indonesian Council of Churches (PGI) could not escape from this political pol- 
icy. As a result Islamic and Christian mainstream organizations received com- 
plaints that they were being replaced by ‘the civil religion of Pancasila’ (Steen- 
brink 1998: 328). Ultimately only a few religious organizations dared to resist 
that policy. They were mainly small Islamic groups which eventually went 
underground.
The first Muslim-Christian conflict after the 1965 communist massacre 
happened in Makassar on 1 October 1967. Muslims attacked several churches,
damaging the fumiture, following the conversion of many people to Christian­
ity and increased Christian public activities in Makassar. This incident 
prompted the Minister o f Religion and the Minister of Domestic Affairs to 
issue a joint decree in 1969 on the building of houses of worship.
An estimated one third o f the inhabitants o f East Timor were Catholics and 
two thirds were adherents of tribal religions. But by 1990 virtually all original 
East Timorese had become fervent Catholics, with Catholicism symbolizing 
opposition to Jakarta power. Muslims and mosques were targets of violence in 
East Timor in the mid-1990s. Motivated by sentiments against Jakarta authori- 
ties (govemment and army officials) and sentiments against Javanese, Makas- 
sarese and Buginese settlers who were (non-indigenous) Muslims, Catholic 
guerrillas attacked and destroyed some seventeen mosques and buildings be- 
longing to Muslims. In other places where Muslims predominated churches 
were attacked, inflicting minor or major damage. Karei A. Steenbrink (1998: 
338) compiled the following data on church attacks from 1945 to 1997.
Table 2
Number of churches attacked from 1945-1997
Period Attacks Average per year
1945-1955 0 0
1955-1965 2 0.2
1965-1974 46 4.6
1975-1984 89 8.9
1985-1994 132 13.2
1995-1997 105 52.5
The increase in the absolute number of churches attacked in 1975-1997 is sig­
nificant. However, it should be noted that there was a tremendous increase in 
the number o f churches during those years. In 2006 the Research and Devel- 
opment Body (Balitbang) o f the Ministry of Religion announced that the num­
ber of churches had increased by 283% from 1977 to 2004 (Republika, 18 Feb- 
ruary 2006). Thus the percentage in terms of relative number o f church attacks 
in fact declined during those years.
However, clashes between Muslims and Christians undeniably got worse 
from the mid-1990s into the early 21st century. They were not confined to 
houses of worship. There were also attacks on private property and thousands 
o f people were killed. Some ten churches were destroyed in Surabaya in June 
1996. In Situbondo 23 churches and a number of Protestant and Catholic 
schools were badly damaged or totally destroyed in October 1996. Less than 
three months later, in December 1996, riots broke out in Tasikmalaya, West 
Java where Christian buildings and Chinese shops were attacked. Other riots 
occurred in Jakarta, Solo, Ambon, Halmahera, Poso and Sampit.
Ambon conflicts include an enormous one between Muslims and Christians. 
It was triggered by an ordinary Street dispute in the city o f Ambon on 19 Janu- 
ary 1999, but soon spread to the whole city and the province. Thousands of 
people on both sides died between 1999 and 2000 and there were between 123
000 and 370 000 refugees and displaced persons. The religious identity of those 
involved in that conflict featured prominently, since individuals tend to associ- 
ate himself with a specific religious group. Group labels like ‘pasukan merah’ 
(red force -  Christians) and ‘pasukan putih ’ (white force -  Muslims) were in- 
creasingly used, in combination with other identity markers (Sterkens & Hadi- 
witanto 2009: 61).
The Ambon conflict died down and ended up among assorted issues after 
Muslim and Christian leaders held dialogues and signed the Malino agreement 
on December 19-20, 2001. Before the agreement secret meetings of senior min­
isters with the most militant commanders, political elites and both Muslim and 
Christian business people were held in Makassar, which paved the way for the 
Malino agreement. Finally key actors in the conflict, including the field com­
manders of Muslim and Christian militias, signed the agreement. Interestingly, 
a Muslim military group that had exported fighters to the battlefield also sup- 
ported the Malino agreement ‘arguing that peace would be a better environ­
ment for mission work than war’ (Braithwaite 2010: 252; Van Klinken 2007: 
86). Conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon was the nadir o f Mus- 
lim-Christian relations, but the Malino agreement proves that peace building 
was more enduring than conflict.
From such conflicts friction between Muslims and Christians continued to 
explode in many places. Most of them were Muslim protests against church 
buildings and open air Christian revival meetings. The Center for Religious and 
Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) at Gadjah Mada University recorded nine cases 
of Muslim protests in 2008, eleven in 2009 and 34 in 2010, mostly related to 
church activities and buildings. The case o f Taman Yasmin church in Bogor, 
West Java was the most complicated. The city mayor withdrew the permit of 
that church after some Muslim groups questioned its validity. The church won 
the case in both the district court and the supreme court. But Christians still 
have difficulty using the church building because o f violent threats from some 
Muslims and the mayor’s refïisal to comply with the court decision. CRCS 
reports also mention intemal conflicts in Christian and Muslim communities. 
Among Muslims these were mostly mainstream Muslim protests and acts of 
violence against the Ahmadiyah group (Cholil et al. 2008; Cholil et al. 2009; 
Bagir et al. 2010).
Interreligious dialogue was initiated by govemment in the 1970s following 
tension caused by religious proselytization after the 1965 communist massacre. 
In 1979 the minister o f religion, R.W. Alamsyah, launched a new project of 
religious harmony on three levels: intra-religious harmony, interreligious har-
mony, and harmony between religions and govemment. Between 1990 and at 
least 1998 the minister organized numerous interreligious meetings, often 
prompted by religious tensions (Steenbrink 1998: 332), but these talks mostly 
involved only leaders of the five recognized religions and did not reach lay 
people. They also disregarded adherents of religions other than the five recog­
nized ones.
In 1997 Tarmizi Taher, minister o f religion from 1993 to 1998, published a 
book Aspiring to the middle path: religious harmony in Indonesia, which is a 
compilation of his international speeches. Interestingly, he rejects the concep- 
tion propounded by some foreign scholars of Pancasila as an Indonesian civil 
religion. Taher explicitly classifies Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and the rest 
as ‘religions’ and Pancasila as ‘ideology’. In describing the policy o f Pancasila 
as azas tunggal (the sole basis) o f the Indonesian state he writes:
‘The ideology o f Pancasila will not interfere in the theology of religion. Government and re­
ligious leaders came to a consensus about ideology and religion, by the formulation that or­
ganizations were to be based solely on Pancasila but theology was to be based on the holy 
books’ (Taher 1995, quoted in Steenbrink 1998: 333).
He advocates the line of Indonesian Muslims who adopt a moderate position 
between secularism and extreme religious fanaticism. He sees the Qur’anic 
words ‘ummatan wasathan’ (moderate and quality-oriented nation) as a defini- 
tion of the character of Muslims in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei: ‘although 
they are dedicated and devout Muslims, the attitude and the culture of Muslims 
in this region are less Arabicized’ (Steenbrink 1998: 333). However, despite 
the govemment organized dialogues with religious leaders and academies and 
promoting these abroad, conflict at grassroots level continues relentlessly. Mi­
nor and major clashes between Muslims and Christians continued in the late 
1980s and into the early 21 st century, some of which were mentioned above.
Individual public figures and interfaith NGO activists wamed against the 
potential o f interreligious tensions, partly caused by the govemment's policy of 
religious segregation. Some of them argued that interreligious dialogue would 
not be effective in preventing conflict when developmentalism in fact margin- 
alizes poor people. In the 1990s Mangunwijaya, a Catholic pastor, in collabora- 
tion with scholars and activists (including interfaith activists), adamantly op- 
posed the construction of Kaliombo dam that displaced several villages, their 
residents being forced by govemment to move to other places.
While Mangunwijaya championed poor marginalized people, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, head o f NU from 1984 to 1999, worked for democratization through 
de-politicization of religions. In the early 1990s he denounced the projected 
Islamization of the state bureaucracy when Soeharto sponsored the establish­
ment of ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association). When Wahid
became president he reinstated Confucianism as one o f six recognized religions 
after more than thirty years. He had vigorously advocated religious freedom 
long before he became president. In general religious and interfaith NGOs in 
Java such as Interfidei, LKiS, the Wahid Institute and the M a’arif Institute con- 
duct interreligious dialogue at grassroots level, while the Peace Provocateurs 
and the Mosintuwu Institute, both NGOs, work intensively in the post-conflict 
Moluccas and Poso.
Despite intermittent clashes between Muslims and Christians, their social 
cooperation generally runs deep. To cite a few examples: a group of Catholic 
and Protestant choirs chanted sholawat (praise to the prophet Muhammad) in 
the Qur’anic Chanting Festival (MTQ) in West Papua in 2008. Hindus at Puri 
Gede Amlapura invited Muslims to break the fast in 2009. In Jombang village, 
East Java, as in many other villages in Indonesia, Muslims, Christians, and 
Hindus attended the funeral o f a Muslim in 2009. When Abdurrahman Wahid 
died in 2009 Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Confucianists and other religious 
groups prayed together for him in many places around Indonesia.
11.5 Tihe stady ©ff irelngDoim ditb ImitoiniesDai
The history of Christian theological schools in Indonesia can be traced to the 
founding of Hoogere Theologische School (the first Christian theological 
school, now the Jakarta Theological Seminary) in 1934 (Singgih 2004: 395), 
while the history of Islamic higher education dates back to the establishment of 
Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN, State Institute for Islamic Studies) in 1960 
(Azra 2011:49).
The number of Christian theological schools and institutions for Islamic 
studies has grown phenomenally. Indonesia has more than a hundred Christian 
(including Catholic) theological schools spread across all provinces. IAIN 
started in 1960 by merging the two main institutions of Islamic higher educa­
tion: the Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (PTAIN, State Islamic Higher 
Institute) in Yogyakarta and the Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama (ADIA, Academy 
of Religious Sciences) in Jakarta (Steenbrink 1990: 153). In the early 2000s 
some IAINs were transformed into fully fledged universities, Universitas Islam 
Negeri (UIN, State Islamic Universities). Whereas IAINs only offer Islamic 
studies, UINs offer Islamic studies and other subjects such as social and human 
sciences, economics, medicine and engineering. Nowadays Indonesia has six 
UINs, sixteen IAINs and 31 Islamic state academies (STAIN), apart from hun- 
dreds of private Islamic institutions for higher education.
On the whole the study o f religion in Western Europe and North America is 
based on an objectivist worldview and a positivistic view of science. From its 
earliest beginnings the study o f religion in Indonesia rejected the ‘objectivist’ 
paradigm. Scholars such as Mukti Ali, considered the founding father o f com- 
parative religious study in Indonesia, tried to link the academie study of relig-
ion with the promotion o f interreligious dialogue (Steenbrink 1990: 154). In the 
West European tradition science of religion claims to be neither naturalistic nor 
religious but to engage in ‘objective’ description and analysis o f religion. Max 
Müller was the first to use the term ‘Religionswissenschaft’ (science of relig­
ion). Under the influence o f phenomenology the study of religion is ‘an impar- 
tial and truly scientific comparison o f religions’ (Waardenburg 1974: 74; Flood 
1999: 31). Edmund Husserl defines phenomenology as going back to ‘the 
things themselves’ (Zurück zu den Sachen) (Flood 1999: 93). Thus scholars of 
religion were convinced that religion existed ‘out there’.
Mukti Ali received a thorough Islamic education at traditional pesantrens in 
Java. After obtaining a PhD from McGill University in Canada he launched the 
discipline of comparative religious studies in Indonesia. Mukti became the first 
head of the Department o f Comparative Religion at IAIN Yogyakarta in the 
1960s. In naming his department he preferred the term ‘comparative religion’ 
(perbandingan agama) to ‘science of religion’ (Ali 1990: 7). Later Mukti be­
came minister o f religion for the period 1973-1978, which facilitated the spread 
of his ideas about comparative religious studies to all IAINs.
In 1988 Mukti wrote a book, Ilmu Perbandingan Agama di Indonesia (The 
science of comparative religion in Indonesia), as part of the 25th anniversary of 
the Department of Comparative Religion at IAIN. In the last chapter of the 
book he refers to the debate at the 58th conference o f International Association 
for the History of Religion (IAHR) in Tokyo, especially between Friedrich 
Heiler and R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, about whether or not the science o f compara­
tive religion should be ‘objective’ and neutral. Mukti positions himself quite 
explicitly in opposition to the principle of ‘ilmu untuk ilmu’ (science for it own 
sake) (Ali 1990:7). He writes:
‘We think comparative religion in Indonesia, in addition to studying religion scientifically, is 
also meant to develop society and the state in Indonesia. Even more important than the pur- 
pose o f  studying the science o f comparative religion is to participate ... [in] creating a safe 
andpeaceful world...’ (Ali 1990: 7, author’s translation)
Accordingly Beek (2002: 216-230) classifies Mukti’s model of comparative 
religious studies as part of the pillar of social harmony in Indonesia’s diverse 
society. Bolland (1971) sees Mukti Ali, not as a scholar of comparative relig­
ion, but as a ‘designer o f a Muslim theology of religion’. Mukti’s speeches and 
major decisions during his term as minister of religion (1973-1978) are col- 
lected in nine volumes entitled Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia (Relig­
ion and Development in Indonesia). These books attest his endeavour to link 
comparative religious studies with national development.
Amin Abdullah (2004), rector o f IAIN Sunan Kalijaga from 2000 till 2010, 
offers a more systematic paradigm of Islamic studies, in which he calls for both
‘normative’ and ‘historical’ approaches to religious studies. But he shuns the 
designation ‘comparative study o f religions’ in order to avoid the concomitant 
issue of the superiority of Islam and, as generally occurred at West European 
and North American universities, the superiority of Christianity. Abdullah is 
optimistic that religious studies in Indonesia, especially Islamic studies, can 
reconcile ‘theology’ (‘normative’ study of religion) and ‘science of religion’ 
(anthropology and sociology of religion) (Abdullah 2004: 9, 17-18, 28-34). To 
this end he constructs a methodological ‘integration’ between disciplines of 
Islamic theology5 and scientific disciplines6 (Abdullah 2006). To my mind the 
idea of ‘integration’ is a methodological oversimplifïcation. I think the term 
‘interdisciplinary’ study or ‘dialogue of disciplines’ is more appropriate.
In general there was a development in the study of (other) religions in the 
1990s from the identification o f exclusive religious truths to a more inclusive 
approach, at least in some leading Islamic and Christian institutions. It was 
characterized inter alia by govemment sponsored academie dialogue. In 1990 
IAIN Sunan Kalijaga founded an Indonesian branch of the International Asso- 
ciation for the History of Religion (IAHR), which three years later organized a 
national conference commemorating the 1893 World Parliament of Religions 
in Chicago.
Prominent Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist scholars and theologians 
spoke at that conference. The Hindus speakers talked about pluralism and the 
participation of religions in national development (Steenbrink 1998: 332). The 
word ‘pluralism’ began to be heard. But the main message was about harmony, 
also reflected in the name of the joumal recommended by that conference: Re- 
ligiosa, Indonesian Journal on Religious Harmony. It was first published in 
August 1995. A keen awareness o f the need for ‘non-confessional’ or ‘non- 
doctrinal’ religious studies also emerged at both Islamic and Christian institu­
tions. It led to the incorporation of new methods of religious studies and con- 
tributed to interreligious understanding (Zainal & Abdullah 2011: 59).
Another development was the introduction of disciplines like anthropology, 
sociology and psychology of religion in the 1990s. These disciplines are core 
courses at Islamic and Christian universities. Some universities also have a 
department of sociology o f religion, for instance UIN Bandung, UIN Yogya­
karta, and Satya Wacana Christian University (UKSW) in Salatiga. But these 
disciplines are regarded as preparatory for introductions to religions rather than 
as ‘objective’ paradigms in religious studies.
5 Kalam  (theology), falsafah  (Islamic philosophy), tasaw uf (mysticism), hadits (the prophet’s 
traditions), tarikh (Islamic history), fiqh  (Islamic law), tafsir (exegeses) and lughah (Arabic 
language).
6 Philosophy, history, anthropology-sociology, archaeology, philology, hermeneutics, physics- 
chemistry-biology, mathematic, ethics, phenomenology and psychology.
The qualification ‘objective’ is commonly used by scholars of religion in 
Indonesia as a technical term referring to an approach to their subject that obvi- 
ates religious favouritism. It does not indicate the ‘agnostic’, ‘unengaged’ ap­
proach which is dominant in Western Europe and North America. Zainal and 
Abdullah (2011: 70) say that this is influenced by the Indonesian context. First, 
it should be understood that in Indonesian society the overwhelming majority 
considers itself religious. According to the 2009 Gallup poll 99% of all Indone- 
sians respond affirmatively to the question, “Is religion an important part of 
your daily life?” Religious education is taught from the lowest level of elemen- 
tary school to the highest level of tertiary education. Thus religious vocabulary 
is used throughout leamers’ careers. Secondly, because religions are so impor­
tant in Indonesia, religions and religious institutions help to overcome societal 
problems.
The department of religious studies at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) of 
Yogyakarta, a state and non-religiously affüiated university, aims to contribute 
socially via conflict resolution, peace development and resolving the environ- 
mental crisis. In 2000 it established a Center for Religious and Cross-cultural 
Studies, which offers a master’s programme (Lewis 2012). In 2006, in collabo- 
ration with UIN Sunan Kalijaga (Islamic university) and UKDW (Christian 
university), UGM established ICRS (Indonesian Consortium for Religious 
Studies), which offers a doctoral degree (Banawiratma, Bagir et al. 2012). Be- 
sides a department of sociology o f religion, UIN Yogyakarta also has a Dia- 
logue Centre which organizes intra- and interreligious dialogues. UKDW has a 
master’s degree in ministry which focuses mainly on Christianity and societal 
life; in addition it has opened Pusat Studi Agama-Agama (Centre for Interrelig­
ious Studies) that offers interreligious dialogue for students and society at 
large. Sanata Dharma University, a Catholic university based in Yogyakarta, 
offers master’s programmes in its Department of Theology and Department of 
Religion and Culture (Ilmu Religi dan Budaya). Similarly, Satya Wacana 
Christian University offers master’s courses in its Department o f Theology and 
Department o f Religion and Society (Agama dan Masyarakat). To my knowl- 
edge none o f these courses adopt the approach o f methodological atheism. 
Thus religious studies in Indonesia is not ‘objectivist’ but ‘religionist’.
Flood (1999: 18-20) says the language of theology -  as traditionally under­
stood -  is a language o f  religion whereas the language of religious studies is 
language about religion. For the aforementioned reasons (Zainal & Abdullah 
2011: 70) such a distinction would be difficult to make in Indonesia. Hence in 
my view the positivistic and objectivist approaches to the study of religions and 
interreligious relations are inadequate to cope with religious dynamics in the 
Indonesian context with its complex relations between Muslims and Christians. 
To get beyond positivism and objectivism in religious studies my study shifts 
from a phenomenological to a discursive approach (Kippenberg 1983;
McCutcheon 1997; Flood 1999; Von Stuckrad 2003; Wijsen 2010; Ndaluka 
2012) and aims to make a modest contribution by way of a case study in Sura- 
karta.
After the Reformasi era Sunardi (2007) writes that ‘in Indonesia the need for 
different ways o f speaking about religion is urgent because of the increase in 
religious experiences characterized by intense and rich religious encounter’. 
Considering the manifold problems discussed in the previous section on Mus- 
lim-Christian relations it would be almost impossible to conduct a purely aca­
demie religious study in Indonesia. Put differently, Zainal and Abdullah (2011: 
61) observe that despite Indonesia’s long history of interreligious tolerance, 
relations between adherents o f different religions are always tested by new 
social and political developments. A discipline like religious studies needs to 
respond to the aforementioned societal and scientific developments, and the 
present study seeks to contribute this development.
2 Concertina! design
In this section we clarify the conceptual design o f our study (Verschuren & 
Doorewaard 1999). It consists of the research objective, research questions, 
theoretical framework and research concepts.
2.1 Research ©fojjective
For several decades before and after independence Indonesia was establishing 
its national identity by promoting bahasa Indonesia (Anderson 1966) and Pan­
casila (Steenbrink 1998; Hidayah 2010). When the New Order regime came to 
power in the mid-1960s the state prioritized economie growth by limiting de- 
mocracy and suppressing diversity, including religious diversity (Dhakidae 
2003; Latif 2008). Since the Reformasi in 1998 democracy and freedom have 
resumed (Bagir & Cholil 2008; Cholil 2010), but there has also been a return of 
religion to the public domain (Sterkens, Machasin & Wijsen 2007). In this doc- 
toral thesis I study the relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) 
social cohesion in Indonesia after Reformasi in 1998.
I explore why and under what conditions religious discourses are elevated 
above other discourses and whether or not religious diversity jeopardizes social 
unity and leads to conflict. I start with the micro (interpersonal) level of dis­
course (focus group discussions, FGDs), but I am also interested in the dialecti- 
cal relation between the micro (individual) and the macro (societal) level of 
discourse, and whether the meso (institutional) level plays a mediatory role 
between the other two levels.
The main approaches to the study of identity and diversity are positivism 
and constructivism. Positivism assumes a reality ‘out there’ that is govemed by
natural laws. The seientist’s duty is to discover these laws and make generali- 
zations (Guba 1990: 20; Droogers 2011: 229). Put differently, the relation be­
tween observers and objects of observation is objective and impartial (Flood 
1999: 31). By contrast constructivism works with an ontology that assumes the 
existence o f diverse realities as multiple mental constructs that are explored by 
scholars of different disciplines. These realities are socially and experientially 
localized, limited and specific. In this scientifïc approach pursuit of ‘the ’ scien- 
tifïc truth is absent or at any rate relativized. Constructivism opts for realities in 
the plural, and is even cagey about whether these realities actually exist ‘out 
there’ (Droogers 2011: 229-230).
Research results depend on the scientifïc paradigm that is adopted. Positiv- 
ism and constructivism handle research variables differently. The positivist 
model seeks to control them, the constructivist model treats them as the raw 
material for the ongoing process of identity and reality construction. Positivism 
helps to clarify the structure of power mechanisms, whereas constructivism 
examines the processes in which actors do something with these structure 
(Droogers 2011: 229-230). In keeping with the constructivist paradigm Flood 
(1999: 150) locates the observer ‘within a context and responding to the prob- 
lems o f a particular environment’.
In this research I adopt a constructivist approach and try to find altemative 
ways of theorizing about and studying religious identity and interreligious rela­
tions. The research objectives are: (1) to gain insight into the relation between 
religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion (intemal objective), and by 
doing so (2) to contribute to a theory and method of studying interreligious 
relations (extemal objective).
2.2 Research Cjuestiora
In the first section o f this chapter I mention that Indonesia is an interesting 
country to study. It has a long tradition of peaceful co-existence, but also a long 
history o f violence and ethnic and/ or religious conflict. Muslim and Christian 
history in Indonesia paradoxically reveals growing religious convergence and 
divergence. The paradox is compounded by technological progress and global- 
ization that are accompanied by both cultural homogenization (Ritzer 1993) 
and cultural diffusion (Robertson 1992), so the religious discourse of the re­
search participants in Solo cannot be separated from the broader discourse at 
the national level.
This study examines religious identity transformations in Indonesia after the 
Reformasi in 1998 as manifested in interreligious, particularly Muslim- 
Christian, relations. I make a detailed analysis of the discourse of Muslims 
about Christians and vice versa, and their discourse when they (Muslims and 
Christian) are together. I also explore why and under what conditions they ele- 
vate their religious identities above other (e.g. ethnic, national, economie) iden-
tities, and whether this leads to social conflict or social harmony. The question 
is whether the existing conflict (or cohesion) in society was reflected in the 
religious rhetoric and vocabulary of the research participants.
More specifically, the main research questions are the following. First, how 
do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others? Sec- 
ondly, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and position- 
ing? Sub-questions relating to question one are: (a) How do Muslims and 
Christians speak about each other? (b) How do Muslims and Christians speak 
with each other? Sub-questions relating to question two are: (a) What are the 
conditions for understanding/ misunderstanding? (b) What are the conditions 
for cohesion (convergence) or conflict (divergence)?
2 3  Theoretical framework
As indicated in section 1.5, in Indonesia there are two disciplines that study 
religion and interreligious relations: theology and religious studies. Theology 
and religious studies, and particularly the growing tension between the two disci­
plines, can be understood in light of societal and scientific developments in 
Europe in the modem era. In what follows, therefore, 1 interpret the tension be­
tween theology and religious studies from the perspectives of European intercul- 
tural philosophy and cultural history. Put differently, both disciplines are contex- 
tual and thus culture specific (Wijsen 2013). In Indonesia there is no marked ten­
sion between the two.
Indeed, in the European context Flood (1999: 18-20) also tries to mitigate 
the tension between the two disciplines. He writes:
‘I shall attempt to illuminate the differences between theology and religious studies by argu- 
ing that these differences have been primarily about language, but that the language of con- 
temporary, academie theology is closer to religious studies than to traditional theology un­
derstood as ‘faith seeking understanding’... The language of theology is a language which 
expresses religion whereas the language o f religious studies is language about religion.’
Following Flood, this study is inspired by the shift from the philosophy of con- 
sciousness, in all its variations and complexities, to the philosophy o f signs 
(semiotics) or language (Flood 1999: 9, 107). Benhabib (1992: 208) observes 
that ‘the paradigm of language has replaced the paradigm of consciousness’. In 
this study I concentrate on the linguistic model of studying interreligious rela­
tions (Panikkar 1978:19-22), based on the theory o f performative speech or the 
symbolic power of language to make and unmake groups, a theory which 
Bourdieu (1991) derives from liturgical language. In my technical design this 
theoretical premise leads to the method of critical or socio-cognitive discourse 
analysis (Blommaert & Verschueren 1991; Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk 2008).
My primary interest is not the sources and teachings of religions but reli­
gious practitioners and their practices, not structures but people (Kim 2004: 3).
So I do not study scriptures (Bible or Qur’an), prophets (Jesus or Muhammad) 
and the like, but try to determine whether, when, how and with what intention 
these symbols are ‘used’ by believers. Parallel to the distinction between syn- 
tactics and pragmatics in linguistics, I distinguish between a systematic and a 
practical study of religion. Whereas systematic religious studies concentrates 
on the religious symbolic system, practical religious studies looks at its applica- 
tion by religious practitioners (Klöcker & Tworuschka 2008). The two, how- 
ever, are interrelated. The Symbol system is reproduced through its application 
(institutionalization), but the same system affects the practitioners and influ- 
ences them.
The conceptual framework is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu (1991: 220), who 
noted that ‘practical classifications are always subordinated to practical func- 
tions and oriented towards the production of social effects’. Bourdieu sees 
identity as a resource or capital, by means of which people strive to further 
their interests in collaboration or competition with others. According to him 
language has the power to make and unmake social groups. Identities are not 
defined by intrinsic values measurable by objective criteria, but are social 
through and through (Wijsen 2013). The assumption is that there is a dialectical 
relation between language and reality (Fairclough 1992).
1 do not study religions as belief systems but as systems of communication 
and shared action. Von Stuckrad (2003: 268) calls this the discursive study of 
religion. I use this term (discursive study) in the title of this book. Instead of 
studying the believer’s inner states of mind, I am interested in understanding 
the public manifestation of religions. I assess the strength of religions not ac­
cording to their revealed transcendent truths but according to the communica- 
tive formation of identity and the way they provide people with a ‘concrete 
script of action’ (Von Stuckrad 2003: 268-269). Discourse analysis as it has 
developed in other disciplines (Wetherell 2001) can help scholars of religion to 
go beyond an essentialist and objectivist approach (Wijsen 2013).
To answer the question o f how Muslims and Christians achieve conver- 
gence in Indonesia we can leam from the Tanzanian experience. In terms of 
linguistic pragmatism Muslims and Christians use language, in this case 
KiSwahili, to create common ground between them. They regard KiSwahili as 
an ecumenical language (Mazrui & Mazrui 1995; Ndaluka 2012: 25). Benedict 
Anderson explains it in the Indonesian context (narrowed down to the Javanese 
case). After Indonesian independence the Javanese had three languages and 
two separate linguistic cultural traditions. The languages were Dutch,7 Javanese
For instance , in his speech to the Committee o f Indonesian Independence Preparation on 1 
June 1945 Soekamo used many Dutch words such as philosofische grondslag (philosophic 
foundation), politieke onafhankelijkheid (political independence), zwaarwichtig (ponderous), 
international recht (international law), nationale staat (nation-state), and so forth.
and revolutionary Malay, while the traditions were Dutch (Western) and Java­
nese. However, since the 1960s the new bahasa Indonesian (Indonesian lan- 
guage) has had to develop into a communication medium which can express 
‘Indonesian nationalism’ (Anderson 1966: 89). For the younger generation 
bahasa Indonesian is of paramount importance for shaping an ecumenical lan- 
guage.
However, even though Indonesians speak the same national language, they 
are still struggling to achieve social cohesion. Andrew Beatty cites the lan­
guage used during ritual meals (slametan). By means of ambiguous language 
and playing with words ‘people o f different orientations come together in a 
single ritual and manufacture consensus or at least the appearance of it’ (Beatty 
1999: 27). According to the theory o f communicative action two or more actors 
create a relationship and ‘seek to reach an understanding about the action situa- 
tion and their plans o f action in order to coordinate their actions by way of 
agreement. The central concept o f interpretation refers in the first instance to 
negotiating defmitions of the situation which admit o f consensus’ (Habermas 
1984: 85-86). When a speaker uses language strategically, he or she Controls 
language and instrumentalizes the listener to her own advantage. That means 
using language with a view to reaching ‘parasitic’ understanding (Habermas 
1984: 288).
With increasing communication in an interculturally connected society dia- 
logism becomes crucial. In reaction to philosophy of consciousness, Bakhtin 
(1993) defines his notion of ‘dialogism’ as a component of the larger signifying 
system of language and communication. The distinction between natural Sci­
ence, whose methods entail objectification and the identifïcation of causes, and 
the social or human sciences, whose methods entail understanding subjectiv- 
ities, is basic to dialogism. In this regard Bakhtin was influenced by W eber’s 
concept of Versteken. But dialogism is not subjectivism -  the focus is on inter- 
subjectivity and communication, explained by Bakhtin as the ‘I’ in interrela- 
tionship with other persons, that is ‘I ’ and ‘other’, ‘I ’ and ‘Thou’ (Flood 1999: 
150-151).
Bakhtin uses the concept of utterance. Basically an utterance is any unit of 
language, from a single word to an entire text. However, for Bakhtin it is not so 
much a purely linguistic concept as a meeting place between my self- 
consciousness, my mind and the world with all its socio-historical meaning. An 
utterance is always a response to a previous utterance, and always expects an 
answer in the future. Any utterance is a link in the sequence o f speech com- 
munion. The first aspect of an utterance is the active position o f the speaker in 
some referential semantic sphere or another. The second aspect is the speaker’s 
subjective, emotional evaluation o f the referential semantic content of his utter­
ance (Bakhtin 1952; Morris 1994: 84-85, 251).
Another important concept of Bakhtin’s used in this research project is het- 
eroglossia, which perceives language as ideologically saturated and stratified. 
Discourse always articulates a particular view o f the world. Heteroglossia re- 
fers to the conflict between ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’, ‘official’ and ‘unof- 
ficial’ discourses in the same national language. It foregrounds the clash of 
antagonistic social forces (Bakhtin 1935; Morris 1994: 15-17, 248-249). This 
reminds us o f Beatty’s work on slametan in Java, where people o f different 
orientations use ambiguous words (of the same local language, Javanese) and 
play with words to maintain harmony.
In Bourdieu’s theory o f practice human society, or ‘social space’, is multi- 
dimensional, consisting of diverse interrelated yet somewhat homogenous 
fields (les champs). A field is a competitive arena of social relations in which 
agents and institutions contend for the production, acquisition and control of 
forms of capital peculiar to that field. For example, academic degrees are an 
obvious form of educational capital in the educational field, money in the eco­
nomie field and prestige in the cultural field. The term ‘market’ (le marché) is 
interchangeable with the term ‘field’. Bourdieu maintains that all fields con­
form to a certain economie logic that is ‘capable of treating all practices, in- 
cluding those purporting to be disinterested or gratuitous, and hence non- 
economic, as economie practices directed towards maximalizing of material or 
symbolic profit’ (Bourdieu 1977: 183; Rey 2004: 332-333). The concept of 
field (arena) is helpful to discem the difference voices of our research partici- 
pants in different arenas (e.g. religious, social, political).
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus refers to the matrix of perceptions, or the basis 
of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences. Habitus predis- 
poses the agent to perceive and behave in a certain fashion. An individual’s 
habitus is always that of a specific class, which predisposes the agent to per­
ceive, appreciate and act in ways reflecting the material conditions of the class 
that contributed to her habitus formation (Rey 2004: 335).
Among the various forms of religious capital Bourdieu frequently cites ‘the 
goods o f salvation’ (les biens de salut). He goes beyond Weber and Marx, 
specifying the means by which the structures of domination and subjugation 
are entrenched and perpetuated, namely through the dynamics of 
(mis)recognition of the legitimacy of social inequalities. In regard to religious 
capital, Bourdieu emphasizes the impact of economic logic on religious prac­
tice and commerce. The forms that religious capital take are determined more 
by the needs o f the consumer than by the power of the prophet. Here Bourdieu 
is critical o f Weber’s view of the prophet as someone possessing powers to 
create religious capital ex nihilo. Hence for Bourdieu the prophet is not vox 
Dei, as Weber has it, but rather vox populi. Bourdieu argues that charisma is 
socially grounded (Bourdieu 1987: 129; Rey 2004: 337-338).
Some eritieal approaehes accept Foucault’s notion that participants are posi- 
tioned in discourse and that we do not have access to reality outside discourse. 
This view is deterministic. There are others who claim that the relation between 
discursive and non-discursive is dialectic, hence it is possible to develop dis­
course analysis as ideology critique. In fact, science is ideology critique. Gram- 
sci’s concept of hegemony is more helpful than Foucault’s concept of power 
(Fairclough 1992: 58).
The basic premise of hegemony is that society is not ruled by force alone 
but also by ideas. For Gramsci a ‘foundation of ruling class is equivalent to the 
creation of Weltanschauung’ (Turin 1966: 75; Bates 1975: 351). Through the 
creation of meaning power relations become naturalized and so self-evident 
that they cannot be questioned. For instance, in the Indonesian New Order era 
people rarely questioned the second Indonesian president Soeharto’s official 
interpretation of Pancasila, namely his ‘Directives for the realization and im- 
plementation of pancasila’.8 Another instance is that nowadays Indonesians 
commonly label bombers in Bali, Jakarta or Solo ‘terrorists’, and those in 
Papua ‘separatists’.
Following John Thompson’s and Gramsci’s view of ideology, Fairclough 
maintains that resistance is possible. ‘Subjects are ideologically positioned, but 
they are also capable of acting creatively to make their own connections be­
tween the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed, and to 
restructure positioning practices and structures’ (Fairclough 1992: 91; Jorgen- 
sen & Phillips 2002: 76). In the Javanese war (1825-1830), for example, the 
Dutch administration declared Diponegoro a rebel. To counteract that his fol- 
lowers reproduced the notion o f Diponegoro as a freedom fighter from Java 
and, more than that, a messiah. Hence hegemony is never stable but is always 
changing and unfïnished, and consensus is at all times a matter of degree -  a 
‘contradictory and unstable equilibrium’ (Fairclough 1992: 93; Jorgensen & 
Phillips 2002: 76)
2 A  Research coracepts
In this study religious identity transformation is examined via interreligious, 
particularly Muslim-Christian, relations. The concept of identity emerged in the 
social sciences and humanities as a core concept in the 1950s (Gleason 1983). 
Over more than 60 years it has become one of the most widely used terms in 
these disciplines, featuring in the titles o f many thousands, if  not hundreds of 
thousands, of books and articles (Wetherell 2010: 3). But it remains a highly 
controversial concept (Giddens 1991; Kim 2002).
The term ‘identity’ derives from the Latin idem et idem (the same and the 
same) (Gleason 1983). But instead o f a fixed definition, Margareth Wetherell
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reformulates the trends in scholars’ conceptualization of identity. There are 
three possible interpretations: identity as a personal project, a property of 
groups, or a convergence of social and personal identity. She also points out 
current theoretical shifts to intersectional and hybrid trends in the study of iden­
tity (Wetherell 2010). My thesis follows the latter trend (identity as a hybrid), 
since in most cases identities are not based on innate properties that can be 
measured according to objective criteria (Bourdieu 1991: 220-228). For exam- 
ple, the classification into santri and non-santri or abangan is not fixed but 
fluid and flexible (Beatty 1999: 115-157).
Thus in this research identity is defined as a narrative of the self (Giddens 
1991: 54). People have not just one identity but multiple identities (polyphonic 
selves). They always engage simultaneously in a plurality of partly overlapping 
self-narratives, none o f which corresponds entirely with only one society or 
territory (Van Binsbergen 2003: 381). In concrete conditions people may prefer 
one self-narrative among all potential self-narratives (Hall 1996). Social iden­
tity is shared by members of a group (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel & Turner 1986), but it 
is fragile, fluid, flexible, not fixed and stable. In this study I use ‘social iden­
tity’ as an umbrella term, which includes other identities (e.g. religious, ethnic, 
regional, national, economie). Religious identity is only one o f the social iden­
tities people can have.
Similarly, religion is religion because it is placed in a particular narrative 
context or speech community. Outside that narrative context there is no religion 
(Asad 1991). This differs from Durkheim’s (1964: 47) definition of religion as 
‘a unified system of beliefs and practices related to sacred things’ or Geertz’s 
(1973; 1993) phenomenological quest for a sui generis ‘meaning’ of religion. I 
assume that definitions of religion are not based on natural properties but are 
the result o f the scholar’s classification system (Asad 1993; McCutcheon 
1997). Accordingly practices and artefacts are religious because their believers 
place them in a specific narrative context and distinguish them from other prac­
tices or artefacts, which are considered non-religious or secular (Flood 
1999:137-141).
Put differently, definitions of what is religious and what is not are historical 
products of discursive processes (Asad 1993: 29). After more than a century 
religious studies has not managed to come up with a generally accepted defini­
tion of religion. There is disagreement between those who define religion as an 
autonomous reality and those who see it as a reflection of something else (e.g. 
psychological or social processes).
In this study the concept of understanding is seen as a cognitive process 
aimed at grasping speakers’ intentions (Van Dijk 2008: 1-18). Understanding 
assumes at least partially shared knowledge, a common ground or meeting 
point. According to cognitive Science producers of texts (communicators) al­
ways employ other ‘texts’ or mental models stored in their long-term memory.
And consumers of texts (interpreters) can only make sense of these texts if  they 
are able to link them to other texts that they have stored in their long-term 
memory.
In cognitive theory culture is a cognitive system (beliefs, values, forms of 
knowledge, etc.) present in the minds of members o f a specifïc social group. In 
understanding culture two conjoined aspects are key requirements: the cogni­
tive system and language. People have lexical items (e.g. words) which articu- 
late schemata (universal cognitive structures located in memory) (Flood 1999: 
57-58). From an intercultural philosophy perspective it is accepted that human 
potential is universal, but people are also products o f socialization and accul- 
turation.
In daily life there will always be partial understanding and partial misunder- 
standing, misunderstanding understanding and understanding misunderstanding 
(Mali 2000), or working misunderstanding (Tanner & Wijsen 1993). From one 
point o f view multicultural society is a drama and intercultural understanding 
an illusion. This is the theory of cultural collision (Blommaert 1991: 18-21) or 
clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). But multicultural societies function 
more or less well and -  at least partial -  intercultural understanding is possible. 
In a postcolonial world no culture has the power to impose its worldview on 
other cultures. Thus intercultural understanding is the outcome of struggle and 
negotiation.
In this book transformation is defined in terms o f conditions, processes and 
consequences of cultural contact (Burke 2009). Hence we always link the con­
cept of transformation with the concept of identity and interaction. Norman 
Fairclough cites a simple, clear instance. The school system presupposes a spe­
cifïc language use (discourse) and specifïc social relations (e.g. lecture or 
seminar, authoritarian or democratie) and subject positions (teacher and pupil). 
The social system of the school determines the discourse to a large extent, but 
by using it teachers and pupils either reproduce the school system unchanged or 
they transform it (Fairclough 2001: 31-32). For example, teachers and pupils 
may reproduce hierarchical relations or develop egalitarian relations. By taking 
their positions participants become either teachers or pupils. So reproduction 
may further conservation or transformation o f the existing order. It is not only 
rigid but also Creative (Fairclough 2001: 24, 32). This logic reveals the link 
between discourse and transformation (social change).
In regard to cultural contact, if  shared knowledge is necessary for under­
standing, we can conceptualize the conditions for cultural contact in three mod­
els. Briefly they are the following. The identity model is based on the assumption 
that ‘we’ and the ‘others’ are basically the same (Wiredu 1996): the ‘others’ are 
like ‘us’, we are equals. The alterity model is based on the assumption that ‘we’ 
and the ‘others’ are essentially different. The ‘others’ are not like ‘us’; they are 
strangers and potential enemies. The analogy model is based on the assumption
that there are overlaps between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Human potential is universal, but 
this does not mean that all people are the same, as they are also products of accul- 
turation and socialization (Mali 2000). This book investigates social identity 
transformations through interreligious relations.
In this study social cohesion and conflict are defined in terms of conver- 
gence or divergence of interests (Bourdieu 1991). Bourdieu identifies society 
as a pluralistic enclave composed o f more or less autonomous fields (or ‘mar­
kets’) where individuals or groups struggle to actualize their interests (make a 
‘profit’) using various resources (forms o f ‘capital’), partly in coalition and 
partly in competition with others. Thus inclusion and exclusion almost always 
go together.
There are various theories about what conflicts are and where they come 
from, depending on the perspectives of different disciplines and levels of 
analysis. From a religious studies point of view there are those who recognize 
the causes o f conflict mainly within the religions themselves (e.g. dakwal mis- 
sionary activity, sacred text), and those who trace the roots mainly outside the 
religions (e.g. power struggle). The realistic group conflict theory (Sherif 1966) 
holds that inter-group conflicts occur when parties have incompatible goals or 
compete for resources. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1986) posits that 
inter-group conflicts are the result of social categorization and group identifica- 
tion per se. Experiments show that even if there is no shortage of resources, 
participants develop in-group favouritism. Most scholars combine various per­
spectives, maintaining that virtually all conflicts are complex and caused by a 
multiplicity o f factors (Taylor & Moghaddam 1994).
3 TechnicaB design
This section clarifies and justifies the technical design of the study (Verschuren 
& Doorewaard 1999). It describes the research strategy (social settings in 
which the study was conducted), research sources and language translation. 
Finally it outlines the output and planning o f the research.
3.1 Research strategy: Suirakarta as case stady
My research strategy is a single case study. Social identity constructions in 
Indonesia are studied through Christian-Muslim relations, narrowed down to 
Surakarta as a case. That is to say, I study Muslim-Christian relations in one 
particular location, Surakarta. A single case study is commonly employed to 
obtain an explanatory as opposed to a merely exploratory account (Yin 1994: 
5). The purpose of the research is to look at identifïcation, relations and idea- 
tional processes among FGD participants in Surakarta that constitute and are 
constituted by the broader discourse of Indonesian society.
The city, formally called Surakarta, is popularly known as Solo (sometimes 
Sala). In tourism and in public spaces the name of Solo is more common than 
Surakarta. Surakarta was one o f the great Islamic sultanates in Java, the 17th 
century Islamic Mataram. The Giyanti agreement in 1755 divided the Mataram 
sultanate into two kingdoms: Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Previously the Sura­
karta sultanate had been in Kartasura (Sala), but in 1745 it moved to Surakarta. 
Nowadays the Surakarta royal family plays a purely cultural role in preserving 
Javanese culture. The district is headed by a mayor, who is accountable to the 
govemor of Central Java and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
Surakarta is located in the middle of Java island, the most densely populated 
island in Indonesia. Although 57.5% of the Indonesian population live on Java 
island, it represents only 6.8% of the whole Indonesian area (BPS census 
2010). Surakarta is one o f the major cities in Central Java, whereas the capital 
city o f Central Java is Semarang. It is situated in a low-lying area at an altitude 
of 92m. The temperature ranges from 25°C to 27°C and humidity from 67% to 
85%. In the north the city borders on the Boyolali regency, in the east on 
Karanganyar regency, in the south on Sukoharjo regency and in the west on 
Kartasura regency.
In 2011 Surakarta had a population of 588 110. The sex ratio was 95,02 
(100 female to 95 male). Daytime dwellers could be three times the population 
figure (around 1,5 million). People from surrounding regencies such as Klaten, 
Boyolali, Kartasura, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Sragen work in 
Surakarta by day and go home after work. Like other big cities in Java, Sura­
karta is popular among Street traders (pedagang kaki lima). Out o f 2 950 Street 
traders, 38.7% operate by day and only 4.1% at night (Surakarta in figures 
2 0 1 1 /2 0 1 2 ).
The total area of the city is 44.04 km2, including five sub-districts (kecama- 
tan) and 51 villages (kelurahan). Land use is mainly housing (65%), while 8% 
is used for business, 6% for trade and only 2% for farming. Among the five 
sub-districts Banjarsari is the largest and Serengan the most densely populated.
The population comprises mostly industrial and construction workers 
(33.5%). The rest are: retired (10.7%), retail sector (8.0%), civil servants, army 
and police (5.5%), transport sector (5.3%), entrepreneurs (2.9%), farm workers 
(0.1%), and peasants (0.1%) (Surakarta in figures 2011/2012). The percentage 
o f unemployed people is 8.7. About 13.9% of the population is considered to 
be below the poverty line with an income of less than IDR 306,584.00 (around 
USD 33.71) per month (Regional statistics Surakarta 2011).
The city has 274 elementary schools (SDs), 75 junior high schools (SLTPs), 
79 senior high schools (SLTAs), 3 state universities/institutes, and more than 
50 private big and small universities, institutes and academies. The majority of 
the population completed SLTA (24.2%). The rest completed SLTP (20.7%),
Table 3
Land area, number of villages, number of RTs, population and population density of sub-districts of Sura- 
karta9
Sub-district Land area 
(km2)
Number of 
villages
Number of 
neighbourhood 
associations (RTs)
Total
population
Population
density
Laweyan 8,64 11 458 111.767 12.936
Serengan 3,19 7 312 63.491 19.903
Pasar Kliwon 4,82 9 424 89.164 18.499
Jebres 12,58 11 637 145.703 11.582
Banjarsari 14,81 13 874 177.985 12.018
Total 44,04 51 2.705 588.1 10 13.354
SD (20.6%), academy or university courses (9.2%) and 7.4% of the population 
did not complete SD (Surakarta in figures 2011/2012).
Certain unique characteristics o f Surakarta make it a perfect case study. The 
first is its religious diversity. Islam is the majority religion (75.9%), with Chris- 
tianity (Protestants and Catholics) a significant minority religion (23.2%). 
Catholics and Protestants are almost equal in number: Catholics at 11.7% and 
Protestants at 11.5%. The 2010 census puts the national percentage of Christi- 
anity at 9,87% (Protestant 6.96%, Catholic 2.91%), with only 2.75% at the 
provincial level (Central Java) (Protestant 1.77%, Catholic 0.98%). That na­
tional census puts Islam at 87.18% nationally and 96.74% at provincial level. 
Thus adherents of Christianity in Surakarta outnumber the national and provin­
cial average.
Table 4
Religious demography in Surakarta in 1970'°, 200111 and 201112
Year Muslim Catholic Protestant
1970 
2001 
2011
286.928
404.662
446.036
61.8%
73.1%
75.9%
38.686
69.871
69.057
8.3% 
12.6% 
11.7%
40.305
72.266
67.653
8.7% 
13.1% 
1 1.5%
Year Buddhist Hindu Confucian Others
1970 
2001 
2011
12.307 (2.6%) 
4.400 0.8% 2.381 
3,724 0.6% 1.640
0.4%
0.3%
70.902 15,3% 15.068 3.3%
9 Regional statistics Surakarta 201 land Surakarta in figures 2011/2012.
10 Sala in figures 1970, total population 464.196. The label ‘others’ in this table refers to 13 
groups o f local beliefs, the three largest being Sapta Darma, Djwa Haju, and Pangestu.
11 Surakarta in figures 2001, total population 553.580.
12 Surakarta in figures 2011/2012, total population 588.110.
Both Buddhism and Hinduism exist in Surakarta, though their following is not 
significant: both are below 1%. The 2010 census also reports that there are 
adherents of Confucianism (0.03%) and other beliefs (0.01%). In this city Bud- 
dhists have six Vihara (Buddhist temples) and Hindus have three Pura (Hindu 
temples). During the last decade no new Buddhist or Hindu temples and Catho­
lic churches were built. Catholics only have five churches in Surakarta. By 
contrast, according to the statistics the number of Muslim mosques and Protes­
tant churches has grown significantly. In 2001 there were 419 mosques and 118 
Protestant churches, whereas in 2011 there were 502 mosques and 180 Protes­
tant churches. So 93 new mosques and 48 new Protestant churches were built 
during the last decade.13
One may ask how the proportion of Christians in Surakarta can be as high as 
23.2%, while in other cities in Java it is below 10%. Conversely, why is the 
percentage of Muslims in Surakarta less than the average in other cities in 
Java? Religious demographic statistics show that it is not because of the suc- 
cess of Christian mission, as Muslims have assumed in recent years. As noted 
in table 4 above, the statistics in 1970 show that Muslims stand at 61.8%, 
whereas Christians (Catholics and Protestants) are put at 17%. From 1970 to 
2011 Muslims increased by 14.1%, whereas Christians increased by 6.2%. In 
addition, over the past decade (2001-2011) adherents of all religions except 
Islam decreased slightly. Islam was the only religion to show a slight increase. 
Hence it is more accurate to talk about ‘Islamization’ than about ‘Christianiza- 
tion’ during the past four decades.
In the latter part of the Soekamo period people in Solo were strongly pro- 
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and the mayor was a Communist (Ricklefs 
2012: 175). In the 1955 general election the PKI won 57.26% of the votes. A 
nationalist political party (PNI) got 30.03% of the votes. By contrast, two Is- 
lamic political parties won a minority of the votes: Masyumi 11.10% and NU
1.61% (Mulyadi & Soedarmono 1999). Since 1965 citizens have had to opt for 
one of five/six state recognized religions, and PKI and PNI members or sympa­
thizers -  mainly abangan or members o f kebatinan (Javanese) -  mostly chose 
Christianity or Islam. That was a fairly general pattem in Java (Feillard 1999; 
Hefner 2000; Suhadi 2006; Nugroho 2008). There are no statistics on religious 
affiliation in Surakarta before 1965, but the proportion o f Christians in 1970 
(17%) shows that Christian missions had achieved considerable success by 
then. However, Ricklefs (2012: 175) points out that not only Christianization
13 However, this does not always mean the erection o f new houses o f worship, but relates to 
poor record keeping in the past. Maybe some mosques or churches were not listed in 2001, but 
were only listed in govemment records in 2011.
but also Islamization intensified in Surakarta.14 Hence the significant number of 
Christians in Solo is not attributable to the success o f Christianization in recent 
decades.
Surakarta is also a multi-ethnic city. The majority is Javanese, the others 
being Chinese, Arab, Banjarese, Madurese and so forth. Current statistics do 
not reflect ethnicity in Surakarta, but a 2001 report gives a clear picture of eth­
nic diversity in this city. Javanese constitute an absolute majority at 94%, 
whereas the two biggest minority groups are Chinese (3.5%) and Arab (0.7%).
Table 5
Number of ethnic groups in Surakarta in 2001 15
Javanese Chinese Arab Sunda/
Priangan
Madura Batak/
Tapanuli
Malay Betawi Others
460.080 17.594 3.874 1.940 968 708 271 251 3.734
It is generally assumed that Chinese means Christian and Arab means Muslim. 
There is no cross tabulation of inter-ethnic and religious data, but a village 
monograph supports the popular assumption. The monograph on Pasar Kliwon 
village gives the following information: Javanese (73.5%), Arab (24.6%) and 
Chinese (1.9%); the religious statistics are Islam (95.8%), Protestant (3.6%), 
Catholic (0.3%) and Buddhist (0.3%). Thus the majority ethnic groups (Java­
nese and Arab) are most probably Muslim. Besides Christians, the Chinese 
group may include Khonghucu, Muslims and Buddhists. As a rule members of 
the Arab group do not convert from Islam but remain Muslim.
On the whole the Chinese and Arab groups dominate economically. Last but 
not least, Chinese and Arabs usually live separately from Javanese in certain 
parts o f the city. This adds to their divergence from the Javanese. Arab settle- 
ments are mostly concentrated in Pasar Kliwon sub-district, especially the vil- 
lages of Pasar Kliwon, Semanggi and Kedung Lumbu. Chinese settlements are 
located round Pasar Gede, Balong, Coyudan, Tambak Segaran and some main 
streets of the city.
In-group settlement based on ethnicity dates back to the era o f the sultanate 
and Dutch rule in Surakarta. Through the wijken system and the pass system 
the Dutch administration prevented mixing of Arabs and Chinese with Javanese 
in the 19th century (Algadri 1988; Utomo 2010; Zunainingsih 2010). Many 
Arabs are in the textile business, while Chinese virtually dominate both retail 
and big business in Surakarta. Nowadays some Javanese label Arabs encik
14 Ricklefs (2012: 175-184) devotes one section to purification o f the abangan and kebatinan 
movements by Muslim movements in Surakarta in the 1970s.
15 BPS 2001. This report sets the total population at 489.420.
(Farkhana 2007) and Chinese cukong (Utomo 2010). Both words have much 
the same meaning as ‘boss’.
There is also diversity within the Arab community, which sometimes cre- 
ates intra-group tension. By and large they are divided into two groups: Sayyid 
(Alawiyin) and Irsyadi. The first group claims descent from the prophet Mu- 
hammad, while the Irsyadi is positioned as lay Arab. In regard to religious ori- 
entation Sayyid tradition is the same as that o f Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), such as 
preserving maulid nabi (praise of the prophet and the family), respecting the 
graves of saints/ ulama and so on. The Irsyadi group is closer to the Muham- 
madiyah worldview, which concentrates on religious purifieation. Chinese in 
Surakarta belong to different clans such as Hokkian, Hakka, Tio Ciu and Kong 
Fu, sometimes reflected in their choice of a profession or line of business.
Historically Chinese and Arabs tried to promote unity (integration) among 
themselves and between them and the indigenous people (Javanese). In 1934, 
for instance, the Arabs established an organization named Persatuan Arab In­
donesia (PAI, Union of Indonesian Arabs). Youth of Arabian descent made an 
oath which affirmed Indonesia as their homeland and bahasa Indonesian as 
their mother tongue. A similar trend occurred among the Chinese in Surakarta. 
The barongsay (China lion dance) is performed not only by Chinese but also 
by Javanese. But to some extent inter-ethnic social segregation is still clearly 
visible. For example, even though Al-Rabithah Al-Alawiyah (a school built by 
the Sayid group) is open to everyone, around 90% of its pupils are Arab (Novi- 
anti 2009).
The Christian community originated some centuries after the establishment 
of Islam and an Islamic sultanate in Surakarta. The Gereformeerde Kerken in 
Nederland (GKN) was permitted to start missionary work in Surakarta in 1910 
(Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008: 677). Since the late 18th century a fair number 
of local children of Dutch East India Company employees were raised in ‘the 
true Christian Protestant religion’ with the support of Dutch businessmen 
(Bosma & Raben 2008: 44). In 1920 Dutch Christian missionaries started four 
primary schools (Christelijke Standaard Scholen) in Margoyudan, Prayunan, 
Temenggungan and Danukusuman.
Long before that, in 1750, a charismatic Javanese Muslim fïgure, Kyai Jam- 
sari, had established the first pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Jamsaren 
Surakarta. One of his students, Kyai Muhammad Mansyur, established a 
pesantren in Klaten close to Surakarta. Kyai Mansyur’s student, Kyai Umar 
Abdul Manan, established pesantren Muayyad in 1947, which has grown into 
the biggest NU moderate pesantren in present-day Surakarta. The Muayyad 
pesantren, sometimes in collaboration with the Sayid group, conducts dakwa in 
society by way of cultural activities such as a mixture of Javanese and Arabic 
song and music. The Windan pesantren, a branch o f Muayyad in the west of
Surakarta, concentrates on Islamic teaching, community development and in­
terreligious dialogue (Pohl 2006).
Besides heavy influence from the modernist views of Muhammadiyah and 
the traditionalist outlook o f NU, present-day Islam in Surakarta is shaped by a 
development which started in the 1970s. Three Arab descendants of the non- 
Sayyid group -  Abdullah Sungkar, Abdullah Thufayl and Abdullah Marzuki 
(popularly known as triple-A) -  each established his own Islamic institution in 
1972 after a disagreement with their previous institution (Mulyadi & Soedar- 
mono 1999). Sungkar founded Pesantren Al-Mukmin in Ngruki Sukoharjo 
close to Surakarta. This pesantren and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Sungkar’s succes- 
sor) are often mentioned in the press as the centre and leader of a network of 
radical Muslims in Indonesia suspected o f links with Al-Qaeda. Thufayl estab­
lished Majelis Tafsir A l-Q ur’an (MTA, Qur’anic Interpretation Council). The 
dakM>a of MTA passionately propagates purging Islam of Javanese mystical 
elements, which often provokes tension, sometimes Street fights, with NU fol- 
lowers. Marzuki in his turn established Pesantren Assalam, which is much 
more moderate than Al-Mukmin and MTA.
The current dynamics of Islam in Surakarta is also influenced by the pres- 
ence of Muslim paramilitaries (laskars). These include Front Pemuda Islam 
Surakarta (FPIS, Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta), Laskar Hizbullah, Laskar 
Jundullah and Barisan Bismillah. Some laskars went to Poso and Ambon on a 
jihad  in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Besides conducting religious services 
the laskars were active in Surakarta and surrounding cities, where they com- 
bated gambling and drinking and attacked night clubs and Christian places of 
worship. Sometimes they engaged in fights with so-called abangan paramilita­
ries. Several members of both sides were killed in such fights.
Mainline Protestant and Catholic churches have long dominated the Chris­
tian community in Surakarta. There are only a few Orthodox churches. The 
first Catholic church, St Antony, was built in Surakarta in 1905. However, for 
almost two decades now the mainline churches have faced challenges from 
new Pentecostal/ charismatic churches. Several new Pentecostal churches have 
establish mega churches, some established medium-sized churches, while oth­
ers move from one hotel/shop to another to conduct services.
The most monumental Pentecostal church in Surakarta is the Indonesian 
Bethel Church of God’s Family (GBIKA, Gereja Bethel Indonesia Keluarga 
Allah). It started out with only seven congregants in 1989. Today GBIKA has 
around 30 000 members. Outside Surakarta they also have churches in Jakarta, 
Yogyakarta, Semarang, Magelang, Sukohaijo, Wonogiri, Ngawi and Madiun. 
GBIKA is rated one o f the ten most rapidly growing churches in the world 
(Bahana Magazine, October 2007, vol. 198; www.gbika.org). It owns a public 
TV station, a radio station and other businesses.
By and large people in Surakarta speak local Javanese languages (basa 
Jawa) in daily interaction. The royal family in the palace, people at cultural 
Javanese events and artists in Javanese dramatic performances tend to use up­
per class Javanese (krama inggil). Indonesian (bahasa Indonesia) is the na­
tional language that is mostly used as a teaching medium and in the govem­
ment bureaucracy. Some Chinese and Arabs speak Mandarin (Chinese) or Ara­
bic in their communities.
The national curriculum requires students to take bahasa Indonesia as a core 
course from elementary to university level. Only students from elementary to 
senior high school have to take Javanese, which is considered a local curricu­
lum. English is taught from junior high school up to university level. Islamic 
schools and madrasah offer Arabic courses. Mandarin is offered at a limited 
number of Chinese schools and Chinese private learning institutions. All popu- 
lar newspapers in Surakarta are written in bahasa Indonesia.
3.2  S©&airee$ aend dato coHBecïiouu
As this is a study o f participants’ perspectives, the main source was the spoken 
language of Christians and Muslims. Most o f the data was generated by 24 
FGDs. Thus the primary source was FGD participants (informants). Before 
organizing FGDs I conducted individual interviews, studied local newspapers 
(<Solopos) from previous years and attended religious services in both Muslim 
and Christian communities. Secondary data came from pamphlets, brochures, 
banners, bulletins, letters from participants and the internet.
FGDs were the primary method of data collection, since the study focuses 
on intergroup and intra-group relations and communication. They provided 
information on how people interact in groups, thus enabling the researcher to 
analyse their speech acts. In view of the nature o f the research problem FGDs 
were classified according to religion, gender, age (generation) and profession. 
This was because individuals feel relaxed to discuss issues with like-minded 
individuals of their own social group. In such an environment they tend to act 
naturally and reveal their discursive practices (Fairclough 1995).
Participants were first grouped according to their religions: Christianity and 
Islam. Religious classification was applied to all groups (gender, age and pro­
fession). Thus group discussions comprised eight Christian FGDs (first round), 
eight Muslim FGDs (second round) and eight FGDs composed of both Chris­
tians and Muslims (third round). Approximately half the participants in the first 
and second round FGDs took part in the third round, so both old and new par­
ticipants joined in the mixed FGDs.
As for age (youths and the elderly), youths were aged between 15 and 24. 
The elderly were aged from 50 upwards. In fact, the youngest participant at- 
tending the group discussions was 17 years old and the oldest was 73. We do 
not have a specific 25-49 age category, but most professionals and workers
were in that age group. By professionals we mean entrepreneurs, managers, 
joumalists and public servants. Workers are labourers, company employees, 
domestic workers, operators in the informal sector, et cetera.
To generate the data I asked a basic question at an early stage in each FGD: 
‘How would you describe the other (Christian/Muslim)?’ The rest of the con- 
versation dealt with issues raised by participants in response to that basic ques­
tion. Each discussion lasted about two hours. The Christian and Muslim group 
discussions were held in the participants’ houses or in the religious organiza- 
tion’s offices. To create a relaxed atmosphere mixed group discussions were 
conducted in restaurants. All FGDs were tape-recorded, using a digital device 
that produced quite good results. The FGD research corpus (data) are taken 
from those tape-recordings.
In my fieldwork I had two research assistants, Mohammad Ishom (41 years 
old) and Ruth Andita Hayu Tejaningtyas (24 years old). Mohammad Ishom 
was bom and lives in Solo. Ishom is a teacher at Pesantren Muayyad and a 
lecturer at the Nahdlatul Ulama University in Solo. He completed a BA degree 
in English at Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta and an MA at the Center 
for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Yogya­
karta. Andita was also bom and lives in Solo. She is a member o f the Javanese 
Christian Church (GKJ), a mainstream Protestant church in Indonesia, and 
graduated in communication at Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta.
Interviewees (research participants) were selected by means of purposive 
sampling, roughly as follows. Ishom invited the Muslim participants, while 
Andita invited the Christian participants. They contacted two candidates for 
each group, whom they already knew. These two then invited two of their 
friends to join the FGD. So Ishom and Andita knew some but not all of the 
participants.
Almost all contacted participants were eager to join the research project by 
accepting the FGD invitation. This shows that almost all prospective partici­
pants were comfortable with the project. Two Muslims candidates declined. 
One was a lecturer o f Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta, who refused to 
join the professional Muslim group discussion. He told Ishom that this kind of 
study would be used by a Western university and non-Muslim parties for a 
negative purpose. Another was a Muslim student activist. He attended the 
young Muslim group discussion, but refused to join the young mixed (Muslim- 
Christian) group discussion. He told Ishom that he would join it, but cancelled 
when he leamed it would be a mixed group discussion. One Christian male 
candidate also declined to join the FGD. He explained to Andita that he had 
another urgent programme, but he gave Andita a handwritten letter, which I 
have attached to this book (see appendix 1). Ultimately a total o f 150 partici­
pants attended the FGDs.
Table 6
Participants in focus group discussions
MALE
Muslims Christians Mixed
FEMALE 
Muslims Christians Mixed
Elderly people 
Youths 
Professionals 
Workers
5
5
5
6
5
5
3
5
5
5
7
7
7
5
5
6
6
5
5
5 8
7
7
6
Although we tried to draw participants from diverse backgrounds, a case study 
such as mine is obviously not representative of all Solonese. We had only very 
few ‘hardliners’ or radicals among our participants, although some of their 
‘voices’ were heard in our group discussions, and we must assume some con- 
formity to social desirability and face saving. In term o f religious affiliation, 
the Muslim participants are mostly members or sympathizers of Muhammadi- 
yah or NU. A few are members of Salafi and sympathizers o f new puritan Is- 
lamic movements. The Christian participants are mainly members of main­
stream Protestant (GKJ and GKI) and Roman Catholic churches. Some young 
participants are members of old and new Pentecostal/ charismatic churches.
The Christian group discussions were held from 18 March to 27 April 2009, 
the Muslim group discussions from 25 July to 27 November 2009, and the 
mixed group discussions from 18 December 2009 to 28 February 2010. Thus 
the time lapse between first and last discussions was not more than one year.
3.3 Methods of data airaalysis
Critical discourse analysis is a theory and a methodology. It was chosen princi- 
pally because of the need to explore a plausible dialectic relationship between 
language and socio-cognitive effects on Muslim-Christian relations in Indone­
sia and explain the role of language in intercultural religious communication in 
the community. I wanted to determine participants’ perspectives with due re- 
gard to their social identity and positions in maintaining and/or changing those 
positions.
Language analysis is a complex, sometimes highly technical sphere in its 
own right, requiring many types and techniques o f analysis. Although a back­
ground in linguistics may be prerequisite for discourse analysis, critical dis­
course analysis is in fact multidisciplinary, and one cannot expect a sociologist, 
psychologist or political scientist to have a detailed linguistic background 
(Fairclough 1992: 74). Discourse analysis is multidisciplinary and some schol­
ars have used it as a method in religious studies, for example Heather (2000), 
Wijsen (2010), Ndaluka (2012) and Wijsen (2013).
Discourse studies made their first appearance in the academie world only 
after the post-structuralist critique in the 1970s. Unquestionably Michel Fou- 
cault played a fundamental role in the development of discourse analysis (Jor- 
gensen & Phillips 2002: 10). His ideas about power, cognition and the self have 
influenced a whole range o f disciplines. Post-structuralism recognizes that 
signs get their meaning not from their relation to reality but from their relation 
to other signs. However, it criticizes the distinction between language system 
and language use (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 11). The relation between signs 
is not stable but fluid. Moreover, language use (parole) determines the system 
(langue), not just the other way round.
Although Foucault is a key figure, not all discourse analysts share his view 
of the relation between power struggle and knowledge production. One can 
differentiate between various versions of discourse analysis. Non-critical ap- 
proaches take participants’ perspectives as they are and study them from 
within. Content analysis and conversation analysis are examples. Critical ap- 
proaches link knowledge production to power relations. To some extent critical 
discourse analysts are suspicious of what participants say, which is linked to 
their social positions and their interest in either maintaining or transforming the 
status quo.
Discourse is a practice like any other. In pragmatic terms, language is not 
only a way of saying things (informative); it is also a way of doing things (per- 
formative) or exercising power (Bourdieu 1991). The only difference from 
other practices is its linguistic form (Fairclough 1992: 71). Thus the first 
method is the analysis o f discourse as linguistic practice, called description 
(Fairclough 1989: 26). According to critical discourse analysts the relation 
between language and social reality is not direct but occurs via discursive prac­
tices. Consequently the second method is the analysis of discursive practice or 
interpretation (Fairclough 1989: 26), that is analysing the production, distribu- 
tion and consumption o f texts (Fairclough 1992: 71). The discursive practice 
(interaction) is crucial, as the dialectic relation between linguistic practice 
(text) and social practice (context) is based on it.
In analysing text and talk researchers can proceed in two ways. They can 
focus on the meaning of the language, analysing taxonomies and other classifi- 
cations. This is what content analysis is about. Or they can analyse the use of 
language in the construction of social realities (Kvale 2008: 103-104). In this 
study I followed the latter line and used a socio-cognitive approach to discourse 
analysis (Van Dijk 2008). While I acknowledge the existence o f other analyti- 
cal methods, both within discourse analysis and in the social sciences gener- 
ally, I opted for critical discourse analysis (CDA), particularly Fairclough’s 
version of it, as it is best suited to my assumptions and objectives. CDA ap- 
proaches the text with the following assumptions.
Critical discourse analysts assume a dialectic relation between language and 
social structure: what participants say is shaped by and in its turn shapes social 
structures, either reproducing them or transforming them (Fairclough 1992: 
72). This is the third method: the analysis of social practice or ‘explanation’. In 
other words, critical discourse analysts are interested in the socio-cognitive -  
that is, ideational and interpersonal -  effects of language.
Fairclough (1992: 73, 231) develops CDA as a multi-perspective and poly- 
methodical approach of discourse analysis. Elsewhere in his book he uses the 
term ‘stages’ instead o f ‘methods’. But the distinction between analytic per- 
spectives and stages is not clear-cut. There are overlaps. Moreover, the distinc­
tion between perspectives and stages o f analysis does not reflect a one-to-one 
situation. All stages are used for analysing all dimensions of practice, although 
one method may be more fruitful for analysing a specific dimension of practice 
than another. In this book I refonnulate Fairclough’s multi-perspective and 
poly-methodical approach as reflected in table 7. I also use numbering in the 
table as a technique for presenting data analysis in the next three chapters.
Table 7
Multi-perspective and poly-methodical model of discourse analysis
PERSPECTIVE
Micro level Meso level Macro level
(individual) (institutional) (societal)
Description (linguistic practice) 1.1 1.2 1.3
Interpretation (discursive practice) 2.1 2.2 2.3
Explanation (social practice) 3.1 3.2 3.3
3.3.1 Description
CDA begins with the analysis of linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 
1989: 25; 109-139; Fairclough 1992: 76-77, 185-194). Description, also called 
linguistic practice, can be classified under four main headings: vocabulary, 
grammar, cohesion and text structure (Fairclough 1992: 75). In this research I 
use mainly one o f these: vocabulary. I am also concemed with metaphor (Fair­
clough 1992: 195). Vocabulary concentrates mainly on individual words and 
can be investigated in many ways. It is of limited value to think of language as 
documented in dictionaries, because there are a great many overlapping and 
competing vocabularies corresponding to different domains, institutions, prac­
tices, values and perspectives.
The vocabulary analysed is wording, overwording and rewording (altema- 
tive wording). The term ‘wording’ entails expressing and constituting the world 
in words, which happens differently in different times and places and for dif­
ferent groups o f people (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Overwording is a sign of
‘intense preoccupation’ pointing to ‘peculiarities in the ideology’ (Fairclough 
1992: 193). Rewording is new articulations which are set up as altematives to, 
and in opposition to, existing ones (Fairclough 1992: 194). Fairclough (1992: 
185-186) maintains that ‘it is sometimes usefiil for analytic purposes to focus 
upon a single word or key words’. The analysis also took into account ‘altema- 
tive wordings and their political and ideological significance’ (Fairclough 
1992: 77). The main question here is, what words do the participants use?
3.3.2 Interpretation
Interpretation is also called discursive practice. It involves processes o f text 
production, distribution and consumption, and the nature of these processes 
varies between different types o f discourse according to social factors (Fair­
clough 1992: 78). When participants produce (communicate) and consume 
(interpret) text or talk, they draw on members’ resources (Fairclough 1989: 
163) or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75) stored in their long-term memory 
(Fairclough 1989: 9-10; 24-24). Texts are also consumed differently in differ­
ent social contexts. These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in 
people’s heads; and they are social in the sense that they are socially con- 
structed and have social effect (Fairclough 1989: 24). So the question is, what 
members’ resources or mental models do participants draw on to produce 
(communicate) or consume (interpret) text?
Processes of production and interpretation are socially constrained in a two- 
fold sense. First, they are constrained by available members’ resources -  that 
is, effectively intemalized social structures, norms and conventions, including 
orders of discourse -  and conventions for the production, distribution and con­
sumption of texts of the aforementioned sort, which have been constituted by 
social practice and struggle. Second, they are constrained by the specifïc nature 
of the social practice of which they are part, which determines what elements 
o f members’ resources they draw on and how they draw on these (Fairclough 
1992: 80).
Fairclough (1992) mentions three aspects of inter-discursivity: the force of 
utterances, the coherence of texts, and the intertextuality of texts. I deal with 
only one of the three: the intertextuality of texts. Intertextuality is basically the 
property of texts that are full o f allusions to other texts, which may be explic- 
itly demarcated or merged, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironi- 
cally echo and so forth. The term ‘intertextuality’ refers to the productivity of 
texts, the way they transform earlier texts, restructuring and tuming them into 
new conventions (Fairclough 1992: 102). As for production, an intertextual 
perspective stresses the historicity o f texts: the way they always constitute ad- 
ditions to existing chains of speech communication.
When it comes to distribution, an intertextual perspective is helpful in ex- 
ploring relatively stable networks within which texts move, undergoing pre-
dictable transformations as they shift from one text type to another. In the case 
of consumption an intertextual perspective is helpful in stressing that it is not 
just the text in hand that shapes interpretation, but also those other texts which 
interpreters invariably bring into the interpretation process (Fairclough 1992: 
80-81). This suggests that speakers borrow and transform words from other 
sources or texts to justify their own speech in their social setting. In the FGDs, 
for example, participants used words from the Bible, the Qur’an and the consti- 
tution of Indonesia to justify social identities/positions to which they were re- 
ferring.
Fairclough (1992: 104) also distinguishes manifest intertextuality, where a 
text overtly draws on specific other texts, from constitutive intertextuality (in- 
terdiscursivity). Interdiscursivity extends intertextuality to include the principle 
of the primacy of the order of discourse. On the one hand, we have texts het- 
erogeneously constituted from specific other texts (manifest intertextuality); on 
the other hand, texts may be heterogeneously constituted from elements (types 
of convention) o f orders of discourse (interdiscursivity).
3.3.3 Explanation
The third stage o f analysis is explanation, also called social practice. It analyses 
the socio-cognitive effects of the text. When participants draw on their cogni­
tive resources they are reproduced (Fairclough 1989:162). Thus social effects 
are achieved via members’ resources (Fairclough 1989:163). Van Dijk’s study 
o f ethnic prejudice shows how stereotypes are reproduced in everyday talk. But 
they can also be reinterpreted and transformed. Here Fairclough (1992: 86-96) 
mentions a variety o f tools. In my research I focus on ‘hegemony’ (Foucault 
1977) and ‘ideology’ (Gramsci 1971), taking into account the overlap with the 
first stage which considers altemative wordings and their ideological signifi- 
cance. So the question is, what are the socio-cognitive effects of what partici­
pants say? Do they reproduce the existing order or transform it?
According to Fairclough (1992: 86) discourse as social practice relates to 
ideology and power. In his view certain uses and forms of language are ideo­
logical and serve to establish or sustain relations of domination in a particular 
discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 87). Fairclough believes that ideologies 
in all societies are characterized by relations of domination, implying that dis­
course is a form of ideology critique. Unlike Foucault, who holds that there is 
no reality beyond discourse, or at any rate that scholars do not have access to it 
and thus lack instruments to assess what is true or untrue, Fairclough (1992: 
58) is convinced that ideology critique is possible. In contrast to Foucault’s 
determinism, he posits a dialectic relation between discourse and reality.
Fairclough (1992: 64-65) speaks about effects of discourse at three levels: 
knowledge or belief, social identities and social relations. In other words, lan­
guage constitutes identities, relations and ideas (Fairclough 2001: 62, 93-94).
These are the ideational and interpersonal (identity in relation) effects of lan­
guage use. Following Fairclough (1992: 65), I am interested in social change, 
that is, whether language use reproduces or transforms the societal order. Ide- 
ology is fixation of meaning. When participants say that Christians are ‘expan- 
sionist’ or that Muslims are ‘extremists’, prejudices are reproduced.
3.4 Lairaggjage trarssSatiom
The main language used by the interviewees (research participants) is bahasa 
Indonesia. Sometimes their utterances are phrased in Javanese or Arabic. 
Hence the first translation issue is from bahasa Indonesian into English, simply 
because this book is written in English.
Translation studies distinguish between two concepts: translation and inter- 
pretation. A translation deals with written language and translators have time to 
polish their output. Interpretation deals with spoken language and interpreters 
have no time to refine their work (Gile 1998: 41-42). In this book I am translat- 
ing in the sense that spoken voices o f FGD participants were recorded on tape 
and partially transcribed. I constantly went back to the transcription in the 
course of analysis and writing.
The second issue is translation from spoken language into written language, 
and the third is translation from colloquial language to academic language. 
Because this is an academic work, I chose formal rather than dynamic equiva­
lents in translation. In the case o f ‘formal equivalent’ (also called formal corre- 
spondence), the message in the receptor language should correspond as closely 
as possible with the diverse elements in the source language (Munday 2001: 
36-48). Because of my choice of a translation method, I had to exert myself to 
determine accuracy and correctness according to the structure and style o f the 
source language. Most typical o f ‘formal equivalent’ translations are gloss 
translations as applied in this book, which closely approximate the source lan­
guage structure, often supplemented with scholarly footnotes. This model of 
translation gives us access to the language and customs of the source culture 
(Munday 2008: 42).
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 there are many footnotes giving the source language, 
as well as glosses for certain words or phrases. In presenting the analysis the 
bahasa Indonesian version (sometimes Javanese or Arabic phrases/ words) of 
participants’ talk is appended in footnotes. Participants’ talk appears in quota- 
tion marks. My additions/explanations to their responses are in square brackets 
([ ]). Three dots (...) show omissions from and/or continuations of the speech. 
Throughout the book double quotation marks (“...”) indicate the research par- 
ticipant’s own voice, while others quotations appear in single quotation marks
3.S Planning arad oytpiaft
In presenting the research outcomes, after this general introduction I present the 
analysis o f the Christian FGDs (chapter 2), the Muslim FGDs (chapter 3) and 
the mixed FGD (chapter 4). This is followed by a general conclusion. Two 
appendixes appear at the back of this book. They consist o f a translation of a 
handwritten letter by a Christian candidate and a translation o f a bulletin writ- 
ten by a female Muslim convert.
The research project on which this book reports started in 2009 and ended in 
2013. It is part o f a collaborative project on religious language, social cohesion 
and conflict in Tanzania and Indonesia. Whereas I conducted my case study in 
Indonesia, my counterpart conducted a case study in Tanzania (Ndaluka 2011) 
and our supervisor conducted a comparative study (Wijsen 2013). The doctoral 
dissertations were submitted to and defended at the Faculty of Philosophy, 
Theology and Religious Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Nether- 
lands. The main output o f the project is two printed books. In collaboration 
with the principal supervisor, we also published several articles in international 
books on critical discourse analysis and a comparative study between Tanzania 
and Indonesia.
The scope of a case study is always limited. While I started with the macro 
political issue at an international (Toft et al. 2011) and national (Sterkens, 
Machasin & Wijsen 2007) level, I studied only one location, Surakarta. Al­
though I acquired in-depth insight into social identity construction in interrelig­
ious relations at grassroots level, the fmdings cannot be generalized to the 
whole of Indonesia. The growing interconnectedness of cultures has generated 
an ever increasing number of cross-cultural and comparative studies.
Yet the question of the translatability or un-translatability of (religious) 
concepts remains unanswered. Insight into translatability or un-translatability 
of concepts reveals the possibilities and limitations of intercultural communica- 
tion of religious meanings, and consequently the conditions for the possibility 
of peaceful co-existence o f religions. I hope this book contributes to the aca­
demie development of religious studies, especially in regard to the cross- 
cultural identity o f Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. Though the study does 
not seek to be practice-oriented, I nevertheless hope that the acquired insight 
may prove useful in policy making for religious community development.
Chapter II
"Normal" and "extreme" Muslims 
H©w Christians speak ab®ut MusSims
This chapter on how Christians speak about Muslims starts with two texts 
found in Solo. The first is a report in the local newspaper Solopos (28 October 
2000): “Indonesia is dar ul kufr” (a land of infidels). It was a statement by a 
speaker in a discussion on “Dakwa strategy of Hizb Tahrir”, organized in Solo 
by Hizb Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI). Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) is an international 
movement that seeks to overthrow democracy and revive the bygone transna- 
tional rule o f the khilafah (caliphate) (Ahnaf 2011). HTI is the Indonesian 
branch o f international HT. The newspaper reported that the speaker called 
Indonesia a dar ul kufr because it does not apply Islamic Syariah. The speaker 
argued that Muslims should not be responsible for national security. The sec- 
ond text is the Bank Mandiri Syariah’s signboard on Jalan Slamet Riyadi, a 
main thoroughfare in Surakarta. Bank Mandiri Syariah is one of the many 
commercial banks using the Islamic banking system, which proliferated after 
the Reformasi.
Figure 1: Signboard o f  the Mandiri 
Syariah Bank in Jalan Slamet Ri­
yadi, Surakarta 
(Source: Author’s collection)
W ES TE RN'
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Both texts deseribe how the word ‘Syariah’ entered the Indonesian public 
sphere after the Reformasi era. Surakarta is no exception. One text describes 
the demand to change the Indonesian constitution. Besides HTI, some other 
Islamic organizations and political parties ask for the implementation of 
Syariah through the state’s law. Their membership is a small proportion of the 
huge number of Indonesian Muslims, but they are highly vocal. Another text 
relates to the commodification o f Syariah to promote Islamic economie devel­
opment. Among other discourses, the discourse on Syariah highlights the reli­
gious transformation in Indonesia after the 1998 Reformasi. The research sub- 
jects of this study, the Christians in Surakarta, constitute and are constituted by 
this transformation when they talk about Muslims.
As indicated in the introduction, this study explores social identity construc- 
tion through interreligious -  particularly Christian-Muslim -  relations from a 
communicative practice theory point of view. We want to know why and under 
what conditions people, both individually and collectively, elevate their reli­
gious identity above other identities and whether or not religious identity 
threatens national identity and leads to social conflict. In this chapter we focus 
on Christians and how they speak about Muslims. When talking about Muslims 
as the ‘other’ (out-group), Christians sometimes talk about themselves (in- 
group).
The research data are mainly utterances from eight focus group discussions 
(FGDs) involving 39 Christian participants. On average each FGD involved 
five to six participants. In addition we draw from their sacred scriptures, reli­
gious books, newspapers, a handwritten letter from a candidate participant, 
flyers, cyber sources, et cetera. Apart from the religious criterion, participants 
were grouped according to three criteria. We had male and female groups, and 
within these categories we distinguished between elders and youths, and pro­
fessionals and workers. Gender-wise 21 women and 18 men attended the 
FGDs. We classify participants aged 17 to 24 as youths and those aged 50 
years and over as elders. We do not have a specific category of participants 
aged 25 to 49, but that was the age group o f most professionals and workers. 
The youngest participant attending the young group was 19 years old, while the 
oldest in the elder group was 73 years old. By professionals we mean entrepre­
neurs, managers or public servants; by workers we mean labourers, company 
employees, domestic workers, et cetera.
All participants invited to join the Christian groups were happy to partici- 
pate and none refused. Only one young Christian male cancelled his acceptance 
because he said he had another urgent commitment. However, on his own ini- 
tiative he submitted a two-page handwritten letter explaining his description of 
Muslims. We include the letter as a data source to be analysed in this chapter. 
The full text o f the letter appears at the back of this book (appendix 1).
To start the discussion in each focus group the researcher (moderator of 
FGDs) posed a basic question at an early stage of the session. This question 
was, “How do you describe Muslims?” The group then proceeded to deal with 
the issues raised by participants in response to the basic question. The main 
title of this chapter -  “normal” and “extreme” Muslims -  derives from partici­
pants’ contributions. We use those words as the title of the chapter because 
“normal” and “extreme” are key concepts in Christians’ labelling o f Muslims 
in the FGDs.
1 OescB-SptDosi
The first stage is description or the analysis o f linguistic practice, that is the 
linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). For this stage Fair­
clough (1992: 73-78, 234-237) suggests various analytic tools. Here we focus 
on vocabulary, that is wording, over-wording and rewording (altemative word­
ing). The term ‘wording’ refers to processes of wording the world, which differ 
in different times and places and among different groups o f people (Fairclough 
1992: 76-77). Over-wording is a sign o f intense preoccupation pointing to ideo- 
logical peculiarities (Fairclough 1992: 193), whereas rewording refers to new 
wordings proposed as altematives and in opposition to existing ones (Fair­
clough 1992: 194). In addition we look at metaphors. Fairclough (1992: 195) 
says: “How a particular domain of experience is mataphorized is one o f the 
stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices.” The object of analy­
sis in this linguistic practice stage is words, phrases or sentences. In our case it 
is the way Christians speak about Muslims. Analytic questions are: How do 
Christians describe Muslims? What do they say about Muslims? What words 
do they use?
1.1 AraaSysis aft micro SeveB
The micro or individual dimension o f discourse is when people speak about 
their personal lives and opinions as individual believers, for example as mem­
bers o f families, neighbourhoods or villages. Participants speak about Muslims 
as “friend”, “neighbour”, “sister”, “brother”, “relative” or “family member” . A 
participant said, “I could not have only Christian friends. I like to have Chris­
tians, Muslims, Hindus or even Buddhists as friends. And I am happy.”16
In talking about her friends a girl in the young female group described three 
o f them. She said “One Muslim is rather fanatical, two others are ordinary.”17
16 Aku juga gak bisa kok mengandalkan hanya bertemen dengan temen Kristen. Aku juga 
seneng banyak temen mbuh kuwi Kristen, Muslim, Hitidu bahkan Buddha. Dan aku seneng.
17 Yang satu agakfanatik, yang dua biasa.
She uses “fanatical” (fanatik) and “ordinary” (biasa) as identity labels. By do- 
ing so she classifies Muslims into two groups: fanatical and ordinary. Another 
participant in that group used the same words to speak about her neighbours. 
She said:
“There is a mosque [close to] my house that can be considered rather fanatical. There are two 
Muslims [neighbors] opposite o f my house. One has a stall, the other doesn’t. The one that 
has no stall goes to the fanatical mosque, sir. 1 don’t know the name o f the group. I have a 
dog. The dog often goes out. And if  it goes out, it chases people. The fanatical man often 
[throws] stones at my dog. [He] often beats it, sir. W hen my dog is outside, the one who has 
no stall and is not fanatical will even open the door [of his house, gate], He is not a dog fa- 
natic.”18
In this text the girl describes her relation with her Mulism neighbors. The 
utterance shows that in the participant’s area, the Christian residences are not 
separated but mixed with Muslim residences. It is confïrmed by later texts that 
the Christian residences sometimes close to mosques. In this text the girl men- 
tions that the non-fanatical man is “not a dog fanatic”. Using the foregoing 
classification, he is an “ordinary” Muslim. Another participant in the same 
group used the same words to define the identity of her fanatical neighbour. 
She said:
“[He is] very fanatical... I happen to have a Muslim neighbour. His Islam is from the school 
that wears pants like when people are in a flood. He is [a member of] LDII [Indonesian Is- 
lamic Dakwa Institution]... They [members o f that family] are weird, sir. I played in his 
house. I was hurt. I sat down on the sofa. But the next day [I] saw that sofa. It was [drying] in 
the sun. ... I also played with his younger sister ... I went inside the sister’s room... Then the 
next day I passed by [that house]. The bed was drying in the sun. The bed was a carrycot. 
W hy was it drying?”19
The participant describes an ambiguous inter-personal relation between her and 
the neighbor. She describes the neighbor as a “fanatical” and “weird” Muslim.
18 Di rumah saya itu kan ada masjid yang bisa dibilang agak fanatik. Di depan rumahku itu 
ada Muslim dua-duanya. Yang satu punya warung yang satu nggak. Yang gakpunya warung itu 
ke mesjid yang agak fanatik itu, Pak. Jadi aku gak tahu alirannya apa. Aku kan punya anjing. 
Anjingnya itu sering keluar. Dan kalau keluar itu sering ngejar orang. Nah sama bapabiya yang 
agak fanatik itu, dia itu kayak sering ngelempari anjing saya itu pakai batu. Sering ngusir itu 
Iho, Pak. Lha kalau bapabiya yang punya warung dan tidak terlalu fanatik itu kalau anjing saya 
di luar pintunya malah dibukain. Dia itu gak fanatik sama anjing.
19 Fanatik banget... Kebetulan saya punya tetangga Islam. Islamnya itu dari aliran yang kalau 
pakai celana itu kayak kebanjiran. Dia itu LDII. ...Mereka itu suka aneh gitupak. Saya itu main 
masuk ke rumahnya. Saya itu sakit hati. Saya duduk di sofa. Tapi masak besuk paginya itu ngeli- 
hat sofanya itu dijemur di luar ...Lalu pernah juga saya main dengan adiknya... Saya itu masuk 
ke kamar adiknya... Waktu besuknya saya lewat, kok kasurnya dijemur gitu. Kan kasurnya yang 
lipetan gitu. Eh kok dijemur.
But as their neighbor she makes relation with them, for instance by visiting 
their house and playing with them. In that text the phrase “like when people are 
in a flood” is a metaphor explaining calf-length pants. In the cited texts we see 
that when participants describe fanatical Muslims they differentiate between 
degrees o f fanaticism, such as “rather fanatical”, “fanatical” and “very fanati- 
cal” . They not only label them, but the speakers also associate them with con­
crete behaviour like the fanatical man affïliated to the fanatical mosque and the 
dog fanatic, the “very fanatical” neighbour with drying the sofa after it had 
been used by a Christian, and so forth. The words “dog fanatic” refer to a spe­
cific (not absolute) kind o f fanaticism.
The participant who cancelled his acceptance described his personal experi- 
ence of Muslim paramilitaries. He wrote, “Islamic paramilitaries, such as FPI 
[Islamic Defender Front] and LUIS [Surakarta Islamic Paramilitary Troops], 
attacked my house to break up the Bible study that we were doing.”20 In this 
text he described a cause-effect relationship between the attack of the Islamic 
paramilitaries and the holding of Bible study meetings in the house.
Another participant said: “The older sister [of my friend] who is very fanati­
cal... [is] lebay [over acting].”21 Here “lebay” is a rewording (altemative word­
ing) of “very fanatical”. The word “fanatical” was repeated again and again by 
participants in almost all group discussions, also in one and the same FGD. 
Thus it is an over-wording, indicating intense preoccupation. The participant 
who cancelled his acceptance used the word “narrow-minded” as an altemative 
for “fanatical”. He said that those narrow-minded Muslims think “...that their 
religion is the best while another religion is bad”. A male worker participant 
complained about the loud voice from the “hom ” o f the Muslim house of wor- 
ship. He said:
“My house is near the mosque. After magrib [evening prayer] Islamic songs are broadcast 
until nine or ten a clock. After that there is pengajian [preaching] and the preaching often in- 
sults other people... There is also a big mosque... [Its] loudspeaker faces my house. I heard 
that it irked my friend ... [He] took a gun [air rifle], then he shot [the loudspeaker].”22
In the rest of his utterance the speaker said that the reason people protested 
against the pengajian in the mosque is that the preacher prohibited
20 Para laskar umat islam, misal FPI atau Luis (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta)... pernah 
menyerbit rumah saya untuk membubarkan Pendalaman Alkitab yang diadakan di rumah saya.
Kakaknya itu sangatfanatik,...lebay.
22 Rumah saya deket masjid. Selesai magrib sudah lagu-lagu rohani Islam dikumandangkan 
sampai jam sembilan jam sepuluh malam. Setelah itu pengajian dan pengajiannya itu sering 
menyinggung perasaan orang lain... Satu masjid yang besar itu yang corongnya sudah pas di 
depan rumah saya... Saya pernah mendengarkan temen itu sampai jengkel. Ngambil senapan 
lalu ditembak.
“gambling”23 and the use o f “drugs” by villagers.24 That sermon “was broadcast 
[to people’s houses] loudly through the hom ”.25 The participant described how 
protesters “who are drinkers and gamblers directly went to the musholla [Mus­
lim chapel, where the pengajian was held], [They said to the preacher] if  you 
still preach like that, please do not stay in this area.”26
In talking about Muslims participants sometimes also talked about them- 
selves. A Catholic in the male worker group spoke about his “Pancasila fam- 
ily”. He said, “I myself have eight siblings. [My family is] a Pancasila family. 
There are Muslims, Christians, Catholics.”27 Another participant, a member of 
Bethel church in the female worker group, said, “My family is diverse (maje- 
muk)... There are Catholics, Christians, Muslims.”28 Both participants described 
pluralist families, but they used different words. The first speaker called this a 
“Pancasila family”, while the second spoke o f a “diverse” family. A male 
worker described diverse religions in his neighbour’s family: “The child is 
Christian, the wife is Christian, but he [the husband] is Muslim.”29
Another participant said, “We are six siblings. My oldest sibling is Muslim. 
Our parents [and my] younger siblings are Christian. He/she [my oldest sibling] 
never problematizes [our diversity], He/she accompanies [us] to Sunday 
school... When the fasting month comes, he/she [observes the fast] alone. My 
mother cooks early in the moming, asks my oldest sibling to wake up [and] 
have a meal before fasting [sahur].”30 Here the speaker described social rela­
tions in her mixed family. A young male spoke about his parents. He said:
“ [My] father is Catholic, but [my] mother converted to Christianity [from Islam]... [My] 
m other was not a devout Muslim. W hen [she] met [my] father [she] feil in love... My father 
was active in the church. Then it was impossible [for him  to convert], because [he] was al- 
ready there. However, [my] mother, who was Islam KTP [Islam by Identity Card] [and was 
not] obedient, surrendered [converted]... So [my] mother’s ID is Christian, [my] father’s ID
23 Judi.
24 Mabuk.
Dicorongkan langsungpakai hom itu kan besar.
26 Ada yang tukang mabuk, tukang main, langsung ndatangi ke mushola. Nek kowe sih ngajari 
koyok ngono, wis kowe ra sah ning lingkungan.
21 Keluarga saya sendiri ada delapan saudara. Keluarga Pancasila. Ada Muslim, ada Kristen, 
ada Katolik.
28 Keluarga saya majemuk. ..Ada yang Katolik, ada yang Kristen, ada yang Muslim.
29 Anaknya Kristen, isterinya Kristen, tapi dianya Islam.
30 Kami enam bersaudara. Yang tertua kakak saya itu memang Muslim. Orang tua kami adik- 
adike Kristen. Selama ini dia tidak mempermasalahkan. Kalau sekolah Minggu gitu dia yang 
nganterin... Kalau pas puasa, dia sendiri. Ibu saya yang masakin pagi-pagi, mbangunin kakak 
saya untuk sahur.
is Catholic.31 Their children are all Christians. I don’t know [the process], but finally... [my] 
mother repented.”32
In this utterance the participant described converting to Christianity as a kind of 
repentanee. He also mentioned that his mother was not an obedient Muslim. 
The speaker called his mother “Islam KTP”. Another person in the same group 
observed: “Thanks be to God, [my] father got [my] mother to become Chris­
tian.”33 Here the speaker said “thanks be to God” with reference to her mother’s 
conversion to Christianity, so converting to Christianity is something to be 
grateful for.
At the micro level Muslims are generally described as “good” and “toler­
ant”. Muslims and Christians live together harmoniously (social relations). 
Many utterances in FGDs reveal such coexistence in the family and the 
neighbourhood. A young female participant described the tradition of lebaran 
[an Islamic feast] in her extended family. She said, “The majority in my family 
are Muslims. During lebaran [we] gathered. There was an arisan [gathering 
and lottery].”34 A man in the worker FGD said, “When Christmas comes in my 
place [village] [we] share food [with Muslims]... When lebaran comes I also 
receive parcels [of food] from them.”35
A young female, a member of a Protestant church, said, “On the day o f Idul 
Fitri [an Islamic feast] in Klaten our whole family met, mixed, shook hands. 
There was a ziarah [pilgrimage to cemetery]. We [Christians] also joined. They 
[Muslims] pray for the spirits, but we [Christians] pray for those who are alive.
I think it is the adat [custom].”36 Here the speaker described ziarah as an adat. 
She added that Christians do not pray for spirits but for the living. Thus she 
distinguished between two different aims of prayer.
Another utterance in the elderly male group reveals a similar attitude. In 
talking about Christmas celebrations in his neighbourhood association an eld-
31 As was explained in the introduction (chapter 1, section 1.2) the Indonesian state recognizes 
six religions but distinguishes Christianity (Protestantism) and Catholicism as distinct religions.
32 Bapak Katolik, tapi ibu pindah ke Kristen... Ibu itu juga bukan Islam yang taat gitu. Waktu 
ketemu dengan bapak lalu cinta... Bapak dulu aktif di gereja. Karena itu kemungkinan kan sudah 
tidak memungkinkan, karena sudah disitu. Tapi ibu yang Islam KTP tidak taat itu sudah pasti dia 
yang mengalah... Jadi ibu KTP-nya Kristen, bapak KTP-nya Katolik. Anaknya Kristen semua. 
Gakngerti, tapi akhirnya... ibu baru bertaubat.
33 Puji Tuhan bapak bisa membawa ibu menjadi umat Kristen.
3,1 Di keluarga saya sendiri mayoritas memang Muslim. Kalau lebaran ngumpul bareng. Ada 
arisan.
3 Kalau Natalan itu tempat kami. bagi-bagi makanan... Kalau lebaran tempat saya itu juga 
dapatpaketan dari mereka.
6 Kalau hari H  Idul Fitri sih di Klaten kami sekeluarga ngumpul-ngumpul, membaur, 
bersalam-salaman gitu. Trus ada ziarah kita juga ikut.Mereka mendoakan yang sudah mati, tapi 
kami ikut berdoa mendoakan yang masih hidup. Saya kira itu adat.
erly male said, “I conducted a Christmas celebration. A Muslim [girl] who 
wears a jilbab [veil] aeted as receptionist. But [she] did not follow the ritual.”37 
By saying “[she] did not follow the ritual” he showed that even though the girl 
took part in the Christmas celebration, she did not join in the ritual.
The participants also talk about togethemess between individual Muslims 
and Christians. A young male said, “Whenever there is a prayer and Islamic 
leaming program (pengajian) in the village I join in. [I help] by carrying 
[chairs, etc.].”38 Here the speaker described his role in the Islamic prayer ser­
vice as carrying chairs, so he was not involved in the ritual part of the service. 
Another participant in the elderly female group said, “At my place, for in- 
stance, if  the Christians have services, those Muslims help [Christians], [It also 
happens] the other way around. So there is no religious boundary.”39 An elderly 
male reported, “[There was] a funeral ceremony. I was asked to make a speech 
as the representative of [my] Muslim family.”40
Another elderly male said, “When the [economie] crisis occurred, I initiated 
the prayer service in our place. That was a village service. Muslims, Christians, 
Buddhists, adherents o f indigenous beliefs (kepercayaan) attended [that ser­
vice]. We made cone rice (tumpeng).41 Then [we] prayed, taking tums. The 
prayer was for the state [security].”42 This speaker described a prayer service in 
which Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and adherents o f indigenous beliefs took 
tums to pray.
A young male participant said, “Personally I do not agree with the PDS [a 
Christian political party], For instance, ultimately [they] want to make Indone­
sia a Christian [country]... So [it is] not just [the advocacy of] Syariah by Mus­
lims [that I disagree with]... To be honest, if I listen to the Christian party, I 
don’t like [it], [I] hate [it].”43 By means of over-wording the speaker described 
his strong personal disagreement not only with Islamic parties which espouse
37 Saya pernah mengadakan Natalan. Yang jilbaban yang Muslim jadi among tamu. Tapi tidak 
mengikuti ritualnya.
38 Kalau ada pengajian saya juga ikut di desa. Bantu angkat-angkat.
39 Di tempat saya saja itu katakanlah yang punya kerja orang Kristen, tapi mereka yang 
Muslim ya mambantu, juga sebaliknya bagitu. Sehingga, batas agama itu nggak ada.
40 Kesripahan, saya sendiri diminta untuk memberikan sambutan wakil keluarga dari keluarga 
yang Islam. Jadi kita malah kerjasama.
41 Tumpeng is cone shaped rice served on a round woven bamboo tray called tampa, covered 
with banana leaf and surrounded by assorted dishes.
42 Waktu terjadi krisis, saya pernah mengadakan doa bersama di tempat kami. Itu program 
desa. Pada datang dari Muslim, Kristen, Hindu, Buddha, kepercayaan. Kita buat tumpeng. Lalu 
doanya gentenan, doanya untuk negara.
43 Aku sendiri juga gak setuju kalau partai PDS, misalnya nanti terakhirnya ingin membuat 
Indonesia jadi Kristen... Jadi bukan hanya Syariah yang dari Muslim... Jujur kalau dengar 
partai Kristen, saya malah gak suka, benei.
Syariah, but also with Christian political parties which want to make Indonesia 
a Christian country.
1.2 Analysis at mes® Bevel
The meso or institutional level of discourse is when participants speak about 
themselves as adherents o f a religious institution, hence about shared, collec- 
tive pattems of belief and practice which go beyond their personal convictions. 
In talking about Islam (the other, out-group) Christians sometimes also speak 
about their own religion, Christianity (in-group).
A participant said, “Islam is good. But it depends on the people.”44 “There is 
diversity in Islam,”45 said another participant. The prospective participant who 
cancelled his acceptance wrote, “They [Muslims] are fragmented into various 
groups.”46 A male worker said, “Muslims in Solo could be classified into two 
[groups], [There are] those [who are] nationalist Muslims... The second, actu- 
ally very few, are those [who are] hardliners.”47 A female participant in the 
elderly group made similar utterances about nationalist and radical Muslims.
Nationalist Muslim groups ... show a spirit o f tolerance toward Christians... [By contrast] we 
are afraid o f people [who advocate] radical Islam. How do we behave [towards them]? For 
instance, [they] refuse to shake hands. [When we] help to put up [their] washing line, [they] 
rewash. On the other hand, to adherents o f nationalist Islam we [behave] ordinarily.48
In this text the speaker not only uses labels (“radical” and “nationalist Islam”), 
but also cites concrete behaviour. They (Christians) behave ordinarily to na­
tionalist Muslims, but are afraid of radical Muslims. In referring to Muslims the 
speaker links identification as a radical with behaviour, namely refusal to shake 
hands with Christians.
A female worker observed, “Islam has diversities, sir. Those extremists are 
dangerous... They often attack cafes. [They do] something haphazardly ... But 
there are Muslims who want to gather with us.”49 In this text the speaker linked 
Muslim extremism with being dangerous and doing something haphazardly. 
They attack cafes and do not want to gather with Christians. Thus the speaker
44 Islam itu baik. Tapi tergantung orang-orangnya.
Islam itu beragam.
Mereka terpecah-pecah menjadi berbagai aliran.
47 Solo ini terbagi dua Muslimnya. Muslim yang nasionalis... Yang kedua, sebetulnya sedikit 
sekali, Islam yang garis keras.
Golongan orang Islam yang nasionalis kan... terhadap orang Kristen semangat toleransinya 
masih ada... Kalau terhadap orang Islam radikal kita jadi takut sendiri. Kita harus bersikap 
bagaimana. Misalnya salaman tangan saja tidak mau. Mbantu ngangkat jemuran aja sampai 
dicuci lagi. Beda kalau dengan orang Islam nasionalis kita biasa.
49 Islam itu ya macem-macem Iho, mas. Ada yang ekstrim itu Iho bahaya... Yang sok nutup 
kafe-kafe. Ngawur itu... Tetapi ada orang-orang Islam yang mau bersama-sama dengan kita.
described both the label o f extreme and the concrete behaviour associated with 
Muslim extremism. Another participant said, “ [We are] afraid to approach 
those radical Muslims.”50 If  we compare utterances in the last two paragraphs, 
we conclude that the words “hardliner” and “radical” are altematives for “ex­
tremist”. The participants distinguish between Muslim extremists and national- 
ists.
A young female participant said, “There is very fanatical Islam. There is 
still normal, ordinary [Islam].”51 Another participant used a different term, 
“proper” (wajar), saying, “To behave [as a Muslim] in society in a proper (wa­
jar) way should be natural {wajar).”51 In these texts the words “ordinary” and 
“proper” are altematives for “normal” . According to that classification, fanati­
cal Islam is not normal or proper.
Some participants talked about Islam abangan. Two participants said, “At 
my place, the majority of Muslims are Islam abangan. [They] like to gamble 
and get drunk.”53 A male worker described drinking (alcohol) as a custom 
among abangan Muslims,54 even on the night before lebaran.55 The participants 
over-worded the Muslims’ abangan attitude towards drinking, signifying in­
tense preoccupation.
A participant said, “Islam abangan is the same as Islam KTP [Islam by 
ID].”56 Another contrasted two categories: “Islam KTP” and “Islam ndeles” 
(piety). He said that Islam KTP refers to those who join the faith for pragmatic 
reasons, 57 who are “not clear”58 about ritual affairs. Islam ndeles are “really 
spiritual”59 and “obedient” Muslims.60 Another participant said, “Those [aban­
gan] Muslims never go to mosque, and [abangan Catholics] are Catholics but 
[they] never go to church. I think they are abangan,”61 This text shows that the 
word “abangan” is used not only for Muslims but also for Christians. Thus 
there are abangan Muslims and abangan Catholics/Christians. From the usage 
of the word we infer that abangan simply means Muslims or Christians who 
rarely go to their houses o f worship.
50 Kalau dengan Islam radikal takut untuk mendekat.
51 Islam itu ada yang fanatik banget, ada yang masih sebatas normal, biasa.
5‘ Hidup di masyarakatya natural saja, wajar saja.
53 Di tempat saya mayoritas Islamnya Islam abangan. Suka judi dan mabuk.
54 Mabuk.
55 Besuk lebaran malamnya.
56 Islam Abangan itu sama dengan Islam KTP.
57 Seenaknya sendiri.
58 Ora cetho.
59 Bener-bener rohani.
60 Muslim taat.
61 Muslim tapi ndak pernah ke mesjid kalau dia Katolik tapi ndakpernah ke gereja, saya kira
Participants further described social relations between Christians and Mus- 
lim fanatics/hardliners. An elderly female said, “If so-called fanatical [Mus- 
lims] are invited [by Christians] to a prayer service [they] do not want to 
[come], [If they are] invited for Christmas [they] also do not want to [come]. [If 
they are] given [food], they throw it out. So we Christians already know [that 
attitude].”62 “Those from the hardliner group ... the [gatherings of] PKK [moth- 
ers’ union], kids [gatherings], karang taruna [youth village association] they 
join. But if  there is a funeral ceremony, they do not want to accept the others 
[non-Muslims),” said a female worker.63 Another participant in the same group 
commented, “When [they are] invited to church [they] do not attend... If  [they 
are] invited to a reception at home, they [come].”64
Another participant in the same group said, “When there were celebrations 
[Christmas or Easter] we invited [Muslims] ... They [Muslims] came to the 
reception part. [They] chose [to attend at] a certain time. [If] the ritual was still 
going on, they didn’t come ... They came after the ritual.”65 Another participant 
in the same group responded, “When halal-bi-halal [an Islamic feast] [was 
held] [all] the villagers [came], including Christians. Yes, all attend [the ser­
vices] from beginning to end.”66 The last two texts describe a difference be­
tween Muslims and Christians with respect to accepting invitations from mem- 
bers of the other religious community. A female worker said:
“At my place [there is] a mosque which people call [the mosque] o f  hardliners. Or [they use] 
other labels. Once someone with his pants hitting the floor [long pants] prayed [sholat]... Af­
ter he had prayed [the floor] was cleaned. It [the mosque] belongs to a certain group. They 
[members o f that mosque] wear pants that, sorry [to say], are rather short [calf-length pants], 
There may be a teaching [in that group] which forbids them to say merry [Christmas]... I f  
they are too close to non-Muslims, they are called kafir [by other members o f that group].”67
62 Istilahnya fanatik sebut saja, diundang ke persekutuan tidak mau. Diundang ke Natalan juga 
tidakmau. Diberiya dibuang. Jadi, kita umat Nasrani Kristen itu sudah maklum.
63 Aliran garis keras... Untuk PKK, anak-anak, karang taruna, mereka ikut. Tapi ketika ada 
kematian mereka tidak mau menerima keberadaan orang lain.
Kalau diundang ke gereja gak mau datang... Kalau diundang resepsi di rumah saja, datang.
65 Di tempat kami di RW  atau di kelurahan itu, kalau ada perayaan kan kita undang itu. 
...Mereka itu datangnya itu pada saat resepsinya. Nanti pilih waktu sendiri, nanti wah ini 
kebaktian, dia tidak datang... Dia akan datang kalau sesudah perayaan.
66 Kalau Halal-bi-Halal, itu satu kampung, termasuk yang Kristen, ya semua dari awal sampai 
akhir.
Di tempat saya, mesjid aliran tertentu yang orang banyak bilang aliran keras atau apa ya. 
Pernah ada orang yang Sholat di situ yang celananya menyentuh lantai... Setelah sholat 
langsung dibersihin... Itu aliran tertentu. Mereka pakai celana yang, maaf, agak ke atas. 
Mungkin ada ajaran ndak boleh mengucapkan Selamat (Natal)... Kalau mereka terlalu bergaul 
dengan orang Non-Muslim, dibilangin kafir.
Another participant said, “There is a mosque opposite my grandmother’s 
house. My grandmother’s driver [a Muslim] prays there. As soon as [he] has 
prayed [the mosque] is immediately cleaned.”68 “When I go there [to my rela- 
tive’s house, who is a Muslim fanatic], I am asked to wash my hands,”69 said a 
participant. A female participant said, “Those males [fanatical Muslims] do not 
want to shake hands [with women].”70 These last utterances described two types 
o f social relations: first, relations between hardliner Muslims and other Mus­
lims outside their group; second, relations between them and Christians.
In the young male and female FGDs the participants talked about different 
types o f veils (jilbab).
“The jilbaber women, their jilbab  are very, very big. ... [just like] a bed sheet wom as a 
jilbab.”1'
“Every Friday jilbaber held demonstrations. They occurred often, either in Slamet Riyadi 
Street or elsewhere.”72
“There was ... a Muslim family and she [the woman in that family] wore burqa (cadar). One 
day a washing line with wet laundry collapsed, sir. Then my uncle [a Christian] tried to help 
by taking and putting up [the washing line]. She rewashed the clothes.”73
“A pious Muslim woman [on my campus] wears jilbab. It is the modest jilbab, not the burqa. 
It is the modest one. Although she is pious, she shows great tolerance towards other reli­
gions.”74
In the foregoing texts the participants distinguished between three kinds of 
veils: jilbaber, burqa and modest jilbab. The suffix -er in the word “'jilbaber” 
indicates a person wearing a jilbab. The speaker does not apply this word to 
any woman wearing a veil, but only to Muslim women wearing “very, very 
large”yï/èaè. The words “a bed sheet worn as a jilbab” are sarcastic, describing 
an excessively large veil. The words “to rewash” wet clothes that have been 
touched by Christians are comparable with similar texts quoted previously. 
Using that classification, a woman wearing a burqa is a radical Muslim (cf.
Ada masjid di depan rumah nenek saya. Sopirnya tadi kan sholat di situ. Lalu habis sholat 
langsung dilap.
69 Waktu saya ke sana, saya disuruh cuci tangan.
70 Yang laki-laki tidak mau salaman.
71 Cewekjilbaber, jilbabe gede-gede banget. ... Ki sprei dipakai jilbaban.
Setiap hari Jumat jilbaber itu beraksi. Itu sering, entah di Slamet Riyadi, entah di apa. Demo 
setiap hari Jumat.
73 Ada keluarga Muslim dan pakai cadar. Suatu saat ada jemuran yang jatuh Iho Pak. Lha 
terus maksudnya pamanku tho nek tibo yo diambilke dibalekke. Itu dicuci lagi sama dia.
Muslim yang taat pakai jilbab. Jilbab yang modis. Bukan yang cadar. Jadi yang modis. 
Meskipun dia taat, tapi toleransinya juga besar pada agama lain.
previous classification o f radical and nationalist Muslims). By adding the word 
“although” in the last utterance the speaker contrasted piety and tolerance.
In regard to typical dress of fanatical Muslim men, a participant said, 
“Those fanatics... wear calf-length pants (celana cingkrang), [they] do not [be- 
have] properly, [they] wear koko shirts, [they] wear kopyah [hats].”75 Another 
participant commented, “The Bali bombers, they are very [anti-]West, they also 
hate Christians very much. They wear turbans, [have] beards, very long beards, 
[wear] head covering, and also [wear] what is called waistcoats.”76 In this last 
text the speaker links the Bali bombers with anti-Western and anti-Christian 
sentiments and a particular style o f dress. The word “very” in the phrases “hate 
[the West, Christians] very much” and “very long beards” suggests strong in- 
tention. With reference to certain types of dress some participants observed, 
“They want to imitate their prophet, prophet Muhammad”77 and “The prophet 
Muhammad is imitated exactly” .78
A participant said, “[Why] is his [Muhammad’s] teaching obeyed slavishly 
(,mentah-mentah)?”79 “In Arabia or Egypt this [style of dress] may protect [you] 
from dust, from hot weather. But in Indonesia it is not proper,”80 said a partici­
pant. Another participant mentioned, “[Their way of dressing] is disgusting. 
According to me, they should wear ordinary (biasa) clothes.”81 In the phrase 
“their prophet, prophet Muhammad” the speaker described Muhammad as 
“their” prophet, not ours. In the text the participant explains that such clothes 
are appropriate in Arabia or Egypt, but not in Indonesia. It is not ordinary dress 
but disgusting. Here the speaker contrasts two words: ordinary and disgusting. 
The word ‘disgusting’ (nggilani) is a rude expression in the Javanese language.
The participant who cancelled his acceptance made the following statement 
in his letter:
“Sometimes I feel sorry (kasihan) for Muslims because they are fragmented into various 
groups. This is because their understanding of the holy book is different and because most 
Muslims obey what their leaders say [they treat their leaders as if  they were prophets] even 
though their leaders may not be right. For example, the santri [students] at Pesantren Ngruki
75 Yang fanatik... pakai celana cingkrang, gak anggah-ungguh, bajunya pakai koko, pakai 
kopyah.
76 Pelaku bom Bali, mereka kan sangat apa namanya Barat, orang Kristen, dia juga sangat 
benei. Mereka berpakaian itu pake apa surban, jenggot, jenggot sangat lebat, penutup kepala, 
sampe yang namanya rompi.
Mereka itu mencontoh nabi mereka, Nabi Muhammad.
Nabi Muhammad itu dicontoh persis plek.
Ajarannya kok dimakan mentah-mentah.
80 Kalau di Arab apa di Mesir itu kan bisa melindungi dari debu, dari panas. Lha kalau di 
Indonesia kan kurang pas.
Nggilani, menurutku, wongya biasa aja gitu kan kalau berpakaian.
think that B a’asyir is always right, so they really look up to him and ignore the fact that he is 
a human being who has faults and weaknesses.”82
In his letter he calls the followers stupid,83 because “they are willing to be en- 
slaved”84 by the leader, “to fight against Christians”85 or “to go to war”. A male 
worker (Catholic) said something different: “If  religion came [through] adapt- 
ing the [local] culture, [then] there is no conflict. Because Christianity, Catholi- 
cism, Islam all came from abroad... If  they implement [Islam in] Arabic [style] 
in Solo, conflict is sure to happen.”86 From the linguistic features o f the text the 
speaker linked the practice o f Arabic-style Islam with conflict. The phrase “be 
enslaved” is in the passive voice and is a highly sarcastic metaphor indicating 
blind obedience to the leader.
Several participants in the male worker group talked about two different 
kinds of Muslims and their social relations with Christians. “Muslims who are 
new leamers about Islam, they show their egoism and they perceive themselves 
as the most proper,”87 said one of them. Another observed, “People who are just 
leaming [Islam], they show their fanaticism”.88 By contrast a participant said, 
“Those who are deeply educated in Islam have a better understanding of human 
relations”89 and “they can assimilate with us”.90 Here the speakers suggested 
that the deeper Muslims’ knowledge o f Islam, the more harmoniously they live 
with others. Conversely, the more limited their knowledge, the more fanatical 
and egoistic they are.
Participants said that Muslims refuse to give seasonal greetings to Chris­
tians. A female worker said, “Everyday relations [between Muslims and Chris­
tians] are good. But when Christmas comes [they] never say merry Christ- 
mas.”91 An elderly male participant commented, “During lebaran we some- 
times say happy Idul Fitri. But why do none [of the Muslims] give a greeting at
For the complete letter, see: appendix 1.
83 Bodoh.
84 Mereka mau diperbudak.
85 Memerangi Umat Kristiani.
86 Kalau agama masuk menyesuaikan dengan budaya, tidak akan terjadi konflik. Karena 
agama Kristen, Katolik, Islam, itu dari luar semua... Kalau mereka terapkan yang dari Arab di 
Solo, itu pasti terjadi konflik.
87 Orang Islam yang Islamnya baru belajar, justru dia memberikan semacam ini ya 
keakuannya dan merasa dia yang paling benar.
Orang-orang yang baru belajar, justru mengeluarkan kefanatikannya.
89 Orang yang mendalam dalam pendidikan agama Islam itu justru lebih memahami hubungan 
antar manusia.
Mereka justru bisa membaur dengan kami.
91 Hubungan setiap harinya itu bagus. Tapi kalau Natal itu, tidak pernah acapan selamat 
Natal.
Christmas?”92 Also: “We went to our grandfather ... when Idul Fitri came... 
[We] follow the sungkeman.93 But at Christmas [our Muslim relatives] never 
greet us [merry Christmas].”94 “During [the month] o f fasting [we] always put 
up a banner in front o f our church saying “happy fasting”. [There are also ban- 
ners saying] “happy Idul Fitri Mohon M aaf Lahir Batin” [we wish/beg for for- 
giveness]. But on their side there is no response [when Muslims convey similar 
greetings],”95 said an elderly male participant. “Mohon Maaf Lahir Batin” [we 
wish/beg for forgiveness] is a Standard Indonesian Idul Fitri greeting.
Speaking about extremists, a participant contrasted their style of dress 
(white kopyah, long white dress, etc.) with their attitude. She said, “Many peo- 
ple wearing that typical dress give [me] the impression that [they are] pious, 
worshipful people ... [But, they] suddenly [yell] Allahu Akbar (the great God), 
then break something, then bum something.”96 In this text, the speaker linked 
typical Muslim dress with yells of Allahu Akbar and violent acts (break- 
ing/buming things).
However, a Catholic participant said, “Javanese Islam is not like that [vio­
lent], They must be influenced by something from outside that enters Solo. So 
these Javanese Muslims of Solo, we know they [observe] Javanese culture. 
Their tolerance ... is strong enough.”97 Here the speaker links Javanese Islam 
and Javanese Muslims with Javanese culture and tolerance of others (social 
cognition). The same participant commented, “Religion must enter [society] 
through local culture. I f  the culture is abandoned, there will be conflict.”98 In 
this utterance the speaker intimates that mixing religion with local culture 
would prevent conflict.
We have pointed out that in describing Islam or the Muslim community 
Christian participants sometimes also described their own religion or the Chris-
52 Pada waktu lebaran kadang-kadang kita itu sok mengucapkan Selamat Idul Fitri. Tetapi 
mengapa di saat Natal, mengapa tidak ada seorangpun yang mengucapkan.
93 Sungkeman is the Javanese ceremony during Idul Fitri in which the young people pay respect 
to the elder people. Usually the young people bend down in front o f and kiss the hand o f  the 
elder people.
94 Kami datang ke kakek kami... saat idul fitri... Ikut sungkeman... Tapi kalau saat Natal itu gak 
pernah ada ucapan.
Waktu puasa itu selalu di dalam gereja Selamat Menunaikan Ibadah puasa, pakai sepanduk 
di depan gereja. Selamat Hari Raya Idul Fitri Mohon M aaf Lahir dan Batin. Tapi di sisi lain 
tanggap responnya kok...
96 Banyak orang yang pakai seperti itu kan kesane itu khusuk beribadah... Tiba-tiba Allahu 
Akbar kokyo mecahi kaca, trus bakar opo-bakar opo.
97 Kalau Islamnya Jawa sebetulnya tidak seperti itu. Itu mestinya ada masukan dari orang luar 
yang tnasuk ke Solo. Jadi kalau Muslim Jawa Solo itu kita sama-sama tahu, budaya Jawa. 
Toleransinya... cukup kuat.
98 Agama masuk itu harus melalui budaya setempat. Kalau budaya ditinggalkan, pasti akan 
terjadi konflik.
tian community. At meso or institutional level they indicated that Christians 
should love others. An elderly male said, “Love others as you love your- 
self!”"A  young female asked, “Why don’t we love [others]...? When you are 
slapped on your right cheek, give your left cheek [as well].”100 A young male 
participant said, “ [I] pray for them [Muslims] because [I] love [them].”101
A participant said, “In a pluralistic society you have to be the salt [of the 
earth], and at the same time be the candle, the light.”102 The metaphor “you 
have to be the salt” indicates that Christians must serve others (social cogni- 
tion). It is also an altemative wording of “candle” and “light”. Some partici­
pants talked about what Christians should do when Muslims oppress them. A 
participant said, “Pray for those who hate you!”103 A female professional com- 
mented, “When we are oppressed... [we must] pray for those who hate us!”104 
Some participants claimed that they are also challenged by other Christian 
groups. They talked about a new wave of Christianity. A male worker referred 
to his Christian friend, who maintained that “it [our church] is wrong according 
to the Bible... Even [our] way of baptism is considered wrong.”105 An elderly 
male said:
“My Christian friends have an inappropriate understanding. The inappropriateness is that 
they always say that to live [in a Christian way] they must practise the faith slavishly, slav- 
ishly... Usually that is a problem we have with our Muslim brothers... Radicalism in Christi­
anity exists, exists. Secondly, something that creates problems with our Muslim brothers, it 
could be said that an evangelical group or a certain church is not sensitive to the surround- 
ings, is not sensitive to the surroundings.”106
In the text the speaker repeats the words “exists” and “is not sensitive to the 
surroundings” . These are over-wordings indicating the significance of those 
words. In this text the speaker relates slavish understanding o f Christianity to 
radicalism. The same participant said, “They just get to page two or three [of 
the Bible], [then they] think they have fmished. But there are still hundreds of
99 Kasihilah sesamamu sebagaimana dirimu sendiri.
100 Mengapa kita tidak mengasihi... Saat kamu ditampar pipi kananmu, berikan pipi kirimu.
' 1 Saat umat Muslim berpuasa, saya juga berpuasa dan berdoa untuk mereka mengasihi.
102 Di masyarakat yang majemuk, kamu harus menjadi garam, dan pada saat bersamaan 
menjadi lilin, penerang.
,<b Doakan orang-orangyang membenci kamu.
104 Ketika kita ditekan... Doakan orang-orang yang membenci kamu.
105 Ini menurut Al-Kitab itu salah... Sampai baptisanpun dianggap salah.
106 Temen-temen Kristen ada yang mempunyai pemahaman yang kurang tepat. Kurang tepatnya 
adalah dia selalu berbicara bahwa aplikasi kehidupan itu harus mengaplikasikan iman secara 
mentah, secara mentah. Kalau gini yo gini...Sering-sering itu yang menjadi kendala bagi 
saudara-saudara kami yang Muslim... Radikalisme di dalam Kristen ada, ada....Yang kedua 
yang menjadi kendala saudara-saudara kami di Muslim katakanlah kelompok evangelical atau 
gereja tertentu tidakpeka lingkungan, tidakpeka lingkungan.
pages after that.”107 This speaker considers the understanding o f evangelical and 
radical Christians imperfect. The utterance about radical Christians is compara- 
ble with the previous reference to fanatical Muslims: “Those with a deep edu- 
cation in Islam have a better understanding of human relations.”
1.3 Auiaiysis at macro level
The macro or societal level of discourse is when participants speak about them- 
selves as members o f Solo society, as citizens o f Indonesia, or about interna­
tional issues. They talked about freedom (kebebasan) as something new in 
Indonesian life after the Reformasi in 1998. A male professional said, “Free­
dom has broadened, opened up more. Formerly there was oppression.”108 He 
classified the New Order era as an era of oppression and the Reformasi as an 
era of freedom.
A participant said, “In the govemment bureaucracy... it was diffïcult for 
non-Muslims to occupy [a high] position.”109 But after Reformasi, another par­
ticipant said, “In Solo we fortunately have a leader [mayor] who is a Muslim 
[and] another [vice mayor] who is a Catholic.”110 The two texts describe the 
different positions Christians held in the bureaucracy before and after Refor­
masi. The word “fortunately” shows that having a Christian vice mayor is aus- 
picious for Christians. An elderly male said, “Solo is an interesting example [in 
politics]. Among the leaders, the mayor is Muslim, the vice mayor is Catholic. 
In the past I never saw a big Christmas celebration in the city hall.”111 In this 
text the speaker sees a relation between the position of a Catholic vice mayor 
and the opportunity to hold a big Christmas celebration in the city hall.
However, some participants said that freedom stimulates the emergence of 
Muslim extremism. Freedom implies “whatever is free”,112 said a participant. 
Freedom also leads to “violence” (kekerasan). A male professional said, “To 
open the door of democracy on a large scale nowadays makes the dominant 
people able to do whatever they want. Because they think they are not chal- 
lenged.”113 Here the speaker relates the introduction of large-scale democracy to 
scope for the dominant group (majority) to act arbitrarily. An elderly female 
described a similar situation using different vocabulary: “free in the wild
107 Dia membaca baru sampai halaman dua atau tiga dia merasa sudah khatam. Padahal masih 
ada sekian ratus halaman di belakangnya lagi.
108 Kebebasan semakin diperluas, semakin dibuka. Kalau dulu kan ada tekanan.
109 Di pemerintahan... non-Muslim itu sulit untuk menduduki jabatan.
110 Di Solo ini utungnya kita punya pimpinan satunya Islam satunya Katolik.
111 Solo ini bisa menjadi contoh menarik. Pemimpinnya, walikotanya Islam, wakil walikotanya 
Katolik. Itu dulu saya gak pernah merasakan Natalah besar-besaran seperti ini di balai kota.
112 Apa-apa ini bebas.
113 Membuka besar-besaran pintu demokrasi sekarang ini membuat orang yang dominan lebih 
bisa berbuat semaunya. Karena mereka merasa tidak mendapatkan halangan.
sense”.114 This is an altemative wording of the phrase “whatever is free” and 
people who “are able to do whatever they want”. A male worker described acts 
of violence during the 1998 riots. He said:
“The mail o f Ratu [and the mail of] Luwes belong to Chinese. [The masses shouted] they be- 
long to Chinese. Just loot [them]! Just loot [them]! [They] belong to Chinese... [They] 
thought like that, like that. Because there was division between Javanese and Chinese. [It 
was] old vengeance. A long time ago Javanese were labourers o f the Chinese.” 115
This text describes violence during the 1998 riots and illustrates the subject 
position of Javanese who take “old vengeance” on the Chinese. The identity of 
Javanese is that o f employees o f Chinese employers. Besides acts of violence 
during these riots, some participants referred to attacks and raids by radical 
Muslims on Christian places o f worship. A participant said:
“I live in the south of Solo. That [place] is very close to Ngruki. They [Muslims at the 
Ngruki pesantren] are Islamic radicals... [A group o f Muslims] from Ngruki suddenly at- 
tacked the place [of worship], They forced that place to close down and be forbidden to wor­
ship.”116
In this text the speaker labelled Muslims at the pesantren o f Ngruki Islamic 
radicals (social position). Another participant said, “This is a Pancasila state. 
Everyone has freedom of worship. But why was there a raid to force the clo- 
sure of that place o f worship? ... That [place] is not in their region. Ngruki be- 
longs to Sukoharjo. That [place] belongs to Solo.”117 In the second utterance the 
participant described Indonesia as a Pancasila state where everyone should 
have freedom of worship. She also classified an inside and an outside region: 
those radical Muslims are from Sukoharjo, not from Solo.
A young male participant observed, “The [New Order] govemment had 
authority... But now the [Reformasi] govemment is defeated by words like 
Reformasi and freedom.”118 In this text the speaker linked authority with the 
New Order govemment, and absence of authority with the Reformasi govem­
ment. He also combined the words “Reformasi” and “freedom” into something
114 Bebas dalam arti liar.
115 Mali Ratu, Luwes itu yang punya China. Wuh kuwi nggone Cino. Dijarah wae! Jarah wae! 
Nggone Cino... Seperti itu berpikirnya, seperti itu. Karena ada batas antara Jawa dan China. 
Dendam sejak dulu. Sejak dulu itu orang Jawa itu menjadi bawahannya orang China.
116 Saya tinggal di Solo selatan. Itu sangat dekat sekali dengan Ngruki. Itu kan Islam radikal 
ya... Dari Ngruki itu tiba-tiba menyerbu tempat itu. Mereka memaksa tempat itu ditutup dan 
tidak boleh lagi ada ibadah.
117 Ini kan negara Pancasila. Setiap orang kan bebas untuk beribadah. Tapi kenapa harus ada 
yang namanya penggrebekan, penutupan secara paksa... Itu kan bukan kawasan mereka. Kalau 
Ngruki itu kan Sukoharjo. Itu kan kawasan kota Solo.
118 Pemerintah memang memiliki otoritas... Tapi sekarang itu pemerintah itu sudah kalah 
dengan yang namanya kata-kata Reformasi dan kebebasan.
that undermines govemment authority. By contrast an elderly female said, 
“Those [Muslims] extremists are very dangerous. Those [who] force cafes tó 
close down are distracted.”119 The two speakers linked extreme Muslims with 
acts of violence, for instance forcing cafes to close down. A male professional 
said, “Nowadays it is probably very difficult to stop them [extremists] [from 
perpetrating acts of violence].”120
Some participants talked about the image Solo has among people elsewhere. 
“I went to East Java for several months. I was asked [by someone], from where 
are you, brother? [I answered] from Solo. Wow, [that is] a terrorist city. I am 
very surprised,”121 said a male worker. In this text the speaker described some­
one identifying Solo as a terrorist city. Another participant in the same group 
talked about a Muslim wearing a shirt with the slogan “Fuck Terrorist”.122 The 
words were in English. He said, “They [Muslims] also disagree with the Is- 
lamic notions of the hardliners, the radicals.”12’ In terms of our previous classi- 
fication the speaker indicated that “normal” Muslims disagree with the Islamic 
perspective o f hardliners and radical Muslims.
Besides acts o f violence in the Reformasi era, participants also talked about 
the lack of Pancasila in society. “Pancasila was never promoted again,”124 said a 
participant. On the contrary, the same participant pointed out, “There is politi- 
cization [of Islam], Everything related to Islam is continually promoted. [It is] 
said that this country will end up an Islamic state.”125 In this text the participant 
described how an Islamic state would replace the Pancasila state.
A participant said, “The first pillar o f Pancasila is Lordship. We have God, 
whom each o f us perceives as ultimate. But each o f us has our own understand- 
ing. [We are] united by the element o f [Indonesian] culture.”126 This speaker 
suggests that Pancasila permits people to have different interpretations of God. 
He also mentions Indonesian culture as an element unifying diversity. An eld­
erly male claimed, “As a [state] ideology Pancasila is nothing but the best.”127 
Another participant in the same group said, “Pancasila is like colourful flowers
119 Yang ekstrim itu Iho bahaya, yang sok nutup kafe-kafe. Ngawur itu.
120 Saat ini dirasa sangat susah menghentikan mereka.
121 Saya pernah jalan beberapa bulan lalu ke Jawa Timur. Saya ditanya dari mana mas? Dari 
Solo. Who, kota teroris. Wah saya kaget.
122 Fuck Terrorist.
123 Mereka juga tidak setuju pandangan-pandangan Islam yang mungkin garis keras gitu, radi- 
kal.
124 Pancasila tidak didengung-dengungkan lagi.
125 Ada politisasi. Hal-hal yang menyangkut keislaman itu didengung-dengungkan terus 
menerus. Pernah terdengar juga kalau negara ini akhirnya nanti mau dijadikan negara Islam.
126 Unsur dari Pancasila kan satu ketuhanan itu. Sama-sama kita punya Tuhan masing-masing 
yang kita akui Yang Maha segalanya. Tapi masing-masing kita punya pemahaman sendiri- 
sendiri. Disatukan oleh unsur budaya.
127 Sebagai ideologi, Pancasila itu tidak ada bandingannya.
[in the garden], I f  all are red, they are not beautiful. [The beautiful one is the 
one that] is next to yellow, green and red ones.”128 The speaker described Pan- 
casila using a metaphor that refers to accommodation of diversity and coexist- 
ing with others.
Some participants described the identity of Muslims as anti-Pancasila. 
Christian identity, on the other hand, is described as pro-Pancasila. A male 
professional mentioned, “Christians have a deeper spirit of Pancasila than them 
[Muslims].”129 The same person added, “Christians appreciate diversity more 
[than Muslims].”130 “Those who recognize [themselves] as Christians, [they] 
appreciate the condition of pluralism, diversity more. It rarely [happens] that 
[Christians] are very, very extreme like Muslims,”131 said another participant. 
Here the word “pluralism” is an altemative for the word “diversity” . The ex- 
pression “very, very extreme” is an over-wording.
A participant commented, “Some [Islamic] educational institutions are anti 
that [Pancasila]. Moreover, I heard that Ngruki [name of pesantren] does not 
recognize Pancasila. They refuse to respect the [national] flag, state Symbol.”132 
A woman worker said, “Because [they are] over fanatical they consider them­
selves to be better than others. They impose their beliefs [on others], which 
should not happen in the Pancasila state.”133 In this text the speaker identified 
Indonesia as a Pancasila state. The word “fanatical” is used again.
An elderly male said, “The majority [of Muslims] wants [Syariah] to be 
included in the constitution. If  the Jakarta Charter were included, Pancasila 
would change.”134 A young male averred, “The Indonesian state does not have 
only one religion, [but] several religions. If [Indonesia] wanted to [create] a 
Syariah [state], it would be very difficult.”135 Here the participant points out the 
problem of a Syariah state in the context of Indonesian religious diversity. An­
other participant in the same group said, “ [Rather than a] Syariah state ... Pan-
128 Pancasila itu seperti bunga yang berwarna-warni. Kalau merah semua kan nggak baik. Bisa 
berdampingan kuning, hijau, merah.
Orang-orang Kristen itu lebih punya nafas Pancasila daripada mereka.
Orang Kristiani itu lebih bisa menghargai kondisi perbedaan.
1 Orang-orang yang mengaku Kristiani itu lebih bisa menghargai kondisi pluralisme, 
perbedaan. Kayaknya jarang sekali yang kayak Muslim sangat ekstrim sekali.
12 Lembaga-lembaga pendidikan tertentu itu kan anti seperti itu. Bahkan saya dengar kalau di 
Ngruki itu gak mau mengakui Pancasila. Mereka gak mau hormat bendera. Mereka memahami- 
nya sempit sekali mengenai bendera, lambang negara.
133 Karena fanatik berlebihan, dia menganggap dirinya lebih benar dari yang lain. Dia 
memaksakan kepercayaannya yang seharusnya tidak terjadi di negara Pancasila.
134 Mayoritas penginnya kan mau dimasukkan ke perundang-undangan.Misalnya Piagam 
Jakarta kan mau dimasukkan. Pancasila pengin diubah.
135 Negara Indonesia kan agamanya gak cuma satu, lebih dari beberapa agama. Kalau mau 
dijadiin Syariah, ya sangat susah sekali.
casila should be prioritized.”136 This speaker points out a contradiction between 
a Syariah state and the state ideology of Pancasila, thus applying another par­
ticipant’s classification: “Pancasila state contrasts with Syariah state”.
Moreover, if  Syariah were to be included in the constitution, a participant 
said, “Bali [people] want to separate [from Indonesia], North Celebes [people] 
want to separate, Papua [people] want to separate.”137 A participant commented, 
“If Islamic Syariah [were implemented], [Indonesia] w ouldbe like purely Ara- 
bia [or] Pakistan.”138 Another said, “The Syariah bank is from the Middle 
East.”139 The participants repeated the words “Pancasila state” and “Syariah 
state”. They over-worded those terms, revealing intense preoccupation. A par­
ticipant said:
“My m other’s extended family is Muslim. My father’s are all Christians. One night [we] 
watched television at [our] grandma’s house... [We] watched the fighting o f Israël and Pales- 
tine [programme], Then [we] discussed. They [Muslims] thought that the Israeli-Palestinian 
war was a religious war ... It is a fact that sixty percent o f Israëli people are Christians. It is 
taken for granted by [them, Muslims] that Christians are friends o f Israel. [We] must disagree 
with that [idea], [When I] look for [information] on the internet it also says that Christians 
are henchman of Israel. [It was mentioned there] that Jews and Christians [are] those who 
colonize our [Muslim] friends in Palestine.”140
This text describes Jews and Christians as colonizers of Palestinian Muslims. 
Another participant said, “[The Israeli-Palestinian war] involves Islam and 
Jews. But they [Muslims] understand it as a war between Islam and Christian- 
ity.”141 “If there is a conflict abroad ... they [Muslims] feel solidarity with them 
[other Muslims abroad]. Because they are of the same faith,”142 said another 
participant. This participant described how Muslims feit solidarity based on the 
same faith beyond Indonesian territory. Another participant commented, 
“[Muslims] easily say that America is kafir.”143 In this text the participant main-
136 Negara Syariah... Pancasila seharusnya diutamakan.
137 Bali ingin pisah, Sulawesi selatang ingin pisah, Papua ingin pisah.
138 Jika Syariah Islam, akan jadi murni Arab, Pakistan.
139 Bank Syariah itu dari Timur Tengah.
140 Keluarga besar saya dari orang tua yang dari ibu saya kan Muslim. Terus dari bapak saya 
itu semuanya Kristen. Pernah suatu saat malem itu nonton di TV di rumah nenek itu, bu Lik saya 
kan Kristen, melihat pertikaian antara Israel dan Palestina. Setelah itu lama-lama trus ngobrol, 
jadi pandangan mereka tentang perang Israel Palestina itu adalah perang agama... Kenyataane 
kan Palestina itu enampuluh persen Kristen. Secara pandangane umum, Kristen itu temane 
Israel. Bener-bener harus dibantah seperti itu. Browsing-browsing internet juga itu ada vang 
intinya bahwa umat Kristen itu anteknya Israel. Itu yang menjajah teman kita Palestina itu.
141 Itu kan Islam sama Yahudi. Tapi pemahamannya kan perang Islam sama Kristen.
14 Kalau ada konflik di luar negeri... Tenggang rasanya itu malah ke mereka. Karena mereka 
itu saudara seiman.
Dengan mudahnya mengatakan Amerika itu kafir.
tained that Muslims apply the term “kafir ” not as religious vocabulary but to a 
country (America).
In places where fanatical, extreme and radical Muslim groups exist Chris­
tians have difficulty maintaining or building churches. An elderly male partici­
pant said, “In radical areas on the border o f Sukoharjo, [especially close to 
pesantren] Ngruki, we know for a fact that our churches experience difficulties 
when their members want to worship.”144 In this text the participant repeats the 
word pesantren “Ngruki”, also mentioned by other participants. It is an over­
wording.
A male professional mentioned, “There are several locations where these 
groups exist. [I] mean places where very fanatical [Muslims] live... [We] just 
want to build a church. [It is] very, very difficult.”145 Again the speaker relates 
the presence of fanatical Muslims in such localities to the difficulty of building 
a Christian church. By adding the word “just” the speaker indicates that build­
ing a church is a basic need for a Christian community. The repetition of the 
word “very” in the phrase “very, very difficult” is an over-wording indicating 
extreme difficulty o f building a Christian church. Another participant in the 
same group said, “They are very extreme. If  there are churches in the area, 
[they are] raided”.146 This speaker not only used the label “extreme”, but also 
cited a concrete example o f extreme behaviour by Muslims, namely raiding 
churches.
Some participants talked about state regulations that discriminate against 
Christians.14' A male professional described it as follows:
“ [We have] difficulty building a church... W hen we want to develop [our community], [the 
others] obstruct it. I think this [situation] is a new thing, sir. In the past it was different. When 
I was a university student there were many small churches here [but no problems], When I 
was child there were many [churches], [But] after Reformasi [the problems] began to appear. 
[Churches] must have [state] permission... Basically [Muslims] look for arguments [to stop 
Christians developing]... But they do not check whether [every] mosque has permission or 
not. That is also [our] question: why do only Christian [churches] have their permission re- 
stricted?”148
144 Radikalisme di daerah-daerah yang berbatasan dengan Sukoharjo, Ngruki, dan kami tahu 
persis gereja-gereja di lingkungan kami ada kesulitan-kesulitan warganya untuk menjalankan 
ibadah.
145 Ada beberapa tempat-tempat tertentu yang ada basis-basis tertentu. Artinya ya yang dihuni 
lingkungan-lingkungan yang sangatfanatik...Mau mendirikan gereja saja sangat sulit sekali.
146 Mereka sangat ekstrim. Jadi seumpama ada gereja di situ digrebek.
Mendiskriminasikan orang-orang Kristen.
14 Kesulitan mendirikan gereja... Mengapa kita ingin berkembang kok ada yang menghalangi. 
Kayaknya yang seperti itu baru-baru aja sich Pak. Kalau yang dulu-dulu beda. Waktu saya 
masih kuliah juga banyak sich gereja-gereja kecil disini. Waktu saya kecil banyak.Baru waktu 
Reformasi itu kelihatan sekali. Haruspakai ijin... Pokoknya cari alasan... Tapi gakpada melihat
The speaker mentions building a church as a way to develop the Christian 
community. Muslims are described as obstructing that development by ques- 
tioning the church’s licence to do so. The speaker points out a difference be- 
tween the situation when he was a child and a university student (before Re- 
formasi), and the situation after Reformasi. The problems came afiter Refor- 
masi. The restriction only applies to churches, not to mosques. In another FGD 
a participant described such a situation as “discrimination”.149
An elderly female participant stated that those who refuse having a church 
in Banyuanyar “are not community members from [that place], If there are 
members of the community from there, [they are] only one or two.”150 Another 
participant in the same FDG said, “They are from another place. Not all of 
them are villagers from Banyuanyar.”131 Both speakers said that the challenge 
comes from outsiders, not from members of the local community. An elderly 
male talked about perpetrators of acts of violence in Solo. He said, “In fact they 
are not from Solo, but from outside, from Sukoharjo.”152 “If people from out- 
side did not enter Solo... there would be no conflict [between Muslims and 
Christians],”153 said another participant. Another elderly male said the follow- 
ing:
“We had an experience in Jebres. This is an interesting and very touching experience. A cer­
tain group from outside, Muslims from outside Jebres, wanted to close the church [in my vil- 
lage], But villagers from there, they are our Muslim brothers. [The Street] was blocked. [The 
attackers] were forbidden [to enter the village]... Because the church is also used for PKK 
(village mothers’ union) activities every week except on Sunday, such as Posyandu [child 
health care]... In fact our [Muslim] brothers also care [about us], They [our Muslim brothers] 
do not allow acts o f violence [perpetrated by other Muslims].”154
In this text the speaker describes Muslim villagers who protect them from at- 
tack by “outside” Muslims as “our Muslim brothers”. He says that having Mus­
lim brothers protect them is a very touching experience. The participant uses 
the words “from outside” twice (rewording) to underscore their significance. 
The word “because” indicates a cause-effect relation between Muslim villag-
juga apakah mesjidpunya ijin tidak.Kadang-kadang itu juga satu pertanyaan juga kenapa hanya 
Kristen saja yang diperketat ijinnya.
149 Diskriminasi.
150 Bukan warga situ, kalau ada warga situya cuma satu dua.
151 Dari tempat lain. Bukan semuanya penduduk Banyuanyar.
Sebenarnya yang dari Solo sendiri tidak, tapi itu dari luar, dari Sukoharjo.
Kalau orang luar tidak masuk ke Solo... tidak akan ada gesekan.
154 Ini kami pernah punya pengalaman di Jebres. Ini kejadian yang menarik dan menyentuh hati 
betul. Kelompok tertentu itu tadi dari luar, Muslim, dari luar Jebres akan menutup satu gereja. 
Tetapi justru dari masyarakat kampung disitu, yang notobene saudara kita Muslim. Dipalang. 
Gak boleh... Karena kebetulan gereja itu di hari-hari tidak minggu dipakai untuk kegiatan PKK, 
Posyandu... Ternyata saudara kitapeduli juga. Tidak mengijinkan tindakan-tindakan kekerasan.
ers’ protection o f the church and the church’s function in village society. He 
also describes closing the church as a kind of act o f violence. A female worker 
said, “Mostly in my place they [radical Muslims] are newcomers.”15' This 
speaker makes the point that radical Muslims are not old inhabitants but new- 
comers from outside. Another participant mentioned that they are “new people
5? 156in my area .
When the participants talked about Muslims they also talked about them- 
selves. An elderly male said, “On our side [Christians] there is also radicalism. 
Because ... the influence of freedom of expression extends to the field of relig­
ion too.”157 This text makes two points. First, radicalism as a growing move- 
ment is not confïned to the Muslim community, but also occurs in the Christian 
community. Second, the word “because” indicates a cause-effect relation be­
tween freedom of expression and emerging radicalism.
2 IraterpretotnoBi
The second stage is interpretation or analysis of discursive practice, which in- 
cludes production, distribution and consumption o f texts. Analysis of discur­
sive practice (inteipretation) is the intermediary between analysis of linguistic 
practice (description) and analysis of social practice (explanation). There are 
many ways to analyse discursive practice (Fairclough (1992: 78-86, 232-234), 
but this study uses mainly two tools: intertextuality and what Fairclough calls 
inter-discursivity. When participants produce (communicate) and consume 
(interpret) text or talk they draw on members’ resources (Fairclough 1989: 163) 
or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75), stored in their long-term memory (Fair­
clough 1989: 9-10; 24-24). These resources are cognitive in the sense that they 
are in people’s minds, and they are social in the sense that they are socially 
constructed (Fairclough 1989: 24). So what members’ resources or mental 
models do Christian participants use to produce (communicate) or consume 
(interpret) talk?
2.1 AraaBysis att micro leve!
The participants drew on mental models of living in “harmony (rukun)” with 
their relatives, friends and neighbours when they talked about the others (Mus­
lims) or about themselves. Talking about togethemess of Muslims and Chris­
tians, a young female participant referred to the situation in her family when
155 Banyak di tempat saya kebanyakan mereka itu pendatang.
156 Orang baru di lingkungan saya.
157 Dari sisi kami juga ada radikalisme. Karena... pengaruh kebebasan berpendapat itu masuk 
imbasnya ke ranah agamawi juga.
Idul Fitri came. She said, “All of our family members met, mixed, shook 
hands.” Another young female drew on her family tradition of arisan and gath- 
ering during lebaran.
Speaking of Muslims’ and Christians’ engagement in society, an elderly 
male participant remembered the funeral o f a relative when he was asked to act 
as the representative o f his Muslim family. They described such practices as 
the “custom” (kebiasaan) of Javanese in Solo. A participant was also referring 
to custom when he said, “For the Javanese these [religious] days are for visiting 
the elders out of respect [for them].”158 Custom is a common ground that unites 
Christians and Muslims.
Talking about religious conversion from Islam to Christianity, a young male 
participant remembered his mother’s conversion process. He said that his 
mother was Islam KTP (Islam by ID). He also said, “[my] father’s ID is Catho­
lic”. The Indonesian ID card (KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk) shows the per- 
son’s gender, religion, occupation and marital status. Officially only Islam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism are recog- 
nized in Indonesia. The identity card is issued by the civil administration (po­
litical arena). So when participants referred to Muslim/Christian “by ID” they 
were using a mental model from the political arena. They drew on a typical 
Indonesian system of officially recognized and unrecognized religions.
The Christians drew on their individual experience with their neighbours in 
the village. When talking about fanatical Muslims and fanatical mosques they 
were remembering personal encounters in neighbourhood life. In mentioning 
the unpleasant attitude of a Muslim who throws away food given by Christian, 
an elderly female participant was drawing on her memory of a personal rela- 
tionship with a Muslim neighbour. Likewise the elderly male participant cited 
his relationship with Muslims neighbours when he spoke about Muslims who 
do not wish Christians merry Christmas.
When discussing relations between Christians and Muslims the participants 
referred to shared ideas about how to be good villagers. “I initiated the prayer 
service at our place. That was a village event. Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, 
adherents of indigenous beliefs (kepercayaan) attended [that occasion],” said 
an elderly male. A participant also referred to his personal experience of help- 
ing Muslims at the pengajian service and another referred to an occasion when 
Muslim and Christian villagers came together to celebrate halal bi halal (an 
Islamic feast). Here Christians were speaking o f an identity shared with Mus­
lims as neighbours or fellow villagers. When speaking about the apparel of 
fanatical Muslims some participants referred to shared knowledge about what 
is considered normal. According to them the fanatics’ dress is improper and not 
well mannered.
158 Untuk orang Jawa hari besar itu untuk silaturrahmi menghormati yang lebih tua.
The participants also drew on friendship when talking about Muslims. A 
young female remembered her Muslim friends when speaking about fanatical 
and normal Muslims. Another referred to her individual experience of having 
Christian, Muslim, Hindu and even Buddhist friends. But “friend” does not 
always refer to a crony or comrade. The elderly male, who said that the evan- 
gelical group was not sensitive to the surroundings (“our Muslim brothers”) 
was showing his disagreement with that group, yet he still called them “my 
Christian friends”. This utterance is a common way of maintaining a high level 
of politeness.
In the young female FGD the concept of fanatical and normal Muslims 
arose from the early phase of the discussion. When I (the researcher) asked the 
participants in that group how they described Muslims a participant responded 
by telling about her friend’s brother who is a member of LDII. Soon afterwards 
she used the label “fanatical Muslim” when referring to the boy from LDII. 
Another participant in the group told a story about three friends and said that 
“one Muslim was rather fanatical and the other two were normal”.159 Whereas 
talk about friendship crops up frequently in FGDs with youths, references to 
neighbourhood are more common among the elderly.
Some participants referred to friendship or daily family activities when talk­
ing about their social relations with Muslims. For example: “I played inside the 
house [of my Muslim friend]”, “my mother... asked my [Muslim] sibling to 
have a meal before fasting (sahur), ” et cetera. Some of them referred to pets 
such as a dog. Others cited experience of good interpersonal cooperation 
(“helping” each other) in neighbourhood life when they talked about social 
relations between Muslims and Christians.
Sometimes when participants talked about Muslims or Christians they also 
referred to adherents of other religions in their surroundings. For instance, a 
participant referred to Confucians when talking about relations between relig­
ions and local cultures in Islam and Christianity. He said, “Opposite my 
[house] lives a Confucian. He/she is a Christian, but also a Confucian. Christi­
anity is his/her faith, Confucianism is his/her custom (adat istiadat). Even 
though he/she is a Christian, there is a statue of the goddess Kwan-im in [that] 
house.”160 In referring to a Confucian neighbour the speaker described two 
categories: “faith” (imari) and “custom” {adat). This distinction is a mental 
model stored in the speaker’s memory.
159 Yang satu agak fanatik, yang dua biasa.
160 Di depan saya itu ada Konghucu. Dia itu Kristen, tapi juga Konghucu. Kristen itu keimanan 
dia, Konghucu itu adat istiadatnya. Walaupun dia Kristen, di dalamnya pasti ada arca dewa 
Kwan-im.
2.2 Analysis at meso Bevel
At meso level Christian participants ofiten used the classification of “we” (kami, 
kita) and “them” (mereka) when speaking about themselves and Muslims. They 
drew on a mental model of Christian communalism. One participant used the 
words “from our side”. This is a reference to Christian community spirit. When 
some participants talked about forcible closure of place of worship by radical 
Muslims or “building a church is very, very diffïcult”, they saw themselves as 
coming from the same community (religion, institution). At other times partici­
pants made utterances that revealed a personal voice. Thus a participant said, 
“Personally I do not agree if the PDS [a Christian political party], for instance, 
fïnally want to make Indonesia a Christian [country].”
Christian participants drew on general Christian sources when talking about 
Muslim-Christian relations. When explaining that “Islam has a lot o f interpreta- 
tions”161 and “has many faces” (extremist, hardliner, nationalist, tolerant) a par­
ticipant -  a member of a Pentecostal church -  said that he was citing a book 
series 40 Days to love nations in prayer.162 The book series is published by an 
international evangelical movement. One volume163 writes about diverse fea­
tures o f Islamic understanding and comprehension (Corak pemahaman dan 
penghayatan Islam yang berbeda-beda). The book lists eleven models of Is­
lam: normative Islam, exclusive Islam, cultural Islam, transformative Islam, 
inclusive pluralist Islam, contextual Islam, esoterie Islam, traditional Islam, 
modernist Islam, actual Islam and rationalist Islam. The same participant said:
“In that [book] there is knowledge about [Islam]... There are clearly Qur’nic verses which re- 
fer to capturing Christians and killing Christians... [However,] there are verses which are in 
line with the Bible. Those verses are to love Christian, to love others... I m yself concluded 
that there is diversity among Muslims, because the one Q ur’an contains many things. [If] 
they take [only] one thing, they will fight Christians. They will be extremists, hardliners. If  
they take [verses of] loving Christians, loving others, they will be nationalist Muslims, who 
are tolerant.”164
161 Islam itu tafsirannya banyak sekali.
In bahasa Indonesia: “40 Hari Mengasihi Bangsa-Bangsa dalam Doa
163 22 August-30 September 2008, pp. 7-17.
164 Di situ ada pengetahuan tentang Muslim... Ada ayat-ayat di dalam Al-Qur’an yang dengan 
jelas ngomong bahwa tawanlah orang Kristen dan bunuhlah orang Kristen... Ada yang sejalan 
dengan Al-Kitab. Ayat-ayatnya ini mengasihi orang Kristen, mengasihi sesama... Kalau 
menyimpulkan sendiri, ada banyak perbedaan di Muslim, karena di dalam satu Al-Qur 'an itu 
ada bermacam-macam. Mereka hanya menangkap satu bagian itu, dia akan memerangi orang 
Kristen. Dia akan menjadi Muslim yang ekstrim gitu, yang bergaris keras gitu. Kalau dia 
menangkap mengasihi orang Kristen, mengasihi sesama, dia akan menjadi Muslim yang 
nasionalis yang bisa toleransi.
Here the speaker was referring to another volume of 40 Days to love nations in 
prayer.'65 One section of the book, ‘What the Qur’an says?’, lists three catego- 
ries o f Qur’anic verses: verses and hadits (Muhammad’s traditions) that accord 
with the Bible; verses and hadits which are in opposition to the Bible; and 
verses and hadits which are unrelated to the Christian faith. In this case the 
speaker described Islam or Muslims, not by quoting the Qur’an directly but by 
citing a book about Qur’anic verses produced by the Christian community. 
Here intertextuality illustrates a process of indirect discourse representation 
(Fairclough 1992: 107). Hence the speaker was not citing Muslims’ ideas but 
the ideas of Christians about Islam. In discourse representation there is a dis- 
tinction between a Christian voice talking about Muslims and the voice of the 
Muslim who is talked about.
Other participants assumed that Muslims perceived Christians as kafir. One 
participant said, “I often hear from their ustadzs [preachers] that [Muslims] are 
asked not to associate with people from a different faith.”166 Another said that in 
the “great religious meeting” [pengajian akbar\ “ [the preacher] forbade Mus­
lims to interact with the kafir,”167 Usually major religious meetings are broad- 
cast on loudspeakers, so villagers around the mosque can hear the sermon. In 
the text “The great religious meeting [pengajian] ... [the preacher] forbade 
Muslims to interact with the kafir”, the speaker referred to an Islamic penga­
jian  in a mosque near her house. A speaker referred to his assumption about the 
M uslim’s voice saying, “There is Islam that wants to gather with us. But there 
is Islam that considers non-Islam [non-Muslims] musyrik [polytheists], Those 
[non-Muslims] are considered enemies.”
In talking about Muslim clerics and intellectuals who are tolerant because 
they have a good understanding of Islam an elderly male drew on an Islamic 
principle, “my religion is mine, your religion is yours”.168 It is from the 
Qur’anic surah 109:6: “lakum dinukum wa liyadin” (to you be your religion, 
and to me my religion). Another participant referred implicitly to his own 
knowledge of the Qur’an: “Those extremists and hardliners do not pay atten- 
tion to the truth in the Qur’an itself. They pay attention to the [teachings] of 
their clerics.”169 Thus he communicated that the Qur’an does not teach extrem- 
ism, but Muslim clerics do.
Talking about the relation between religion and local culture, a participant 
referred to a book about Sunan Kalijaga (a Muslim saint). He said, “Sunan 
Kalijaga, as I have read, preached his religion [Islam] that is not similar to Ara­
165 3 September-12 October 2007, p. 64.
166 Dari ustad-ustadnya sering saya dengar tidak boleh bergaul dengan yang tidak seiman.
167 Mengharamkan... orang Islam berhubungan dengan kafir.
168 Agamaku ya agamaku, agamamuya agamamu.
165 Itu yang ekstrim dan garis keras itu nggak ngelihat dari segi kebenaran di dalam Al-Qur’an 
itu sendiri. Mereka itu melihat dari pendahulu-pendahulu mereka.
bic [Islam].”170 Following the oral tradition, some people believe that Sunan 
Kalijaga was one of nine saints, early figures who spread Islam in Java. He 
conducted his dakwa using local cultural media such as gamelan, shadow pup­
pets and Javanese songs.
A female worker, a member o f the Bethel church, cited the evangelist Mat- 
thew when talking about love among Christians. She said, “In the Bible Mat- 
thew said [if] you love me [who is invisible], you should171 love your 
brother/sister who is visible.”172 Other participants also drew on biblical texts 
such as love others as you love yourself and when you are slapped on your 
right cheek, turn your left cheek as well. Another participant drew on Christian 
teaching, saying that Christians must be humble towards others in this world in 
order to be humbled before God. A female professional, a Chinese Catholic, 
drew on the concept of predestination in Catholicism when she talked about her 
bread shop, which was bumt down during the 1998 riots in Solo. She said, “I 
feel my life was prepared [by God].”173 She rebuilt the bread shop shortly after 
the riots ended.
When Christian participants in the elderly female group talked about the 
attacks on Christian places o f worship I (the researcher) asked them whether 
Christians do not want to counter-attack. One of them replied, “No, [because 
we have] a teaching o f love.”174 Another participant in that FGD said that Chris­
tians have a teaching that when you are slapped on your right cheek, you must 
offer your left cheek as well.
A Protestant participant was inspired by the church’s prohibition of praying 
for the spirits. She said that “ziarah” (pilgrimage to cemetery) and prayer for 
spirits are “adat” (custom, not religion). She only prayed for those who are 
alive and not for the spirits. Here the word “adat” refers to a mental model (so- 
cial cognition) that is used by the speaker to interpret and evaluate Muslims’ 
prayers to the spirits.
Talking about Syariah a participant mentioned that Syariah creates “a wall 
o f segregation”175 between Muslims and Christians. It separates Muslims from 
others in society (mental model). They referred to this experience, especially in 
Aceh. A participant said, “That [Syariah] will encourage strong sectarianism in
170 Sunan Kalijaga, seperti pernah saya baca, menyiarkan agamanya tidak sama dengan yang 
di Arab.
171 The literal translation o f the text is, “you love me [who is invisible], but why you do not love 
your brother/sister who is visible?” But it does not render the meaning for English readers, so I 
rephrased it.
172 Dalam Injil matius dikatakan kamu mengasihi aku, tapi kenapa kamu tidak mengasihi 
saudaramu yang terlihat.
173 Perjalanan hidup saya itu sudah dipersiapkan.
174 Tidak, karena ajaran kasih.
175 Tembok pemisah.
the future, not so?”176 By contrast the Christian vision is to break down walls of 
segregation. An elderly male, a presbyter in the Javanese Christian Church 
(GKJ), drew on Jesus’ words to covey the Christian rejection of segregation: 
“It was stated by Jesus at that time that Samarian people, who were considered 
kafir [infidels] by the Jews, were in fact visited by Jesus, helped by Jesus... 
How can we now build walls of segregation? All humans are the same.”177 The 
speaker was inspired by a narrative similar to a biblical account (Luke 10:33- 
34).
The participants also mentioned Gandhi’s view that “Islam is the same 
[good religion], Christian is good, Buddhist is also good... Mahatma Gandhi 
said... it all depends on the people.” Another participant referred to Gus Dur 
(Abdurrahman Wahid): “Gus Dur ... was a very democratie, moderate [Muslim 
leader].”178 In similar vein a participant observed that Sobari [a Muslim figure] 
has been saying that he and pastor Mangun are of “the same faith, but o f differ­
ent religions.”179 Here the participants referred to the views o f Christian, Mus­
lim and Hindu leaders.
When some elderly male participants talked about religious radicalism, a 
member of that group compared Islam and Christianity, pointing out that radi­
calism also existed in Christianity. “The evangelical group or a certain church 
is not sensitive to the surroundings [Muslims],” said a participant. Most par­
ticipants referred to Muslim groups when talking about religious radicalism, 
but in this text the speaker cited a Christian case.
Talking about social relations between Muslims and Christians some par­
ticipants remembered their experience of wishing Muslims happy fasting or 
happy Idul Fitri, but the Muslims did not reciprocate. The picture below shows 
a similar utterance in Solo where Christians put up a happy fasting banner out­
side the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ).
Sometime participants referred to me (the interviewer) not only as the re­
searcher, but also as a Muslim (double identity). An elderly male said, “Pak 
Hadi (my nickname), [you] have a very good role next, in writing the disserta- 
tion.”180 In that text the speaker referred to the signifïcance of my proposed 
dissertation on Muslim-Christian relations. But the same person also said, 
“This I take from yours [i.e. interviewer’s religion: Islam], fastabiqul khairat
176 Apakah itu kemudian ke depan tidak menimbulkan sektarianisme yang begitu kuat.
Dikatakan Yesus saat itu yang orang Samaria dikatakan kafir oleh orang Yahudi justru 
didatangi oleh Yesus, ditolong oleh Yesus, dibantu Yesus... Lha kita kok membuat tembok 
pemisah, manusia itu manusia juga.
178 Gus Dur sangat demokratis, moderat.
179 Seiman, tapi beda agama.
180 Pak Hadi, memilikiperan yang sangat baik, nanti, di dalam penyusunan desertasi.
means please eompete in doing good”181 when he talked about his hopes of how 
Muslims and Christians should act in society. In that utterance the speaker used 
the Arabic terms, “fastabiqul khairat” (so race to do good). It is a fragment of 
surah 2:148 that reads: “For each [religious following] has a direction toward 
which it faces. So race for [all that is] good [fastabiqul khairat]...” These utter- 
ances show that several Christian FGD participants are quite familiar with Is- 
lamic expressions.
Figure 2: ‘The whole 
council and congre- 
gants o f  the GKJ 
Manahan xvish Mus­
lims a happy fast. ’ 
Banner outside GKJ 
Manahan church in 
Surakarta, 2012 
(Source: A uthor’s 
collection)
2 3  Arsalysis at macro level
At macro level participants compared the situations under the New Order and 
after Reformasi. The statements “formerly there was constraint” and “I never 
experienced ... [that] in the past” referred to the political situation under the 
New Order regime. Statements such as “to open the door of democracy on a 
large scale nowadays”, “I think this [condition] is a new thing”, and “after Re­
formasi [the problems] began to appear” referred to the current political era of 
Reformasi.
181 Ini saya ambil dari panjenengan, fastabiqul khairat, dalam arti berlomba untuk berbuat 
baik.
Participants drew on Pancasila philosophy when they talked about their 
social identity and social relations between Muslims and Christians in Indone­
sia. Most o f them mentioned only the first pillar. In saying “The first pillar of 
Pancasila is Lordship. We have God whom each of us perceives as the Ulti- 
mate. But each of us has our own understanding”, the speaker might have been 
inspired by a popular principle in Indonesian society, namely agreeing to dis- 
agree or agreeing to differ.
The participants produced a meaning of the word “Pancasila” which extends 
its original connotation. They consumed and reproduced Pancasila in relation 
to freedom of worship, spirit and appreciation of diversity, appreciation of plu- 
ralism, and used a metaphor of colourful flowers in a garden. The original defi- 
nition of Pancasila refers to five pillars which are written in the preamble to the 
constitution of 1945. They are: belief in the one Lordship; just and civilized 
humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by inner wisdom in the 
unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and social justice 
for all the people o f Indonesia.
Freedom of worship is not mentioned in the five pillars of Pancasila, but it 
is written into the constitution o f 1945. Article 29, paragraph 2 reads that “the 
state guarantees all persons freedom of worship, each according to his/her own 
religion or belief’. Pluralism is a mental model that might be taken from the 
common language in society, which is popular in books and the media. When 
comparing the Pancasila state with an Islamic or Syariah state participants drew 
on a general understanding among Christians in which images o f an Islamic, 
Syariah state are anti-Pancasila. When a participant commented, “If the Jakarta 
Charter were to be included, Pancasila would change”, he drew on an under­
standing o f the Charter as anti-Pancasila. The Jakarta Charter is the initial draft 
of Pancasila. It was drafted and ratified by a Committee of Nine (eight Muslims 
and one Christian) before the preparation for Indonesian independence on 22 
June 1945. The difference between the Jakarta Charter and Pancasila is con- 
fined to the first pillar. The first pillar of the Jakarta Charter is ‘Belief in Al- 
mighty God with the obligation for Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic 
Syari'ah’.182
Comparison between the Jakarta Charter and Pancasila philosophy was one 
of the public discourses during the process of constitutional amendment in the 
early 2000s. Some Christian politicians and leaders refused to reinstate the 
Jakarta Charter. We give a few examples. Kompas newspaper published two 
articles on 4 August 2000 when the house of representatives (DPR) was debat- 
ing the constitutional amendment. Herman Musakabe, a Protestant and gover- 
nor o f Nusa Tenggara Timor, wrote an article entitled, ‘Please be careful in
182 Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya.
amending the constitution’.183 Yongky Karman, a Catholic pastor, wrote an 
article entitled ‘About the first pillar of Pancasila’.184 Both writers mentioned 
that Pancasila is ‘the foundation o f the Indonesian state’. ‘Replacing the first 
pillar o f Pancasila with the Jakarta charter would change that foundation, with 
all its implications,185 Musakabe wrote. He added that it “would strengthen the 
spirit o f disintegration o f Indonesia because religion can stimulate 
disintegration”.186 Karman in his turn wrote:
“Christians of Eastem Indonesia rejected the inclusion o f the majority religion in the state 
foundation, because they feared that it would lead to undesirable excesses by all parties, 
namely a growing sense o f first class citizens [Muslims] and second class citizens [Chris­
tians]
Referring to Sukamo, he wrote: “Indonesia is neither a religious nor a secular 
state but a Pancasila state.”188 The claim that it would change the foundation of 
the state drew on the idea that if the Jakarta Charter were included in the 
amended constitution, it would replace Pancasila. The writer gives the reason 
why Christians rejected it: they were worried about becoming ‘second class’ 
Indonesian citizens. He also uses the words “Pancasila state”. The foregoing 
examples clearly show that the discourse in the FGDs was linked to a discourse 
that had been going on in Indonesian society. The utterance in the FGDs that 
“Bali [people] want to separate [from Indonesia], North Celebes [people] want 
to separate, Papua [people] want to separate” if Syariah were to be included in 
the constitution relates to Musakebe’s comment on “the spirit of disintegration 
[of Indonesia]”.
When talking about Pancasila some participants referred to certain Muslim 
groups in society. The speaker who said that Ngruki does not recognize Pan­
casila was referring to such a group. Ngruki is a village in Sukoharjo district 
south o f Solo. The pesantren Al-Mukmin led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is based in 
this village. People commonly call it by the name of the village. Ba'asyir was 
suspected by international anti-terrorism agencies o f links with the interna­
tional network of Al-Qaida. He was jailed for fifteen years by an Indonesian 
court in Jakarta after the state had proved his support of acts of terrorism in 
Aceh. Participants’ references to a Syariah/Islamic state are based on a general
183 Hati-hati mengamandemen UUD.
184 Sekitar sila pertama Pancasila.
185 Mengubah dasar negara dengan segala konsekuensinya.
186 Akan memperkuat semangat disintegrasi karena faktor agama sebagai pemicunya.
187 Orang Kristen dari Indonesia Timur menolakpencantuman agama mayoritas di dalam dasar 
negara sebab pencantuman itu dikhawatirkan akan menimbulkan ekses yang tidak diinginkan 
semua pihak, yakni berkembangnya perasaan menjadi warga negara penuh dan menjadi warga 
kelas dua.
Indonesia bukan negara agama, juga bukan negara sekular, tetapi negara Pancasila.
image in Islamic countries like Arabia, Pakistan and Middle Eastem countries. 
When talking about Syariah and Pancasila they said that the Indonesian state 
does not have only one religion but several religions. In so doing they were 
mindful of and referring to the existence of many religions in the country.
A participant mentioned shared knowledge about the social and economic 
gap between Javanese and Chinese when he talked about the cause of the riots. 
In talking about Muslim radicals. rioters or church attackers the participants 
referred to urban or village territorial divisions such as “not from Solo”, “from 
outside, from Sukoharjo”, “from another place” or “not from Banyuanyar”. 
Administratively Solo and Sukoharjo are two different territories. Sukoharjo is 
the name of a district south of Solo city.
When participants talked about radical Muslims they sometimes referred to 
the discourse of outsiders, for instance the description of Solo as a terrorist city. 
In expressing disagreement with terrorism a participant compared his utterance 
with Muslims’ utterances, such as “They [Muslims] also disagree with the Is- 
lamic notions of the hardliners” . A participant also mentioned a popular t-shirt 
logo, ‘Fuck Terrorist’, illustrated below (figure 3).
Talking about problems associated with church building, FGD participants 
referred to state “permission”. This is the licence required by a joint decree of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministiy of Domestic Affairs in 2006. 
The decree requires approval by sixty non-adherents of the religion proposing 
the construction of a house of worship. In addition it has to be approved by the 
Forum of Interreligious Harmony (FKUB). The participants also referred to the 
fact that the “restriction” generally applied only to Christians, not to Muslims.
IS? The blog is a commercial advertisement written in bahasa Indonesian. For more details see: 
http://digitalsablon.blogspot.com/2010/09/sablon-digital-kaos-hitam-sablon-flex.html, posted on 
September 25, 2010 and accessed on April 25, 2012.
A participant talked about his Christian friend stopping the pengajian (Is- 
lamic leaming/teaching) in the mushola (Muslim chapel) “because ... the pen­
gajian was SARA and stimulated conflict”.190 SARA is an acronym for Suku 
(ethnicity), Agama (religion), Ras (race), and Antar golongan (intergroup). It is 
a mental model. The New Order government introduced SARA and prohibited 
talk about SARA problems in the public sphere, which could generate conflict. 
Since Reformasi government and citizens still use the word occasionally, 
though not as often as in the New Order era. So the speaker was invoking a 
mental model (SARA) stored in his long-term memory.
3 Explanation
The third stage is explanation or the analysis o f social practice, that is analysis 
of the socio-cognitive effects of the texts. The aim is to determine the nature of 
the social practice of which the discourse is part, which explains why the dis­
course is what it is, and the effects o f the language (text) on social reality (con­
text). The analytic concepts used in this stage are ideology (Foucault 1977) and 
hegemony (Gramsci 1971). For Fairclough, discursive practices are ideological 
insofar as they include significations aimed at either supporting or restructuring 
power relations. When participants draw on their mental models they either 
reproduce or transform them (Fairclough 2001: 158-161). For the purpose of 
this section we look at ideational and relational transformations, particularly in 
regard to subject positions or social identities. The question is: what are the 
socio-cognitive effects of what the Christian participants said?
3.1 AanaBysis at inroicr© 5eveQ
At a personal level the participants primarily positioned Muslims in two boxes: 
“fanatical” and “ordinary” or “normal”. A participant identified a fanatical 
Muslim as one who ‘stones my dog’, while an ordinary Muslim is one who 
opens the door of his house for the participant’s dog. Another participant had a 
personal experience with a fanatical Muslim neighbour who dried the sofa and 
the bed after she (the Christian participant) had used them.
The participants position these fanatical Muslims as ‘weird’. That is to say, 
fanatics are not the norm but the exception in neighbourhood life. Participants 
in the youthful groups identified fanatical Muslims by using a slang word, ‘7e- 
bay” (over acting). Here they were heavily influenced by popular culture (he­
gemony).
The participants positioned ordinary Muslims as good and tolerant (subject 
position). This classification meant that they positioned fanatics as “not good”
190 Karena... pengajian ini sudah SARA, menimbulkan konflik.
and intolerant. Whereas tolerant Muslims share food with Christians during 
religious feasts, intolerant Muslims throw away food that was given by Chris­
tians. These “good” Muslim villagers are prepared to act as receptionists at 
Christmas celebrations. In family life “good” Muslims will accompany their 
Christian siblings to Sunday school.
When a male Catholic participant said, “I myself was asked to make a 
speech as the representative o f [my] Muslim family”, he reproduced an image 
of a tolerant Muslim family. In relation to family and neighbourhood life par­
ticipants clearly classifïed fanatical Muslims as those who problematize reli­
gious diversity, whereas tolerant Muslims do not.
On the whole participants positioned themselves as pluralistic but pious 
persons. They constituted and were constituted by religious diversity in their 
families, schools and villages. Several participants identified their families as 
“Pancasila families”. This shows the influence o f the political domain on the 
personal domain. Pancasila rules citizens’ interpersonal everyday life (hegem- 
ony). Participants reproduced the ideology o f national unity and harmony in 
their families.
In regard to interpersonal tolerance, a young female Protestant identified 
herself as joining in a “ziarah” (pilgrimage to ancestral cemetery) of her Mus­
lim relatives during an Idul Fitri celebration. Hence she made social adjust- 
ments for the sake of good relations with her Muslim relatives. Another par­
ticipant identified the Javanese “custom” (kebiasaan) in Solo, which requires 
respecting elders by visiting them on holy days. In families with diverse reli­
gious backgrounds, then, participants were constituted by Javanese custom in 
their personal relations with Muslim relatives. This shows the effects o f the 
cultural field on the personal field.
A Protestant participant explained, “They [Muslims] pray for spirits, but we 
[Christians] pray for those who are alive.” She positioned ziarah (pilgrimage to 
ancestral cemetery) as “adaf’ (custom). Here she was influenced by Protestant 
beliefs, illustrating the effects of the religious field on the personal field.
By saying “thanks be to God, [my] father got [my] mother to become a 
Christian”, a participant positioned Christianity as something to be grateful for, 
thus positioning herself as a non-relativist. Linguistic practice analysis reveals 
a high frequency o f “puji tuhan” (thanks to be God) and “fortunately” . Thus 
participants identified that being tolerant is not the same as being a relativist. 
Pluralism and piety go together.
3.2 Atmaflysis att inraeso Seweö
At meso level Christian participants identified Islam as having “many faces” 
and multiple interpretations. In general they reproduced two images of Is- 
lam/Muslims: a “nonnal” and an “extremist” image. They positioned normal
Muslims as “moderate”, “tolerant” and “proper”. Extremists, on the other hand, 
are positioned as “dangerous” and “disgusting”.
Participants identified that trouble with Islam was not caused by normal 
Muslims but by extremists. They reproduced an image of extreme Muslims 
who position Christians as musyrik, kafir and enemies. They also identified 
extreme Muslims as anti-Christian and anti-West. This identification shows the 
influence (hegemony) of a common discourse about Westemers as typifying 
Christians in general. Thus the Christian participants position extreme Muslims 
as people who do not know where to draw the line between anti-Westem and 
anti-Christian.
Most participants positioned themselves as supporters of normal Islam and 
as critics o f extreme Islam. Muslims should behave “properly” in society. 
Hence they positioned extreme, hardliner and fanatical Muslims as abnormal 
and improper. Fanatics are identified as “new leamers about Islam”. By con­
trast normal Muslims are identified as having a “deep education in Islam”. Par­
ticipants positioned Muslims who are knowledgeable about Islam as more tol­
erant. This is comparable with the way participants talked about Christians. 
The better Christians’ understanding of Christianity, the more tolerant they are. 
So there is a correlation between education and tolerance.
One participant mentioned that “although she [a Muslim] is pious [person], 
she has great tolerance toward other religions”. The conjunction “although” 
suggests a negative correlation between piety and tolerance. Besides advocat- 
ing “normal” Islam, most participants favoured democratie and moderate Mus­
lims.
As mentioned in the section on description, terms like “extreme”, 
“hardliner”, “radical” and “fanatical” are interchangeable. Some participants 
identified extreme Muslims with acts of “violence” and “jihad” activities/ 
groups. A Christian positioned jihad  as fanatical Muslims’ fight against Chris­
tians. A participant identified the term “hardliners” with Muslims’ notion of 
fighting and killing Christians. As noted in the section on description, usage of 
these terms is fluid.
Participants also produced an image of Muslims based on their appearance 
and style of dress. A participant identified the Bali bombers as having long 
beards. Other participants positioned Muslim men wearing calf-length pants as 
extreme, hardliner, radical or fanatical. They included Muslim women who 
wear large jilbab or burqa in those groups. The participants identified these 
groups as ones who want to purify Islam, which influences how they dress 
nowadays. However, the participants positioned Muslim women who wear 
modest or ordinary jilbab as tolerant.
Besides identifying some Muslims as normal and others as extreme, partici­
pants identified some Muslims as “abangan”. They positioned abangan Mus­
lims as those who (arbitrarily) oversimplify religious ritual. In addition they are
positioned as breaking common Islamic rules such as the prohibition of gam- 
bling and drinking liquor. In contrast to Islamic/Muslim abangan, the partici­
pants identified obedient Muslims.
Some participants distinguished between Islam (the religion) and Muslims 
(its believers). Others differentiated between the Qur’an and its interpretations. 
The problems were not with Islam and the Qur’an, but with the clerics and “the 
people”. The dominant opinion was that the problems arose from the extrem- 
ists’ and hard-liners’ interpretations of Islam and the Qur’an. However, few 
participants identified the Qur’an as problematic in the sense that it literally 
supports Muslims capturing and killing Christians.
Some participants identified a difference between Indonesian or local Islam 
and Middle Eastem or Arabian Islam. Normal Muslims are positioned as prac- 
titioners of Indonesian or local Islam. Conversely, extreme Muslims practise 
Middle Eastem or Arabian Islam. The dominant voice reproduces an image of 
Indonesian or local Islam as the way to avoid conflict with Christians. Indone­
sian or local Islam uses local culture as the medium to conduct dakwa (preach­
ing Islam), for instance gamelan, shadow puppets and Javanese songs. Extreme 
Muslims are influenced not only by the Arabic way o f practising Islam but also 
by their style of dress. The participants identified troubles arising from reli­
gious teachings as not coming from local Islam/Muslims, but from abroad.
The participants cite evidence that fanatical, extreme and hardliner Muslims 
divide things or goods into two categories: pure (suci) and impure (najis). 
Hardliner Muslim groups were identified as ones who perceive Christians as 
impure. That is why they dry a sofa after it has been used by Christians, rewash 
wet clothes that have been touched by Christians, and ask Christians to wash 
their hands before shaking hands with them. In other utterances hardliner Mus­
lims clean the mosque floor after it had been used by Muslims outside their 
group. So here Muslims outside their own group are also considered impure.
The Christian participants positioned fanatical Muslims as ones who distin- 
guish ritual/worship/religious from social activities. They identified joining in 
Christmas celebrations, saying merry Christmas and participating in a funeral 
ceremony as religious activities. PKK (mothers’ union) gatherings, children’s 
gatherings and karang taruna (youth village association) gatherings are social 
activities. In regard to social relations with Christians, fanatical Muslims are 
identified as participating only in social activities with Christians and not in 
religious activities. Thus fanatical Muslims do not segregate themselves from 
Christians totally but only partially.
In constituting and positioning Muslims as other Christians sometimes also 
constituted and positioned themselves. Participants primarily positioned Chris­
tianity as a religion of love. They cited sources that Christianity taught them to 
be a candle, light and salt o f the earth. But this does not prevent some partici-
pants from positioning other Christians as radicals. Radical Christians come 
from evangelical rather than mainstream groups.
Evangelicals create trouble not only for Muslims who are “not sensitive to 
the surroundings”, but also for other Christians. Participants identified evan­
gelical groups as arguing that the non-evangelical understanding of the Bible 
and baptism is wrong. They reproduced a link between level of education and 
tolerance. The better Christians understood the Bible, the more sensitive they 
would be to the surroundings.
One participant hoped that he would convert Muslims to Christianity 
through his prayers. He said, “[I] pray for them [Muslims] because [I] love 
[them].” He referred to the book, 40 Days to love nations in praying, which 
sees the purpose of prayer as God touching and transforming Muslims’ hearts 
because he is their Creator191 and the Lord Jesus wanting to bring them (Mus­
lims) into his etemal kingdom.192 That means that he hoped that by praying for 
Muslims he would convert them to Christianity.
Some participants identified Catholics as more inclined to appreciate local 
culture than other Christians. They are identified as praying for the spirits (doa- 
doa arwah) and commemorating certain days after a person’s death, such as the 
40th, lOOth and lOOOth anniversary, while others reject those practices. Some 
participants positioned praying for the spirits (doa-doa arwah) as according 
with Javanese culture. They positioned some Christians as appreciating local 
culture in their missionary work, whereas others criticized local culture. They 
reproduced the view that missionaries’ neglect of local culture would cause 
conflict with both Muslims and Javanese people.
They identified Christians as participating in Muslim religious events, 
whereas Muslims mainly refuse to join in Christian religious occasions and 
participate only in the social part. Christians are identified as extending reli­
gious seasonal greetings to Muslims, but not vice versa. Thus most participants 
positioned Christians as more tolerant than Muslims.
3 3  AïroaSysis at macro SeveS
At macro level participants identified a transformation among Indonesian peo­
ple from the New Order to the Reformasi era. Participants reproduced an image 
of the New Order as an era o f state oppression. By contrast they recognize Re­
formasi as an era of freedom. They reproduced the view that in the Reformasi 
era freedom was not only opened up but also broadened.
191 Tuhan sanggup menjamah dan mengubahkan hati umat Islam karena Dialah Sang Pencipta 
mereka. 40 Days to love nations in praying, 3 September-12 October 2007, p. 1.
192 Tuhan Yesus rindu untuk membawa mereka masuk ke dalam kerajaan-Nya yang kekal. 40 
Days to love nations in praying, 3 September-12 October 2007, p. 3.
They reproduced an image of the Reformasi era as presenting a dilemma. 
On one hand a Christian can be “vice mayor” and Christians can have a big 
Christmas celebration in the city hall, which never happened before. On the 
other hand freedom leads to “violence”. The participants also identified that 
Christians were not immune to the influence of discourse on freedom in society 
(hegemony). Because of freedom radicalism is also growing among Christians.
Some participants identified the post-Reformasi era in Indonesia as trans- 
formation into a “Syariah state” (Islamization). They cited the examples of the 
establishment of a Syariah bank, implementation of Syariah law in Aceh, the 
demand for inclusion o f the Syariah in the amended constitution, and the ap- 
pearance o f Islamic programmes on television, for instance Islamic sinetron 
(drama) programmes.
In general participants identified the affairs of the Muslim majority as 
emerging in many aspects o f (public) life, including the economic and social 
spheres.193 One participant explained that if  this tendency is consistently pro- 
moted, Indonesia will really become an “Islamic state”. If  this were to happen, 
there will be regional “separation” . Participants identified that some regions are 
already threatening separation or independence. In a globalizing world partici­
pants identified extreme Muslims as positioning America and the West as ene- 
mies.
Participants reproduced an image that “freedom” and “democracy” tend to 
give the “dominant” people a voice. They cited examples o f the minority reli- 
gious group (Christians) and the minority ethnic group (Chinese) being targets 
of discrimination and violence. The participants identified instances where 
churches and Christian places of worship in their area were raided by extreme 
Muslims.
Most participants reproduced an image of the state’s lack o f authority in the 
Reformasi era to deal with extreme Muslims’ acts of violence. In the present 
era they positioned the state as defeated by extreme Muslims. Thus they posi- 
tioned the state as unable to protect them against acts of violence. Since Refor­
masi some participants have also experienced difficulty in obtaining state per- 
mission to build churches or worshipping communally outside the church. But 
this restriction does not apply to Muslims.
However, this does not lead to identification o f the majority of Muslims as 
supporting Syariah law and practising discrimination and acts of violence 
against Christians. The trouble came from outsiders, hardliners who are very 
few and not local Muslims. Thus the participants identified the challenge to 
Muslim-Christian relations as coming from minority groups within mainstream 
Islam. Among Christians, too, the problem comes from evangelical move- 
ments, not from mainstream denominations such as the Javanese Christian and
193 Mayoritas banyak berkembang ke berbagai aspek kehidupan, segi sisi ekonomi, sosial.
Catholic churches. Thus participants reproduced a social mechanism to main- 
tain harmony and peace between Muslims and Christians.
Participants created an image of a Syariah state as opposed to a “Pancasila 
state” . They cite examples of extreme Muslims who reject the Pancasila state 
or are anti-Pancasila. To uphold state authority participants identified a need to 
“prioritize Pancasila”194 rather than “Syariah”. They identified the implementa- 
tion o f Syariah in public life as the main cause o f segregation between adher­
ents o f different religions. By identifying Christians as having a deeper spirit of 
Pancasila than Muslims the Christian participants advocated Pancasila.
In general participants reproduced an image of Indonesia as a pluralistic 
country where religious minority groups are protected by the state. In advocat- 
ing communal prayer by religious believers in the village when Indonesia was 
experiencing an economic crisis in the mid-1990s, a participant reproduced the 
image o f Solo as pluralistic region where diverse religious believers live to- 
gether in harmony. The pattem of communal prayer in which different religious 
leaders pray, taking tums, shows that Solo is primarily a multireligious society.
4 Condusion
In this research we use the method of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 
1992) to acquire insight into the relation between religious language and social 
cohesion. We distinguish between the dimensions o f individual believers (mi­
cro level), their (full or partial) identifïcation with their religions or religious 
institutions (meso level), and the societal context in which these religions or 
religious institutions operate (macro level). At the micro, meso and macro lev- 
els our research participants produced rich labels o f Muslims. Indeed, they are 
more than labels in that they also identify concrete behaviours.
Our conclusions pertain to the classifications (description), the cognitions or 
mental models that are drawn on (interpretation) and the social conditions and 
effects (explanation). Christian participants classified Muslims into “normal” 
and “extreme” categories. Normal Muslims adhere to Javanese custom and 
extreme Muslims follow new waves of Islam from outside. According to them 
Javanese Muslims do not support violence. They identify Javanese Islam as 
peaceful, non-violent.
On the level of mental models, Christians identified Muslims as distinguish- 
ing between social and ritual affairs. According to them this accords with the 
Qur’anic principle, ‘to you be your religion, to me my religion’. Christians 
perceived fanatical Muslims as differentiating strictly between pure and impure 
things. According to them fanatical Muslims perceived Christians as impure.
194 Pancasila seharusnya diutamakan.
Christians considered normal Muslims to be those who follow Pancasila phi- 
losophy, that is unity in diversity and agreeing to disagree. We conclude from 
the Christian FGDs that Javanese culture and Javanese wisdom are identified as 
shared cognitions.
On the level o f social conditions Christians identify themselves as a minor- 
ity group and they position Muslims as the majority group. Muslims are identi­
fied as pious believers, who are faithful to their own tradition. In general Mus­
lims were positioned as tolerant and respectful towards others (Christians), but 
they refuse to mix Islamic with other religious teachings. The participants re- 
produced an image of Javanese adat (custom) as bridging the gap between 
Muslims and Christians. Custom was identified as common ground between 
the two religions. Some participants advocated that religion must adapt to local 
culture, otherwise it leads to conflict. They positioned puritan and fundamental­
ist Muslims as far removed from Javanese culture. Even though Christians 
identified several Muslim groups as not respecting Pancasila, most of them 
position Muslims as nationalists who endorse the Pancasila state.
Chapter III 
"Good" and "excessi¥<e" Christians 
How Muslims speak about Christians
Although Muslims are a majority (75.8%) of the population of Surakarta, 
Christians are a significant minority group (23.2%). There are many churches -  
153 to be precise -  in a city with an area of only 44 km2, which is considered 
small in Indonesia. When one passes Jalan Sutan Sahrir in Surakarta one im- 
mediately spots a new megachurch belonging to a Pentecostal community, the 
Gereja Bethel Indonesia Keluarga Allah (GBIKA). The building was finished 
in 2006 with a total capacity of 5,000 seats. Bahana Magazine (8-10 October 
2007) writes that the GBIKA is one of the ten fastest growing churches in the 
world. Thus Muslims in Surakarta are very aware of the development o f Chris­
tians surrounding them.
Figure 4: The 
Gereja Bethel 
Indonesia 
Keluarga 
Allah
megachurch 
in Surakarta 
(Source: 
Author’s 
collection)
In this dissertation I study social identity constructions through interreligious, 
particularly Christian-Muslim relations from a communicative practice point of
view. I seek to determine why and under what conditions people, both indi- 
vidually and collectively, elevate their religious identity above other identities 
and whether or not religious identity threatens national identity and leads to 
social conflict. This chapter focuses on how Muslims speak about Christians. 
In talking about Christians as the other (out-group) Muslim participants some- 
times talk about themselves (in-group).
The main data are utterances from eight focus group discussions (FGDs) 
involving 44 Muslim participants. In addition I use sources like sacred scrip- 
tures, religious books, newspapers, bulletins, flyers and cyber sources. On av­
erage five to six participants were involved in each FGD.
Besides the religious criterion, participants were grouped according to three 
criteria. We had male and female groups and within these categories we distin- 
guished between elders and youths, professionals and workers. Gender-wise 21 
women and 23 men attended the FGDs. We classify participants aged 17-24 as 
youths and those aged 50 and over as elders. We do not have a specific age 
category o f participants aged 25-49, but professionals and workers were mostly 
in that age group. The youngest participant attending the youths group was 17 
years old, while the oldest elder was 71. By professionals we mean entrepre­
neurs, managers or civil servants, whereas by workers we mean labourers, 
company workers, domestic workers, et cetera.
Almost all invited participants of the Muslim group were happy to join the 
FGDs. Only one person, a lecturer at Muhammadiyah University, refused to 
come. He told Mr Ishom (my research assistant) that this kind o f study would 
be used by Western universities and non-Muslim parties for negative purposes.
To start the discussion in each FGD the researcher (moderator of FGDs) 
posed a basic question at the beginning: “How would you describe Christians?” 
The rest o f the conversation dealt with issues raised by participants in response 
to that basic question. The words “good” and “excessive” (Christians) in the 
title of this chapter are the participants’ words.
1 Descripttöomi
The first stage of discourse analysis is description or analysis o f linguistic prac- 
tice, that is analysis of the linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1992: 76- 
77). For this stage Fairclough (1992: 73-78, 234-237) suggests various analytic 
tools. Here we focus on vocabulary: wording, over-wording, rewording and 
altemative wording. The term ‘wording’ connotes processes of wording the 
world, which differ in different eras and places and for different groups of peo­
ple (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Over-wording is a sign of intense preoccupation 
pointing to peculiarities in the ideology (Fairclough 1992: 193). Rewording is 
new wordings presented as altematives, and in opposition, to existing ones
(Fairclough 1992: 194). We also look at metaphors. Fairclough (1992: 195) 
says, “How a particular domain of experience is metaphorized is one o f the 
stakes in the struggle within and over discourse practices.”
Thus the objects of analysis in this linguistic practice stage are words, 
phrases or sentences. We focus on how Muslims speak about Christians. Ana- 
lytic questions are: How do Muslims describe Christians? What do they say 
about Christians? What words do they use?
1.1 Atraalysis at rraicro level
This section deals with the micro or individual level of discourse, that is where 
Muslims speak about Christians from the perspective of their personal experi­
ence and opinions as individual believers, members of a family, neighbourhood 
or friendship. At individual level many Muslim participants describe Christians 
as their friends. For instance, a professional woman said, “[In] junior high 
school I had a close friend. Her name was Fani195 and [she was] a Christian.”196 
The word “close” shows that the speaker had an intimate relationship with her 
friend.
The participants referred to Christians as family members or relatives. A 
participant said, “The background of my father’s relative was Hindu- 
Christian.” This text shows that the participant’s extended family represents 
diverse religions: Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. Some participants said that 
they have members o f many different religions in the extended family and only 
few different religions in their nuclear family.
A professional male said, “We do not differentiate [between] Muslim and 
Catholic [in my family], So [we have] something like a family fund. [If mem­
bers of the family] are sick, if [they], what is it called, have an operation, [they] 
receive one million [rupiah], a hundred [rupiah] for those who get a less serious 
sickness.”197 This text shows the equal position (“we do not differentiate”) and 
mutual relationship (sharing money) between Muslims and Catholics in the 
speaker’s family.
Some participants used the label “abangan” as an attribute of their family. 
A male professional said, “I am from an abangan family. My uncles are Chris­
tians, I mean Catholics, and Muslims. It is customary [to have] a meeting dur- 
ing lebaran [Islamic feast], ”198 Here the word “abangan” indicates a family
195 This is a pseudonym.
196 SMP itu saya punya teman dekat, namanya Fani, dan Kristen.
1 Kita satu keluarga ya tidak memandang Islam atau Katolik. Jadi ada semacam iuran 
keluarga. Ada yang sakit, kalau apa namanya operasi dapat sekian juta, seratus ribu kalau sakit 
biasa.
198 Saya dari keluarga abangan. Pak De saya ada yang Kristen, eh Katolik, dan Islam. Sudah 
biasa seperti itu ketemu kalau lebaran.
with religiously diverse members. Another participant contrasted “abangan” 
Christians with “fanatical” Christians.
“ [In] Blibis area, Baki... [the Christians] succeeded to build church. Now [it] has become an 
area of Christianization. Some o f the inhabitants [who are now Christians] formerly were 
Muslims. So they [new Christians by conversion] have had social intercourse for a long time, 
have family relationships, [are] close neighbours. They don’t have problems in daily rela­
tions. But their Christianity is also abangan, not that fanatical. The abangan M uslim meets 
the abangan Christian, so [it is] ordinary [no problem].”199
The phrases “abangan Muslim” and “abangan Christian” show that the label 
abangan is applied not only to Muslims, but also to Christians. Neither aban­
gan Muslims nor abangan Christians are fanatics. In this text abangan is a 
shared identity that serves as a meeting point between Muslims and Christians. 
That is why they “don’t have problems in daily relations”. Thus, the word 
“abangan” is not only an identity label but also relates to concrete behaviour. 
The speaker’s phrase “area of Christianization” indicates a place where proc­
esses are at work to Christianize Muslims.
The participants referred to Christians as their “neighbours”. An elderly 
female talked about her Christian Chinese neighbour: “In the ‘70s [1970s] I had 
a Christian Chinese neighbour... When it was Ramadan [she] often made 
dawet200 for me. “Bu Siti,201 I made dawet for you.”202 Here the participant talked 
about social relations between her and her Christian neighbour. Another elderly 
female commented: “In my place [one person] donates rice during Idul Fitri 
[Islamic feast]... up to two quintals. [He/she is] a Chinese Christian.”203 The 
phrase “Chinese Christian” in the last two utterances shows a combination of 
religious and ethnic identities.
A male worker said, “There is a Christian neighbour of mine. Coinciden- 
tally he is close [to me] and he often repairs his bicycle at my house.”204 In the 
last utterance, besides talking about his neighbour as a Christian (social posi­
tion), he also describes a social relationship between him and his neighbour.
Daerah Blibis, Baki... sudah berhasil bangun gereja. Sekarang jadi daerah Kristenisasi. 
Sebagian yang disitu itu dulu aslinya Islam. Jadi bermasyarakat sudah lama, ada yang 
bersaudara, tetangga cukup dekat. Dalam sehari-hari gak ada masalah dalam berhubungan. 
Tapi Kristennya sekarang juga Kristen abangan, bukan Kristen yang fanatik. Islam abangan 
musuh Kristen abangan, jadi ya biasa-biasa aja.
200 Dawet is a cold drink made from rice or arrowroot, flour, coconut milk and palm sugar.
201 This is a pseudonym.
202 Tahun tujuh puluhan itu saya punya tetangga itu ya Kristen ya China... Iha itu kalau 
Ramadhan, sering buatkan saya dawet. Shoh, tak gekke dawet.
203 Di tempat saya, kalau idul fitri itu ada yang ngirim beras... sampai dua kwintal. Wong Kris­
ten China.
204 Tetangga saya itu ada yang umat Kristiani. Kebetulan itu dekat dan itu sering sok ndandakke 
sepeda ke rumah saya.
This utterance and some of the earlier ones show that when Muslims talk about 
the others at micro level they also talk about themselves.
Most Muslim participants said that they have a diversity of friends. A par­
ticipant said, “My friends are diverse.” Some participants described their 
schools which represented diverse religions. A participant said, “When I was at 
junior high school [the students were] Catholic, Protestant, Muslim.”205 Another 
female participant described a similar situation, “[At my] senior high school... 
half the class were Muslims, half were Catholics.”206 These two sentences indi- 
cate that some participants attended religiously diverse schools. A young fe­
male participant said, “My boyfriend’s family [its members] is [religiously] 
diverse: Christian, Catholic and Islam.”207 The word “boyfriend” shows that the 
speaker, a young female, has a special relationship with a Christian boy. Thus 
the word “tolerant” is not only a label but also relates to concrete behaviour.
Generally Muslim participants mentioned that Christians are tolerant. A 
young female said, “ [I] had a Christian boyfriend. He was highly tolerant... if  [I 
said] a prayer of tarawih, [he] didn’t pray with me, but [he] waited for [me] 
outside the mosque.”208 In that text the participant described a link between the 
word “tolerant” and an attitude o f waiting for his girlfriend while she prayed.
Most participants described interpersonal relations between Muslims and 
Christians as good. A participant said, “Their relationship with us is good... I 
was hospitalized in the PKU (Muhammadiyah hospital), [I was] visited. The 
Christians also visited [me], [They] also prayed [for me] outside [the ward].”209 
Likewise an elderly male narrated, “I was hospitalized in Jebres. My [Muslim] 
friends didn’t come first, my jem a’ah (congregants) didn’t come first, they 
[Christians] came first.”210 In those texts two participants shared the same ex- 
perience of being visited by Christians in hospital when they were sick.
Some participants described interpersonal interaction with Christians in 
daily life. An Arabian businesswoman in the elderly female group talked about 
her daughter’s wedding. She gave the invitations to her neighbours regardless 
o f whether they were Muslim or Christian. She said, “When I had a wedding 
[for my daughter], I organized something [a party], Although they [my
205 SMP ada yang Katolik, Protestan, Islam.
SMA... separoh kelas Muslim, separoh kelas Katolik.
Pacar saya kan beda-beda agama keluarganya, ada Kristen, ada Katolik, sama Islam.
Sempat punya pacar Kristen juga. Itu toleransinya sangat tinggi. Bila sholat tarawih, tidak 
ikut sholat sich, tapi menunggu di luar mesjid.
Hubungannya dengan kita ini ya baik... Saya mondok di PKU itu ya ditiliki. Orang-orang 
Kristen itu yo dho tilik. Di luar itu ya pada mendoakan.
210 Saya opname di Jebres. Temen-temen saya belum dateng, ja m a ’ah saya belum dateng, 
mereka udah ke sana.
neighbours] are Christians, the invitation was for them.”211 Here the speaker 
described that she did not discriminate between guests at a wedding party on a 
religious basis. By adding the word “although” she shows that sometimes Mus­
lims do not invite Christians to a party.
A young female participant expressed her personal experience of playing 
inside the church when she was child. She said, “My house is very close to the 
church. When [I was] a child, that church was in the same area as my friend’s 
house. So except on Sundays, except during prayer time, kids played there [in­
side church], Because its chairs could be moved, that place became a play- 
ground.”212 Here the speaker indicated that church was not an exclusive place 
reserved for Christian religious services.
Some Muslim participants mentioned that in forming friendships and 
neighbourhood relations Muslims and Christian avoid mixing religious (Islamic 
and Christian) practices. A female professional said, “I had a friend. [She was] 
also Christian. She distinguished ibadah [worship] affairs from friendship af­
fairs. So she did not mix [ibadah and friendship].”213 In this text she mentioned 
that the Christian avoided mixing Islamic and Christian worship or prayer. She 
continued, “When time for sholat [prayer] came I was asked [by her] to pray 
fïrst. When she had a [Christian] service, [she] asked permission to have her 
service fïrst... So her tolerance was very high.”214 Here the speaker described a 
connection between a high degree o f “tolerance” and the Christian’s suggestion 
that the Muslim pray fïrst.
Another participant shared the same notion of respecting each other’s 
prayers but not mixing them. “I had a friend who was a Muslim. He/she also 
made friends with a Catholic. When the Muslim friend prayed in the mosque, 
that Catholic waited outside. [It was] always like that. So it seems very social. 
We didn’t interfere with each other’s aqida [faith].”215 Here the label “social” is 
used for an interpersonal understanding between a Muslim and a Christian. 
Using the distinction between social and religious affairs, the speaker’s Catho-
2" Sayapunya acarapernikahan, mengadakan apa. Walau dia Kristen tetep undangan itu jatuh 
untuk dia.
Rumahku deket skali dengan gereja. Waktu kecil gerejanya itu jad i satu sama rumahnya 
temenku. Jadi disitu kalau nggak minggu, waktu bukan ibadah, malah buat tempat main anak- 
anak. Soalnya disitu gerejanya kursinya itu bisa dipindah-pindah. jadi disitu malah jadi tempat 
bermain.
Aku pernah punya temen, cewek dari Kristiani juga. Dia itu bisa bedakan mana yang urusan 
ibadah, mana urusan buat teman. Jadi dia gak mencampuradukkan.
Kalau pas waktunya aku sholat, aku disuruh sholat dulu. Kalau dia waktunya ibadah ya ijin 
ibadah dulu... Jadi toleransinya sangat tinggi.
215 Pernah tho punya temen, temen itu Muslim. Dia sahabatan sama orang Katolik juga. Setiap 
temen Muslim itu sholat di masjid, yang Katolik nunggu di luar. Pasti kayak gitu. Jadi sosialnya 
terasa banget. Kita nggak masuk ke masalah aqidahnya masing-masing gitu.
lic friend is described as tolerant. In this text the speaker differentiated between 
the fields of aqida (faith) and friendship.
A male participant, who is a local board member o f Muhammadiyah, ob- 
served, “When they have a Christmas celebration... we are invited to attend. 
Yet it’s impossible for us to come, because it is related to aqida [faith].”216 Here 
the speaker explained that attending a Christmas celebration is prohibited be­
cause Christmas is a religious feast.
Again, a young female mentioned, “In social activities, le f s work together. 
But if  it is religious affairs [of Islam and Christianity], do not mix.”217 Thus the 
participant distinguished between social and religious affairs. In another text an 
elderly female said: “In muamala [social] affairs we are good [to Christians], 
[while] in aqida (faith) affairs we couldn’t be good.”21k As evidenced by the 
linguistic features o f these texts, the word “aqida” [faith] is an altemative 
wording for “religion” (agama), while the word “muamala” is an altemative 
wording for “social”. Using the previous classification, the participant was 
saying that it is permissible to be tolerant in the social arena but not in the reli­
gious arena.
Whereas some participants described how they avoided mixing Islamic and 
Christian worship and teachings, others described the togethemess of Muslims 
and Christians during Islamic or Christian feasts. An elder female talked about 
her Muslim and Christian neighbours who helped each other decorate the bal- 
cony for Christmas and halal bi halal (Islamic feast) celebrations. Similarly, a 
young male said, “I have many Christian neighbours... There is service [held by 
my Christian neighbour], I don’t know [what it is called], [they] sing... I also 
assist there [serving food, etc.].”219 Here the speaker described helping at his 
Christian neighbour’s religious service.
An elderly male, a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leader, talked about a Catholic 
pastor who died and some Muslims participated in the funeral ceremony. The 
pastor was his close friend. He said, “When he died, he was a Catholic pastor, 
there was a cross on the tombstone, [but those] who carried his corpse were 
[members of] Banser and Anshor [NU’s youth wing].”220 Here the speaker de-
216 Kalau mereka Natalan... kami diundang untuk menghadiri itu. Ya, kami tidak mungkin 
datang. Kerena itu sudah menyangkut soal aqidah.
217 Kalau masalah sosial ayo kerja bareng-bareng. Tapi kalau masalah agama jangan 
dibanding-bandingkan. In the text the speaker did not use the word ‘mix’, but “be compared 
(dibanding-bandingkan)”. However, for the sake of clarity I use the word ‘m ix’.
218 Untuk muamalah kita baik, untuk aqidah kita tidak boleh baik.
219 Tetangga saya banyak yang Kristen... Ada acara apa, saya gak tahu, nyanyi-nyanyi itu... 
Saya juga ikut nyinom disitu, tetangga saya yang Islam juga banyak nyinom disitu.
220 Pada waktu dia meninggal, dia itu jelas romo, bandosane ada palang gitu, yang ngangkat itu 
Banser sama Anshor.
scribed how even though his close friend was a Catholic pastor, members of his 
organization helped to carry his corpse at the funeral.
Another elderly male, an imam and member of Muhammadiyah, said, 
“When there was halal bi halal [Islamic feast] in the church [yard], I was in­
vited to preach. [It was] in Gajahan. Sixty percent of those attending were Mus­
lims, forty percent were non-Muslims.”221 A male worker mentioned, “ [I got] 
many SMSs [short messages] from my Tionghoa Christian friends during le- 
baran [Islamic feast].”222 The linguistic features o f these texts indicate that the 
word “lebaran” is an altemative wording for “halal bi halal”, while “Tionghoa 
Christian” is an altemative wording for “Chinese Christians”.
Talking about whether Muslims should also distribute zakat (alms) to poor 
Christians during the month of Ramadan, a female worker said the following:
“There is a guideline from the Q ur’an and hadits about the zakat fitrah (personal alms) [in Is­
lam], But we could not implement it strictly here [in this village]. How [to implement the 
teaching of] Islam? Here we prioritize social. Why? ...For instance I am a member o f 
Muhammadiyah. I f  I were to implement the principles o f Muhammadiyah [about zakat -  she 
assumed that these principles prohibited giving zakat to non-Muslims], the Muhammadiyah 
rules from the HPP [the organizational guidance] or whatever, then [I would] make non- 
Muslims, [even] Muslims, not symphatize with Islam” .223
In contrast to the foregoing narrations, some Muslim participants described 
Christians as the enemy. A participant said, “When I was at senior high school, 
[I] considered Christians the enemy... Even in my [early] university years [it 
was] still like that.”224 Other participants mentioned that “not all Christians are 
good to Muslims”.225 Mostly they complained about Christianization. The way 
they “spread their religion” makes Muslims “emotional” (angry).
Some participants said that Christians pretend to do good deeds for Mus­
lims. A female participant said, “Their (Christians’) daily life is good, but how 
is their heart? Perhaps the goodness is pretended. Perhaps [it is] to get protec-
221 Kalau saya halal bi halal di gereja pun saya suruh ngisi. Di Gajahan. Yang datang enam 
puluh persen Muslim, empat puluh persen non-Muslim.
222 SMS kalau lebaran itu kan banyak dari temen-temen Kristen Tionghoa.
223 Zakat fitrah kalau disini itu ya untuk dalilnya untuk pedoman Al-Qur’an dan Haditsnya ada 
dan tahu. Tapi untuk disini kalau diterapkan seperti itu saya kira kurang begitu apa ya istilahnya 
terlalu saklek. Kalau Islam? Di sini itu yang kita utamakan itu sosial dulu. Karena apa? 
...Umpamanya saya, Muhammadiyah memegang teguh dari prinsip Muhammadiyah, kaidah- 
kaidah Muhammadiyah dari HPP atau apapun, itu nanti menjadikan umat lain, umat Islam 
kurang simpati dengan Islam.
224 Waktu saya SMA, memandang Kristen sebagai musuh... Bahkan waktu awal-awal kuliah 
masih seperti itu.
225 Tidak semua orang Kristen baik terhadap orang Islam.
tion. Perhaps there are other intentions.”226 A Muslim participant used the label 
“stubbom” 227 to describe Christians who always have hidden intentions when 
doing good deeds for the benefit of Muslims. Christians are described as hav- 
ing hidden agendas aimed at Christianization underlying their benevolence to 
Muslims.
Several participants described their personal experience o f Christianization 
within their family. A female worker said, “My sister was a Muslim. She at- 
tended a Christian junior high school. She followed the [Christian] course, so 
she converted. Since then she has been following Christianity. However, al­
hamdulillah [thanks be to God], her younger siblings are still Muslim.”228 The 
speaker uses the word “alhamdulillah” to show that being and remaining a 
Muslim is something to be grateful for.
Another participant described a conversation with her daughter. She said, 
“My daughter joined an extracurricular course [at a Christian institution], Once 
or twice [she was asked to] do exercises, this one and that one. Later the course 
was changed... [She said] mom, I was taught religious [Christian] education 
like this. [Then I said] when you are picked up [by your friends] tomorrow, 
please don’t join [go].”229 Here the speaker described her suspicion about hid­
den agendas underlying Christian education.
Some participants described a difference between religious education at 
public and Christian schools. A female professional said, “ [I received my] high 
school [education] at a public high school... When [we were taught] religion 
[we were] separated.”230 At public schools students are separated because they 
are taught their respective religions. Another participant had a different experi­
ence. She said, “My big cousin was Muslim, but he/she went to a Christian 
junior and senior high school. And its [religious] course was exclusively on 
Christianity. From the books on worship, about worship [he/she] was also 
taught Christianity... even though he/she was Muslim.”231 In Christian schools 
Muslims are taught about Christianity. Compared with the previous descrip-
226 Kesehariannya itu baik, tapi bagaimana hatinya? Mungkin kebaikan pura-pura. Mungkin 
untuk mencari perlindungan. Mungkin ada tendensi lain.
227 Nekad.
228 Agama Islam... dia kakak saya. Terus dia masuk SMP Kristen. Dia kan mengikutipelajaran 
itu, ketut njuran. Mulai itu dia terus ikut Kristen. Tapi alhamdulillah adik-adiknya tetep Islam.
229 Anak saya ikut les. ... satu dua kali ya latihan nggarap ini nggarap ini. Lama-lama 
pelajaranne kok ganti... Buk, Iha aku tadi diajari ngaji ngene-ngene. Yo sesuk nek diampiri ra 
usah melok.
SMA di SMA Negeri... kalau pelajaran agama dipisah.
"3I Kakakku keponakan itu dia Islam, tapi dia untuk SMP-SMA-nya Kristen. Dan untuk 
pengajarannya pure Kristen gitu. Jadi mulai buku-bukunya, trus kalau pas ibadah, ibadah itu 
juga diajari Kristen. Jadi nggak ada pemilahan subjek oh ini agama Islam ini agama Kristen... 
Walau dia itu agamanya Islam.
tion, this speaker was worried that the aim of these lessons was to persuade 
pupils to “follow Christianity” (i.e. to convert).
A participant described her personal experience. “In Kusumodiningratan, on 
the whole [people are] Christians. Their way to restrain us, to make [us] afraid 
to enter the area... is to keep dogs. Our experience living in Kusumodiningratan 
is that on average each house has a dog. And in the aftemoon the dogs are let 
out. But the aftemoon is when [Muslim] kids leam Qur’anic recitation.”232 In 
this utterance the speaker describes a link between “dog” and a Christian fam­
ily. Moreover, the phrase “to make [us] afraid” describes a dog as an animal 
used to frighten Muslims.
Similarly, a young female commented, “When I used to teach kids the 
Qur’an... the young [Christians] were hanging around. And that is admittedly a 
Christian area. They don’t have tolerance. They played football, played music. 
At the same time we used to teach kids in the mosque. [The place where they 
hung out to play is] just across the road.”233 The speaker wanted to say that 
young Christians displayed a lack of empathy and tolerance by disturbing Mus­
lim children who were studying the Qur’an. Here the speaker described intoler- 
ance in a particular age category, namely the younger generation.
Another participant used a bahasa Indonesian metaphor, saying that Chris­
tians are “like a jackal in sheep’s fur”,234 which means tricking by pretending. A 
participant added, “ [They] don’t respect Muslims.”235 Another participant used 
a metaphor to describe the relation between Christians and Muslims “as that of 
oil and water”,236 implying that Muslims and Christians can never blend.
In talking about the others, the participants also talked about themselves. A 
young female talked about her housemate. She said, “She wears jilbab of a 
different kind to the jilbab I use... Her jilbab is wide. She is indeed anti non 
[non-Muslims].”237 The speaker linked wearing a wide jilbab with an anti- 
Christian attitude. The label “non” is applied to Christians (non-Muslims).
232 Kalau di Kusumodiningratan, ini ya rata-rata, itu Nasrani. Mereka caranya mencegah kita 
agar takut masuk ke ruangan itu, ke lingkungan itu, dengan mereka memelihara anjing. Karena 
pengalaman kami pernah tinggal di daerah Kusumodiningratan, sehingga rata-rata satu rumah 
pasti punya anjing. Dan sore hari anjingnya dikeluarkan. Padahal sore itu adalah waktunya 
anak TPA.
233 Saat saya mendidik anak-anak belajar ngaji... kaum yang masih muda nongkrong. Dan disitu 
memang wilayahnya orang-orang Kristen. Disana tidak ada kata toleransi, ya untuk dia bermain 
bola, apa genjrengan. Padahal kita mendidik anak-anak di masjid. Hanya berseberang jalan.
234 Serigala berbulu domba.
235 Tidak menghormati umat Islam.
236 Seperti air dengan minyak.
“37 Dia juga pakai jilbab yang berbeda dengan cara berpakaian jilbab seperti saya... jilbabnya 
besar. Dia memang antipati dengan non.
1.2 Arsalysis at mes© level
The meso or institutional level of discourse is when participants speak about 
themselves as members o f an institutional religion, that is shared, collective 
pattems of belief and practice which go beyond personal convictions. In talking 
about Christianity (the other, out-group), sometimes Muslims also speak about 
their own religion, Islam (in-group).
At an institutional level Muslim participants generally described Christians 
as “grandchildren o f Abraham (cucu Ibrahim)” and Christianity as a “good” 
religion. For example, a male professional said, “Christians are not too differ­
ent from Muslims, being grandchildren of Abraham.”238 An elderly female ob- 
served, “Basically the core of all religions is good ... their teachings are almost 
the same.”239 Another elderly female said, “Basically all religions are good.”240 
The utterance “Christians are not too different from Muslims” shows that 
Christians and Muslims share their traditional roots. The two speakers use the 
word “good” rather than right or true.
However, some participants described Christians as infidels (kafir) and 
polytheists (musyrik). Christians by conversion are described as apostates (mur- 
tad). A participant commented, “There are many apostate Christians, who left 
Islam for Christianity.”241 Another said that Muslims will go to “paradise”,242 in 
contrast to Christians who go to a different place. Yet another pointed out that 
the Qur’an says “do not make those Jews and Nasrani your allies”.243
A male professional said, “ [If] a Christian [says] assalamu ’alaikum (greet- 
ing/peace upon you), we are forbidden to reply. Just answer wa'alaikum (be 
upon you), not wa’alaikum salam (peace be upon you).” Likewise a female 
professional observed, “If  it [salam, greeting] is [spoken by] a Muslim, [we 
have to] answer. I f  it is [spoken] by a non-Muslim, we are forbidden to an­
swer.”244 Here the speaker used the passive voice. She did not mention who 
forbade that practice.
Both the foregoing speakers said that the greeting “assalamu’alaikum” is 
exclusively for Muslims. A female participant who works for an NGO engaged 
in community education and who often invites govemment staff to present 
courses, said that she had asked govemment to send only Muslim staff as its 
representatives in the Muslim community programme. She said, “If there is an
238 Umat Kristen tidakjauh berbeda dengan umat Islam sebagai cucu Ibrahim.
™ Intinya semuapada dasarnya agama baik... ajarannya hampir sama.
240 Pada intinya semua pada dasarnya agama baik.
Kristen murtadan akeh, murtad saka Islam nang Kristen.
242 0Surga.
Jangan jadikan orang Yahudi dan Kristen temanmu.
Kalau Muslim kan harus dijawab, kalau non Muslim kita tidak boleh menjawab.
Islamic programme... Whatever the way, [we] ask for a Muslim [as govemment 
representative]. So we can use [Islamic greetings] to answer their greetings.”245 
An elderly female participant said, “They [Christians] had been indoctri- 
nated by the church to proselytize.”246 Another person in the same FGD said, 
“Dewi Pumamawati is from Arimatea [organization of Muslims by conver­
sion]. Dewi was a Catholic, staunch. Allah gave [her] guidance. [When she was 
a Catholic] she had been indoctrinated since she was child... to apostatize.”247 
Another participant said, “Their nature is to look for our carelessness [about 
being Christianized].”248 By comparing the two statements we leam that the 
verb “to apostatize” is an altemative wording for “to proselytize”. The expres- 
sion “Allah gave [her] guidance” refers to the person’s conversion to Islam.
Some participants said that building new churches and serving the poor are 
forms of Christianization. A young male participant talked about the church’ s 
service of providing for poor Muslims during the month of Ramadan. He said:
“It could be an invitation [to become Christian], because ... I see those who join the fast- 
breaking are only pedicab drivers and beggars. Actually those people are easily indoctrinat­
ed. The first step is to jo in  the fast-breaking. The second step is through another way. That is 
their mission. There is a second [strategy]. Maybe, maybe [it is] the cheap rice [pro­
gramme]. ”24!l
By adding the word “only” in this text the speaker describes pedicab drivers 
and beggars as poor Muslims. Thus only poor Muslims attend the church fast- 
breaking. The speaker is describing a particular social class: the lower class. 
The vocabulary shows that he uses the word “mission” with reference to Chris­
tians’ strategy to persuade Muslims to convert to Christianity by rendering a 
social service. If  we compare this with a previous utterance by another partici­
pant, the word “mission” is used as an altemative for the Christianization of 
Muslims.
A young male participant said, “In Solo Christians behave excessively 
(,kelewatan). For instance, during the month o f Ramadan (fasting) church
245 Kalau ada kegiatan Islam... Entah caranya gimana minta yang Muslim. Sehingga kita jelas 
kan menjawabnya.
Mereka itu sudah didoktrin dari gerejanya agar selalu berusaha meraih.
Dewi Pumamawati dari Arimatea, Dewi itu dulu Katolik, jeglek, Allah memberi petunjuk, 
sekarang menjadi mubalighah. Dari kecil dia itu sudah didoktrin... memurtadkan.
Sifat mereka itu mencari kelengahan kita.
4 Bisa saja untuk apa namanya sebagai mengajak, karena... saya lihat yang buka puasa disitu 
kan, hanya tukang becak, ataupun yang pengemis. Sebenarnya orang-orang seperti itu kan 
mudah terdoktrin. Tahap awal mereka ada yang ikut buka puasa. Tahap kedua dengan cara lain. 
Ada misi mereka. Ada yang kedua kalinva. Mungkin ada, mungkin dengan beras murah.
[members] prepare fast-breaking [for Muslims].”250 The same person described 
another instance of the fast-breaking programme in the Javanese Christian 
Church o f Manahan. He said, “Inter alia they want to do a good thing for Mus­
lims, that’s their aim. But [they engage in] excessive [practices] towards Mus­
lims, to us. So no, they should not do that. I f  they want to do a good thing for 
us, [do] not do this by inviting us to the church.”251 In both texts the speaker 
said that preparing fast-breaking for poor Muslims and inviting them to come 
to the church are “excessive” Christian practices. From the linguistic features 
of the texts, the speaker does not object to the fast-breaking programme as such 
but to inviting Muslims to come to church.
Another participant said, “When the floods [came], or what, the church was 
very quick [to help people]. Their funds were already readily available... But 
we would always question: what is the intention?”252 Here the speaker is suspi- 
cious o f Christians’ assistance to Muslims. Another participant said, “We 
should not be fooled by their kindness. Because later they will have mis- 
sions.”253 Here the word “mission” signifies the practice o f Christianizing Mus­
lims. A participant said, “Muslims who are financially poor are assisted by 
them until [they feel] embarrassed [to refuse their invitation to become Chris­
tians].”254
The linguistic features of the following sentences show that participants 
questioned whether social and educational services are ways of Christianizing 
Muslims. A female professional talked about her neighbours who converted to 
Christianity. She said, “ [They] are always picked up to go to church, receive 
money, receive clothes, receive basic goods.”255 The speaker added, “If I am not 
mistaken it is the GBI (Indonesian Bethel Church) o f Solo Baru.”256 Another 
participant said, “Many children are driven to school and their school fees are 
paid. It is in Mojosongo.”257 In the texts the speakers mentioned the names of 
two places/churches: Solo Baru and Mojosongo. “She/he [a Christian] is doing
250 Di Solo, umat Kristiani ini memang bertindaknya sudah kelewatan gitu, seperti bulan 
Ramadhan. Apa gereja-gereja membuat buka bersama.
251 Mereka memang salah satunya pengin berbuat baik untuk umat Islam, itu tujuan mereka. 
Tapi kelewatan terhadap orang Islam, terhadap kita. Jadi nggak, tidak boleh mereka. Kalau toh 
niat mereka ingin berbuat baik kepada kita, ya dengan ndak ngundang ke gereja donk.
252 Itu ada banjir, atau apa, itu gereja sangat cepat sekali. Dana mereka memang sudah ada 
betul... Tapi kita akan tetap bertanya mereka ada tendensi apa?
Jangan sampai kita istilahnya terlena dengan kebaikan-kebaikan mereka. Karena apa bisa 
belakangnya mereka punya misi-misi.
254 Orang Islam yang lemah ekonominya kemudian disantuni oleh dia sampai lewat pekewuh.
255 Setiap ke gereja dijemput, mendapatkan uang, mendapatkan pakaian, mendapatkan bahan 
pokok.
256 Gerejanya itu kalau tidak salah itu GBI mana Solo Baru.
25 Banyak anak-anakyang diantar, dijemput, disekolahkan, dibayari. Itu daerah Mojosongo.
dakwa ... sometimes with food or whatever, [giving] clothes,”258 said a male 
worker. Here the speaker used “dakwa” as an altemative wording for Christian 
mission (misï).
A participant said, “ [They] convert to that religion [Christianity] for a par­
cel.”259 Another participant commented, “His/her KTP [identity card] says Is­
lam, but he/she never performs sholat (prayer). Their religion could be ex- 
changed for Sarimi [a brand of noodle].”260 In this text, the speaker shifts from 
using single pronoun (he/ she: dia) to plural pronoun (they: mereka). This 
commonly happens in Indonesian oral conversation. A young female partici­
pant said, “Because o f financial need they will go to church and [when they] 
return [they] brought Sarimi. [They are] picked up to go [to church], [If they] 
do not come, [they are] looked for.”261 This speaker described a link between 
Muslims who “never perform sholat” and their casual way of changing their 
religion to obtain Sarimi. The word “parcel” is an altemative wording for 
“Sarimi”, referring to gifits from Christians which are viewed suspiciously as 
ways o f persuading poor Muslims to convert to Christianity. By contrast a male 
worker feit that “those [who] already have a religion, should not be converted 
to another religion”.262 In effect he was saying that converting Muslims to 
Christianity is prohibited. In this text the speaker used the passive voice. Using 
previous and subsequent categories applied by participants, the speakers de­
scribed people who easily convert to another religion as not “devout Muslims”, 
but “abangan” (nominal) Muslims and “poor people”.
With reference to KTP, a male worker said, “Their Islam is Islam KTP. 
Then [they are] given something, tempted. They live in poverty. Unfortunately 
their friends [come] to influence [them], Join me [in Christianity], then [you 
will] receive a monthly incentive [money].”263 Another male worker said, “I 
have a cousin. Fortunately [the cousin was] previously a Muslim. But his/her 
[way of] Islam rarely performed shalat (prayer). Now he/she has joined the 
church [Christianity] ... [because he/she] is given a job. [It is] Pasar Legi Beth- 
any Church.”264 The label “Islam KTP” is applied to Muslims who may be 
tempted to join Christianity. If  we compare it with the previous sentence,
258 Dia dakwah... kadangpakai makanan atau apapakaian.
259 Pindah ke agama sana karena sesuap parcel.
260 fcTp_nya js[anti tapi dia tidak pernah menjalankan shalat. Mereka-mereka inilah yang mau- 
maunya agamanya ditukar sama Sarimi.
261 Karena kepentok kebutuhan ekonomi, mereka mau ke gereja dan pulang dibawakan Sarimi. 
Berangkatpun dijemput. Tidak datang, pun dicari.
Yang sudah punya agama jangan ditarik ke agama lain.
263 Islamnya Islam KTP, terus dikasih itu, diiming-imingi, mereka kan hidup kekurangan. 
Ndlalah ada temennyayang mempengaruhi. Melu aku wae nanti per bulan dapat gaji.
Saya punya kepokan sendiri, kebetulan kemarin Islam, tapi Islamnya juga jarang sholat. 
Sekarang itu dia masuk gereja... dikasih kerjaan. Di gereja Bethany Pasar Legi.
“his/her KTP says Islam, but (he/she) never performs sholat [prayer], Their 
religion could be exchanged for Sarimi [a brand of noodle]”, the speaker says 
that the target of Christianization is “Islam KTP” who rarely perform shalat 
(prayer). The speaker specifically mentioned the Pasar Legi Bethany Church.
Some participants talked about Muslim-Christian marriage. “They [young 
Christian men] also approach our children, our girls,” said an elderly female 
participant.265 A female professional explained: “At first, when getting married, 
the man [converts to] Islam. But when [they] have a child [the woman] is 
threatened: if you do not want to follow me [become a Christian], please take 
care of your kid yourself. Indeed the woman was forced to be a housewife [not 
working outside the house]... Finally [she] moved, moved to Christianity.”266 
The sentence, “please take care of your kid yourself’ is a divorce threat. The 
wording of the utterance shows that marriage can be a strategy to convert 
someone to Christianity.
A young female participant described various strategies such as providing 
food, clothing and education for poor Muslims as “Christianization in a smooth 
way”.267 A participant said, “Two [missionaries] who cycle every aftemoon 
come to people’s houses to deceive [them] to join their religion.”268 A female 
professional made a similar observation:
“There were [two] people cycling, wearing helmets. One o f them was Indonesian. [The oth­
er] was a foreigner. Both people went cycling every aftemoon. [They] went door to door to 
persuade [other people] to follow their religion... At first I did not realize they were mission­
aries. I did not think [they were missionaries]. I thought [they were] tourists... [Once] I met 
them [missionaries from the same group] coincidentally in the Grand Mali. [I] met a woman, 
a foreigner, a sister... [she] approached [people] one by one.”269
Thus, besides “Christianization in a smooth way” there is door-to-door mission. 
Another participant used the word “londo” (Dutch) to speak about foreign mis­
sionaries. “Those active [in mission] were cycling. [They] wore white [and] 
black uniforms. Those londo [went] door to door.”270 Another participant said,
265 Mereka kan juga mendekati anak-anak kita, gadis-gadis kita.
266 Pertama waktu nikah yang cowok mau Islam. Tapi begitu sudah punya anak, diancam kalau 
kamu gak mau ikut saya, anakmu urusono dewe. Padahal yang perempuan sudah dikondisikan 
ibu rumah tangga... Akhirnyayopindah, pindah Kristen.
261 Kristenisasi secara halus.
268 Dua bersepeda jalan setiap sore, datang ke rumah-rumah gitu. Untuk membujuk memeluk 
agama mereka.
269 Orang bersepeda dengan helmnya. Mereka dari Indonesia ada satu. Dari luar ya kayaknya. 
Dua bersepeda jalan setiap sore, datang ke rumah-rumah gitu untuk membujuk memeluk agama 
mereka...Pertamanya saya gak tahu kalau dia misionaris. Saya gak tahu. Saya tahunya ada turis 
nih... Saya pernah ketemu tidak secara langsung di Grand Mali. Itu ketemu sama perempuan, 
bule, sister... Mendatangi satu per satu.
270 Yang aktif itu pakai sepeda. Tapi pakai sragam hitam putih. Londo itu door to door.
“There are many institutes of theology in Solo... The final assignment [of stu- 
dents] is to bring [convert] at least one person [to Christianity]... If he/she can- 
not bring one, then [he/she] doesn’t pass [obtain the diploma],”i71 Here the 
speaker described students of institutes of theology as agents of Christianiza­
tion.
However, other participants refused to generalize on the issue of Christiani­
zation. A male professional said:
“Regarding the expansion o f Christianity, those Christians are not Javanese Christians. In the 
GKJ [Javanese Christian Church] they are not too problematic... Those who are expansionist 
are other churches like El-Shaddai, Bethany, et cetera, Adventists ... One cannot generalize 
that all Christians are like that. [I] think the Javanese, [for instance] the GKJ, are more and 
more nice to [other] people ... in Javanese language, more acculturated”.272
In that text the speaker uses two different words: “Javanese Christians”, a gen- 
eral category, and “the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church)”, a specific church. 
From the foregoing text we gather that the gap is between Muslims and non- 
Javanese churches such as El-Shaddai, Bethany and Adventist. Similarly, a 
young male participant said, “Because of the similarity of customs ... there is 
no gap between [Javanese] Nasrani and Muslims.”2'3 In these texts the partici­
pants assigned a different position to Christian churches that are close to Java­
nese culture and those that are not. The linguistic features of the texts teil us 
that “Nasrani” is an altemative wording for Christian.
An elderly female participant said, “If we [live] close to the church [and] 
they are singing... we have to accept [the situation], [We] can’t... be egoistic, 
angry, then report [them]... It isn’t right... Although he is the first Muslim 
leader [to criticize Christians].”274 She also said, “For Christians, all, if they stay 
here, there is a mosque next door [to their house], then when adzan (summon to 
prayer) is echoing, maybe he/she will also complain [but in fact they don’t].”275 
She added, “Do not be too critical of their religious affairs.”277 The linguistic
271 Sekolah tinggi teologi cukup banyak di Solo ... Tugas akhirnya membawa minimal satu 
orang... Kalau gak dapatya nggak lulus.
212 Ini berkaitan dengan ekspansi dari Kristen. Kristen pun bukan Kristen Jawa. Kalau GKJ itu 
nggak terlalu bermasalah kayaknya... Yang ekspansif itu kayak gereja-gereja lain kayak El- 
Shaddai, Bethani dan sebagainya, Advent... Gak bisa menggebyah uyah bahwa Kristen kabeh 
seperti itu. Kayaknya kalau Jawa, GKJ, itu lebih dengan warga itu lebih enak... berbahasa Jawa, 
akulturasi lebih.
273 Karena kesamaan adat... di situ gak ada istilahnya jurangpemisah antara umat Nasrani dan 
umat Islam.
274 Kalau kita deket gereja dianya nyanyi-nyanyi... kita harus terima. Nggak boleh... egois, 
marah, lalu lapor... Itu sudah nggak benar... Meskipun dia orang Muslim yang paling top.
"7 Bagi orang-orang Kristen, semuanya, kalau dia tinggal disini, sininya mesjid, terus adzan 
barengan. Mungkin bagi dia juga ndrememeng.
276 In the Indonesian text the speaker used two adverbs together: terlalu (too) and banget (very).
features of these texts show the speaker arguing that Muslims should accept 
Christians and churches as they are. Those Muslims who rejected Christians are 
described as egoistic. The words “do not be too critical” show that the speaker 
is highly critical of her own Muslim community.
In talking about Christianity (religion of the others) participants talked about 
Islam (their own religion). Mostly they described its social identity as one of 
“rahmat” (mercy). A male participant said that Islam is for “rahmatan lil ‘ala- 
min” (mercy to the world). A participant, the leader of NU, said, “The impor­
tant thing [in relating to Christians] is bil hikmah wal maudzatil hasanah (to do 
so in wise and good ways).”278 In this text the participant suggests to other 
participants that Muslims should behave in a “good” way toward Christians. He 
continued, “Inna hudallah huwal huda (the guidance of Allah is the (only) 
guidance). [We] do not need to be tense [with Christians].”279 In this text the 
speaker says that whether someone becomes Muslim or Christian depends on 
God’s guidance. The way Muslims encounter Christians should be “wise” and 
“good”. The speakers mixed Indonesian and Arabic in the same sentence.
An elderly female participant said, “There is also a basic teaching from the 
hadits: man kana y u ’minu billahi wal yaumil akhiri falyukrim jarahu (whoever 
believes in Allah and the Last Day, let him treat his neighbour respectfully).”280 
She was connecting belief in Allah and the Last Day with a duty to treat one’s 
neighbour respectfully. An Arabian businesswoman said, “If we worry all the 
time about building churches and mosques, [we] can never stop [conflict 
between each other].”281 Then she added, “We take the best, [that is] rukun 
(harmony).”282
A participant -  a journalist -  said, “[At] UNS (State University of Sebelas 
Maret), in the middle [of our student years] I and my friends who were Catho­
lics, Buddhists, initiated an interfaith community in Surakarta.”283 He contin­
ued, “We always discuss, always meet to talk, not about the differences but 
about the similarities.”284 In that utterance the label “interfaith community” 
refers to a community of people from different religious backgrounds. The 
speaker said that in their community they preferred to talk about the similarities
277 Ndak usah terlalu kritis banget urusan agama mereka.
278 Yang penting bil hikmah wal mauidzatil hasanah.
279 Inna huda hudallah, tidakperlu metenteng.
280 Aturan bertetangga itu kan haditsnya dasarnya: man kana yu ’minu billahi wal yaumil akhir 
fa  yukrim jarahu.
281 Kalau kita ngributin gereja, masjid, yang dibangun dimana-mana, itu ya gak ada habisnya.
282 Kita ambil wae yang terbaik, rukun.
283 UNS, bahkan waktu pertengahan itu saya membentuk sama-sama teman-teman Katolik, 
Buddha, membentuk komunitas dialog antar iman Surakarta.
284 Kami selalu diskusi, selalu ketemu untuk apa ya kita tidak berbicara soal perbedaan, tapi 
mencari persamaan-persamaannya.
between their religions rather than about the differences. The same person also 
said, “I am closer to the Catholics... They already recognized that there is truth 
outside church.”285 By this he meant that Catholics are more open than other 
Christian groups.
1.3  Airaallysis att macro leveB
This subsection deals with the macro or societal level, where Muslim partici­
pants speak about themselves as members of Solo society, as citizens of Indo­
nesia, or about international issues. By and large participants said that Indone­
sia had experienced Reformasi since 1998. “In this Reformasi era,” a partici­
pant said, “the state is really free, freedom like nowadays.”286 As a result of 
Reformasi, another participant mentioned, “[In] Solo, many candidates for be- 
coming legislature members (MPs) are Christians.”287 “Now the vice mayor is 
non-[Muslim],”288 said another participant. In these texts, the speakers de­
scribed links between Reformasi, freedom and the new phenomenon of Chris­
tian MPs and a Christian vice mayor.
At macro level the participants described Indonesia as based on Pancasila 
and the principle of bhineka tunggal ika (unity in diversity). A female profes­
sional said, “1 am not living in an Islamic state. I am living in a bhineka tunggal 
ika state which recognizes five religions and even [indigenous] beliefs.”289 She 
added, “We cannot force ourselves to be an Islamic or Muslim state. Our city 
of Solo must not be based on Islam.”290 In these texts the speaker contrasted two 
categories: a “bhineka tunggal ika state” and an “Islamic or Muslim state”. She 
described a bhineka tunggal ika state as one that accommodates diverse relig­
ions and beliefs. The speaker also described her refusal to identify Solo as a 
region based on Islam.
A young male, an activist in the NU youth organization, made the following 
distinction between Syariah in the sense of rituals (amaliyah) and Syariah as a 
(political) system. He rejected Syariah as a political system, but accepted 
Syariah in the sense of Islamic rituals.
“We do not reject Syariah in terms of... rituals (amaliyah). We must accept [Syariah], be­
cause we are Muslims... The Islamic Syariah [that I reject] has to do with symbolization or 
formalization o f a [political] system... Yesterday I debated with friends from HTI [Indone-
285 Saya lebih dekat dengan orang Katolik... mereka sudah menganggap kebenaran ada di luar 
gereja Katolik.
Negara sangat bebas, kebebasan seperti saat ini.
Solo, calegnya yang Kristen banyak.
Sekarang wakil walikotanya non.
Saya tidak hidup di negara Islam. Saya hidup di negara yang bhineka tunggal ika yang 
agamanya mengenal lima bahkan ada aliran-aliran kepercayaan.
Kita tidak bisa memaksakan diri kita itu menjadi Islam atau negara Muslim. Atau kota Solo 
harus berdasarkan Islam.
sian Hizbut Tahrir]. They strongly favoured the khilafah. I was invited [to a discussion] on 
the topic o f plurality [pluralism] or khilafah. I have no choice, I choose pluralism ... meaning 
that Indonesia should not be an Islamic state. [Otherwise it] would be like Iran.”291
In this text the speaker contrasted the political concept of khilafah with that of 
pluralism. Even though he disagreed with the people of HTI and debated with 
them, he called them “friends” (social position). A young male observed, “Pan­
casila itself, if you look at it, there is no contradiction with the values of Islam. 
The belief in one divine Lordship, just and civilized humanity -  in the end, 
there is no contradiction with Islam.”292 Another young male said, “Nashara or 
Christians ... they are also citizens of Indonesia.”293 The use of the word “also” 
shows that the man wanted to say that, like Muslims, Christians are citizens of 
Indonesia. “Nashara” is an altemative wording for Christian.
Speaking about what happened in 1945, a participant said, “The Jakarta 
Charter ... [that proposes] the implementation of Islamic Syariah for adherents 
[of Islam], I think it should not be dropped. Because in fact we Muslims are the 
majority.”294 In this text the speaker described her support of the Jakarta Charter 
or the principle of implementing Islamic Syariah for Muslims. She also gives 
the reason: “it is because Muslims are a majority in Indonesia”.
A participant said, “Now the vice mayor is a non-[Muslim]... Since Mr 
Rudy became vice mayor [the] number of Muslims, the Muslim population has 
decreased drastically.”29’ Another participant commented, “In Surakarta ... there 
are many acts of Christianization. According to the figures [Muslims] remain 
sixty [percent], seventy percent [of the population].”296 Another participant said, 
“Formerly [Christians were] only sixteen [percent].”297 The first speaker related 
the position of a Christian as vice mayor to the decrease of the Muslim popula­
tion. Again the participant used the label “non” with reference to Christians.
291 Kita nggak menolak Syariah dalam arti... amaliyah. Kita pasti menerima. karena kita orang 
Islam... Syariah Islam itu kayak semacam simbolisasi atau formalisasi sistem... Kemarin saya 
juga sempet debat dengan temen-teman HTI. Mereka getol sekali memperjuangkan khilafah. 
Kebetulan saya diundang itu temanya plurality atau khilafah. Ya mau gak mau, saya harus milih 
pluralism.... Jadi tanpa harus Indonesia itu negara Islam. Malah justru nanti kasusnya kayak
Iran.
Pancasila sendiri, kan kalau njenengan amatin itu kan juga nggak ada yang bertentangan 
dengan nilai-nilai Islam juga. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab, 
sampai terakhir itu kan juga gak ada yang bertentangan dengan Islam. 
m Nasrani atau Kristen... mereja juga warga Indonesia.
294 Piagam Jakarta... menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya bagi saya, itu tidak 
diubah gak masalah. Karena kenyataan kita mayoritas, Muslim.
295 Sekarang wakil walikotanya non... Setelah Pak Rudy menjadi wakil walikota itu, angka 
Islam, populasi Islam, itu menurunnya sangat tajam.
296 Di Surakarta... banyak Kristenisasi. Dari angkanya sendiri kan enam puluh tujuh puluh 
persen.
2,7 Dulu kan hanya enam belas.
Some participants said that they were afraid of Christians occupying public 
office. A participant said, “If Mr Jokowi [the mayor, a Muslim] lives for the 
next five years [it is no problem]. But if he passes away after a year, he will be 
succeeded by Mr Rudi, who is a Christian. So what will Solo be? If we are 
replaced by Christians, then Islamic dakwa in mosques will be closed, closed. 
What will we do?”298 Here the speaker described his fear of a Christian occupy­
ing the position of mayor of Solo. The speaker over-worded “closed” to show 
his concern. He used the word “we”, assuming that all Muslims feel the same.
Two other participants expressed similar sentiments. An elderly male said, 
“When the village headman of Pasar Kliwon was replaced by a non-Muslim we 
protested, sir! Then, it was cancelled.”299 The speaker’s point was that the 
headman of a predominantly Muslim village had to be a Muslim. An elderly 
female said, “When my village headman was a Christian the craft training of 
PKK [village mothers’ union] was run by... [a group from] Santo Paulus 
[Christian school].”300 In this text the speaker linked a Christian village head­
man with the role of Santo Paulus Christian school in the village programme.
An elderly male had a different opinion about the Muslim population and 
Christianization. He argued that actually “formerly they indeed were not Mus­
lim”. Here is a quotation from his text.
“Formerly they [new Christians] indeed were not Muslims, they acted as if  they were Islamic 
(Islam-islaman). Because o f G30S [communist massacre in September 1965], for safety’s 
sake, not to be killed, et cetera [they became Muslims], There were many [communists] in 
Solo. Now the situation is totally safe. The state does not problematize [if someone becomes 
religious or not]. [Then they] retumed to their original [non-Muslim] faith. Originally they 
indeed were not Muslims... Because o f the temptations [from Christians] [they became] like 
that [converted to Christianity].”301
In that text the speaker used the expression “acted as if they were Islamic (Is- 
lam-islaman)” to say that they were not really Muslim. Looking at the vocabu- 
lary, we can see that “Islam-islaman” is an altemative wording for “abangan”.
In general the participants described Christianization as a problem in Mus- 
lim-Christian relations. A young male participant talked about pamphlets that 
he saw in mosques. He said, “In some mosques there are many pamphlets say-
2,8 Kalau PakJakowi itu selama lima tahun masih bisa hidup, kalau saumpama satu tahun terus 
dia meninggal digantikan Pak Rudi yang Kristen itu, mau jadi apa Solo... Kalau kita digantikan 
oleh yang Kristen, nanti dakwah di masjid ditutup, tutup. Kita mau apa?
299 Lurah Pasar Kliwon, ini pernah mau diganti yang non Islam, kita berontak pak. Terus ndak 
jadi.
300 Setelah lurah saya yang ini Kristen, PKK diisi keterampilan soko... Santo Paulus.
301 Dulunya itu memang bukan Islam, Islam-islaman. Dengan adanya G 30 S itu akhirnya 
supaya selamat, tidak dibunuh dan lain sebagainya. Kan Solo banyak sekali... Sekarang 
keadaaan semua aman. Negara tidak mempermasalahkan. Kembali ke aslinya. Aslinya dulu itu 
memang ndak Islam... Dengan adanya iming-iming itu tadi, iming-iming tadi, ya seperti itulah.
ing: be careful of the latent danger of Christianization.”3fi: A participant, an 
activist of the Muhammadiyah youth organization, said, “We refused church 
[building], because we had bitter experiences of Christianization. Don’t be 
stolen again! If there is a church, that is their base. [Muslims who live] behind, 
in front of, next door [to them] will be given basic commodities, et cetera and 
are sure to be converted.”’03 Here the speaker described Christianization as a 
kind of robbery. He also referred to “giving basic goods” as a strategy of Chris­
tianization. A participant in the professional group commented, “Basically, 
[we] reject [Christianization], What is the weapon? Yes, it is the SKB [gov- 
emment rule about constructing places of worship].”304 Thus the label “Christi­
anization” is applied to Christians’ attempts to convert Muslims. In calling 
SKB a weapon for Muslims to fight Christianization the speaker used military 
terminology.
Some participants mentioned Muslims’ opposition to “illegal” churches as a 
response to Christianization. “Many houses are tumed into churches without 
[state] permission,” said a participant.303 A male professional, who identified 
himself as a member of the Muhammadiyah movement, said, “Yesterday we 
threatened a house in Sukoharjo region which was used as a church, an illegal 
church. The church did not have [state] permission. But there were religious 
activities there. ... In the end it was closed down.”306 Here the label “illegal 
church” refers to a church that has no state “permission”. He added, “To show 
their force, the laskars (Muslim paramilitaries) play a role. If negotiations were 
conducted [but failed] ... then the church will be encircled.”307 He added, “If 
[they have been] wamed once, twice [to close the place of worship], [and they] 
do not [close it], [the place of worship] must be raided .”30& The word “we” 
indicates that the speaker was part of the group which attacked the “illegal” 
church. The word “illegal” is juridical vocabulary.
Participants also talked about actors responding to Christian expansionism 
or Christianization. An elderly male observed, “They are hardliners, the Laskar 
Laweyan, the Jama’ah Islamiyah, the FPI [Islamic Defender Front], the Jun-
302 Di masjid-masjidnya itu banyak pamphlet itu hati-hati bahaya laten Kristenisasi.
303 Intinya kita menolak gereja, karena kita sudah punya pengalaman pahit dengan Kristenisasi, 
jangan sampai kecolongan lagi. Gitu ada gereja, basisnya mereka itu disitu. Belakang, depan, 
samping dikasih terus, sreeet sembako dan lain-lain, mesti ada yang kena.
,04 Intinya itu menolak. Senjatanya apa? Ya SKB itu.
305 Banyak rumah-rumah yang dialihkan untuk gereja tanpa ijin.
306 Itu kemarin kita menggerebek rumah di daerah Sukoharjo yang dijadikan gereja, gereja 
ilegal. Gerejanya itu tidak ada ijin. Cuman, ada kegiatan keagamaan disitu... Akhirnya dia 
ditutup.
Untuk menunjukkan show force-nya laskar-laskar itu berperan. Kalau sudah negosiasi... 
gereja itu dikepung lah.
Kalau satu dua kali diperingatkan gak bisa, ya harus diparani.
dullah. They [include] [group] X.309 They are hardliners, like the FPI.”310 An­
other participant said, “Salafi [members] are anti-Christianization.”311 Besides 
mentioning names of groups, the first speaker referred to those who are anti- 
Christianization as “hardliners”. Furthermore the second speaker used the word 
“actively” to describe the intensity of Salafi’s anti-Christianization fervour. In 
talking about laskars (Muslim paramilitaries) who attack “illegal” churches, a 
participant said, “The laskars are mostly from outside the region [outside 
Solo].”312 Thus the problem comes “from outside”.
Participants also talked about the relation between religion (Christianity, 
Islam) and ethnicity (Javanese, Chinese). A young male participant said, “In 
Solo ... there are ethnic groups such as Arabs, Chinese, Javanese. The Chinese, 
as far as I know, are Christians..., Arabs are Muslim, Javanese are a mix of 
Islam abangan and fundamentalist Islam.”313 Thus he identifies three ethnic 
groups: “Javanese”, “Chinese” and “Arabs”. He describes “Arabs” as 
“Muslim”, “Chinese” as “Christian”, and “Javanese” as “abangan” and “fun­
damentalist” Muslim. In an earlier sentence the participant also mentioned 
Javanese Christians. Thus the ethnic label “Javanese” includes both Muslims 
and Christians.
Sometimes participants linked ethnic-religious identity with residential ar- 
eas. For instance, a young female participant said, “In Gajahan ... the majority 
is Christian, that is Chinese.”314 This speaker associated the majority population 
of a certain area (Gajahan) with a religion (Christianity). She also associated 
that area with a specific ethnic group (Chinese). A young male participant said, 
“In Solo there is [residential] grouping. In Pasar Kliwon the majority is Mus­
lim, by and large. In Kauman they are also Muslim, Arab, while Christians are 
the majority in Balong near Widuran, near the centre of churches [where there 
are many churches], There are [residential] groupings based on religions.”315 
These participants classified Pasar Kliwon and Kauman as Javanese Muslim 
and Arab Muslim areas, while Gajahan and Balong are Chinese Christian areas.
309 The speaker mentioned the name o f the group, but I substituted a pseudonym.
310 Itu aliran keras, Laskar Laweyan, JI, FPI, Jundullah. Itu X. itu aliran yang keras seperti apa 
FPL
311 Salafi itu justru gencar anti Kristenisasi.
312 Laskar itu rata-rata berasal dari luar daerah.
313 Di Solo itu kan... ada etnis-etnis seperti Arab, China, Jawa sendiri. Kalau China itu mungkin 
notobene sepengetahuan saya umat Kristiani... Arab Islam, Jawa campuran Islam abangan dan 
Islam fundamental.
314 Di Gajahan... mayoritas memangKristen, China-China.
315 Di Solo itu ada yang mengelompokkan diri. Di Pasar Kliwon, itu kan mayoritas kebanyakan 
agamanya Islam, rata-rata. Di Kauman sendiri juga Islam, Arab. Kalau orang Kristen, mereka 
juga seperti itu. Di Balong deket Widuran dekat dengan pusat-pusat gereja. Seperti ada 
pengelompokan-pengelompokan menurut agamanya.
A participant described the connection between religion, ethnicity and the 
economy as follows:
“The economy here is dominated by the Chinese. And their links are very good... We [finan- 
cially] suffer from their tricks. The trade in Pasar [market] Gede, Pasar Kliwon is strongly 
connected with Chinese links ... Their religion is Christianity, Islam is rare, there are only a 
few [Muslims]. [They are] mostly Nasrani, Protestant Christians. So those Chinese mostly go 
to church [i.e. are Christians], [go] to church. [They] build economic empires here in Solo. 
The big businessman in Solo also [is the same, a Christian] as far as I know: Pak X,3'6 the 
owner o f Catlay. [He] has a restaurant in the Grand Mali. He actively supports the church, 
wholeheartedly. Even the Roti Dika [Christian-owned bakery], its policy is to give ten per­
cent [of its profits] to the church.”317
In this text the speaker refers to three interconnected social entities: Chinese 
Christian and “economic empires” in Solo. The word “empire” (kingdom) sig- 
nifies the dominance and close connection between Chinese Christians and the 
economy. She says that only a few of them are Muslims. She mentions some 
markets, stores and brands such as Pasar Gede, Pasar Kliwon, Catlay and Roti 
Dika. The donations of these economic empires are said to go to the church. 
The speaker mentions a specific group of Christians: Protestants. She over- 
worded “go to church” to underscore that they really are Christians (intense 
preoccupation).
Another participant said, “It is also Luwes [name of supermarket], Those 
big mails, all of them have church links, Chinese, and [they] give donations to 
the churches.”318 “Their numbers are small, but their funds are strong,”319 said 
another participant. An elderly female spoke about the megachurch of El- 
Shaddai. She said: “The whole area of the village was bought, Kepatihan [name 
of village], almost all was bought by El-Shaddai.”320 The expression, “the 
whole area of the village was bought” is a metaphor indicating that the church 
is extremely big. Besides dominating the economy, Christians are said to own 
radio stations. A participant mentioned, “Ria FM [name of radio station] is
316 The speaker mentioned the person’s name, but I substituted a pseudonym.
317 Ekonomi di sini itu banyak dikuasai orang China. Dan mereka linknya sangat bagus... Kita 
banyak dirugikan dengan trik-trik mereka. Perdagangan di Pasar Gede, Pasar Kliwon dengan 
link China itu sudah sangat erat. Mereka agamanya Kristen, semua... jarang yang Islam, ada 
tapi cuma beberapa. Mereka semua ke gereja, Kristen. Nasrani banyaknya, Kristen Protestan. 
Jadi China-China itu banyaknya ke gereja, ke gereja. Membangun suatu imperium ekonomi di 
Solo ini. Pengusaha-pengusaha besar di Solo ini, juga yang saya kenal, Pak X yang  punya Cat­
lay, di Grand Mali punya restaurant. Dia aktif memberikan bantuan ke gereja, secara penuh. 
Bahkan Roti Dika, itu trade mark-nya 10 persen untuk gereja.
318 Juga Luwes. Mal-mal yang besar itu, itu semua rentetan dari gereja, China, dan menafkah- 
kan ke gereja.
Mereka itu lebih minim jumlahnya, tapi lebih kuat dananya.
320 Sak kampung dituku kabeh weh, Kepatihan hampir semua dibeli El-Shaddai.
Christian ... El-Shaddai, Perdana, Meta FM [names of radio stations] -  all of 
them are backed by Christians.”321
In talking about Christians as the others, the participants also talked about 
themselves (Muslim organizations). A young female classified various forms of 
Islam, saying, “There is Islam NU, there is Islam Muhammadiyah. And there is 
Islam which is more extreme. [The women of that group] wear burqa (cadar). 
They [extreme Muslims] refuse to take gifts from Christians.”322 Here the 
speaker described Islam NU and Islam Muhammadiyah as not extreme. Some 
participants referred to other social identities of Muslims such as abangan, 
fundamentalist and moderate. A young male said, “In Solo maybe there are 
fundamentalists, there are moderates, even abangan. Maybe those moderates 
have good relations with the abangan.,,m
By contrast a participant commented, “The KAMMI [Indonesian Muslim 
Students Action Front], the HTI [Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir] are very anti non- 
Muslim organizations.”324 These texts show that members of NU, Muhammadi­
yah and moderate Muslims have good relations with Christians, unlike funda­
mentalist Muslims and members of KAMMI and HTI.
Some participants described a new Muslim organization in Solo: MTA 
(Qur’anic Exegesis Council). An elderly male participant said, “Alkhamdulillah 
(thanks be to God), nowadays [Christianization] is suppressed by the MTA”325 
Also: “Because of MTA Semaki [name of canton] has become [Islamic], 
Maybe if there was no MTA [that place] could be Nashara’s pilot project.”326 
The phrase ‘very anti non-Muslim’ indicates a fiercely anti-Christian attitude. 
The word “alkhamdulillah” indicates the speaker’s support for the MTA, which 
is opposed to the Christianization project. Nashara is an altemative wording for 
Christian. Another participant said, “MTA is the fortress (benteng) [against 
Christianization], we are sympathetic [to it].”327 Here the speaker identified 
MTA as a fortress protecting Muslims from Christianization.
An elderly male said, “The headquarters of Indonesian [MTA] is here [in 
Solo].”328 Another participant in the same group went on: “The MTA has now 
become a very powerful organization ... [They] have their own commercial
321 Ria FM  Kristen... El-Shaddai, Perdana, Meta FM  semua berbacking Kristen.
322 Ada Islamnya Islam NU, ada Islam Islamnya Muhammadiyah. Dan ada Islam yang lebih 
ekstrim. Pakai cadar. Itu kan menolakpemberian dari orang Kristen.
323 Di Solo, mungkin ada yang fundamental, ada yang moderat, malah ada yang abangan. 
Mungkin hubungan antara yang moderat dengan yang abangan itu baik.
324 KAMMI, HTI itu antipati banget sama organisasi-organisasi non-Muslim.
325 Alkhamdulillah saat ini terbentengi dengan adanya MTA yang kentel.
326 Maka dengan adanya MTA ini betul-betul Semaki menjadi, mungkin kalau tidak ada MTA 
bisa menjadi pilot project-nya Nashara.
MTA sebagai benteng, kita tersentuh.
Itu pusat sak Indonesia disini.
businesses. The MTA is very strong, very extra big ... [lts followers] are very 
militant.”329 Another participant said that MTA’s [religious] puritanism is al- 
most the same as that of Muhammadiyah, but [its followers’] submission to the 
leader (kyai) is like in NU.”330 In this text the speaker described an element that 
MTA shares with both NU and Muhammadiyah. The speaker also indicated 
that Muhammadiyah is puritan. “Even though Muhammadiyah is puritan, it is 
not as hard as MTA in its practice,”331 said an elderly male participant who is 
the leader of NU. He was describing the similarity and difference between Mu­
hammadiyah and MTA. With reference to degree of puritanism, the text says 
that NU is not puritan, Muhammadiyah is puritan, and MTA is very puritan.
Several other elderly males commented on the MTA: “The MTA has televi- 
sion [a station], [it] has radio [a station]”;332 “The sympathizers [of MTA] that 
listen to the radio [the MTA station] are so many”;333 and “They [MTA follow­
ers] always refer to the radio. [While] the radio [is full of preaching of] Ustadz 
Sukino [name of the leader].”334 The linguistic features of the participants’ ut- 
terances indicate huge numbers of MTA followers/sympathizers, the effective- 
ness of radio in MTA dakwa, and the authority of Ustadz Sukino, its leader.
“The conflict [between MTA and NU] ... in Grobokan [a region to the north 
of Solo] relates only to [the practice] of tahlil [repeated recitation/prayer],”335 
said a participant. A male professional, an activist in Muhammadiyah, said, 
“Muhammadiyah should criticize it [MTA], It [MTA] has many schools [that 
compete with Muhammadiyah schools], [from] kindergartens to senior high 
schools.”336 In this text the speaker expressed the hope that Muhammadiyah 
would criticize the development of MTA schools.
The participants also mentioned fundamentalism among Christians. A par­
ticipant said, “If Islam has fundamentalists, [they also exist] in Christianity, 
exactly [the same], I think. But their movement is more hidden.”337 Here the 
speaker points out that there are fundamentalists in both Islam and Christianity, 
but Christian fundamentalists have a different strategy in the sense that they 
operate undercover.
329 MTA sekarang menjadi kekuatan yang besar sekali... Sudah punya ekonomi sendiri. Sudah 
kuat sekali MTA itu, besarnya bukan main itu... Militan-militan.
330 Puritannya hampir sama dengan Muhammadiyah, tapi taqlidpada kiainya seperti NU.
331 Walaupun Muhammadiyah puritan, tetapi tidak sekeras MTA dalam pelaksanaannya.
332 MTA punya televisi, punya radio.
333 Simpatisan yang mendengar radio itu besar sekali.
334 Dia itu selalu menurut radio. Radio itu ustadz Sukino.
335 Konflik... di Grobokan, Grobokan, hanya soal tahlil.
336 Muhammadiyah seharnya mulai mengkritisi dia. Itu sekolah-sekolahnya sudah banyak, TK 
sampai SMA.
337 Kalau di Islam sendiri ada kaum yang fundamental, di Kristen pasti saya pikir. Cuman 
gerakan mereka lebih tersembunyi.
The diseussion on religion and ethnicity led some participants to talk about 
the 1998 riots in Solo and other parts of Indonesia. They used different labels 
in speaking about the riots. Some talked about ethnic conflict, others about 
political conflict or conflict about religion. Yet others said that it was “not only 
inter-ethnic conflict, but also [motivated by] social inequality”. The actors in 
the conflict were called ocnum (individuals). Talking about the actors in the 
1998 Solo riots, a male worker said, “They are merely ocnum (individuals).”338 
The word “merely” (saja) underscores that the speaker distinguished between 
the actors as individuals and their religious and ethnic identity. They acted nei- 
ther as members of a religious community nor as members of an ethnic com- 
munity. Besides, “Some [persons] took advantage of the riots for personal gain 
... For instance, shops were plundered,” a participant said.339
A young male participant, an NU student activist, mentioned that in society 
in general Javanese were repressed by the Chinese. Then conflicts that were 
actually motivated by “social inequality”340 turn into conflicts “in the name of 
religion”341 or “of ethnicity”.342 A male worker differentiated between two kinds 
of riots in which Chinese become the victims: anti-Chinese riots and anti-state 
riots. He said, “Formerly, in the 1980s, they were [anti-]Chinese riots, they 
were really [anti-China], But in 1998 [the rioting] was only [people] destroying 
[because they were anti] the state. They were ocnum wanting to destroy the 
state.”343 Previously he had said, “Because we want to destroy the state, we 
[destroy] the Chinese first.”344 Here the speaker described the Chinese as an 
intermediary target before the state, which was the primary target. He applied 
the label “ocnum” to the rioters. The repetition of “[anti-]Chinese riots” is an 
over-wording to indicate that the 1980s riots were “really” different from the 
1998 riots. An elderly Arab female said, “Before the Chinese [stores] were 
bumt [in the 1980s and 1998] we Arabs [were the object of riots in 1970s] ... 
my place was destroyed... [my] house was destroyed.”343 This speaker pointed 
out that the objects of riots in the past were not only Chinese, but also Arabs.
Since some people in Solo were involved in acts of terrorism and some ter- 
rorists were captured in Solo, the participants talked about it. “I was surprised.
338 Itu oknum saja.
™ Ada yang memanfaatkan kerusuhan itu untuk kepentingan sendiri... misalnya ada toko yang 
itu apa dijarah.
340 Ketimpangan sosial.
341 Atas nama agama
342 Atas nama etnis.
343 Dulu yang tahun 1980an pernah kerusuhan China, pernah bener-bener. Tapi yang 1998 
cuma mau menghancurkan negara. Ada oknum saja mau menghancurkan negara.
344 Karena kita mau menghancurkan negara, China dulu.
345 Sebelum Cina-Cina diobong-obong itu kan kita-kita orang-orang Arab-Arab... tempatku 
ancur... rumah ancur.
The bodies of terrorists were refused [burial] in many places. But in Solo, Air 
and Eko [two suspected terrorists] were considered heroes of Islam. [There 
were banners] welcoming the heroes of Islam everywhere. Ba’asyir came to the 
fimeral.”346 In this text, the speaker differentiated between the response of peo­
ple in Solo and that of people of other regions to requests to bury the bodies of 
suspected terrorists in their region. He also mentioned that some people in Solo 
labelled Air and Eko “heroes of Islam”.
Here is a short conversation in the female worker FGD on Noordin M. Top 
who was shot dead in Solo. Indonesian police captured and shot him in his 
hideout close to the female worker’s house in 2009.
Participant A: Before there was a mosque for tarawih prayer [during Ramadan] it was held in 
my house. It was in my house. It was held, but in my house. Alkhamdulillah (thanks be to 
God). [We] can pave the floor [of the mosque], even its, what is it called, veranda, that ve­
randa, alkhamdulillah, from the proceeds o f Noordin yesterday, alkhamdulillah. The dona- 
tion was from [the incident] o f Noordin yesterday.
Other participants: Ha., ha..
Participant A: Yes, yes, like that...
Researcher: What do you...?
Siti: Noordin brought a blessing (berkah), he brought a blessing [berkah], Although Noordin 
was a disaster (musibah), [but all the same he] brought a blessing {berkah). That was from 
the visitors, we circulated boxes for donations [infaq] for the mosque.
Researcher: Also it was near the holiday, madam?
Other participants: Ha., ha...
Participant B: Yes, it was like a place for recreation [tourism].
Participant A: Yes, it was in [the month of] fasting, after that the holidays. Finally, it was col- 
lected ... maybe how many millions [of rupiah] for [ceramic] tiles for that veranda [of the 
mosque].
Researcher: It was from parking [fees]?
Participant A: Yes, from parking [fees], [and also] from the boxes o f donations that we col- 
lected, then we used it to tile the floor [with ceramics], Thanks be to God (alkhamdulillah), 
[but] also to him shall we return (innalillah)...341
346 Saya itu heran. Jasad teroris ditolak dimana-mana. Malah di Solo Air dan Eko dianggap 
pahlawan Islam. Selamat datang pahlawan Islam di mana-mana. Ba ’asyir malah datang ke 
pamakamannya.
347 Sebelum ada masjid, untuk sholat tarawih-nya itu di rumah saya. Di rumah saya sholat 
tarawih. Itu tetap ada tapi di rumah saya. Sudah alkhamdulillah. Bisa mengeramik sampai ke,
In that conversation the participant described Noordin’s death using two differ­
ent terms: “blessing” (berkah) and “disaster” (musibah). It was a blessing in 
that local Muslims made some millions of rupiah from parking fees and collec- 
tion boxes. But it was also a disaster because, she said, society was “pol- 
luted”.348 In colloquial speech “polluted” means that the image of society was 
tamished.
Some participants talked about Muslim-Christian relations outside Indone­
sia. An elderly female described Muslims in other countries who had been ill- 
treated by non-Muslim groups. She said, “Intemationally Muslims are really 
oppressed. In Moro [south Philippines] there was [a mother who was] breast- 
feeding. But then her throat was slit [by non-Muslims] until her child drank the 
blood.”349 Here the speaker described Muslims being oppressed and killed in­
temationally.
An elderly male said, “Saudi Arabia invests its money in American banks. 
[They] are given interest, [but they] refuse. Finally the money is given to 
[Christian] mission to destroy Muslims.”350 A participant said, “Globally ... 
there are certain [Christian] missions... to destroy Muslims.351 An other partici­
pant in the same group said, “The language [of the funding agencies/ missions] 
is not to destroy Islam but ... to civilize [Islam].”352 A participant linked the 
struggle of the Hizbut Tahrir with Muslims’ oppression worldwide.
2 Iraterpreftatiors
In this second section we interpret or analyse the discursive practice, which 
includes the production, distribution and consumption of text. Discursive prac­
tice connects linguistic practice (text) with social practice (context). There are
apa istilahnya teras, emperan itu, alkhamdulillah kemarin dari hasil Noordin itu. Infaq dari 
Noordin kemarin./Ha..ha../ Ya iya memang./Maksudnya gimana...?/Noordin itu kan membawa 
berkah, dia kan membawa berkah. Meskipun musibah kan membawa berkah. Itu bagi pengun- 
jung kita berikan kotak infaq untuk masjid./ Apalagi itu mau hari raya ya Bu?/ Ha..ha.../ Ya 
malah jadi tempat rekreasi./ Ya itu pas puasa, selebihnya kan hari raya. Akhirnya setelah itu 
terkumpul... mungkin itu berapa juta, terus untuk ngeramik yang itu serambi./Berarti anu dari 
parkir?/ Ya dari parkir, dari kotak infaq itu kita kumpulkan terus kita untuk ngeramik. Betul unik 
ini. Alkhamdulillah, juga innalillah.
348 rr,1 ercemar.
Secara internasional saja orang-orang Islam digencet sampai penyet. Islam di Moro masak 
baru ngemiki dipenggal lehernya anaknya sampai minum darahnya.
Dana non Muslim itu kan dari luar negeri. Bahkan, ini pernah dengar kan, bahkan Arab 
Saudi itu, orang-orang Arab Saudi itu memendam uang di bank di Amerika. Diberi bunga ndak 
mau. Akhirnya, diberikan kepada misi untuk menghancurkan orang Islam.
351 Secara global... ada misi-misi tertentu... untuk menghancurkan Islam
352 Bahasanya bukan untuk menghancurkan Islam, tapi... untuk memajukan.
many ways to analyse discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 78-86, 232-234), 
but this study uses just two tools: intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The the­
ory underlying discursive analysis is that when participants produce (commu- 
nicate) and consume (interpret) text or talk they draw on members’ resources 
(Fairclough 1989: 163) or mental models (Van Dijk 2008: 75) stored in their 
long-term memory (Fairclough 1989: 9-10; 24-24). These resources are cogni- 
tive in the sense that they are in people’s heads; and they are social in the sense 
that they are socially constructed (Fairclough 1989: 24). What members’ re­
sources or mental models do Muslim participants use to produce (communi- 
cate) and consume (interpret) talk?
2.1 Analysis at m icro level
In talking about Christians and about themselves Muslim participants at micro 
level drew on the mental model of helping each other in the family. For in- 
stance, they help each other when a family member is sick, regardless of 
whether the person is Muslim or Catholic.
When saying “I am from an abangan family” the participant referred to a 
mental model, namely the concept of “abangan”. Although it normally refers 
to a religion (usually Islam), in this case it alludes to the family. It connotes a 
social cognition which is shared by the members of the speaker’s society, 
namely the concept of nominal believers (abangan) as distinct from devout 
believers (santri).
Some participants referred to experiences in family life when they talked 
about “Christianization”. For instance, a participant mentioned her sister’s con- 
version to Christianity because she joined a course in Christianity at school. 
Several other participants referred to similar occurrences in their families. They 
distrusted the provision of Christian education to poor people. A mother re- 
membered her daughter doing an extracurricular course offered by a Christian 
educational service. According to her the daughter was taught Christianity in 
order to convert her.
Many participants drew on a mental model of “tolerant” and “harmonious” 
(rukun) relations with friends. For instance, a Muslim girl talked about her 
relations with Christian friends by remembering her childhood when they 
played inside the church. Other participants remembered school day experi­
ences with friends. Thus a participant mentioned that when he was in senior 
high school, half the students in his class were Muslims and the rest were 
Catholics. Another participant said that when she was at junior high school she 
had a “close friend” who was a Christian.
Other participants remembered friendly relations with Christians outside 
school. A young girl recalled a personal relationship with a Christian “boy- 
friend”. An elderly male, the leader of NU, referred to the funeral of a close
friend who was a Catholic pastor. A worker, a parking attendant, remembered 
his “Tionghoa Christian friends” who sent SMSs at lebaran.
Participants also drew on the principle of neighbourly cooperation and shar- 
ing regardless of religious identity. For instance, a male worker referred to his 
Christian neighbour who often came to his house to repair his bicycle. Another 
participant remembered her Christian Chinese neighbour who often made her 
dawet (a cold drink) during Ramadan to show Muslim-Christian tolerance. A 
young male participant remembered an occasion when he assisted his Christian 
neighbour during a Christian service at the latter’s home. To show how a Mus­
lim should behave towards others an elderly female participant described an 
occasion when she had a wedding party and invited all her neighbours regard­
less of religion.
When the participants produced and consumed talk they drew on mental 
models stored in their long-term memory. For instance, a participant men­
tioned: “When I was at senior high school [I] considered Christians to be the 
enemy... Even in my [early days at] university [it was] still like that.” Here the 
speaker drew on a mental model of Christians as Muslims’ enemies.
Participants were inspired by social “custom”, such as helping neighbours 
regardless of the person’s religion. They referred to other customs such as visit- 
ing a sick neighbours and gatherings during lebaran.
Some participants clearly drew on the resource of distinguishing “social” 
affairs from aqida (religious affairs). They also drew on local metaphors such 
as “like oil and water” (seperti air dengan minyak) and “a jackal in sheep’s fur” 
(serigala berbulu dornba). One participant drew on the mental model of a dog 
being impure (najis), relating it to the Christians’ animals stored in his long­
term memory. Apart from this participant’s talk, both the book of Muham- 
mad’s tradition (hadits) and the law books (fiqh) refer to dogs’ saliva being 
impure. Some fiqh  schools regard not just the saliva but the dog itself as im­
pure.
2.2 Airaalysas att meso levei
At meso level participants drew on the mental model of Muslim communalism. 
For instance, they reproduced the words “our kids” and “our girls”, meaning 
Muslim children. In many conversations they classified themselves as “we” 
(,kami, kita) or “our” (milik kami, milik kita) and Christians as “they” (mereka). 
A participant said, “We [Muslims] have our reward guaranteed by God... They 
[Christians] do not have [it].” The quotation in the analysis of linguistic prac- 
tice about whether Muslims can distribute “zakat” (alms) to poor Christians 
reveals the participant’s dual self-identification as both a person living in a 
poor canton (micro level) and a member of Muhammadiyah (meso level). 
Hence besides referring to themselves as persons, participants refer to them­
selves as members of organizations.
When saying, “In the Qur’an it is clear that [we are advised] not to have 
them [Christians] as allies” the participant was citing Surah 5:51: “O you who 
have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in 
fact] allies of one another.” Some participants quoted the Qur’an verbatim in 
Arabic when they talked about the other or about themselves, such as the utter­
ance, “wa la tardha ‘anka yahudu wala nashara hatta tattabi ’a millatahum” 
(and never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow their 
religion). It comes from Surah 2:120. Another participant quoted another part 
of that surah: “inna hudallah huwal huda” (the guidance of Allah is the [only] 
guidance).
When calling Islam the religion of rahmatan lil ‘alamin (mercy to the 
world) a participant summed up the instruction in the Qur’an, Surah 21:107. 
The actual text reads: “And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a 
mercy to the world.” In this verse the personification “mercy to the world” 
refers to Muhammad’s vision, but the participant reproduced it as the vision of 
Islam. Speaking about dakwa, a participant said, “The important thing is bil 
hikmah wal maudzatil hasanah [with wisdom and good instruction].” He was 
inspired by a principle of dakw>a, whose parallel can be found in the Qur’an, 
Surah 16:125: “Invite them [non-Muslims] to the way of your Lord with wis­
dom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best.”
One participant was inspired by a general notion that “Christians are not too 
different from Muslim, being descendants of Abraham”. This positions Jews, 
Christians and Muslims as descendants of Abraham. A similar notion can be 
found in the Qur’an, Surah 14:40 on Abraham’s prayer: “My Lord, make me an 
establisher of prayer, and [many] from my descendants. Our Lord, accept my 
supplication.” Surah 14 is also known as the surah of Abraham. The general 
interpretation of it is cited in many popular Islamic books. For instance, in her 
book entitled Gus Mus: Satu Rumah Seribu Pintu (Gus Mus: one home, a thou- 
sand doors) Labibah Zain (2009: 143-144) wrote about “cucu Ibrahim” (de­
scendants of Abraham) from the roots of Moses, Isa and Muhammad.
A participant cited the hadits of prophet Muhammad: “There is also a basic 
teaching from the hadits: man kana yu ’minu billahi wal yaumil akhiri falyuk- 
rim jarahu (whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, let him treat his 
neighbour respectfully).” That was the hadits transmitted by two Islamic schol­
ars Bukhari and Muslim. The participant who called someone who leaves Islam 
to join Christianity an apostate was inspired by one meaning of murtad (apos- 
tate) or riddah (renegade from the Islamic community) in Islamic teaching. 
Qur’an Surah 2:217 states: “And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to 
unbelief] and dies while he is an unbeliever...” The Gema Insani Press, a popu­
lar Islamic publisher, published a book entitled Musuh Besar Ummat Islam 
(The great enemy of Islam). It says that apostasy (kemurtadan) means “leaving 
Islam” (Bashori 2006: 96).
A participant, inspired by a notion that has a parallel in the hadits of prophet 
Muhammad, said: “[If] a Christian [says] assalamu’alaikum (greeting/peace 
upon you), we are forbidden to reply. Just answer wa ‘alaikum (be upon you), 
not wa ’alaikum salam (peace be upon you).” Another participant said, “If it 
[salam, greeting] is [uttered by] a Muslim, [we have to] answer. If it [is uttered 
by] a non-Muslim, we are forbidden to answer.” Both participants are inspired 
by a hadits recorded by Bukhari: “If the people of the book [ahl al-Kitab] greet 
you, say in reply: Wa alaykum (and also on you).” In saying “[If] a Christian 
[says] assalamu’alaikum ... just answer wa ‘alaikum” the speaker was inspired 
by the idea that Christians are people of the Book. The popular understanding 
in Islam is that Jews and Christians are people of the Book.
Another participant referred to daily Islamic rituals such as adzan (summons 
to prayer), sholat (prayer) and tahlilan (reciting Qur’anic verses and prayers). 
Adzan is the summons to prayer five times a day, usually echoing from the 
mosque or mushalla (Muslim chapel). The speaker who said, “when time to 
sholat [pray] came” meant the prayers five times a day. They are a specific 
kind of prayer -  there are many other kinds. When comparing Christian home 
worship and Muslim tahlilan the speaker was referring to reciting Qur’anic 
verses and saying prayers at home.
The participant who said, “I am closer to the Catholics... They already rec- 
ognize that there is truth outside church” drew on a theological interpretation 
by the Roman Catholic Church. The utterance, “there is truth outside church”, 
refers to a new interpretation after the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s.
Participants are inspired by state policy in talking about their relations with 
Christians. When a participant said, “we take the best, that is rukun (har- 
mony)”, she drew on a mental model existing in society. Interreligious har- 
mony (kerukunan antar umat beragama) is also state policy. Several partici­
pants said “his/her Islam is Islam KTP [Islam by ID]” and “his/her KTP is Is­
lam”. They drew on the official policy that citizens’ religious identity is speci- 
fied on their identity document (KTP/ID). Besides such identities as sex, occu- 
pation and citizenship, citizens must declare their religious identity on their ID.
When a participant said “those who have a religion, let them not be con- 
verted to another religion”, he was inspired by a general discourse in society, 
which is also state policy -  prohibition of proselytizing anyone who has a relig­
ion. In 1979 the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Domestic 
Affairs published a joint regulation, “Procedure of Religious Mission and In­
ternational Aid for Religious Institutions in Indonesia”.353 In that regulation the
353 The Joint Regulation o f the Ministry o f Religious Affairs and the Ministry o f Domestic 
Affairs No. 1, 1979.
govemment prohibits religious mission among persons or groups that already 
belong to another religion.354
A participant drew on another official policy when he said, “Basically, [we] 
reject [Christians]. What is the weapon? Yes, it is the SKB.” SKB stands for 
Sur at Keputusan Bersama (Joint Decision). It was actually the 2006 Peraturan 
Bersama (Joint Regulation) on the building of houses of worship, not SKB.355 
When calling SKB a weapon for Muslims to fight Christianization the speaker 
used military vocabulary. So did another participant, who said that “nowadays 
[Christianization] is embattled by the MTA”.
In talking about Christianization of poor Muslims several participants men- 
tioned Sarimi. In the sentence “their religion could be changed by Sarimi” the 
speaker used commercial language: Sarimi is a brand of Indonesian noodle 
which is a common food in Indonesia. It is a metaphor for any basic food.
When some participants talked about door-to-door mission they were refer- 
ring to the mission of the Salvation Army in Solo. One participant mentioned 
Dewi Pumamawati from Arimatea when she talked about Christianization. 
Arimatea is the acronym for “Advocacy, Rehabilitation, Immunization of Aqi- 
dah [that is] Integrated, Effective, and Actual”.356 lts slogan is to preach Islam, 
to prevent apostasy. lts main mission is to explain Islam (i.e. conduct dakwa) to 
non-Muslims and to counterbalance/hinder any other religious movement 
which interferes with the aqida of Muslims.357 This organization was estab- 
lished in 2003 and is based in Jakarta.
Pumamawati joined the Arimatea Fomm of Solo. A participant referred to a 
bulletin written by her: “She had been indoctrinated since she was child... to 
proselytize.” In the bulletin Pumamawati mentioned her little brother (a priest), 
whose task is to convert Muslims.
“One example of my m other’s successful teaching is my younger brother. After obtaining his 
master’s degree at the Christian Institute TIRANUS Cimahi, Bandung, he has been a priest in 
Cimahi ever since. He created a false impression by teaching the villagers to cultivate hydro- 
ponic plants and helping them to sell these, providing therapy for drug addicted Muslim 
teenagers in a rehabilitation centre, and counselling through the Consultant Bureau. All these 
good deeds are just a means to Christianize Muslims and lead them to receive Jesus as 
God.”358
354 Chapter 4 o f the Joint Regulation.
’55 The Joint Regulation o f the Ministry o f Religious Affairs and the Ministry o f Domestic 
Affairs Nos 8 and 9, 2006 on the Task Guidance for Head/Vice Head o f Region in Maintaining 
Interreligious Community Harmony and House o f Worship Building.
356 Advokasi, Rehabilitasi, Imunisasi Aqidah Terpadu Efektif dan Aktual.
357 Anonymous, J  Years o f  Arimatea (2003-2005), p. 3.
358 In the bulletin Pumamawati described other Christianization or proselytization practices. The 
speaker mentioned that Pumamawati was Catholic, but she was mistaken. She was Protestant. 
For further details, see appendix 2.
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BIBLE MENGANTAR AKTIFIS GEREJA 
MEMPERJUANGKAN ISLAM
Kisah Muaiaf; Dra. Dewi Purnamawati
Assalaamu 'alaa manittaba alhudoa i
{ Semoga keselamatan diberikan kepada orang yang mengikuti petunjuk.) i
Perkenalkan, saya Dra. Dewi 
Purnamawati, lahir di Solo tahun 1%?. 
Tahun 1971 saya ikut ayah yang 
anggota AURI pindah tugas ke Pulau 
lombok. Sekolah di lombok NTB, 
di SD Katolik St. Antonius Ampenan, 
SMP Katolik Kesuma Cakranegara & 
di STM Negeri Mataram, lulus tahun 
1981. Kuliah di IKIP Negeri Yogyakarta 
lulus Tahun 1985. Tahun 1986 saya 
kembali ke Solo dan mengajar listrlk 
di salah satu STM.
Pengaruh kekristenan dari Ibu 
yang Aktifis Gereja, sangat kuat. Tahun 
1971 Ayah yang islam, dikt istenkan ibu 
bahkan berhasil dibina menjadi aktifis 
penginjilan (misi menyebarkan ajaran 
Kristen) yang militan & handal. Ayah 
punya talenta mampu berinteraksi
dan mengusir roh kegelapan. Padahal 
kemampuan metafisik / paranormal 
yang umumnya dianggap anugrah 
Tuhan itu, sebenarnya dari Setan.
Saya dan 2 adik saya dididik 
dengan taat dalam kehidupan Kristen 
yang fanatik. Sejak kecil sudah 
dicekoki doktrïn-doktrin Kristen. 
Merendahkan&aprioriterhadaplslam. 
Harus mampu mencitrakan bahwa 
Kristen adalah KASIH. Digembleng 
menjadi militan untuk mampu 
memasuki dan mempengaruhi 
kehidupan masyarakat Pulau Lombok 
yang mayoritas beragama Islam. 
Kami semua aktifis gereja, aktif 
memurtadkan muslimin.
Contoh keberhasilan didikan ibu
L
Kisrih MuatofDewi Purnamawati
Figure 5: First page o f  Dewi Purnamawati ’s bulletin
Some participants referred to events in their surroundings when talking about 
Christians or about themselves. For instance, a participant referred to the fast- 
breaking programme for poor Muslims at the Javanese Christian Church 
Manahan. Other participants mentioned actions by churches in Solo and the 
surroundings such as the GB1 (Indonesian Bethel Church) of Solo Baru, the 
Pasar Legi Bethany Church, the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church), the El- 
Shaddai church, and the Adventist Church.
In general the FDG participants agreed with the ideas expressed by their 
fellow participants. But in some cases they refuted their friends’ utterances 
(interdiscursivity). There was a heated discussion in the elderly female FDG. 
The main view was that they have to oppose any acts of Christianization. A 
mother (let’s say Mrs A) said that Muslims in her village prohibit Christians to 
have community prayers at home. “[We] prohibit them to have pengajian 
(prayers, Christian religious meeting) in [our] village, because they clap and 
make a noise.”359 Another participant (let’s say Mrs B) promptly replied, “We 
have to accept [the situation], [We] shouldn’t... be egoistic, angry...” She con- 
tinued, “For all Christians, if they stay here there is a mosque next door [to 
their house], then adzan [summons to prayer] is echoing, maybe he/she will 
also complain [but in fact they don’t].” Mrs A, annoyed by this response, 
grumbled to other participants. She said again, “The [Muslim] community 
leader also supports us.” Then Mrs B replied, “It isn’t right... Although he is 
the first Muslim leader [to criticize Christians].” A similar situation arose in the 
elderly male FGD. A participant questioned why other participants in his group 
objected to Christian services at home. He argued that these services at home 
are the same as tahlilan in Muslim tradition, which is also held at home.
2.3 Analysis at m acro level
At macro level, the participants drew on the concept of Reformasi, maintaining 
that nowadays Indonesia is “really free, [there is] freedom”. With respect to the 
Reformasi era, they reproduced an image of Solo where many MPs and even 
the vice mayor were Christians.
In fact only eight Christians became members of Surakarta’s legislature for 
the period 2009-2014. The total number of MPs is forty, so the Christians con- 
stitute 20%. Of these, five are from the Indonesian Democratie Party of Strug­
gle (PDIP), two are from the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS/Christian party), 
and one is from the Democratie Party (PD).360 The vice mayor referred to FX 
Hady Rudyatmo, a Roman Catholic.
359 Melarang pengajian di kampung, Iha keplok-keplok rame.
360 Secretariat o f Surakarta House o f Representatives 2009.
Figure 6: The Muslim mayor 
(Joko Widodo) and
Catholic vice-mayor (FXHady 
Rudyatmo) o f  Surakarta, 2005- 
2012
(Source:
www. suaramerdeka. com)“ 1
In talking about Indonesian politics and the state’s foundation participants drew 
on the philosophy of bhineka tunggal ika (unity in diversity) and referred to the 
principles of Pancasila. “I am living in a bhineka tunggal ika state, which rec- 
ognizes five religions and also some [indigenous] beliefs,” said a participant. 
But bhineka tunggal ika does not relate directly to the state’s form. It is rather 
the political symbol of Garuda Indonesia. It is also one of four pillars of Indo­
nesian nationhood. The other three are the constitution, Pancasila, and the Ne­
gara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (United Republic of Indonesia).
Bhineka tunggal ika also has no direct link with the recognition of five re­
ligions and certain indigenous beliefs. Freedom to follow and worship any one 
of the religions or local beliefs was not granted by bhineka tunggal ika but by 
the constitution (chapter 29, article 2). It declares that “the state guarantees 
each and every Citizen the liberty of religion and of worship in accordance with 
his religion and belief’. In the New Order era five religions were officially 
recognized: Islam, Christianity, Catholicism (as a separate religion, distinct 
from Christianity), Hinduism and Buddhism, but the Reformasi govemment re- 
introduced Confucianism as a state recognized religion in 2002.
Pancasila refers to the five pillars of the Indonesian state ideology. They 
are: belief in one divine Lordship; just and civilized humanity; the unity of 
Indonesia; democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations among representatives; and social justice for all the people of 
Indonesia. In saying that there is no contradiction between Pancasila and Is- 
lamic values the speaker was inspired by a mental model that is also supported 
by Muslim organizations. Almost all Indonesian Muslim organizations accept 
Pancasila as their organizational base.
Participants also referred to the “Islamic state” that evolved in Islamic poli­
tics after the collapse of the Ottoman khilafa model in the early 20th century. In
361 Link: http://suaramerdeka.eom/vl/index.php/pilkada/profil/9, accessed on July 20, 2012.
the utterance, “We cannot force... Solo must be based on Islam”, the speaker 
was referring to an aspiration among certain Muslim groups who support the 
formalization of Syariah. A participant classified Syariah into two categories: 
rituals (amaliyah) and the political system.
Some participants drew on the Jakarta Charter. It was the initial draft of the 
five pillars of Pancasila. It was drafted and approved by a Committee of Nine 
(eight Muslims and one Christian) during the preparation for Indonesian inde- 
pendence on 22 June 1945. The only difference between the Jakarta Charter 
and Pancasila is in the content of the first pillar. The first pillar of the Jakarta 
Charter is “belief in Lordship with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to 
carry out the Islamic Syariah”.362
A participant linked Christianization with a decrease of the Muslim popula- 
tion. Another participant reproduced a relation between that decrease and the 
social position of a Christian vice mayor (Mr Rudy). He added that the Muslim 
population decreased drastically. A participant mentioned that in Solo Muslims 
remain at 60% and another participant said formerly Christians were only 16%. 
Both participants referred to a general assumption that the number of Muslims 
is decreasing and the number of Christians increasing without specifying exact 
percentages.
By saying that if Mr Rudi were to replace Mr Jokowi as mayor of Surakarta, 
Islamic dakwa in mosques will come to an end the participant was referring to 
a growing fear in Muslim society. In general Muslim participants reproduced a 
feeling of fear (majority inferiority complex) of a Christian becoming a public 
leader such as mayor or village headman. They also drew on a mental model of 
fear when discussing Christian and Chinese domination in the economic arena. 
They display an inferiority complex or sense of marginalization.
A participant referred to the history of the crusades when he talked about 
conflict between Muslims and Christians. Another participant referred to the 
Communist mass killing in 1965 when they talked about the proselytization of 
Communist members. The utterance, “be careful of the latent danger of Chris­
tianization”, is a mental model. The phrase “bahaya laten” (latent danger) is 
political language produced by the New Order govemment: “bahaya laten ko- 
munis” (the latent danger of communism). The New Order regime launched a 
virulent campaign against communism in Indonesian public discourse in order 
to prohibit the ideology. Other participants remembered the Solo riots in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1998 when they talked about conflict in Solo.
Participants drew on govemment policy when they talked about regulations 
on the building of houses of worship. Some of them drew on the obligation of 
Christians to get state permission when they want to build a church. In talking 
about illegal churches a participant used a mental model of attacking such
362 Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya.
churches, which was considered appropriate when non-violent acts were inef- 
fective.
Some participants drew on the members’ resource that Muslims were en- 
gaged in combat with Christians, for example the statement about MTA being 
“benteng” (a fortress) against Christianization. Another participant drew on the 
language of criminal law (“don’t be stolen again!”) when waming the other 
participants in his group against Christianization.
In talking about terrorism some participants referred to the incident when 
Noordin was shot by the police near their homes. As was described in section 
1.3, in terms of interdiscursivity the participants in that FGD joked about the 
incident. One participant said the place where Noordin was shot was like a 
place for recreation. Talking about another case of terrorism, a male profes­
sional referred to banners proclaiming Air and Eko (two suspected terrorists) 
heroes of Islam. Here is a banner displaying such a slogan.
Figure 7: "Welcome 
Islamic heroes; the 
martyrs Air Setiawan 
and Eko Joko Sarjono; 
Jihad still continues 
abanner 
(Source:
www.tempo.co)363
A participant referred to a book that she borrowed from her friend at the Ngruki 
Pesantren. It said that intemationally Muslims are oppressed, for instance in 
Moro. It reveals an inferiority complex in the international Muslim community. 
Another participant remembered pamphlets that he saw in mosques when talk-
A5T-STAHn>: 
• A I S  S E T tA W A K
• m o jc w o m u jo k o
363 Link: http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2009/08/13/063192398/Ada-yang-Menolak-Air-dan- 
Eko-Dikubur-di-Pemakaman-Muslim, the picture was posted on August 13, 2009 and accessed 
on July 22, 2012.
ing about wamings from a certain Muslim group about the danger of Christi­
anization.
Some participants referred to ethnic and religious residential grouping in 
Solo, such as Javanese, Chinese, Arabian groups or Muslims and Christians 
groups. They also referred to Muslim organizations when talking about Chris­
tians and Muslims, such as Muhammadiyah, NU, MTA, HTI, KAMMI and 
Salafi. A participant referred to Ustadz Sukino when he talked about MTA 
followers’ submission to their leader. Other participants mentioned different 
Christian groups or churches such as the GKJ, the Catholic Church, El-Shaddai 
Church, Bethany Church, the Adventist Church and Bethel Church.
3 Explanatüoïa
The last section of this chapter presents an explanation or analysis of social 
practice, namely the socio-cognitive effects of the texts. The aim is to specify 
the nature of the social practice of which the discourse forms part, which is 
necessary to explain why the discourse practice is what it is; and the effects of 
the discourse practice on social practice. The analytical concepts used in this 
stage are ideology (Foucault 1977) and hegemony (Gramsci 1971). For Fair­
clough discursive practices are ideologically imbued insofar as they absorb 
significations which support or restructure power relations. When participants 
draw on their mental models they either reproduce or transform them (Fair­
clough 2001: 158-161). For the purpose of this analysis we look at ideational 
and relational transformations, particularly conceming subject positions or 
social identities. The question is: what are the socio-cognitive effects of what 
Muslim FGD participants say?
3.1 Analysis a t micro level
At the micro or personal level the participants mainly positioned Christians as 
“good” persons. Some participants identified Christians as “my close friend”, 
someone who “repaired his/her bicycle at my house” or who “often made 
dawet [a cold drink] for me”. Others identified Christians as donating rice dur­
ing idul fitri (a Muslim feast), “visiting me when I was hospitalized” and send- 
ing an SMS “wishing me happy Idul Fitri”. In talking about Christians the pe- 
ripheral voice of Muslims positioned Christians as “excessive” because of their 
acts of Christianization.
The participants primarily positioned Christians as “tolerant” and on the 
whole as respecting Muslim ritual. Some of them pointed out that when it was 
time to sholat (prayer) their Christian friends asked them to pray and the Chris­
tians would wait outside the mosque. But several participants identified young
Christians as intolerant. In a village where Christians are the majority their 
dogs frightened Muslim children.
Some participants constituted and were constituted by diverse religious 
backgrounds in the family. They mentioned that they have relatives with differ­
ent religious affiliations in their extended family such as Christianity, Catholi- 
cism or Hinduism.
The participants identified both “abangan” Muslims and “abangan” Chris­
tians as not “fanatical”. One participant reproduced an image of abangan Mus­
lims as not genuinely religious by saying they acted “as if they were Islamic” 
(Islam-islaman). That also applied to abangan Christians. Abangan people 
have least difficulty coexisting harmoniously. Thus participants referred to two 
social effects of those identifications. First, “abangan” are always “tolerant”. 
Second, religious persons (both Christians and Muslims) may be tolerant, since 
they are not very “fanatical” or “extreme”.
The participants constituted and were constituted by a multireligious 
neighbourhood milieu and they lived in harmony. Many participants said, “I 
have many Christian neighbours”, “My house is very close to the church”, and 
“I was nursed in the PKU [Muhammadiyah hospital]... The Christian 
[neighbours] also visited [me]”. In addition participants constituted and were 
constituted by a religiously diverse friendship milieu. Quite a number of par­
ticipants said, “I had a close friend... and [she was] a Christian”, “I had a 
friend, [she was] also a Christian”, “[I] had a Christian boyfriend”, and “When 
I was at junior high school [my classmates’ religions were] Catholic, Protes­
tant, Islam”. Many of them identified that their friends were “diverse”. The girl 
who confided about her Christian boyfriend positioned the boy and herself as 
“tolerant”. Thus at micro level the participants engaged and had good inter- 
personal relations with Christians in everyday life.
In general participants positioned themselves as “tolerant” people, not “fa- 
natics”, except for two persons. For example, a participant who is an imam 
preached in the churchyard on halal bi halal (Islamic feast). An NU leader 
established a close friendship with a Catholic pastor. This shows that at the 
level of Muslim leaders inter-religious and inter-personal relations with Chris­
tians occur. This engagement also happens at the level of Muslim lay persons 
as is shown by the story about a young Muslim who assisted at a service of 
worship at his Christian neighbour’s home. An Arab business woman said that 
when she had a wedding party she invited both her Muslim and Christian 
neighbours.
However, some Muslim participants reproduced contradictory expressions 
in talking about Christians. On the one hand they identified Christians as 
“good” persons, on the other they identified Christians as having “hidden agen- 
das” (“intentions”) behind their “good” attitudes towards Muslims, namely 
Christianization. In interpersonal and social relations, Christians are good, but
in spreading their religion they angered Muslims. A participant identified that 
Christians do good deeds for Muslims to get Muslims’ protection. This relates 
to the position of Muslims as a majority and Christians as the minority.
Even though participants generally reproduced a discourse of separating 
“religious” (“aqida”) from “social” (“muamalla”) affairs, they assumed differ­
ent positions in identifying something as either religious or social. Some par­
ticipants positioned celebrating Christmas as “religious”, others positioned it as 
“social”. Another example: some participants considered attending a Christian 
funeral as “aqida”, whereas others positioned it as “social”.
A participant took a position of prioritizing social affairs in implementing 
Islamic practice. Implementing zakat fitrah (personal alms) as an Islamic rule 
(Qur’an, hadits, the Muhammadiyah’s codes) rigidly will alienate Islam from 
society. Another participant identified himself thus when talking about his fam- 
ily’s practice of donating money when a relative is sick: “We don’t consider 
[whether someone is] Muslim or Catholic [in our family].” Thus participants 
were ambivalent when deciding whether something was religious or social 
(power relations). At micro level participants positioned themselves as com­
munity or family members rather than as members of religious associations.
3.2 Araaiysis att mes© Devel
At meso level Muslim participants identified Christianity as an Abrahamic 
religion just like Islam. They reproduced Christians and Muslims as “broth­
ers/sisters”, being “grandchildren of Abraham”. In saying that the core of all 
religions is good they identified the universality of religions.
The participants positioned Christianity as a good religion, which is an ethi- 
cal qualification. They did not use a theological qualifïcation, such as right or 
true. Even though participants identified a common ground (“not too differ­
ent”) between Muslims and Christians, they consider Islamic identity impor­
tant. Thus they frequently used the expression alhamdulillah (thanks be to 
God), for example “Alhamdulillah, her younger siblings are still Muslim”.
They also reproduced religious inclusion and exclusion. By calling Chris­
tians “kafir” (infïdel) and “musyrik” (polytheists) participants were religiously 
exclusive. Some reproduced social borders between Muslims and Christians. 
Two participants identified the greeting “assalamu'’alaikum” as reserved for 
Muslims. Two participants identified dogs as pets of Christians. A social effect 
of that identification is that Muslims avoid and are afraid to have relations with 
Christians who have dogs.
The Qur’anic text on Islam as grace to the world and the hadits injunction to 
respect neighbours are transformed into the social practice of interreligious 
harmony between Muslims and Christians. This kind of transformation was 
illustrated by the participant who said dakwa should be conducted in “wise and 
good ways”. He also positioned himself by saying that he had a close friend-
ship with a Roman Catholic pastor. Besides, he advocated social equality be­
tween Muslims and Christians and rejected acts of violence against Christians.
One participant constituted and was constituted by a Qur’anic verse when 
she said, “And never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you 
follow their religion.” Then the speaker expressed her suspicious attitude to- 
wards Christians. Participants’ narration about Christianization strengthens and 
reinforces their suspicious perception of Christians.
Some participants identified Christians as “excessive” (kelewatan) because 
of their fast-breaking programme for poor Muslims in their church. Those 
Christians were identified as “overacting”. Because they are rich they help poor 
Muslims. The same was said in regard to natural disasters: “Their funds were 
readily available”, so they were quick to help. These utterances reproduce Mus­
lim participants’ suspicion of Christians.
One Muslim participant reproduced enmity toward Christians. By saying 
that SKB was a “weapon” for Muslims to fïght Christianization this participant 
positioned Muslims as adversaries of Christians. He identified some Muslims 
as obstructing the progress of Christianization, such as the laskars (Muslim 
paramilitaries) who took part in the fight against illegal churches.
The participants mostly understood the religious principle “lakum dinukum 
wa liyadin” to you be your religion, and to me my religion” in two ways. First, 
they recognized religious diversity. Second, they identified themselves as dis- 
tinguishing between “religious” affairs (“aqida”) and “social” affairs (“mua- 
mala”). For instance, one participant refïised an invitation to a Christmas cele­
bration from his Christian neighbours because “it is already related to aqida 
(faith)”. There was also a statement that they did not interfere in each other’s 
aqida. But, as noted already, this distinction between religious and social af­
fairs is sometimes fluid.
Participants identified ethnic identities (Javanese, Chinese, Arab), which 
relates to the reproduction of interreligious cohesion or convergence. Most 
participants positioned Javanese Christians or Javanese churches as “more ac- 
culturated”. Some participants identified Javanese Christians as having the 
same “customs” as Muslims. On the other hand they identified a gap between 
them and Christians from non-Javanese churches.
A participant identified the relations of “moderate” or “abangan” Muslims 
with “moderate” or “abangan” Christians as good. However, relations between 
“fundamentalist” Muslims and “fundamentalist” Christians are not good. Both 
abangan Muslims and abangan Christians are positioned as having close rela­
tions. By saying “I am from the abangan family”, that is a religiously diverse 
family, and they live in harmony, the speaker positioned an ideology of reli­
gious tolerance as goveming their everyday life.
3.3 Araalysis at macro level!
At macro level participants in the Muslim FGDs mostly positioned and repro­
duced Indonesia as a “Pancasila state” that upholds the principle of “bhineka 
tunggal ika” (unity in diversity). A participant identified Indonesia as a “bhi­
neka tunggal ika state”, not an “Islamic state”.
Participants recognize that Indonesia is a home for various religious groups. 
When saying, “I live in a bhineka tunggal ika state which recognizes five relig- 
ions and also some [indigenous] beliefs”, the participant reproduced the recog- 
nition of different religions and beliefs in Indonesia.
Participants constituted and were constituted by the idea of equal citizenship 
(ideology). Here we note a socio-cognitive effect of utterances about Pancasila 
or bhineka tunggal ika and the recognition of civic equality between Muslims 
and Christians: “Christians ... they are also citizens of Indonesia.”
Regarding equal citizenship, a participant positioned an Islamic state and a 
Syariah political system as not accommodating pluralism. But by saying “We 
do not reject Syariah... We must accept [Syariah], because we are Muslims” he 
refused to be identified as anti-Syariah. The speaker explained that there are 
two domains: Syariah as a political system championed by the Indonesian Hiz- 
but Tahrir (HTI), and Syariah as ritual (amaliyah). He positioned himself as 
anti political Syariah and pro non-political Syariah.
None of the participants in the Muslim FGDs positioned Indonesia as an 
Islamic state. Nevertheless most of them argued that the Pancasila state must 
accommodate the interests of Muslims. For example, a participant stated “[It is] 
very necessary [to have] a person who understands Islam in govemment. So 
[we want] no Perda (local govemment law) to be published, or any law that 
complicates Muslim life.”364
Muslim participants at macro level positioned Indonesia as undergoing “Re- 
formasi” since 1998. They identified the political situation in this Reformasi 
era as “really free, freedom”. Some Muslims are worried about this develop- 
ment, because freedom allows a Christian to become vice-mayor of Solo as 
well as many more Christian MPs. Thus participants identified a transformation 
of power relations in the Reformasi era, which is a threat to Muslims. The 
threat includes Christians who are village headmen.
In the statement, “If Mr Jokowi [the mayor, a Muslim] is still alive in five 
year’s time [it is no problem], But if he were to pass away after a year, then he 
will be succeeded by Mr Rudi, who is a Christian. ... Then Islamic dakwa in 
mosques will be closed down”, the speaker reproduced fear of a situation in 
which political authority passes into Christian hands. A participant uttered:
364 Memang perlu sekali orang yang paham agama Islam duduk di pemerintahan. Jadi jangan 
sampai nanti keluar Perda, atau UU, menyulitkan kehidupan Islam itu sendiri.
“Since Mr Rudy has been vice mayor the number of Muslims, the Muslim 
population has decreased drastically.”
However, census statistics for Surakarta over the last thirty years show that 
while the Muslim population decreased and the Christian population increased, 
the change was not drastic. In 1980 Muslims were at 80%, while in 2011 they 
were 75.8%. In 1980 Christians (Catholics and Protestants) were at 19%, 
whereas in 2011 they were 23.2%. Thus during the last three decades Muslims 
have decreased by 3% and Christians have increased by 1.3%.365 But during 
Reformasi (2000-2010) Muslims increased by 0.3%, while Christians decreased 
by 1.2%.
Some participants indicated that Christian education has hegemonie inten- 
tions. Muslim students are taught Christian teachings and worship in Christian 
schools and extracurricular courses. Thus Christian educational services are 
used for Christianization.
The participants also constituted and were constituted by ethnic identity 
construction. In general they reproduced inter-ethnic/religious identity such as 
Javanese as Muslims, Christians or abangan-, Arabs as Muslims; and Chinese 
as Christians. They also identified such inter-ethnic/religious identity groups in 
society, especially in certain parts of Solo.
Chinese in particular were identified as “rich”. “Their number is small, but 
their financial situation is strong.” Thus participants -  mostly Javanese Mus­
lims -  positioned themselves as economically inferior to Chinese Christians 
(power relations). Because of this financial power they were identified as using 
tricky ways of Christianization.
Most participants refused to position the Solo riots as inter-ethnic or interre­
ligious conflict. They were mostly identified as social conflicts caused by so­
cial inequality, for instance between poor Javanese Muslims and rich Chinese 
Christians. But some of them identified ethnic and religious sentiments and 
propaganda being spread in society, including via religious sermons.
The refusal to position the conflicts as inter-ethnic or interreligious is a 
mechanism to explain that the problems are not from within. Thus participants 
positioned the problems as not between Muslim and Christian, or Javanese and 
Chinese.
Actors in conflicts are identified as “ocnum” (individuals). This supports the 
foregoing explanation. The actors are individuals, which dissociates them from 
their religious and ethnic identity. In another case -  an attack on a Christian 
place of worship -  a participant identified the Muslim paramilitaries (laskars) 
as coming from outside Solo. So the problems come from “there”, not from
365 Thus, according to the statistics, the statement that Muslims ‘decreased drastically’ after 
Reformasi was not valid.
“here”. The refusal to identify conflicts as arising inside society is a social 
mechanism to maintain harmony and avoid further and deeper conflict.
Some participants identified current intra-Muslim divergence (intergroup 
power relations) between NU-Muhammadiyah and MTA. NU and MTA dis- 
agreed on the issue of tahlilan (religious field), while Muhammadiyah and 
MTA clashed in the area of schooling (educational and ultimately economic 
field). However, the participants positioned MTA ambiguously. On one hand 
they criticized MTA, but on the other hand they value MTA as the defender of 
Islam against Christianization.
The participants also constituted and were constituted by religious pragma- 
tism. When a suspected Muslim terrorist (Noordin M. Top) was captured and 
shot by the police near to the participants’ houses, some participants reported 
financial benefits. They called the incident a “blessing”, because they profited 
from Noordin’s death.
Some participants reproduced the image that some countries outside Indo­
nesia oppressed Muslims. Muslims are under pressure intemationally. Some of 
them identified America as encouraging Christianization in Indonesia. Another 
participant identified Muslims in Moro, the Philippines, as oppressed by a non- 
Muslim regime.
4 Cdmclltusiora
In this study we use critical discourse analysis as a method (Fairclough 1992) 
to gain insight into the relation between religious language and social cohesion 
or the lack of it. We distinguish between the dimensions of individual believers 
(micro level), their (full or partial) identification with their religions or reli­
gious institutions (meso level), and the societal context in which these religions 
or religious institutions operate (macro level). At micro, meso and macro levels 
our research participants produced a wealth of labels for Christians. Indeed, 
they are not only labels but also identify concrete behaviours.
We draw conclusions with respect to the classifications (description), the 
cognitions or mental models that are drawn upon (interpretation) and the social 
condition and effects (explanation). In general Muslims said that expansionist 
Christians are not Javanese Christians. Muslims classified Christians into those 
who share Javanese culture and those who adopt non-Javanese ways that are 
“excessive” and who have a “hidden agenda”. They said that Christian funda- 
mentalism and the problem of Christianization come from new, non-mainline 
churches that are minor groups within Christianity. Chinese Christians were 
classified as rich people in Christian society and they built economic empires in 
Solo. Muslim participants classified Christians as fellow citizens of Indonesia.
When it comes to mental models, Muslims see Christians as their fellow 
“children of Abraham” and “people of the Book”. Whereas Christians are op- 
pressors and allies of the West, Muslims are intemationally oppressed. How­
ever, because of the similarity of their “customs” (kesamaan adat), there is no 
gap between Muslims and Christians. Thus Javanese culture and adat (custom) 
are shared cognitions. Another mental model is the principle of “rukun” (har­
mony). Muslims distinguished between “religious” (ibadah) and “social” 
(muamalah) affairs. They also differentiated two areas of Syariah: Syariah as a 
political system and Syariah as ritual (amaliyah).
As for social conditions or social effects, Muslims positioned Javanese 
churches as more inculturated. Abangan Christians are positioned as living in 
harmony with abangan Muslims. A Muslim participant identified a tendency 
among young Christians to be more intolerant than older generations. Muslims 
positioned themselves as inferior to Chinese Christians because of their eco­
nomie poverty. They positioned themselves as avoiding any mixing of religious 
teachings. In general Muslims rejected Syariah as a political system and advo- 
cated its ritual (amaliyah) aspects. They positioned Christians as fellow citizens 
of Indonesia. Muslims primarily positioned themselves as religiously tolerant, 
while radicals who use militant language are a peripheral voice.
Charter IV
"Th® familj of Fancasïla" 
H©w Muslims and Christians speak t© each 
other
In Surakarta Muslims and Christians mingle in daily life. Some families have 
members belonging to diverse religions, for instance Islam and Christianity. 
The Al-Hikmah mosque and the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ) of Joyodin- 
ingratan stand side by side in Jalan Gatot Subroto. They symbolize the coexis- 
tence of Muslims and Christians in the city. The GKJ Joyodiningratan was built 
in 1929, while the Al-Hikmah mosque was constructed in 1947. The congre- 
gants of those two houses of worship not only respect each other, but also 
sometimes work together. At the feast of Idul Fitri a lot of Muslims pray in the 
mosque, even in the Street outside the building. At Christmas Christians use the 
Street in front of the mosque to park their vehicles. They also share food during 
religious feasts. In 2006 they worked together to help earthquake victims in 
Yogyakarta and Klaten.
Figure 8: The 
Al-Hikmah 
mosque and 
the Javanese 
Christian 
Church (GKJ) 
Joyodinin­
gratan stand 
side by side in 
Jalan Gatot 
Subroto o f  
Surakarta 
(Source: Au- 
thor’s collec- 
tion)
Ho wever, as noted in previous chapters, Muslims and Christians in Surakarta 
also experienee religious tensions. The emergence of extreme groups in both 
Muslim and Christian communities, who elevate their religious identity above 
other (e.g. ethnic, national) identities, has characterised religious transforma­
tion in Surakarta for over a decade.
Like the previous chapters, this chapter looks at social identity construction 
through interreligious, particularly Christian-Muslim relations from a theory of 
communicative practice point of view. I explore why and under what condi­
tions people, both individually and collectively, elevate their religious identity 
above other identities and whether or not religious identity threatens national 
identity and leads to social conflict. In the previous chapters we focused only 
on how Christians or Muslims speak about each other. In this fourth chapter we 
analyse the way they speak to each other.
The main data are utterances from eight focus group discussions (FGDs) 
involving 52 participants. Of these, 26 had participated before in Christian or 
Muslim FGDs. Another 26 new participants attended these mixed FGDs. Gen- 
der-wise 28 women and 24 men attended the FGDs. We classify participants 
aged 17-24 as youths and those aged 50 and over as elders. Even though we do 
not have a specifïc age category of participants aged 25-49, most professionals 
and workers are in that age group. The youngest participant attending the 
youthful group is 18 years old, while the oldest in the elderly group is 72 years 
old. By professionals we mean entrepreneurs, managers, joumalists and state 
employees, whereas workers are labourers, company employees, domestic 
workers, workers in the infonnal sector, et cetera.
Almost all contacted persons in the previous series of Muslim and Christian 
discussions were eager to join the mixed FGDs. Only one Muslim (a student 
activist at a senior high school) refused to join. At first he said he wanted to 
join the discussion, but when he leamed that the groups would be mixed Mus­
lims and Christians, he withdrew.
In each FGD I asked a basic question at the outset: “How would you de- 
scribe the other (Christian/Muslim)?” The rest of the conversation dealt with 
the issues raised in response to that question. The main title of this chapter, 
“The family of Pancasila”, derives from participants’ words.
1 ©escripttioBU
The first stage is the analysis of linguistic practice (description), that is the 
linguistic features of the text (Fairclough 1992: 76-77). For this stage Fair­
clough (1992: 73-78, 234-237) suggests various analytic tools. Here we con- 
centrate on vocabulary (i.e. wording, over-wording and rewording or altema- 
tive wording). The term ‘wording’ refers to processes of wording the world,
which differ in different times and places and among different groups of people 
(Fairclough 1992: 76-77). Over-wording is an “unusually high degree of word­
ing, often involving many words which are near synonymous” (Fairclough 
2001: 96). It is a sign of intense preoccupation, pointing to “peculiarities in the 
ideology” (Fairclough 1992: 193). Rewording is using new words as altema- 
tives or in opposition to existing ones (Fairclough 1992: 194). In addition we 
look at metaphor. Fairclough (1992: 195) writes, “How a particular domain of 
experience is mataphorized is one of the stakes in the struggle within and over 
discourse practices.” The object of analysis in this linguistic practice stage is 
words, phrases or sentences. We focus on how Christians and Muslims speak to 
each other. Analytic questions are: How do the participants speak to each 
other? What words do they use?
1.1 Analysis at micro SeveS
The micro level of discourse is where people speak about their personal lives 
and opinions as individual believers, such as members of families, neighbour- 
hoods or villages. Some participants said that they come from a “diverse” fam­
ily background. Several participants used the label “Pancasila family” to de- 
scribe their family that accommodates different religions. A Christian profes­
sional said, “I grew up in a Pancasila family... My father is Hindu, my mother 
is Muslim, their children are Christians.”366 A young male Christian said, “I also 
come from a Pancasila background. [My] extended family consists of Chris­
tians, Catholics and Muslims.”367 In the phrase “Pancasila family” Pancasila is 
an adjective qualifying family.
A female Christian participant described her background: “My parents are 
abangan, so only Islam KTP [Islam by identity card/ID], I [became a Christian] 
because of education. My kindergarten and elementary school was Christian ... 
When I was at the third level of high school [I] asked to be baptized... Fortu- 
nately my parents gave permission.”368 In that sentence the word “abangan” is 
associated with Islam KTP. By inserting the word “only” (hanya) before the 
phrase “Islam KTP” the speaker indicated that her father was not really Mus­
lim. She used the active voice (“[I] asked...”) to stress that it was her own ini- 
tiative. The speaker said that a Christian education was the factor that caused 
her to become a Christian. The word “fortunately” expresses that baptism is 
perceived as something to be grateful for.
366 Saya dibesarkan... dari keluarga Pancasila. Ayah saya Hindu, ibu saya Islam, anak-anaknya 
Kristen.
Aku dari latar belakang Pancasila, dari keluarga besar ada yang Kristen, Katolik, ada juga 
yang Islam.
368 Orang tua saya abangan, jadi hanya Islam KTP. Terus saya juga karena pendidikan. 
Sekolah saya dari TK SD itu Kristen... Saya kelas tiga SMA itu minta baptis... orang tua saya 
kebetulan mengijinkan.
A Muslim participant said, “My extended family on my father’s side is 
Christian and Muslim.”369 Similarly, a Christian participant said, “My father is 
Hindu, my mother is Muslim, their children are Christians.”370 A young Chris­
tian female contributed: “I grew up in and come from two different cultures 
and religions. Fortunately my family is a very democratie family that respects 
the principle of humanity.”371 In this last sentence the speaker used the phrase 
“democratie family” in line with her appreciation for the fact that cultural and 
religious differences were respected according to the principle of humanity. 
The word “very” in the phrase “very democratie family” emphasizes the label 
“democratie”.
A Christian participant said, “In my extended family the two religions (Is­
lam and Christianity) are all mixed together and our tolerance is very extraor- 
dinary, very extraordinary.”372 The speaker used the word “tolerance” to de- 
scribe social relations in her family. She also used over-wording by repeating 
“our tolerance is very extraordinary, very extraordinary”, which shows intense 
preoccupation. Another Christian participant said, “[My] relatives are Muslim 
and Christian. Moreover, many of my uncles are Muslims.”373
A Muslim male said that his extended family is “very abangan, because it is 
said that my grandmother was [a member of the] PKI (Indonesian Communist 
Party).”374 Here the speaker linked abangan with PKI affiliation. In that sen­
tence he used the passive voice. From the utterance it is not known who said 
that his grandmother was PKI. The word “very” is an adverb of degree, indicat- 
ing that his grandmother was definitely abangan.
Like the participant quoted above who was grateful for her Christian bap- 
tism, another participant described her gratitude to God for the fact that she and 
her relatives were bom Muslims. A Muslim female said, “Alkhamdulillah 
/AYA5y(thanks be to God), fortunately we were all bom Muslims.”375Ais eaker 
[#K05]considers having a mono-religious family to be fortunate.
A Christian male described his parents’ experience when they obtained their 
IDs at the civil administration office. He said, “My father was an adherent of 
[indigenous] belief (kepercayaan). Finally in a certain year [he] had to choose 
one of the religions. [I forget] in what year [my parents] registered for an ID. 
[We] did not know who made a mistake. Finally both were [registered as] Bud-
369 Keluarga besar saya yang dari ayah itu ada yang Kristen, ada yang Islam.
370 Ayah saya Hindu, ibu saya Islam, anak-anaknya Kristen.
371 Saya tumbuh dan berasal dari dua budaya dan dua agama yang berbeda. Kebetulan 
keluarga saya adalah keluarga yang sangat demokratis menjunjung asas kemanusiaan.
372 Di keluarga besar kami dua agama ini berkumpul bersama-sama dan tentunya toleransi atas 
setiap kami itu luar biasa banget, sangat luar biasa.
373 Keluarga ada Muslim ada Kristen. Bahkan Pak De saya pun banyakyang haji.
374 Sangat abangan, karena katanya nenek saya itu PKI.
375 Kami memang kebetulan terlahir alkhamdulillah dari keluarga yang Muslim semua.
dhists. My mother is [registered] as Buddhist, my father is [registered as] Bud- 
dhist. But actually [they are] Hindus.”376 The phrases “adherent of the [indige- 
nous] belief’ and “but actually [they are] Hindus” show that the speaker de­
scribed his parents as combining Hinduism with indigenous belief. A Muslim 
male said, “I am kejawen, my ID is Islam.”377 Here the speaker described the 
discrepancy between his personal belief (kejawen) and the religious Identifica­
tion on his ID (Islam).
In regard to participants’ diverse family backgrounds, some of them de­
scribed their social relations with Christians in celebrating religious feast days 
in interreligious togethemess. A Christian said, “At Idul Fitri [Islamic feast 
day] I, my kids and my husband always visit my parents and my little broth­
ers/sisters. Similarly, when I celebrate Christmas my mother and my little 
brothers/sisters visit my home.”378 Here the speaker described Christians and 
Muslims visiting each other over religious holidays. A Muslim confirmed this: 
“When lebaran [Islamic feast day] comes, [we] gather; when Christmas comes, 
[we] gather. Even when Valentine’s day comes I am also invited.”379 As is evi­
dent in the linguistic features of those two sentences “lebaran” is an altemative 
wording for Idul Fitri.
Another Christian participant mentioned, “During lebaran... my Muslim 
brothers/sisters usually pray first [in the mosque]... And we, [who are] from 
another religion ... I am a Christian, we prepare food [for them].”380 In this text 
the speaker described the situation in her family during lebaran. She reinforced 
her identity by saying “I am a Christian.” Another Christian participant said, 
“When Christmas [is coming] my little brothers/sisters usually send SMSs 
[saying] Merry Christmas.”381 Here at micro level the participant described her 
Muslim siblings conveying Christmas greeting to her.
Some participants talked about daily togethemess of Muslims and Chris­
tians in the family. A Christian participant cited this example: “Although my 
uncle is a hajj, [he] still wants to stay ovemight in my house... [When] on Sun- 
day my uncle stays at home, we [my relatives and I] go to church. [We say]
376 Ayah saya itu mengikuti kepercayaan penghayatan itu. Akhirnya tahun berapa itu harus 
memilih agama salah satu, itu jadi Hindu. Tapi tahun berapa itu, bikin KTP, gak tahu yang salah 
yang mana itu. Jadi Buddha semua. Ibu saya Buddha, bapak saya Buddha. Padahal sebenarnya 
Hindu.
377 Saya kejawen, KTP saya Islam.
378 Kalau itu Idul Fitri saya dan anak-anak saya dan suami saya mesti menghadiri orang tua 
saya dan saya ke adik-adik saya. Kemudian sama kalau saya Natalan ibu dan adik-adik saya 
yang ke tempat saya.
379 Kalau di pas acara lebaran itu ya kumpul bareng, Natal kumpul bareng. Bahkan valentine 
saya juga diundang.
380 Di saat Lebaran... saudara-saudara saya Muslim untuk biasanya sholat dulu ... Dan kami 
dari agama lain, saya Kristiani, kami menyiapkan makanan.
381 Kalau Natal kebanyakan adik saya SMS Selamat Natal.
don’t want to go inside the church. That is what I mean that he/she is too fa­
natical about her/his religion.”392
11.2 AiniaSysDS at m eso level
We analyse the meso level of discourse when participants speak about them­
selves as members of a religion (institution), hence the shared or collective 
pattems of belief and practice which go beyond personal convictions. In the 
mixed groups participants at meso level classified Islam and Christianity as 
“religions of heaven”, “having the same goal”, “having the same human 
values” and “good” religions. A Muslim participant commented, “We [Mus­
lims and Christians] all have beliefs, all have God, all have a way of wor­
ship.”393
A Christian participant said, “All religions have the same human values.”394 
Another Christian said, “Essentially all religions are good.”395 A Muslim par­
ticipant confirmed, “[All] religions, their goal is good.”396 In addition a Chris­
tian participant said, “All religions... focus on the one God, focus on Allah who 
is the only one God.”397 The participants reworded the term “good” in describ- 
ing the character of all religion. The Christian speaker used the word “Allah” as 
an altemative for Tuhan (God). He created common ground between Muslims 
and Christians. Apart from the temi ‘Tuhan', the word “Allah” is used in ba­
hasa Indonesia.
A female Muslim explained, “The meaning of the word Islam is salam and 
salam means peace. So actually [Islam] teaches beautifulness.”398 A Muslim 
male also mentioned, “In Islam we have a concept of rahmatan lil ‘alamin (a 
mercy to the world), that is according to Islam, Islam means mercy for all crea- 
tures.”399 Similarly, a female Christian said, “The basic [teaching of Christian­
ity] is “love” (kasih). Love your God with your heart totally and love others as 
yourself.”400 As seen in the linguistic features of those texts, for Muslims the
392 Anak saya itu nikah di gereja. Mereka-mereka ndak mau masuk... aku ora melu ning grejo, 
wegah mlebu grejo. Lha meniko Iho Bu, berarti pun pemanggih kulo, dia itu terlalu fanatik 
dengan agamanya.
393 Kita sama-sama punya keyakinan, sama-sama punya Tuhan, sama-sama punya cara untuk 
beribadah.
Agama apapun memiliki rasa kemanusiaan yang sama.
395 Pada hakikatnya semua agama itu baik.
396 Agama itu tujuannya sama-sama baik.
397 Semua agama... menuju satu Tuhan, menuju kepada Allah Yang Maha Esa.
398 Arti kata Islam sendiri adalah salam dan salam itu artinya selamat. Jadi sesungguhnya 
mengajarkan keindahan.
399 Di Islam, kita punya konsep rahmatan lil ‘alamin yang menurut Islam, Islam itu rahmat bagi 
seluruh alam.
4an Dasarnya memang kasih. Kasihilah Tuhan Allahmu dengan segenap hatimu dan kasihilah 
sasama manusia seperti dirimu sendiri.
word “mercy (rahmat)” is an altemative for the Christian concept of love 
(.kasih).
Muslim participants made a basic distinction between different types of 
religion in Islam: the “religion of heaven” (agama samawi) and the “religion of 
earth” (agama ardhi). An elderly Muslim female said, “According to Islam 
there are religions that are revealed by Allah to the prophets. They are called 
the religions of heaven (agama samawi)... The religions revealed by Allah are 
Judaism, Christianity, Islam. Each of them has a holy book and a prophet... 
Apart from these three religions, there are religions that are not of heaven, [but] 
of earth [agama ardhi]. These religions are created by humans.”401 Both Islam 
and Christianity are classified as religions of heaven. In this way the partici­
pants created common ground between Muslims and Christians.
A Christian participant described the social position of Muslims and Chris­
tians, and the relations between them. “A Muslim is [our] brother/sister... So 
[our] treatment of [our] Muslim brother/sister is like we treat ourselves. If be- 
ing pinched is painful, [then] do not pinch [the other].”402 The expression “if 
being pinched is painful, [then] do not pinch [the other]” is a metaphor in ba- 
hasa Indonesia, which means treat others as you treat yourself.
Some participants differentiated between the “goal” (tujuan) and the “way” 
{cara) of Christianity and Islam. A Muslim female described it thus: “The dif- 
ference between Islam and Christianity is only in the way {cara). Whereas the 
goal {tujuan) is actually the same, that is to worship God.”403 A young female 
Muslim pointed out, “[Muslims and Christians] all have God. And [they] have 
ways to communicate with God. But those ways are different.”404 The word 
“only” in the first utterance shows that the sameness of goal is much more sig­
nificant than the differences between the ways of Islam and Christianity. The 
following two participants confirmed those utterances.
401 Menurut Islam itu memang ada agama samawi yaitu agama yang diturunkan oleh Allah 
kepada para Rasul.... Agama yang diturunkan Allah yaitu agama Yahudi, agama Nashrani, dan 
agama Islam. Masing-masing memiliki Kitab Suci dan Rasul... Adapun selain ketiga agama ini 
tidak agama Samawi, agama Ardhi. Itu agama yang direkayasa oleh manusia sendiri.
Orang Muslim itu sebagai saudara... Jadi perlakuan terhadap saudara Muslim ya seperti 
terhadap diri sendiri. Kalau dicubit sakit ya jangan mencubit.
Perbedaan antara agama Islam dan Kristen itu hanya terletak pada cara. Sedangkan 
tujuannya sama sebenernya, menyembah Tuhan.
Sama-sama mempunyai Tuhan. Dan sama-sama punya cara untuk berkomunikasi dengan 
Tuhan. Tapi caranya yang berbeda-beda.
“Who are Adam and Eve? They are my and your ancestors. What is their religion? ... Does 
each religion have its own paradise? No, paradise is only one... Because [we are from] the 
same origin. Ingkang dipun gayuh sami (what will be reached is the same).”405
“In the early creation God created Adam and Eve. So all o f us are descendants o f Adam and 
Eve. So actually we are the same. Only the road (jalan) to God is different. I f  you happen to 
be Muslim it is via this way, those Christians [go] via that way..., but all focus on God.”406
Among the linguistic features of the foregoing texts, the word “road” (jalan) is 
an altemative for “way” (cara). The phrase “ingkang dipun gayuh sami” (what 
will be reached is the same) is a Javanese expression. It is an altemative word­
ing of “tujuan” (goal) in Indonesian. In the utterance “does each religion have 
its own paradise? No, paradise is only one” the speaker wanted to say that 
Muslims and Christians have and will be in one and the same paradise.
The participants also made the following classifïcation of brotherhood and 
in so doing they spoke about the different social positions of Muslims and 
Christians. A Muslim participant said:
“The brotherhood o f humanity (ukhuwah bashariah) is a brotherhood based on humanity.... 
the brotherhood of nation (ukhuwah wathaniyah) is a brotherhood among members o f a na- 
tion. Regardless o f his/her religion, that is among citizens. There is another [brotherhood], 
that is the brotherhood o f  Islam (ukhuwah Islamiyah), which is among Muslims.”407
Thus the Muslim speaker distinguished between three kinds of brotherhood: 
those of humanity, the nation and Islam. A female Christian maintained, 
“Those Christians are brothers/sisters of the same faith, [but] those non- 
Christians are brothers/sisters of a different faith.”408 Thus for the Muslim the 
phrase “brotherhood of Islam” is an altemative for the Christian’s “brotherhood 
of same faith”.
Some participants claimed that salvation is exclusively for certain religious 
believers. A young female Christian, a member of a Pentecostal church, said, 
“We believe in the salvation that is only through the Lord Jesus. Since we are
405 Adam Hawa menika sinten? Menika janipun leluhur kulo panjenengan, menapa agaminipun 
Adam Hawa? ... Napa saben agami gadah suargi piambak-piambak? Mboten. Suarga punika 
namung setunggal... Krana mekaten asal usulipun sami, ingkang pun gayuh sami.
406 Di awal penciptaan, Tuhan menciptakan Adam dan Hawa. Jadi, semua kita ini keturunan 
Adam dan Hawa, Jadi, sebetulnya kita ini sama. Hanya untuk ke Tuhan jalannya berbeda. 
Kebetulan yang Muslim dengan cara demikian, yang Kristen punya cara sendiri..., tapi semua 
arahnya kepada Tuhan.
407 Ukhuwah bashariyah yaitu saudara sesama umat manusia.... Ukhuwah wathoniyah yaitu 
saudara sesama warga negara. Perkara agamanya berbeda ndak masalah. Itu sesame warga 
negara Iho. Ada lagi ukhuwah Islamiyah, itu sesama agama Muslim.
408 Yang Kristen itu saudara sesama iman, yang non-Kristen saudara beda iman.
still in the world, our task is to spread that salvation.”409 In that utterance the 
speaker expressed that people reach salvation by no other way except through 
the Lord Jesus. A Muslim participant said, “Each [prophet] has a teaching and 
his period is limited. [The prophet Moses, the prophet of the] Jews is far ahead 
of prophet Isa (Jesus). [His prophecy was] continued by the prophet Isa. After 
prophet Isa prophet Muhammad came. He is the last prophet.”410 Here he de­
scribed how the period of Jesus’ prophecy ended when Muhammad came.
Some participants talked about “kafir” (infidel). Christians and Muslims 
used the word “kafir” in different ways. A Muslim participant said, “Princi- 
pally kafir is someone who does not uphold Islam, madame! [Someone who] 
does not uphold Islam is what we consider kafir,”411 A Christian participant in 
the same FGD replied, “According to the understanding in our [religion], kafir 
is [someone] who does not uphold any religion... does not worship God.”412 
Another Christian said, “Christianity is only religion. To believe in Jesus as 
God, that is salvation, according to us, no matter what [their] religion.”413
As seen in the linguistic features of the foregoing texts, both Christian and 
Muslim participants used the word “kami”, a “we” that includes the speaker 
and some audiences but excludes others. By using the exclusive “we” they 
shared a collective understanding of belief and practice among their own group, 
either Muslim or Christian, that goes beyond personal convictions. In those 
texts differential utterances about ‘‘'kafir” express disavowal of Islam by Mus­
lims and disavowal of God by Christians.
A Christian participant said, “There are [Muslims] who consider us [Chris­
tians] as kafir... [Then they] refuse to communicate or have relations [with 
us].”414 A Muslim participant commented, “There is a group [in Islam] which 
says that those [who] have different ways of worship [though they are Muslim], 
[because they have] different rituals, [are] called kafir... even if they [those who 
have a different way of worship] are their own fathers. Crazy!”415 In this text 
the speaker called that kind of Muslim “crazy”, indicating disunity in the fam-
409 Kita imani keselamatan itu jalannya hanya Tuhan Yesus. Kalau kita masih didunia, ya tugas 
kita memberitakan keselamatan itu.
Masing-masing punya ajaran dan waktunya juga ada ketentuan waktunya. Yahudi adalah 
sebelum Nabi Isa, kemudian diganti nabi Isa. Kemudian setelah nabi Isa ada lagi lebih baru 
Nabi Muhammad. Itu nabi terakhir.
411 Prinsipnya kalau kajir itu bukan agama Islam, ya Bu. Tidak memeluk Islam itu kami anggap 
kafir.
Pemahaman di tempat kami kalau kafir ndak beragama... Tidak menyembah Tuhan.
413 Kristen itu cuman agama. Mempercayai Yesus itu Tuhan itulah keselamatan. Menurut kami 
gitu, gak masalah agama apapun gak masalah.
4,4 Ada yang menganggap kami kafir... gak mau berkomunikasi ataupun gak mau berhubungan.
415 Ada satu aliran yang menyatakan kalau dia sudah apa tata cara beribadah, amaliah 
berbeda, itu ya sudah dikatakan orang kafir... meskipun itu ayah kandungnya sendiri. Gila!
ily. The same Muslim participant said, “Nowadays the conflict is between 
Muslim and Muslim.”416
Muslim participants described a prohibition of mixing different faiths. A 
Muslim participant said, “On the issue of aqida [faith], there is a rule that says 
lakum dinukum wa liyadin (to you be your religion, and to me my religion). 
You have your religion, please practise your own religion. Whereas I have my 
Islamic teaching, I practise my religious teaching.”417 In that text the speaker 
used the words “religion” (din) ’ and “teaching” (ajaran) as altematives for the 
word “faith” (aqida). The speaker described the prohibition of mixing the 
faiths, religions and teachings of Islam and Christianity.
A Muslim said, “Nowadays we are trapped, driven, then comes up [a con­
cept of] religious pluralism, sir [refers to researcher]! It is dangerous. If a per- 
son does not have the correct faith, it would be a source of disaster.”418 This 
speaker defined religious pluralism as a mixture of the faiths, religions and 
teachings of Islam and Christianity. In that text she also describes religious 
pluralism as “dangerous” and a “source of disaster for the faith”. In the expres- 
sion “we are trapped, driven” she used the passive voice to signify that reli­
gious pluralism came from outside and was initiated by others.
A Muslim male professional described a contrast between his personal view 
and the view of his religious institution:
My background is Muslim Muhammadiyah... The people o f Muhammadiyah are sometimes 
perceived as very, very puritan. I f  [they] face Christians, rather -  what? ... hard. But in daily 
life I could not avoid my personal view, which is rather different [from Muhammadiyah], I 
am more open, Not only in social affairs, but also I and my Catholic or Christian or other 
friends often discuss beliefs, faith. And of course to look for a meeting point, not the differ-
419ences.
In that text the speaker described three things. First, he said that he is Muslim 
Muhammadiyah. Second, he described Muhammadiyah as “very, very puritan” 
compared to Christians. Third, he pointed out that he has a personal view 
which is more open than that of Muhammadiyah. The phrase “are perceived as
416 Sekarang konfliknya adalah orang Islam sendiri dengan orang Islam sendiri.
417 Dalam soal aqidah kepercayaan sudah ada aturan, yaitu apa lakum dinukum wa li yadin. 
Anda punya agama, silahkan anda menjalankan agama yang anda anut dengan agama anda. 
Sedangkan kamipunya ajaran Islam, ya saya mengamalkan ajaran saya.
418 Sekarang kita itu dijebak, digiring, sehingga muncul pluralisme agama, Pak! Itu bahaya. 
Sebab kalau orang sudah tidakpunya keyakinan yang benar itulah sumber bencana.
4,9 Latar belakang saya Muslim Muhammadiyah... Orang Muhammadiyah itu kadang ada yang 
menilai apa ya sangat sangat puritan. Kemudian jika berhubungan dengan Kristiani rada rada 
apa ya... keras. Tapi secara keseharian saya ndak bisa melepaskan diri bahwapandangan saya 
itu agak-agak berbeda. Saya lebih terbuka. Tidak hanya bidang sosial, tapi kadang saya dan 
teman-teman dari Katolik atau Kristen atau yang lain sering berdiskusi soal-soal apa namanya 
kepercayaan, keimanan. Dan tentunya mencari titik temunya, bukan perbedaan-perbedaan.
very, very puritan” is in the passive voice, showing that this is the perception of 
people outside Muhammadiyah. Another Muslim participant in the young fe­
male FGD said, “I am Muslim, but [I] don’t wear jilbab (veil).” By adding the 
word “but” the speaker wanted to say that her practice differed from Muslim 
women in general.
A Christian female participant referred to her religion and the idea of the 
Belief in One Divine Lordship in Pancasila. She said “Pancasila exists... The 
understanding is different [among different religious Indonesians]. [In respect 
of] the Belief in One Divine Lordship... the Christian faith isn’t [exactly the 
same as the belief in] one Lordship [in Pancasila], [We] believe in the 
Christ.”420 In this utterance, the participant described a different understanding 
of the Pancasila Belief in One Divine Lordship between Christians (“believe in 
the Christ”) and Muslims (“the one Lordship”). She used the term “different” 
(berbeda), a polite utterance, in order to avoid confrontation.
Some participants used labels such as “abangan”, “fanatical” and “santri” 
(devout). A Muslim participant described three types of Islam: “In Islam there 
is Islam abangan, fanatical Islam and Islam santri,”421 Other participants de­
scribed the social relations between fanatics and people who have a different 
religion. A Muslim participant mentioned, “Those of the fanatical line who 
wear calf-length pants or large jilbab refuse to associate with people of a dif­
ferent religion.”422
Another Muslim participant said, “Those who are not fanatical Christians 
cooperate [with Muslims].”423 A Christian participant observed, “Each religious 
adherent, all religions, if they are not too fanatical by segregating this and 
that... [they will] respect, appreciate [each other].”424 In those texts the partici­
pants linked the label “fanatical” with dress and the interreligious relations of 
fanatics (“refuse to associate with”, refuse to cooperate, apply segregation). 
The phrase “too fanatical” is an over-wording.
A Christian worker described an abangan Christian practising “sesajen” 
(offering of flowers or food to the spirits). She said, “Before [he/she] enters the 
church [becomes an active church member], [he/she] has practiced sesajen 
(offering). That was [before his/her] faith was strong. So [he/she] was still
420 Pancasila tetap ada ya... Pemahamannya berbeda. Kalau Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa... tapi 
untuk imannya tetep orang Kristen ndak Maha Esa. Yang dipegang ya Kristusnya.
41 Di internal Islam tadi itu kan ada Islam abangan, Islam fanatik, Islam santri.
Orang-orang yang garis fanatik orang yang katok cingkrang atau jilbab besar itu tidak mau 
duduk bareng sama orang-orang yang beda agama.
Yang tidak fanatik sama agama Kristen, tetap menjaga kerjasama.
Masing-masing penganut agama, semua agama, asal tidak terlalu fanatik dengan 
membedakan ini dan itu... saling menghormati, saling menghargai.
abangan. People who are still abangan practise [sesajen].”425 In that text the 
speaker described two things. First, an abangan Christian practises sesajen, 
whereas faithful (“strong”) Christians do not. Second, the phrase “before enter­
ing [becoming active in] the church, [he/she] practised sesajen” indicates that 
the church makes Christians give up that practice. By adding the word “still” in 
the phrase “still abangan” the speaker conveys that the abangan Christian did 
not fully practise the Christian faith.
However, a Muslim participant said, “I think the culture of Java is extraor- 
dinary... A Javanese does not lose his/her Java-ness when following Hinduism. 
When Buddhism enters [the Javanese area], for instance, it is also like that. 
Buddhism does not eliminate the [culture of] Java. The culture of Java is still 
there, while Buddhist adherents also exist. [That pattem] also happens in Islam 
[and] Christianity.”426 Here the speaker described how Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Islam and Christianity do not “eliminate” Javanese culture. The same partici­
pant added, “Which means that the people of Solo are quite elastic (liat) [and] 
flexible (lentur) toward others.”427 Here he uses the labels “elastic” and “flexi- 
ble” to describe the people of Solo, who have a Javanese cultural background.
Another young female Muslim said, “Formerly Islam was only one stream. 
Islam was still [close to] Java, the culture of Java. Then our life was so peace- 
ful. [It is] not like now, when feelings are hot even among [people of] the same 
religion.”428 By using the word “formerly” the speaker said that in the past Is­
lam was close to Javanese culture. She described the history of Islam in Java as 
peaceful. Another Muslim participant said:
“ [Someone looks at him/herself] primarily as Muslim, as Muslim. Java is only a place of 
birth, daily language, et cetera. But there is a person who looks at [him/herself] as I am Mus­
lim [and] at the same time Javanese. So I am Muslim, but also practising the customs o f Java, 
whereas the first [person] does not practise the values and the culture o f Java, et cetera. I am 
a Muslim, a puritan Muslim. Java is only the daily language [and] the place o f  birth. But 
there is also a Muslim who is also Javanese. 1 practise Islam, I also practise the values o f Ja­
va. However, there is [a person] who is more Javanese [than Muslim], I am Javanese first, 
Muslim comes second. That is kejawen [Javanese-ness].”429
425 Dia sebelum ke gereja bikin sesajen. Sebelum imannya kuat, jadi masih abangan. Yang 
masih abangan itu dia bikin.
426 Budaya Jawa ini menurut saya luar biasa... Orang Jawa tidak kehilangan Jawanya ketika 
memeluk Hindu. Ketika Buddha masuk misalnya juga gitu, gak ada, Buddhanya gak merubah 
Jawanya. Budaya Jawa masih, orang Buddha juga ada. Islam Kristen juga begitu.
427 Itu artinya bahwa orang Solo paling tidak yang saya tahu cukup liat gitu Iho, cukup lentur 
ketika dia dengan selainnya.
428 Dulu itu Islam itu masih satu aliran. Islam masih ke Jawa, budaya Jawa. Jadi hidupnya lebih 
apa ya malah tentrem lah, tenteram. Gak seperti sekarang ini yang semakin panas antar satu 
agama saja.
429 Yang pertama adalah Muslim-nya, sebagai Muslim, Jawa itu hanyalah tempat lahir, bahasa 
keseharian dan lain sebagainya. Tetapi ada juga orang yang menganggap saya Muslim
The speaker distinguished between three kinds of Muslims (social identities). 
First, “puritan” Muslim who see themselves as primarily Muslim, who do not 
practise the values and culture of Java, to whom Java is only their place of birth 
and their everyday language. Secondly, there are Muslim Javanese who see 
themselves as Muslim and at the same time Javanese, who practise both Islam 
and the values of Java. Thirdly, kejawen (Javanese-ness) refers to Muslims who 
claim to be more Javanese than Muslim, or to be Javanese first and only then 
Muslim. In that text the words “teachings of Java” are an altemative wording of 
“values of Java”. This description by a Muslim participant is comparable with 
the Christian participant’s description of faithful (“strong”) and “abangan” 
Christians.
To go into Muslim society in more detail, a male Muslim participant ex- 
plained: “In Islam the NU is closest to the traditions. The Muhammadiyah is in 
between... The most [anti-tradition] is the laskar,”430 As seen in the linguistic 
features of the text, the word “tradition” in this utterance is an altemative word­
ing of “Javanese culture” in the previous utterance. Using the previous category 
of puritanism, we can say that the laskar is very puritan, the Muhammadiyah is 
puritan, and the NU is not puritan.
With reference to purification in Muslim and Christian society a male Mus­
lim said, “Groups that are eager to purify their religious teaching exist every- 
where [in Christianity and Islam], They sometimes create tensions.”431 In this 
utterance, the speaker linked religious purification movements with the creation 
of tension. Another participant described a new trend, namely prohibiting Mus­
lims to wish Christians merry Christmas in Muslim society. He said, “In the 
past saying Merry Christmas to one’s neighbours was no problem. [But] after 
reading a book which states that the greeting of Merry Christmas is prohibited 
(haram) a person no longer greets.”432 In this utterance the speaker illustrates 
the shifting of Muslims’ attitudes before and after reading a book forbidding 
them to wish Christians a merry Christmas.
sekaligus saya Jawa. Jadi saya Muslim tapi juga mempraktikkan ajaran-ajaran Jawa. Kalau 
yang pertama tadi sudah tidak menggunakan apa ya kejawaannya, nilai-nilai Jawa kemudian 
budayanya dan lain sebagainya. Saya Muslim, Muslim puritan. Jawa sekedar bahasa sehari- 
hari, tempat lahir saja. Tapi ada juga saya Muslim sekaligus Jawa. Saya mengamalkan Islam, 
saya juga mengamalkan nilai-nilai Jawa. Tetapi ada yang lebih dominan kejawaannya. Saya 
Jawa dulu, Muslimnya yang nomor sekian. Ini yang kejawen.
30 Di Islam ya NU lebih dekat ke tradisi. Muhammadiyah agak tengah-tengah... Yang paling 
atas laskar-laskar itu.
431 Kelompok-kelompok yang mau memurnikan ajaran agamanya itu di mana-mana selalu ada. 
Lha itu kadangyang menjadikan ketegangan-ketegangan.
Dulu sama tetangganya mengucapkan Selamat Natal tidak masalah. Setelah dia baca buku 
kemudian ada orang yang menyatakan bahwa mengucapkan Selamat Natal itu haram, akhirnya 
dia tidak mengucapkan.
The participants also talked about the cause of fanaticism. A young Chris­
tian female, a radio journalist, said, “The person becomes fanatical because 
he/she leamed a lot... Because like this, sir! Noordin [a suspected terrorist], I 
did the live joumalism report from there [place where Noordin was shot]... 
Apart from bombs, a lot of Islamic books were found.”433 On the other hand a 
Muslim participant said, “The person with rich knowledge will not be a fa- 
natic... But if [he/she] has limited knowledge, limited knowledge, wow... all 
people are wrong [except his/her own group].”434 Thus the two participants 
expressed two different opinions about the relation between Islamic education 
or knowledge and fanaticism.
Some participants described “streams” in Islam and Christianity. A Chris­
tian male, a member of the Javanese Christian Church, mentioned, “There are 
streams in Islam, also in Christianity. The stream of Pentecost... stimulates 
people to fly high.”435 A young Christian female described the liturgy in a char- 
ismatic church: “[The liturgy] in that church is like in a discotheque, noisy like 
a concert.”436 In those utterances the speakers described the social identity of 
charismatic and Pentecostal churches that stimulate people to “fly high” and 
their noisy liturgy.
Another Christian participant described Christian Pentecostal groups that he 
considered examples of that “stream”.
“ [The members of] those big churches, unfortunately, do not have a political sense [of being 
part of] the Indonesian state. They [feel that they are] part o f another state [kingdom o f God], 
Moreover, their theology is a theology o f success, o f prosperity. So the rich people, those are 
blessed by God. The puppies, the poor [are considered] not to have repented yet.”437
The speaker linked the big churches, the theology of success or prosperity with 
a lack of political sense of being Indonesian citizens. Another participant spoke 
about Christian brotherhood438 and the strong religious solidarity439 of Pentecos­
tal Christians at an international level. Another Christian participant said,
433 Orang itu menjadi fanatik ketika dia rajin belajar. Menurut saya seperti itu. Karena begini 
Pak... Noordin, kebetulan saya juga raportase live dari sana... Selain ditemukan bom di sana itu 
ditemukan banyak buku Muslim.
434 Orang itu kalau ilmunya banyak, malah justru tidak fanatik.... Tapi kalau masih terbatas 
ilmunya, terbatas ilmunya, wuh... iki kabeh salah.
Muslim wonten madzhab-madzhab, Kristen nggih wonten... merairgsang orang untuk 
melambung tinggi.
436 Di gereja kok kayak ning diskotik, gedombrengan, kayak konser.
437 Gereja-gereja besar ini repotnya itu nggak punya kesadaran politis sebagai bagian dari 
negara Indonesia ini. Mereka ini adalah bagian dari negara yang di sana. Itu kan kemudian 
teologinya teologi sukses, teologi kemakmuran. Jadi orang yang kaya, orang yang ini, itu yang 
diberkati Tuhan. Yang kere, yang mlarat, itu belum bertobat.
438 Persaudaraan Kristen.
439 Solidaritas keagamaan.
“There is pride [among people of those churches] if [their] congregations in- 
crease every Sunday. But they are not aware that [they] take people away from 
other [Christian] churches.”440 Here the speaker points out that new members of 
Pentecostal churches come from other Christian churches. Hence he is describ- 
ing a contest among Christians themselves.
1.3 Aroaiysis at macro level
At macro level the participants in general described Muslims and Christians as 
citizens of Solo society (social position). Those members of Solo society live in 
“harmony” (rukun) and display “tolerance” (social relations). An elderly Chris­
tian female said, “Their harmony is very fabulous.”441 A Muslim participant 
described a similar picture. He said, “In Solo [the relationship] between Mus­
lims and Christians is good, extremely good. For instance, during the fasting 
month Christians prepare the fast-breaking meal [for Muslims] with enthusi- 
asm. So tolerance is very high.”442 The phrase “...good, extremely good” is an 
over-wording.
A Christian said, “[The population] in my place is diverse, but the harmony 
among people is very good. When the halal bi halal [Islamic feast day] was 
held the villagers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, came.”443 Another Christian 
participant mentioned, “At Idul Adha (Islamic offer feast) there was a rewan- 
gan (work party) in Javanese [culture], My family and I [who are Christians] 
were invited... I was very happy, I was happy.”444 In those utterances, the 
speakers described Christians involved in Muslims’ religious celebrations. The 
words “I was very happy, I was happy” represent an over-wording.
Some participants described cooperation between Muslims and Christians in 
religious celebrations. A Muslim participant commented, “At Idul Adha non- 
Muslims, without being asked and invited, [they] help [Muslims] in the 
mosque... While at Christmas usually non-Muslims ask Muslims to help to 
cook food.”445 Similarly, another Muslim said, “Yesterday there was a Christian 
who joined in the process of slaughtering an animal [in Idul Adha] from begin-
440 Ada kebanggaan kalau jemaat saya setiap minggu bertambah. Tetapi dia ndak sadar 
ngambilnya dari gereja lain.
Kerukunannya itu begitu hebat.
442 Di Solo umat Islam sama umat Kristen itu baik, sangat baik sekali. Contohnya kayak bulan 
puasa itu ya umat Kristiani antusias sekali menyediakan buka. Jadi toleransinya tinggi.
443 Di tempat saya beragam, tapi juga kerukunan umat beragamanya saya bilang bagus juga. 
Kalau diadakan Halal bi Halal, siapapun yang merasa warga di kampung saya itu Muslim 
maupun non Muslim dateng.
444 Saat Idul Adha, ada apa ya kalau orang Jawa, ada kayak rewangan. Saya dan keluarga saya 
itu diundang... saya bersuka cita banget, saya seneng.
445 Kalau pas Idul Adha pun dari non Muslim itu, tanpa harus diminta tanpa harus diundang 
gitu itu mau bantuin ke mesjid... Kalau pas Natal biasanya dari yang agama non itu minta 
bantuan ke Muslim untuk bantuin bikin makanan.
ning to end, up to distributing [the meat].”446 Those descriptions show mutual 
cooperation between Muslims and Christians in society.
Christian and Muslim participants described social cooperation between 
them in rendering social services. A member of the Javanese Christian Church 
told the group: “Every year I organize a health service. I cooperate with young 
Muslim friends from Nusukan... The first year there was no response [from the 
Muslims], The second year we discussed again, then [we] reached a common 
understanding. Finally, now it works. Indeed, [the place is] prepared [by Mus­
lims]. [The Muslims said] Sir, please conduct it in front of the mosque.” 7 A 
Muslim participant said, “The Javanese Church did a social service. That [ser­
vice] was in cooperation [between the church] with a pesantren (Islamic board- 
ing school) at Mojosongo.”448
Muslim and Christian participants described Indonesia primarily as a Pan­
casila country which respects freedom of religion. A participant said, “This is 
Pancasila [country].”449 A young male participant used a metaphor, “If we were 
a broom made of such splintered ribs, Pancasila is the string.”450 Here the 
speaker describes Pancasila as a factor that binds diverse citizens together. 
Another participant said, “In Pancasila freedom of religion is much respected... 
If we really implement Pancasila, our tolerance of other religions will be much 
stronger.”451 Thus the speaker linked Pancasila, freedom of religion, and toler­
ance.
Yet the participants described a new situation that has arisen since Refor­
masi in 1998. A Christian participant said, “Since Reformasi Pancasila is never 
mentioned in social interactions.”452[K04]A female participant observed, 
[#K04]“Nowadays Pancasila is being lost step by step.”451 Both participants 
described the decline of Pancasila after Reformasi.
A Muslim participant said, “After Reformasi there were militant groups 
among Christians. So [according to them] a Christian who is not militant is not 
[considered] a [good] Christian. [They also] invite [Muslims] to become Chris-
446 Ada bahkan dari umat Kristiani kemarin ikut apa itu penyembelihan hewan sampai dari 
awal sampai akhir, sampai ngedumke daging itu ikut.
441 Saben tahun kulo ngawontenaken peladosan-peladosan kesehatan. Kulo kerjasama kalih 
konco-konco pemuda Muslim Nusukan ingkang celak peken... Tahun pertama dereng wonten. 
Tahun kaping kalih rembakan malih sampun tuwuh pemahaman bersama. Pungkasanipun, 
lajeng sak mangke mlampah. Malah dipun sediyani, Pak sudahlah pak di halaman masjid ini.
448 GKJ Nusukan ada aksi sosial. Itu kerjasama dengan pondokpesantren di Mojosongo.
449 Ini kan Pancasila.
450 Kalau kita misalkan sapu lidi, Pancasila itu pengikatnya.
451 Dalam Pancasila sendiri kan diakui apa kebebasan beragama itu sangat dijunjung tinggi... 
Kalau kita benar-benar mengamalkan Pancasila kita mungkin toleransi kita terhadap agama 
lain itu makin kuat.
452 Sejak Reformasi Pancasila kan tidak pernah disebut-sebut dalam pergaulan masyarakat.
453 Sekarang ini untuk Pancasila itu sedikit demi sedikit kelihatannya semakin terkikis.
tians. I think it also happens among Muslims.”454 Here the participant described 
the growing phenomenon of Christian and Muslim militant groups after Refor­
masi.
A participant commented, “After the Reformasi era... other [new religious] 
groups from abroad in all their diversity... came to [Indonesia].”455 Another 
participant mentioned, “Though they (militant groups) live in Solo, they have 
[new] religious teachings which come from the Middle East. In Christianity [it 
is similar], I think [the new trends] come from America, Korea.”456 The two 
utterances reveal similar trends in Muslim and Christian communities after 
Reformasi.
The participants agreed that there is an awakening of religion characterized 
by the emergence of jihad  movements after Reformasi. These movements ac- 
centuate “kekerasan” (violence). Some participants talked about attacks on 
alcohol drinkers and gamblers by the jihad group in Solo. A Muslim participant 
said, “Actually [condemning] people who drink [alcohol], gamble is not [part 
of] their authority. It is not the authority of the jihad  [group] ... [However, they] 
enter villages, to purge them in the name of jihad ,”457 A Christian participant in 
the same group mentioned, “[When the] jihad  groups entered the village, en- 
tered my village... fighting occurred on the road, stones were thrown [by vil­
lagers at the jihad  group].”458 In this last sentence, the speaker described the 
villagers’ counter attack on the jihad  group.
A Christian participant described the attack on the “red district” in Solo: 
“Gilingan is the red district (kawasan merah) in Solo that is very old, [it is] 
close to the [bus] station. The prostitutes were attacked... while [the attackers] 
cried in the name of God. The prostitutes opened their BH [brassieres], then 
[the attackers] ran away quickly. It really occurred in 2005 or 2006.”459
Some participants also described the attack on the church’s social services 
in Solo by jihad  groups. A Christian participant mentioned, “During the [month
454 Setelah Reformasi, di kalangan Kristen juga ada kelompok-kelompok menurut saya cukup 
militan. Jadi orang Kriten kalau tidak militan ya nggak Kristen. Artinnya mengajak orang 
menjadi Kristen. Saya lihat temen-temen di Muslim juga ada.
455 Setelah Reformasi... kelompok-kelompok lain termasuk dengan luar negeri dengan macem- 
macem ...itupun juga masuk.
456 Walau dia tinggal di Solo, Jawa, tapi dia mempunyai paham keagamaan yang porosnya, 
misalnya, di Timur Tengah, wajar. Di Kristen saya kira, di Amerika, Korea.
457 Sebetulnya orang mabuk, orang judi itu kan bukan wewenang dia tho. Bukan wewenang 
jihad-nya itu tho. Kita kan punya itu, ada p o lis i... Trus berani masuk kampung-kampung berani 
operasi... dengan menamakan jihad tadi.
458 Jihad masuk kampung, masuk ke kampung saya... dan sempat terjadi bentrokan di jalan 
dilempari batu.
459 Gilingan ini adalah kawasan merah di Solo yang sudah tua, di dekat terminal. Itu sampai 
digropyok kan pelacur-pelacurnya... menyebut-nyebut nama Tuhan gitu. Kemudian dari dalam 
pelacur-pelacurnya buka BH, lari terbirit-birit. Bener tahun 2005 atau 2004 terjadi.
of] fasting the Christians hold [a fast-breaking for Muslims], pay [for it], [and] 
prepare food for that fast-breaking... There was a conflict last [year] when it 
was stopped by the jihad. The jihad  came... [They] assumed that there was 
Christianization [going on].”460 In that utterance the speaker used the label “ji- 
had’ to describe a group attacking the church’s fast-breaking service.
A Muslim participant said, “The cheap food programme offered by the GKJ 
(Javanese Christian Church)... [was] supported by society. People joined that 
programme. Not only Christians took advantage of that cheap food programme, 
but Muslims also joined that programme.”461 So he mentioned that the pro­
gramme benefited both Christians and Muslims.
A Christian participant, the organizer of the fast-breaking service, said, 
“When it was stopped by the police, we thought that it (the programme) would 
[really] be closed. But friends [who were Muslims], joumalists, and friends 
from NGOs did not agree [with the closure]... Those friends eventually sup­
ported [the programme].”462 A Muslim participant said, “[Those protests come 
from] only that group [of jihad] again and again.”463 By adding the words 
“only... again and again” the speaker wanted to say that the jihad  group con- 
sists of a small number of people.
In the following utterance the participant described the transformation from 
gangster to laskar. He said, “The conflict between Mr X464 [a gang leader] and 
the laskar [Muslim paramilitaries] should not be seen as a conflict between 
believers (orang yang beriman) and gangsters. It is more a fight among the 
gangsters themselves... When a group of gangsters fights [another group of 
gangsters], when one [of them] loses... then it transforms itself into laskar.”465 
That is why the speaker said that the fight against gangsters in the name of 
jihad  by certain Islamic groups is actually an intergroup fight between gang­
sters. Thus the speaker described the laskar not as a group of believers, but as a
460 Kalau puasa kan umat Kristen dari gereja mengadakan, mengongkosi, menyiapkan nasi 
untuk buka. Tapi pernah kemarin kebetulan kemarin puasa yang kemarin lalu ada konflik sedikit 
entah gimana itu distop oleh jihad. jihad datang... Pemikiran dari orang-orang yang 
menghentikan itu ternyata mengkristenkan.
461 Nasi murah yang dilakukan di GKJ... Mendapat dukungan misalnya dukungan masyarakat, 
kemudian orang ke sana, tidak saja orang Kristen yang memanfaatkan nasi murah itu tetapi juga 
ada orang Islam yang masuk ke sana itu.
462 Ketika sudah ditutup oleh kepolisian ya udah lah kita selesai. Tapi justru yang gak terima 
temen-temen, temen-temen wartawan sama temen-temen LSM... Itu yang kemudian diadvokasi 
temen-temen.
Hanya kelompok yang itu-itu saja.
464 For the sake o f confidentiality I do not disclose the name used by the speaker.
465 Konfliknya Tuan X  itu kan dengan laskar itu jangan dipahami bahwa konfliknya orang yang 
beriman dengan preman, tapi lebih lebih pada pertarungan antar kekuasaan para preman 
sendiri... Ketika dia bertarung kemudian tidak bisa mempunyai jaringan kekuasaan... dia bisa 
mengubah dirinya jadi laskar.
group of gangsters. The linguistic features of these utterances show that the 
words “laskar” and “jihad” are used as altematives. Participants in FGDs often 
used these two terms as altemative wordings.
A Muslim participant spoke about cultural and religious awakening as a 
response to globalization.
“The religious awareness o f Indonesians generally has increased. [I] mean compared to my 
childhood ... But I suspect this is [only] fear... o f progressive globalization, et cetera. When 
[we are] unable to withstand [globalization]... fmally [we tum] to religion, to culture. Cur- 
rently Javanese culture is gaining strength. Nowadays people are willing to pay to leam the 
Javanese language. People leam how to be MCs (masters o f  ceremony) in Javanese. Then 
[they] start to leam about Javanese culture at the palace. This is seemingly a new symbol for 
Solo people... On the other side religiosity also increases... Then [as a consequence] the only 
way to control people is [through] religion.”466
In saying “compared to my childhood” the speaker was describing a social 
change. The participant illustrates the strengthening of Javanese culture by 
citing three indicators: people are willing to pay to leam Javanese, people learn 
how to be MCs in Javanese, and they start to leam about Javanese culture at the 
palace.
Christian participants talked about the difficulty Christians encounter in 
building churches or houses of worship. A female Christian said in Javanese, 
“In the village of Banyuanyar there is not even one church in any part of the 
village. [We] want to build a church, [but] it is extremely difficult.”467 By con­
trast, “When a mosque is to be built in a [certain] region it seems to be very 
easy. But for the church ... to get permission from the state... the process will be 
long. So it is more complicated. In Kota Barat, [close to] the pharmacy, there is 
the Hope of God Church. Up to now it has not managed to get [permission].”468 
Here the speaker suggested differential treatment of Muslims and Christians 
when it comes to getting permission to build a house of worship.
466 Kesadaran keberagamaan kita secara umum masyarakat Indonesia semakin baik. Artinya 
dibanding masa kecil saya... Tetapi saya juga curiga jangan-jangan ini hanya ketakutan... terha­
dap kemajuan globalisasi dan lain sebagainya. Nah ketika menghadapi itu tidak mampu... 
akhirnya ke agama. budaya. Budaya Jawa akhir-akhir ini menguat. Orang belajar bahasa Jawa 
itu sekarang berani bayar. Orang belajar menjadi apa namanya MC bahasa Jawa. Kemudian 
belajar budaya Jawa di Kraton sekarang udah mulai ini. Agaknya ini menjadi simbol-simbol 
baru bagi orang Solo... Sisi yang lain keagamaan juga meningkat... Sehingga satu-satunya jalan 
untuk mengontrol diri dan umatya agama.
467 Jenenge kelurahan Banyuanyar kuwi sak kelurahan grejo siji wae ra eneng. Arep mbangun 
wae angel ora njamak.
468 Kalau umpamane suatu daerah mau dibangun masjid, kayaknya ah gampang banget.. Tapi 
kalau yang namanya gereja... tanda tangan dari pemerintah... proses itu cukup panjang. Jadi 
istilahnya dipersulit... Daerah Kotabarat. Apotek itu ada namanya Gereja Pengharapan Allah. 
Itu sampai sekarang tidak mendapat.
A Muslim participant said, “When the minority [Christians] group built a 
house of worship in the majority [Muslims] group’s [area]... many objections 
came .... There were no massive riots [and] acts of violence between the two 
religious groups [in society], But [there were] many objections [to church 
building proposals].”46'' In this text the speaker referred to the social position of 
Muslims as the majority and Christians as a minority. He differentiated be­
tween two realities in Solo: the absence of acts of violence between the two 
religious groups and the many objections to the proposed church building.
Some participants mentioned the Solo riots in 1972, 1980 and 1998. A par­
ticipant said, “It was not noted in history that people of different religions have 
less good relations in Solo, especially Christians and Muslims... I heard [about 
the study of] conflicts in Solo from Mr Dharmono, who is a historian, there was 
no conflict based on religion. But conflicts based on ethnicity happened many 
times.”4™ Here the speaker described the absence of religious conflict and the 
frequent incidence of ethnic conflict in the history of Solo.
A Christian participant recounted: “By accident 1 became involved [in the 
riots] of ’80 [1980]... On the third day [of the riots] I and my friends ran riot, 
amuck, were angry ... There were no swearwords relating to religion... [The 
swearwords were about] China, China, basically only China, without mention- 
ing religion.”471 Here the speaker described his own position and that of his 
friends as actors in the 1980 Solo riots. He over-worded “China”, indicating 
intense preoccupation with the ethnic conflict. This text confirms the previous 
utterance about the absence of religious conflict and the presence of ethnic 
conflict in Solo’s history.
The same person said, “I also witnessed the ’72 [1972] riots... it was not 
about religion. It was [prompted by conflict between] Arabs and pedicab driv- 
ers. It was a purely social problem, not about religion.”472 From the wording of 
the text we leam that the speaker perceived the riot as a social problem, be­
cause it was prompted by Arabs (rich people) and pedicab drivers (poor peo­
ple). Even though the speaker mentioned that it was prompted by Arabs, none
469 Ketika kaum minoritas mendirikan tempat ibadah di sebuah kelompok kaum mayoritas... 
Banyak penolakan-penolakan itu muncul... Daerah Solo memang tidak ada kerusuhan skala 
masifkekerasan-kekerasan antar umat beragama. Tapi banyak terjadi penolakan-penolakan.
470 Di Solo tidak ada sejarah terkait dengan apa relasi yang kurang bagus antar umat 
beragama, khususnya antara Kristen dengan Muslim... Saya denger dari Pak Dharmono konflik 
di Solo, dia orang sejarah, gak ada konflik yang didasarkan atas agama. Tetapi kalau konflik 
berdasarkan etnik memang sudah berkali-kali.
471 Kebetulan tahun 80 saya ikut... hari ketiga itu langsung saya ikut ndundeng-ndundeng sama 
temen-temen, pokoke nesu, ngamuk... gak ada istilah-istilah yang terungkap yang terkait dengan 
agama... Cina... Cina... pokoknya Cina aja, tanpa ngomongke tentang agama.
472 72 saya juga lihat... Itu gak agama. Lagi-lagi persoalan orang Arab sama supir becak. Itu 
hanya persoalan sosial saja, jadi bukan agama.
of the participants in that FGD described the 1972 Solo riots as an ethnic con­
flict.
A participant said, “The strong Symbol [of religion] is the house of worship. 
That is [the religious] symbol. For Muslims it is the mosque, for Christians and 
Catholics it is the church. [For Buddhists] it is the vihara. In fact, in fact, no 
vihara was destroyed, no church was destroyed. If at a certain level of con- 
sciousness it related to religion, at least, at least, the house of worship would be 
destroyed.”473 Here the speaker pointed out that if they were religious conflicts, 
the houses of worship would have been destroyed.
However, some participants talked about the victims of the 1998 Solo riots 
and the graffiti during the riots which referred to ethnic and religious identity. 
A male Muslim professional said, “Even though the victims were friends of 
people with a Chinese ethnic [background], ethnically Chinese, in fact Muslims 
from a Chinese ethnic background did not become victims.”474 Here the speaker 
described two identities: non-Chinese Muslims and Chinese Muslims.
During the 1998 Solo riots some people wrote graffiti on textiles and put 
these up in front of their houses to avoid mass attacks. A Christian participant 
described the situation: “The writing was about Muslims, Java... On the sarong 
displayed [in front of the house], for example, it was written Muslim, Java. If 
they were [non-Muslims, then they wrote] only Java. Java! [Chinese Muslims 
only wrote] Muslim!”475 In that text the speaker used the labels “Muslim”, 
“Java” and “Muslim-Java”. He added, “[They wrote like that] in order to not be 
considered Chinese.”476
A Muslim participant said, “I believe that economics is the main motive. 
[There are riots] because of the economic distribution issue, the problem of 
access to [economic] power. Why do the Chinese develop their businesses eas- 
ily while non-Chinese do not...? [Because of that] the Chinese ethnic group was 
eventually eradicated.”477 In this utterance the speaker connected “Chinese” 
with economic power.
473 Sebagai simbol itu yang paling dekat adalah rumah-rumah ibadah. Kan itu kan simbol. Bisa 
Muslim ya mesjid, kalau Kristen Katholik ya gereja. Vihara. Faktanya, faktanya, tidak ada 
vihara yang rusak, tidak ada gereja yang rusak. Kalau toh itu pada tingkat kesadaran tertentu 
ada hubungannya dengan agama paling minimal, paling minimal, rumah-rumah ibadah ada 
yang dirusak.
474 Meskipun yang kena korban itu teman-teman etnik China, ethnic China, tetapi kenyataannya 
etnik China yang beragama Islam ya tidak kena.
475 Tulisannya ada Jawa Muslim ya tho. Bikin tulisan apalah, sarung dijereng tulisane Jawa 
Muslim misalnya. Kalau yang anu ya Jawa saja. Jawa mas! Muslim!
476 Biar dikira bukan China.
477 Saya tetep yakin itu ekonomi yang jadi motif utama. Karena persoalan pemerataan ekonomi, 
persoalan akses kekuasaan. Kenapa orang China lebih gampang untuk mengembangkan 
usahanya. Sementara orang non-China nggak bisa.... Etnis China saja yang sekarang dihabisi.
A Muslim participant in the same group responded, “Those involved in the 
riots quote-unquote were Muslims. If they wrote Islam, [it was in order not to 
be] attacked... The [word Islam] was just attached. But we cannot say that it 
was a purely religious conflict. Because I believe the strongest triggers were 
the economy and [political] power.”478 By using the words “not ... purely” the 
speaker acknowledged the religious element involved in the conflict, but the 
words “the strongest triggers were the economy and [political] power” indicate 
the dominance of non-religious motives.
The Christian participant in his turn replied, “If [the motive is] the economy,
I clearly agree. Because in those years... our Chinese brothers/sisters were 
rather arrogant, rather arrogant, arrogant. [They] did not get along [with oth- 
ers/Javanese]... But after Reformasi up to today those Chinese brothers/sisters 
have become aware of that [they socialize].”479 Here the participant described 
the Chinese as brothers/sisters. In that sentence the over-worded “arrogance” 
shows intense preoccupation. The words “after Reformasi” describe a trans- 
formation among the Chinese after the Reformasi era.
Some participants mentioned “outsiders” or “people of Jakarta” as the actors 
and provocateurs in the 1998 Solo riots. A participant said, “If people of Ja­
karta did not have interests, Solo would be peaceful... Unfortunately Solo be­
came an object.”480 The participant added, “Solo became a target, sometimes 
called a short fuse (sumbu pendek) [of conflict]. The short fase was a label used 
by Jakarta people.”481 In that utterance, the speaker said peace in Solo was a 
result of the absence of “interests” of “people of Jakarta”. The speaker used the 
metaphor “short fuse”, which means easy to explode. It describes the identity 
of people of Solo from outsiders’ point of view.
As seen in the last two utterances, in general Muslims and Christians attrib- 
uted the problems to “outsiders”. A Muslim participant described Abu Bakar 
Ba’ashir, a Muslim who was jailed by the govemment for acts of terrorism, as 
being “not from Solo”. He said to his friend, “[You] do not know the map. Abu 
Bakar Ba’ashir is not a person of Solo, [he is from] Sukoharjo.”482 Thus the 
speaker denied that Ba’asyir, whom he described as militant, is a person from 
Solo.
478 Yang bikin rusuh tanda petik itu mayoritas mungkin umat Islam. Ya kalau dia menulis Islam, 
tidak akan diganggu... Itu (agama) tetep numpang, meskipun tidak bisa kita katakan ini murni 
konflik agama. Karena pemicu utama sayayakin pasti motif ekonomi dan kekuasaan.
479 Kalau ekonomi jelas saya setuju. Karena memang tahun-tahun itu... saudara-saudara kita 
yang China itu agak arogan, agak sombong, arogan. Gak mau bergaul... Tapi setelah Reformasi 
ke sini teman-teman China sudah mulai menyadari.
480 Bila orang Jakarta tidak punya mau, Solo aman. Sayangnya Solo jadi objek.
481 Solo jadi target, kadang disebut sumbu pendek. Sumbu pendek itu julukan orang Jakarta.
48" Tidak tahu peta. Abu Bakar Ba ’ashir bukan orang Solo, Sukoharjo.
2 interpretation
As indicated in previous chapters, the stage of interpretation or discursive prac­
tice concerns the production, distribution and consumption of text. Discursive 
practice mediates between linguistic practice (text) and social practice. There 
are many ways of analysing discursive practice (Fairclough 1992: 78-86, 232- 
234), but this study concentrates on two tools: intertextuality and interdiscur- 
sivity. When participants produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text 
or talk they draw on members’ resources (Fairclough 1989: 163) or mental 
models (Van Dijk 2008: 75), stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough 
1989: 9-10; 24). These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in peo- 
ple’s heads; and they are social in the sense that they are socially constructed 
and have social effects (Fairclough 1989: 24). So what members’ resources or 
mental models do Christian and Muslim participants use to produce (communi­
cate) or consume (interpret) talk?
2.Tl Analysis a t micro leveD
When speaking about their personal experience participants referred to (reli­
gious) diversity in the family. In talking with others Muslim and Christian par­
ticipants referred to their diverse family background, for instance, “My father is 
Hindu, my mother is Muslim, their children are Christians.”
Several participants used the concept of Pancasila. When speaking about a 
“Pancasila family” they drew on Pancasila as a mental model of the diversity of 
religions in their family. Actually Pancasila does not have any relation to famil- 
ial pattems. The word refers to the five pillars of the state ideology mentioned 
in the preamble to the constitution. The term “Pancasila family” is also used 
outside the FGDs. For example, a girl named Adearin, who declared herself to 
be a Muslim, posts quite a long article on her personal website under the title 
“the Pancasila family” (keluarga Pancasila). She submitted her article for an 
essay competition. It talks about her extended family in Purworejo, Central 
Java, which consists of Buddhists, Muslims, Christians and Catholics who live
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Another person who used that term is Rachmanto Widjopranoto. Widjo- 
pranoto (1983) wrote a book entitled The Pattern o f Developing the Pancasila 
Family (Pola Pengembangan Keluarga Pancasila). It is based on his research 
in the village of Bantul Yogyakarta. Widjopranoto used the term “Pancasila 
family” to refer to a family whose members observe the values of Pancasila.
These two writers use the expression “Pancasila family” in different ways. 
First, it refers to a family consisting of adherents of different religions, yet liv­
483 http://adearin.multiply.com/journal/item/297?&show_interstitial=l&u=%2Fjoumal%2Fitem, 
this article posted on October 17, 2010, accessed on October 20,2011.
ing in harmony. Thus “Pancasila family” relates not only to the hybrid identity 
of the family, but also to its harmonious relations. Secondly, it refers to a fam­
ily whose members observe Pancasila values (they are not necessarily relig- 
iously diverse). The concept of Pancasila family as used by our FGD partici­
pants approximates the first meaning.
A participant referred to a democratie family. Democracy is a mental model. 
There is no relation between democracy and family structure. Outside the 
FGDs the term “democratie family” is also used with reference families whose 
members respect each other. For instance, M. Flusnaini (2007) wrote a book 
review on the Nahdlatul Ulama website under the heading, “Portrait of a De­
mocratie Family” (Potret Keluarga Demokratis). He was reviewing The Same 
but Different: Portrait o f  the Extended Family ofK.Fl.A. Wakhid Hasyim (Sama 
Tapi Berbeda: Potret Keluarga Besar K.H.A. Wakhid Hasyim). This book by 
Ali Yahya (2007) is about the six children of Wakhid Hasyim, father of Abdur- 
rahman Wahid (former Indonesian president), who have different professions, 
political orientations and personal characters. But they respect each other in 
that “colourful family” {keluarga yang penuh war na).4X4 Thus when speaking of 
a democratie family FGD participants drew on general language used in soci­
ety.
In talking about family affairs (micro level) some participants also referred 
to a broader development in society. For instance, a female participant spoke of 
“progressiveness” (kemajuan) in describing the appreciation of diverse relig­
ions in a family. She said, “Nowadays [the family] is already quite progressive 
(cukup majü)... People do not really have problems with a family which has 
diverse religions.”485
Some participants referred to their family or parents as “abangan”. Abangan 
is a mental model that does not relate specifically to either Islam or Christian­
ity. It refers to nominal or non-practising believers, such as nominal Muslims 
(“Islam KTP”). The words “Islam KTP” refer to a popular public discourse in 
Indonesia. For instance, for fifteen months SCTV (national television) broad- 
casted a soap opera entitled “Islam KTP” (2010-2011).486 Thus the expression 
“Islam KTP” is common outside the FGDs.
A participant remembered that her grandmother was “very abangan”, be­
cause she was affiliated to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI 
was perceived by some Indonesians as a political party with an atheistic orien-
484 http://www.nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/12/9210/Buku/Potret_Keluarga_Demokratis.html, 
accessed on October 20, 2011.
485 Sekarang sudah cukup maju... orang tidak terlalu mempermasalahkan sekali yang agama 
dalam satu keluarga campur-campur agamanva.
486
http://www.multivisionplus.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57:isla 
m-ktp&catid=42:sinetron-tayang&Itemid=123, accessed on October 22, 2011.
tation. Another participant referred to the mental model of kejawen, which re- 
lates generally to the practice of Javanese values and beliefs.
The participants remembered interactions between Muslims and Christians 
in diverse families when they talked about Muslim-Christian relations. For 
instance, a female Christian remembered her uncle ( “hajj ”) who stayed over- 
night in her house. Another example: “When I celebrate Christmas my mother 
[who is Muslim] and my little brothers/sisters [who are Muslims] visit my 
home.”
Some participants referred to problems in Muslim-Christian relations when 
describing relatives’ experiences of conversion. A Catholic participant recalled 
her grandparents’ disagreement with her parents’ conversion to Catholicism. A 
Protestant Christian referred to his sibling’s conversion either to Islam or Ca­
tholicism.
In terms of ‘interdiscursivity’, a Christian mother applied the label Muslim 
‘fanatics’ to her relatives who refused to enter the church when she held a wed­
ding ceremony for her daughter. A Muslim participant in the same elderly fe­
male FGD replied, “[We are] forbidden to be fanatical.”487 To this another Mus­
lim participant reacted, “[We] must be fanatical, but [we] cannot disparage 
other religions.”488 In so doing she criticized the Christian participant. The pre- 
vious Muslim speaker responded by reporting her personal experience: “When 
I was on the board of a Muslim woman’s organization in Solo I also entered a 
church in response to a Christian church’s invitation.”489 She also cited then 
example of her student days at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, when she at- 
tended church services to observe Christian ritual practices. On the other hand, 
in Egypt non-Muslims often went to mosques simply as tourists. She argued 
that they did not visit churches “because [they] have less understanding [of 
Islam], because they lack knowledge [about Islam].”490
Participants drew on personal experiences with their neighbours in talking 
to each other. A Christian participant remembered an invitation from her Mus­
lim neighbour to join a “khenduri” (prayer meeting). In responding to the utter­
ance of that Christian participant, a Muslim participant in the same group said, 
“For us [Muslims] it is impossible to ask non-Muslims to pray [in an Islamic 
way], [We invite Christians] as guests [out of] respect [for neighbours]. [We] 
appreciate [them] as neighbours... For the harmony of the neighbourhood.”491
7 Tak boleh fanatik.
458 Fanatik itu harus, tapi tidak boleh merendahkan agama lain.
489 Ketika saya masih menjadi pengurus Ormas perempuan Muslim, saya juga masuk gereja 
pada saat organisasi Kristen mengundang.
490 Itu karena kurang pengertian, karena kurang pengetahuan.
491 Kita tidak mungkin mengajak umat Muslim untuk berdoa. Tapi sebagai tamu, penghormatan. 
Menghargai sebagai tetangga... Untuk kerukunan tetangga.
This related to the general comment that Muslims object to mixing Muslim and 
Christian religious teachings, for example in interreligious worship.
A Christian participant referred to the invitation of her Muslim neighbours 
to join a “rewangan” (work party) at the Idul Adha celebration, whereas a Mus­
lim participant remembered her neighbour’s conversion from Islam to Christi­
anity. Participants also drew on friendship experiences. A young female Mus­
lim remembered her Christian boyfriend when she talked about tolerance be­
tween Christians and Muslims. Another Muslim participant referred to his uni­
versity friends from different religious backgrounds when he talked about inter- 
faith discussion, while a Christian participant drew on his experience with 
friends when they were all involved in the 1980 Solo riots.
Participants drew on a distinction between agama (religion) and keper- 
cayaan (indigenous belief). A Christian participant said, “My father was a fol- 
lower of [indigenous] belief. Finally, in a certain year, [he] had to choose one 
of the religions.” Here he was distinguishing between religion and belief. In 
part that mental model is influenced by state policy. The PNPS act of 1965 on 
religious blasphemy introduced a classification: religions/agama-agama (Is­
lam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism) and 
be I iqïs/aliran-aliran kepercayaan. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also clas- 
sifies beliefsfaliran kepercayaan as not religion. The classification is reflected 
in public administration. Religious affairs fall under the Ministry of Religion 
and “beliefs” are dealt with by the Ministry of Education and Culture.
Participants referred to other personal experiences of talking with others at 
special occasions such as Idul Fitri, lebaran, Idul Adha, Christmas, Valentine’s 
Day (which is not a religious event) and Ramadan, khenduri (slametan), sem- 
bahyangan, tarawih prayer and fasting.
Participants sometimes used indirect discourse representation. For instance, 
one participant said, “It is said that my grandmother was [a member of] the PKI 
(the Indonesian Communist Party).” By using the passive voice he represented 
another anonymous speaker who spoke about his grandmother. Similarly, in the 
utterance “They [my Muslim relatives] did not want to enter the church... 
[They said] I don’t want to go inside the church”, the speaker represented her 
Muslim relative’s voice.
2 .2  Araalysis a t mraeso DeweB
In talking with others the participants referred to themselves in two ways. The 
Indonesian language has two words for we: “kita” and “kami”. The word “kita” 
refers to an (inclusive) “we” that includes the speaker and the audience. For 
instance, “We (kita) all have beliefs, all have God, all have a way of worship.” 
“We” in that sentence covers both Muslims and Christians. The word “kami” 
(exclusive we) refers to a “we” that includes the speaker and some audiences, 
but excludes other audiences. This exclusive “we” is illustrated clearly when
Christians or Muslims talk about kafir in terms of their respective religions. 
“According to our (kami) side [religion] kafir is [someone] who does not have 
any religion,” said a Christian participant, whereas a Muslim participant said, 
“[Someone who] does not uphold Islam is what we (kami) consider ka fir.’’ 
Thus, Muslims and Christians have different mental models of the concept of 
kafir.
The participants were inspired by the religious understanding in their faiths 
when they said that both Islam and Christianity focus on God. It is commonly 
accepted that both religions are theistic. When participants talked to each other 
about the concept of God in Islam and Christianity they referred to the first 
pillar of Pancasila, namely Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Belief in One Divine 
Lordship). Whereas Muslim participants perceived the concept ‘One Divine 
Lordship’ as similar to tawhid (monotheism) in Islam, Christian participants 
adjusted it to include the concept of Christ. Thus Christians and Muslims refer 
to the first pillar of Pancasila in quite different ways.
In general Christian participants drew on a mental model of Christianity as a 
religion of “love” (kasih), while Muslim participants generated a mental model 
of Islam as a religion of “peace” (salam). By saying “In Islam, we have a con­
cept of rahmatan lil ‘alamin (a mercy to the world)”, the Muslim participant 
referred to the general narration found in the Qur’an, surah 21:107. But the 
reference in that Qur’anic verse is to the prophet Muhammad, not Islam. Thus 
in the mental model of Muslims Muhammad is equated with Islam. By stating, 
“The basic [teaching of Christianity] is love (kasih). Love your God with your 
heart totally and love the others as yourself’, the Christian participant referred 
to the narration about the teaching of love in Matthew 22:37-39.
Q ur’an, surah 21:107:
“And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the world.”
Bible, Matthew 22:37-39:
“And He replied to him, You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all 
your soul and with all your mind [intellect], This is the great [most important, principal] and 
first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbour as [you love] 
yourself’.
When a Christian participant said, “We believe in the salvation that is only 
through the Lord Jesus”, she drew on a mental model of salvation in Christian­
ity. We find the narration of such an interpretation in the Bible, John 14:6: “Je­
sus said to him, I am the Way and the Truth and the Life; no one comes to the 
Father except by [through] Me.”
When a Muslim participant mentioned that “...After prophet Isaiah there is a 
prophet Muhammad. Fle (Muhammad) is the last prophet”, he drew on a mental 
model in the Islamic faith that designates Muhammad the successor of Isaiah
and the last prophet. We fïnd this description in the Qur’an, surah 3:3: “He has 
sent down upon you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming what was 
before it. And He revealed the Torah and the Gospel”; also in Qur’an, surah 
33:40: “Muhammad is not the father of [any] one of your men, but [he is] the 
Messenger of Allah and last of the prophets...”.
When describing the prohibition of mixing different faiths a participant 
referred to a similar narration in Arabic that we find in the Qur’an, surah 109:6. 
It is “lakum dinukum wa liyadin” (to you be your religion, and to me my relig­
ion). When talking about the “same origin” of Christians and Muslims as de- 
scendants of Adam and Eve a Christian participant said that God created Adam 
and Eve. He was inspired by the concept of human creation in Christianity and 
Judaism, which we find in the Bible, Genesis 4:1: “And Adam knew Eve as his 
wife, and she became pregnant and bore Cain; and she said, I have gotten and 
gained a man with the help of the Lord.”
An elderly Muslim woman, an NU activist, referred to the aforementioned 
three kinds of brotherhood in Islam: the brotherhoods of humanity (ukhuwah 
bashariah), the nation (ukhuwah wathaniyah) and Islam (ukhuwah Islamiyah). 
Here she drew on a popular teaching in NU. It was first popularized by K.H. 
Ahmad Shiddiq, the former Rais ‘Aam (general leader) of the central body of 
NU in a speech at the Muktamar (Ulama conference) in Krapyak Yogyakarta in 
1989.492 The teaching of three brotherhoods is also written in the NU organiza- 
tional guide book, Aswaja.
When pointing out that Pentecostals in Surakarta took new congregants 
from other churches a participant drew on a common perception of the Chris­
tian community’s several mega-churches in Surakarta and its surroundings. 
One of them is the Indonesian Bethel Church of God’s Family (Gereja Bethel 
Indonesia Keluarga ^//a/z/GBIKA). It openly propagates a vision of one mil- 
lion saved souls in its books, pamphlets, television and radio broadcasts and on 
its website, as on the following banner.
. . . v - v :-w■ \i-wjagsssasm
Figure 9: Banner o f  the GBIKAWK?/ \ïErtËy ‘^j F t 1 .w W rail
‘Let ’s pray fo r  the vision o f 1
ü ï  i i f ?  i 
■* jf' 1 T j i*,1 r-*(*f Hr» 11i million saved souls ’(  (Source: www.gbika.org)493
492 M. Eksan (2000: 90) writes that a cleric from East Java who was also the former Rais ‘Aam 
o f the Central Body o f NU, K.H. Akhmad Shiddiq, one day spoke about the concept o f ukhuwah 
(brotherhood). According to him, there are three types o f ukhuwah: ukhuwah Islamiyah (the 
brotherhood o f Islam), ukhuwah wathaniyah (the brotherhood of the nation), and ukhuwah 
basyariyah (the brotherhood of humanity).
493 http://www.gbika.org/about_familyofgod.php accessed on October 18, 2012.
When a Muslim participant described religious pluralism as dangerous and a 
source of disaster for the “aqida” (faith) he drew on current general discourse 
which positions religious pluralism as “haram” (prohibited). The discourse on 
religious pluralism among Muslims has taken the form of a lively public debate 
in Indonesia. In 2005 MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) published a fatwa pro- 
hibiting the ideologies of pluralism, secularism and liberalism. The MUI said 
that the concept of religious pluralism is ‘incorrect and misleading’.
By describing Muhammadiyah as “puritan” and “hard” in its dealings with 
Christians the participant, a Muhammadiyah activist, referred to one of the 
perceptions of Muhammadiyah in society. For example, in 1995 Alwi Shihab, 
an Indonesian scholar, wrote a doctoral dissertation at Temple University in the 
USA entitled “The Muhammadiyah movement and its controversy with Chris­
tian mission in Indonesia”. It was translated into Indonesian in 1998.494 It de­
scribed Muhammadiyah as a movement to block the penetration of Christian 
mission in Indonesia.
When saying “brother/sister of the same faith” (saudara seimari) a Christian 
participant was using language that is commonly used in the Christian commu- 
nity. For instance, a brochure, “Sunday school for youth” (SMR) of the Mana- 
han Javanese Christian Church (GKJ Manahan) in Solo, writes that the SMR of 
the GKJ is one way to help youth to grow up and keep in touch with their 
brothers/sisters of the same faith (saudara-saudara seiman).495 The term is also 
commonly used by Pentecostal churches such as the GBIKA, to which the 
speaker is affiliated.4%
A Christian participant referred to a current development in some Muslim 
communities, which prohibits wishing Christians merry Christmas at Christmas 
time. The discourse on whether Muslims are permitted to say merry Christmas 
is a vigorous debate in Indonesia, including Surakarta. For instance, a book 
published by a Muslim publisher entitled “Hari-Hari Nasrani” (the Christian 
days) mentions that greetings of merry Christmas and happy New Year (or 
other seasonal days of infidels) is “haram” (prohibited), because indirectly, by 
doing that, “we recognize their submission to the cross”.497
The issue of Christmas greetings by Muslims is also a lively debate among 
Muslim clerics and scholars in Indonesian public discourse. In 1981 the Indo­
nesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a decree (fatwa) for Muslims prohibiting 
participation in Christmas celebrations and Christmas greetings. On the other 
hand, a Muslim scholar based in Solo, H.M. Dian Nafi, wrote a popular article
494 Shihab, A. (1998). Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah terhadap 
Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia. Bandung: Mizan.
495 http://www.gkjmanahan.org/content/weekend-sekolah-minggu-remaja, accessed October 15, 
2011.
496 http://www.gbika.org/, accessed October 15, 2011.
497 Al-Ghamidhi, 1995, p. 33.
in Solopos (23 December1998) on the “law of saying merry Christmas”, which 
to some extent permits it. The issue whether Muslims are permitted or prohib- 
ited to say merry Christmas always resurfaces in public discourse, especially 
when Christmas day approaches. The speaker was possibly inspired by that 
general discourse in society.
The participants referred to the Javanese worldview in Javanese. For in­
stance, when talking about the “same goal” of Christians and Muslims the par­
ticipant used a Javanese expression: “ingkang dipun gayuh sami ” (what will be 
reached is the same). That is comparable with the Javanese value of sangkan 
paraning dumadi (the goal of the existence of life), which is popular in Java. 
Here the speaker preferred to use the Javanese language to express a specifïc 
Javanese idea, which might not be rendered accurately in bahasci Indonesia.
When a Muslim woman described two classifïcations of religion in Islam, 
the religion of heaven and the religion of earth, she drew on a general teaching 
in Islam. This teaching is popular among Muslims and is taught in schools or 
madrasah. For example, the national curriculum of the Pendidikan Agama 
Islam (Islamic Education) for the second year at junior high school (SMP) 
deals with this classification.
The participants generated a mental model of the culture of Java, implying 
that it is “extraordinary”, “elastic” and “flexible”. They also drew on the dis- 
tinction between abangan (nominal) and santri (pious) Muslims. A participant 
referred to history when she observed, “Formerly, Islam was only one stream... 
our life was so peaceful.”
Some participants referred to general discourses that are spreading in soci­
ety at large. For instance, a Christian participant mentioned, “There are [Mus­
lims] who consider us [Christians] kafir... [They] refuse to communicate or to 
engage in relations [with us].” A Muslim participant referred to a Muslim 
group in society by saying “There is a group [in Islam] which says that those 
who have different ways of worship [though he/she is Muslim] ... are called 
kafir.”
The participants referred to their daily observation of religious practice in 
society when they talked about fanatical Muslims wearing “calf-length pants” 
(men) and “large jilbab” (women). Those Muslim and Christian “puritans” 
sometimes experience tensions among themselves. A Christian participant also 
drew on his observations when he said that the liturgy of Pentecostal churches 
is noisy.
They referred to the development of religious groups in Solo when talking 
about new “streams” in Islam and Christianity, including the megachurches. 
They also referred to a general occurrence in the society when they talked 
about “abangan” who practise “sesajen”. With reference to ziarah to the graves 
of ancestors, a Muslim female worker commented: “Those neglecting ziarah,
they will usually forget the destination of life.”498 When I asked, “Do people 
practise ziarah to the grave of the ancestors especially during the month of 
ruwah [the month before Ramadan in the Javanese calendar]?”,499 a Christian 
participant in that group replied, “Commonly all old people practise nyadran 
[ziarah in the month of ruwah], but only some youths practise that ritual.”500
2.3 Arsalysis at mroacro level
At macro level the participants referred to social change in Indonesia before 
and after the Indonesian Reformasi in 1998. The phrase “after Reformasi”, 
“since Reformasi” and “nowadays” referred to the political and social situation 
in the post-New Order era when Pancasila ideas declined while those of mili­
tant Muslims and Christians intensified.
When talking about Indonesia’s respect for religious freedom a participant 
referred to Pancasila. He said, “This is a Pancasila [country].” As mentioned 
repeatedly in previous chapters, Pancasila consists of five pillars which are 
written in the preamble to the constitution of 1945. The first pillar, Belief in 
One Divine Lordship, literally implies monotheism. There is no direct relation 
between religious freedom and Pancasila. The concept of religious freedom is 
not mentioned in Pancasila. The Constitution of 1945, article 28.1 speaks about 
“freedom of religion” (hak beragama) and article 28.E says, “Every person 
shall be free to choose and to practise the religion of his/her choice” (Setiap 
orang bebas memeluk agama dan beribadat menurut agamanya).
By saying “If we were a broom made of such splintered ribs, Pancasila is 
the string”, a young male participant drew on a popular metaphor about in ba- 
hasa Indonesia. In bahasa Indonesia the broom is a metaphor for the Indone­
sian national motto “Bersatu kita teguh, bercerai kita runtuh” (United we stand, 
divided we fall).
A participant referred to a social transformation that happened in Indonesian 
society as a whole and in Surakarta in particular, namely the awakening of 
religious and ethnic identities after Reformasi. He said that the religious aware- 
ness of Indonesians generally increased and that currently Javanese culture was 
getting stronger. It relates to earlier statements by other participants about mili­
tant Islam and Christianity gaining strength and a decline in nationalism after 
Reformasi.
Conceming the awakening ethnicity, the participant spoke about people’s 
desire to leam the Javanese language, for instance in order to act as masters of 
ceremony (MC) in Javanese. That speaker referred to the development of soci­
498 Orang yang melupakan ziarah, dia biasanya akan lupa ke mana tujuan hidupnya.
4,9 Apakah orang-orang melakukan ziarah ke kuburan leluhur, khususnya pada bukan ruwah?
500 Pada umumnya semua orang tua melakukan nyadran, tapi hanya sebagian anak tnuda yang 
melakukan ritual itu.
ety in Solo. For instance, the newspaper Suara Merdeka (12 April 2003) re- 
ported that the number of participants in the Sanggar Pasinaon Pambiwara 
(course for Javanese MCs) at Surakarta palace in the past was only about 60- 
80, but the number of applicants increased and since 2003 there have been 
more than 150 students per course.301 So the discourse in that FGD tied in with 
a broader discourse in society.
In describing that there were no conflicts between Christians and Muslims 
in Solo a Muslim participant, a journalist for Solopos, referred to the history of 
Solo and the study of conflicts by Mr Darmono. Mr Darmono is the nickname 
of Drs Soedarmono, S.U. (lecturer in the Department of Historical Science, 
University of Sebelas Maret, Surakarta). In 1999 Soedarmono and his col- 
league, M. Hari Mulyadi, published a book, Runtuhnya Kekuasaan Kraton Alit: 
Studi Radikalisasi Sosial Wong Sala dan Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Surakarta 
(The collapse of the little palace power: study of social radicalization of So- 
lonese and the 1998 May riots in Surakarta).
Soedarmono quite often explained his study of the Solo riots in seminars 
and the mass media. For instance, Solopos (1 June 2008) reported his explana­
tion of the riots in Solo. He said events of 14-15 May 1998 were the eleventh 
riot in Solo since the Dutch colonial period. All those riots were caused by 
racial issues or by animosity between locals (pribumi) and non-locals (non- 
pribumi).502
Figure 10: 
‘Javanese 
village!! Pro 
Amien 
Rais’,503 
a graffiti above 
a village gate 
in Surakarta 
(Source: Team 
Solopos 2008)
501 According to Suara Merdeka newspaper, 12 April 2003.
502 Solopos, 1 June 2008, “The style o f leadership must be changed.”
503 Amien Rais is a Muslim leader bom  in Solo. He was the Indonesian head of Muhammadiyah 
for the period 1995-2000.
Some participants drew on memory when talking about the 1998 Solo riots. 
The Christian professionals remembered that people wrote graffiti (“Muslim”, 
“Java” and “Muslim-Java”) in front of their houses and in villages. The follow- 
ing picture shows such graffiti.
In reaction to the foregoing statement I asked, “So it (the 1998 Solo riot) 
was an ethnic and religious conflict?”504 A Christian professional in that FDG 
replied that it was not a religious but an ethnic conflict. He argued thus: “There 
was no vihara destroyed, there was no church destroyed... there was no house 
of worship destroyed.” Another participant, a Muslim, corroborated the Chris- 
tian’s utterance: “I believe that the economy is the main motive. Because of the 
economic distribution issue, the problem of access to economic power. Why do 
the Chinese develop their businesses easily while non-Chinese do not? ... Then 
the ethnic Chinese were finally eradicated [in the 1998 Solo riot].”
When a participant mentioned that he happened to get involved in the 1980 
riots he was remembering his involvement in those riots. The statement that the 
Chinese have no difficulty developing their businesses, while non-Chinese do 
drew on a mental model: a Javanese inferiority complex stored in the speaker’s 
memory.
Some Christian participants drew on collective memories when talking 
about the difficulty Christians have when they want to build a church or house 
of worship. A Christian participant said, “[We] want to build a church, [but] it 
is extremely difficult.” Describing the building of a mosque as apparently un- 
problematic, the speaker pointed out that the church must obtain permission 
from the state -  entailing a lengthy process. When citing the example of Kota 
Barat the speaker referred to an event in society. Thus they drew on community 
experience of discrimination. The sense of being discriminated against is a 
mental model.
When talking about the emergence of jihad movements the participants 
painted a problematic picture of “jihad” practices in society (mental model). 
Some participants referred to the jihadist attacks on alcohol drinkers and gam- 
blers in Solo. A Christian participant referred to a fight between the jihad  group 
and villagers in his village. The participant also mentioned an attack by the 
jihad  group on the “red district” in Solo. Responding to the utterances of male 
workers about the examples of jihad  attacks on those places, I asked, “Were 
those attacks old or new things?”505 One of the participants replied, “Those 
were new things, that happened around 2000.”506
Talking about the church’s social services, some participants referred to the 
cheap food programme of the GKJ (Javanese Christian Church). It is a service
504 Jadi, itu adalah konflik etnik dan agama?
Kapan peristiwa-peristiwa itu terjadi, baru at au lama?
Hak itu baru, kira-kira setelah tahun 2000an.
for poor people, mostly Muslims who are fasting. The following picture shows 
people joining that service.
Figure 11: Cheap foodpro- 
gramme during 
the month o f  Ramadan in the 
GKJ Manahan, Surakarta 
(Source: Antara news office 
2009)
A Christian participant, an active member of the GKJ Manahan, remembered 
that the jihad groups protested against the cheap food programme. The police 
asked the church to close down the programme. The speaker played a promi­
nent role in the process of advocacy. The Indonesian mass media proved that it 
really occurred. For instance, detiknews.com (28 August 2009), a leading In­
donesian online news medium, reported a meeting between the police, the par­
ticipant and his colleagues as GKJ representatives. The title of the report was: 
“The cheap food programme for the fast breaking in the GKJ Solo has been 
closed by the police.”507
When saying that if people of Jakarta would not bother [people of] Solo, if 
they would leave them alone, Solo would be peaceful, the speaker cited earlier 
drew on general discourse among locals in Solo. For an example of such dis­
course we take an article in Solopos (18 December 1998) under the headline, 
“The Solo riots were caused by the Jakarta elite conflict.”508 It was a report on 
the conclusion to a seminar about the social radicalism of Solo people in his- 
torical perspective, held in Solo on 17 December 1998.
The phrase “short fuse” (sumbu pendek) is also used by people outside the 
FGDs. In a seminar held in the studio of the Radio Republic Indonesia Sura­
karta, Anung Indro Susanto, an official of Solo city, explained that “the slogan 
of Solo as the spirit of Java is an advertisement made by the local government
507 http://us.detiknews.eom/read/2009/08/28/202438/l 191890/10/program-nasi-murah-buka- 
puasa-di-gkj-solo-dihentikan-polisi, accessed October 22, 2011.
508 Kerusuhan Solo karena konflik elit di Jakarta.
to promote the culture of Java and to eliminate the image that Solo [region and 
society] has a short fuse [is very explosive]”.509
3 Explanation
The stage of explanation or the analysis of social practice deals with the socio- 
cognitive conditions and effects of texts. The aim is to trace explanatory con- 
nections between text and context. The analytical concepts used in this stage 
are ideology (Foucault 1977) and hegemony (Gramsci 1971). For Fairclough 
discursive practices are ideologically loaded insofar as they absorb significa- 
tions which support or restructure power relations. The theory of hegemony 
concerns change in relation to the evolution o f power, entailing a particular 
focus on discursive change, but is also a means of viewing it as both contribut- 
ing to and being shaped by broader processes of change. When participants 
draw on mental models these models are either reproduced or transformed 
(Fairclough 2001: 158-161). In this chapter we look at ideational and relational 
transformations, particularly as regards subject positions or social identities. 
The question is: what are the socio-cognitive conditions and effects of what 
Muslims and Christians said?
3.1 Arsalysis at micro leve!
When talking to each other Muslim participants mainly identified Christians as 
“good” persons. while Christian participants primarily identified Muslims as 
“democratie”. A Christian participant reproduced an image of her Muslim rela- 
tives as very democratie and respectful of human values.
In family life participants constituted and were constituted by different cul­
tures and religions. Some Muslims and Christians become “democratie”, others 
become “fanatical”. Most participants identified families with diverse religious 
membership as normal and ordinary “nowadays”. But since religious militancy 
is also increasing, some family members may be “fanatics”. This creates dis- 
unity in the family. For instance, a Christian participant spoke about her fanati­
cal Muslim relative who refused to attend a church wedding ceremony for her 
daughter.
Two participants in different FGDs identified themselves as coming from a 
Pancasila family consisting of members of different religions. Many more par­
ticipants identified themselves as having relatives with “diverse” (beragam)
509 Slogan Solo the spirit o f  Java merupakan branding Pemkot Solo untuk mempromosikan 
budaya dan mengeliminasi kesan Solo sebagai sumbu pendek, as reported by http://mediakebera- 
gaman.com/faktor-politik-dan-industrialisasi-picu-kekerasan-di-solo.php 1 April 2010, accessed 
October 20, 2011.
religions. By saying “nowadays [the family] is already quite progressive (cukup 
maju)... people do not really have problems with a family with diverse relig­
ions”, the participant identified the effect of “progressiveness” as acceptance of 
religious diversity at the family level.
Only one person explicitly identified mono-religious families as “fortunate”. 
She saw the fact that she and all her relatives were bom Muslim as something 
to be grateful for, saying that being bom into such a mono-religious family was 
occasion for alkhamdulillah (thanks be to God). Indeed, she identified herself 
as a tolerant person, who appreciates diversity and is close to Javanese culture. 
This shows that she wanted to be a faithful Muslim and at the same time toler­
ant of non-Muslims, thus without being relativist.
At a personal level most participants positioned themselves clearly as either 
Muslim or Christian. They identified themselves as pious or devout Christians 
and Muslims. In Islamic terms they are santri.
However, several participants positioned themselves and their relatives as 
combining (mixing) religion and indigenous beliefs. For instance, a Muslim 
participant identified himself thus: “I am kejawen, my ID is Islam.” A Christian 
participant identified his parents as Hindus and followers of indigenous belief.
In identifying their and their relatives’ religion some participants saw them­
selves as constituted as Muslims or Christians by education and state policy. “I 
[became Christian] because of education. My kindergarten and elementary 
school were Christian,” said a young Christian woman. Thus a Christian insti­
tution was hegemonie in her personal life. Another participant said, “My father 
was a follower of [indigenous] belief. Finally, in a certain year, [he] had to 
choose one of the religions [which is recognized by the state].” This text refers 
to state policy on religions.
Muslim participants positioned Christians as friends, and the other way 
round. An elderly Christian participant positioned young Muslims in his village 
with whom he cooperated in social services as friends. A Muslim participant 
positioned Christian or Catholic students with whom he had inter-faith group 
discussions at university as friends. A young Muslim woman positioned her 
special Christian friend as her boyfriend.
At micro level Christian and Muslims participants also positioned each 
other as neighbours. An elderly Christian female positioned a Muslim in her 
area who invites her to a khenduri (slametan, prayers) as her neighbour.
However, the words “friend” and “neighbour” sometimes convey extreme 
politeness. An elderly Muslim participant positioned a new Christian convert in 
her vicinity as a neighbour. A Javanese Muslim participant positioned the vic- 
tims of the 1998 Solo riots who had a Chinese ethnic background as friends. To 
some extent the terms “friend” and “neighbour” is a gracious way to identify 
the others.
The participants testified that relations between Muslims and Christians are 
primarily good. One participant used the adjective “extraordinary”. The par­
ticipants constituted and were constituted by the concept of tolerance, which is 
conducive to friendly relations in the family and neighbourhood. Tolerant Mus­
lims were mostly identified by Christians as ones who are willing to extend 
Christmas greetings to Christian relatives and friends. By contrast, fanatical, 
militant, puritan and extreme Muslims were identified as ones who consider 
Christmas greetings “haram”. Tolerant Christians were identified by Muslims 
as ones who appreciate Muslim rituals and do not engage in Christianization.
Some participants said that they organize gatherings either on Islamic feast 
days such as Idul Fitri (lebaran, halal bi halal) or on Christian feast days such 
as Christmas. On such occasions they invite all family members to gather, irre- 
spective of their religion. While the Christian or Muslim relatives are attending 
the ceremony or ritual in the church or mosque, the others prepare food for 
them at home. In family life the participants reproduced a mingled relationship.
In neighbourhood life some participants reproduced an image of khenduri 
(slametan), an inclusive ritual. It is held by and for a particular group of reli­
gious people (Muslim or Christian), but close neighbours from different relig­
ions are invited. School and university are reproduced as spaces where youths 
experience and discuss diversity.
There was a peripheral discourse in which Christian participants positioned 
Muslims as fanatics, and the other way around. A Muslim identified new Chris­
tian converts as “too fanatical” about their new religion, whereas a Christian 
identified Muslims who refuse to attend the church wedding of a relative as 
fanatical.
The participants identified fanatical Christians as ones who refuse to coop­
erate with Muslims. Similarly, fanatical Muslims refuse to associate with peo­
ple of a different religion. The participants recognize fanatical Muslims (not 
fanatical Christians) by their style of dress. They positioned Muslims wearing 
ealf-length pants (men) or large jilbab (veils) (women) as “fanatical” Muslims.
3.2 AraalysSs a t mes© fieveS
At meso level, Christian and Muslim participants primarily positioned Islam 
and Christianity as basically similar in three respects. First, originally Islam 
and Christianity come from God. In Muslim terminology both Islam and Chris­
tianity are “religions of heaven” (agama samawi). Second, both religions focus 
on God. Thus the participants reproduced an image of Christianity and Islam as 
theistic religions. Some participants reproduced an image of Christians and 
Muslims focusing on the one (same) God and ending up in the one (same) 
paradise. Third, the purpose of both Islam and Christianity is good and they 
have the same human values. In Christian terms Christianity promotes “love”
(kasih), while in Muslim terms Islam promotes “peace” (salam) and “mercy” 
(rahmat). Thus the participants reproduced an image of Islam as a religion of 
peace and Christianity as a religion of love.
Some participants constituted and were constituted by Javanese indigenous 
philosophy in expressing their religious view (ideology). For instance, with 
reference to the similar goal of Christians and Muslims a participant used the 
Javanese idiom” “ingkang dipun gayuh sami” (what will be reached is the 
same).
The participants distinguished the “goal” (tujuan) from the “way” (cara) of 
religion. By way of example they pointed out that the goal of Muslim and 
Christian worship is the same, namely to praise God, but their ways of worship 
differ. Thus the difference is located in the way of communicating with God.
The participants also constituted and were constituted by a classification of 
brotherhoods. The categories “brotherhood of humanity” (ukhuwah bashariah) 
and “brotherhood of nation” (ukhuwah wathaniyah) in Muslim terms include 
Christians and Muslims as brothers/sisters. The category “brothers/sisters of a 
different faith” in Christian terms includes Muslims and Christians as broth­
ers/sisters.
However, the category “brotherhood of Islam” (ukhuwah Islamiyah) in 
Muslim terms excludes Christians. The category “brothers/sisters of the same 
faith” in Christian terms excludes Muslims. Thus the participants reproduced 
ambiguity in their classification.
Furthermore, some participants reproduced rigid segregation between Mus­
lims and Christians. A Christian participant identified salvation as accessible 
only through the Lord Jesus. A Muslim participant reproduced non-Muslims as 
kafir. Thus they positioned both Islam and Christianity as exclusive religions.
Some participants identified religious exclusion nowadays as a phenomenon 
not only between but also within religious groups. A Muslim participant identi­
fied militant Muslims who perceived other Muslims outside their group as 
kafir. A Christian participant also identified charismatic groups who regard 
other Christians as people who have not repented yet.
Only Muslim participants reproduced a fear of mixing religious practices, 
which they identified as religious “pluralism”. The dominant voice is: practise 
your own religion. Mixing the faith and teachings of Islam and Christianity is 
dangerous and a source of disaster for the aqida (faith). None of the Christian 
participants reproduced that kind of fear.
Christian participants said it was difficult to adjust their faith in the trinity to 
the first pillar of Pancasila, that is Belief in One Divine Lordship (Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa). A Christian participant positioned the Christian faith as fo- 
cused not on the one God, but on Christ.
Christians and Muslims primarily positioned “abangan” Islam or Christian­
ity at a lower level of religion (power relation). A Christian participant distin-
guished “abangan” Christians from “strong” Christians. A Muslim participant 
distinguished between abangan and santri Muslims. Abangan Christians still 
practice “sesajen”, while abangan Muslims are “only Islam KTP”.
Participants primarily positioned Javanese culture as elastic and flexible. 
They identified it as historically underlying diverse religions such as Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. The early missionaries of those religions did 
not eliminate the culture of Java. In those days Islam and other religions coex- 
isted peacefully.
In regard to accommodation of Javanese culture, they reproduced an evalua- 
tion of Muslim and Christian institutions. Participants positioned NU as the 
most accommodating towards Javanese culture. By contrast the laskars and the 
jihad  groups were positioned as least accommodating (“purification”). “They 
sometimes create tensions,” said a participant. Muhammadiyah was positioned 
in the middle.
Comparably, Javanese Protestant and Catholic churches were positioned as 
most accommodating towards Javanese culture. Pentecostal churches, on the 
other hand, were positioned as least accommodating. Christian participants 
identified the theology of those Pentecostal churches as focusing on success 
and prosperity. In general participants positioned religious purification as creat- 
ing “tensions”.
Thus participants identified churches that are accommodating towards Java­
nese culture as peaceful religious institutions. That is why Muslim participants 
advocate the ideal form of religiosity for Javanese as “Muslim-Java” rather 
than “puritan” Islam or “kejawen”.510 The dominant voice is: “I am Muslim 
[and] at the same time Javanese” and “I practise Islam, I also practise the val­
ues of Java.” As mentioned previously, this position is also applicable to Java­
nese Christians.
Some participants distinguished clearly between their personal and institu- 
tional positions. A Muslim male, an activist in Muhammadiyah, reproduced an 
image of Muhammadiyah as puritan, but added: “I am more open.” A young 
female participant positioned herself by saying “I am Muslim, but [I] don’t 
wear jilbab (veil).”
3.3 Analyses a i m acro level
At macro level most participants reproduced an image of Indonesia as a Pan­
casila country where the principle of religious freedom is respected. By using a 
popular metaphor of Pancasila as a “string of splintered ribs” a participant con­
stituted and was constituted by the Indonesian nationalist idea of unity in diver­
sity. Participants identified Indonesians as a tolerant nation which accommo- 
dates religious diversity in society. They positioned Pancasila as encouraging
510 See: the three Muslim positions in section 2.2 above.
tolerance and respect for religious freedom. However, Christian community 
which adheres to the theology of success or prosperity lacks a political sense of 
being Indonesian citizens (social effects).
Relations between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia and in Solo are 
identified as good. Christians and Muslims live side by side in harmony. They 
engage in mutual cooperation during religious holidays and help each other in 
everyday life. Muslims and Christians also cooperate in social services.
Christian and Muslim participants identified the Reformasi of 1998 as a 
milestone in Indonesian social and political life. However, the Reformasi era 
reveals an ambiguity. On the one hand participants identified the Indonesian 
situation as more democratie and progressive. For instance, “After Reformasi 
up to today those Chinese brothers/sisters have become aware of that [they 
socialize].”
On the other hand they identified “'jihad” groups, which accentuate “vio­
lence”. The participants witnessed and spoke about acts of violence such as 
groups attacking alcohol drinkers, gamblers, prostitutes in the “red district”, 
purging villages of people who, according to them, were disobedient or un- 
faithful. These groups also protested against and stopped a Christian social 
service (the fast-breaking programme) for Muslims during Ramadan, which 
they perceived as Christianization.
A male Christian participant identified a counter attack (fight) from the 
villagers when the jihad  groups purged the participant’s village. Some partici­
pants positioned jihad  groups as associations of “gangsters” rather than “be­
lievers” (orang beriman). They claimed that the problems do not come from 
believers but from and among the gangsters. They identified two issues. First, 
religious groups should not use violence. Acts of violence are close to the way 
of gangsters. Second, some jihad  group members were former gang members.
Some participants explained that the emergence of jihad  groups after Re­
formasi went hand in hand with the awakening of religious awareness (identity) 
and religious militancy. It happens not only in the Muslim community but also 
in the Christian community. In the Christian community they not only invite 
Muslims to become Christians, but also snatch their congregants from other 
Christian churches.
The participants identified the direction for peaceful Muslim-Christian rela­
tions to lie in the local culture. The direction of militant Islam and Christianity 
comes from abroad. Militant Islam refers to “Middle Eastem” Islam, while 
militant Christianity refers to “America” or “Korea”.
Some participants identified the awakening of Javanese culture after Refor­
masi. They cited evidence of the strengthening of Javanese culture. A partici­
pant explained that Javanese culture provides new symbols for Solo people. 
But they reproduced the awakening of Javanese culture as less powerfïil than 
the religious awakening. The participants positioned the awakening of religion
and culture as a response to globalization, prompted by fear. They explained 
that this is the only way to control people.
In identifying her grandmother, an affiliate of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI), as “very abangan” a participant reproduced a New Order doctrine 
defining PKI as a political party with an atheistic orientation. The New Order 
govemment reproduced that discourse in school curricula and courses, a film 
on the PKI broadcast on 30 September each year, the banning of Communism, 
Marxism and Leninism, et cetera.
Christian participants identified discrimination against Christians which still 
continues after Reformasi. They testified that Christians face difficulties in 
building churches, for example in Banyuanyar and Kotabarat. By contrast, it is 
easy for Muslims to build a mosque. The Muslim participants did not deny that 
there are objections from Muslims when Christians want to build church in a 
predominantly Muslim area, because Muslims object to Christianization in 
their area. Thus Muslim and Christian participants disagreed on this issue.
Some participants said that people used “swearwords” and graffiti such as 
“Muslim”, “Java” and “Muslim-Java” during the 1998 Solo riots, but they re- 
fused to identify those riots as interreligious conflicts. A participant explained 
that there was no destruction of houses of worship (vihara, mosque, church) 
during the riots. Indeed, those houses of worship are “symbols of religion”. 
Some participants indicated that people used religious and ethnic texts like 
Muslim, Java and Muslim-Java to avoid victimization during the riots.
Both Christian and Muslim participants identified the Solo riots in 1980 and 
1998 as primarily motivated by social, economie and political grievances. 
Some participants positioned them as inter-ethnic conflicts. A participant ex­
plained that religious elements and words were used in the riots, but they were 
“just attached”. The main trigger was economic.
They positioned the actors and provocateurs of the 1998 Solo riots as out­
siders or “people of Jakarta”. In speaking about militant and jihad groups they 
also rejected the statement that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is from Solo; instead they 
said he is from Sukoharjo. The firm refusal to attribute the riots to interrelig­
ious conflict and to insiders in Solo reveals a strong desire to maintain religious 
harmony and avoid conflict.
4  CoBDclysDora
In this study we use the method of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992) 
to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse and social cohe- 
sion. We distinguish between the dimensions of individual believers (micro 
level), their (full or partial) identification with their religions or religious insti- 
tutions (meso level), and the societal context in which these religions or reli-
gious institutions operate (macro level). When speaking to each other at the 
micro, meso and macro levels our research participants produced rich identity 
labels, which were also related to concrete behaviour. We draw conclusions 
about the classifications (description), cognitions or mental models that are 
drawn on (interpretation) and the social condition and effects (explanation).
In general Muslims and Christians consider people of Solo to be “elastic”. 
They identified others and themselves as faithful believers who are tolerant (of 
others) but not relativistic (in their own religion). The utterance “thanks be to 
God” is used by both sides. Whereas Jesus is classified as the “only saviour”, 
Muhammad is the “last prophet”. They made a distinction between tolerance 
and pluralism. Muslims and Christians classified religious fanatics as crazy, 
abnormal people from “outside” or newcomers. Whereas they classified Java­
nese culture and people as “extraordinary”, Chinese are classified as arrogant.
In regard to mental models, Christians and Muslims perceived Christianity 
as a religion of “love” (kasih), while Islam is a religion of “peace” (salam) and 
“mercy” (rahmat) for the world. Whereas they see an overlap of identity (as in 
the case of the mental model of brotherhoods) between Muslims and Chris­
tians, they subscribe to “to you be your religion, to me my religion”. Javanese 
culture embodies not only greatness of vision but also a sophisticated world- 
view, expressible only in the Javanese language, for instance the concept of 
“slametan” or the saying, “ingkang dipun gayuh sami” (what will be reached is 
the same). Thus Javanese culture offers opportunities for managing religious 
diversity. Pancasila is perceived by participants as advocating interreligious 
tolerance and respecting religious freedom.
In regard to social effects Christians and Muslims positioned Javanese Islam 
and Javanese Christianity as conducive to peaceful life, whereas non-Javanese 
churches and Islamic institutions stimulate conflict. Thus the ideal religions are 
Javanese Islam and Javanese Christianity. However, they positioned pluralism 
as dangerous, which accords with the prohibition of mixing religious teachings. 
This is quite strong on the Muslim side, but less so on the Christian side. Our 
research participants positioned conflicts and riots in society as primarily 
caused by people from “outside Solo” -  a social mechanism to maintain har­
mony and avoid conflict among them. Most Muslims and Christians positioned 
Indonesia as a Pancasila country.
Chapter ¥  
"Pe®ple ©ff S©0© are quite elastic" 
C©nclysi©ns aond di$cussi©n
In Solo Muslims and Christians mingle in daily life. Some families comprise 
members of diverse religions such as Islam and Christianity. A participant said, 
“People of Solo are quite elastic [and] flexible.” However, as noted in previous 
chapters, Muslims and Christians in Surakarta also experience religious ten- 
sions. The emergence of extreme groups in both Muslim and Christian com- 
munities, who elevate their religious identity above other (e.g. ethnic, national) 
identities, has marked religious transformation in Surakarta for over a decade. 
In this thesis I study social identity transformations through interreligious, par- 
ticularly Muslim-Christian, relations in the post-Reformasi era in Indonesia. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the aim is to answer two main questions. First, 
how do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others? 
Second, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and position- 
ing?
As a background to these questions I quote scholars who argue that religion 
has not died on our modem globe as secularization theory might suggest. The 
21 st century is God’s century (Toft et al. 2011). In addition Peter Berger (1999: 
2), a sociologist who had been one of the main advocates of the secularization 
theory declares that this theory is false: ‘The world today with some exceptions 
...is furiously religious, as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.’ 
In the Indonesian context we see the resurgence of religious identity in public 
space after the Reformasi of 1998. Whereas Indonesia has a long tradition of 
peaceful coexistence, it also has a long history of ethnic and/ or religious vio­
lence and conflict (Bertrand 2004; Klinken 2007; Lire 2011). Scholars record a 
series of violent collisions in diverse regions of the country before the collapse 
of Soeharto’s political regime in 1998 and in the ensuing Reformasi era.511
This research seeks to determine whether the rhetoric about the return of 
religion into the public arena is an appropriate way to speak about the trans­
formations taking place in Indonesia, and if so, why and under what conditions 
people elevate religious identity above other (ethnic/ national) identities. The 
New Order regime tried to limit the manifestation of religious identities in the
511 In general Indonesian contemporary history is classified into three phases: Old Order era 
(1945-1967), New Order era (1967-1998), and Reformasi era (1998-now).
public sphere to safeguard national stability. Soeharto assumed that the emer- 
gence of religious identities in the public arena would lead to conflict and 
would create instability, which could hamper economic development (Dhaki- 
dae 2003; Latif 2008). For this reason Pancasila philosophy was invoked to 
manage diverse religious identities and reduce the potential for conflict.
In studying social identity transformations I examine how Muslims speak 
about Christians, and the other way around, and how Muslims and Christians 
speak to each other when they are together. In separate groups some partici­
pants used harsh language when speaking about the others. For instance, a 
Christian participant found the style of dress of “fanatical” Muslims “disgust- 
ing”, and a Christian participant quoted that (Muslim) terrorists deserve a “fuck 
[you]”. In Muslim groups the participants called Christianization a kind of 
“stealing”. A Muslim participant said that it is a latent danger, implying that 
Christianization is as dangerous as communism.512 This kind of language cre- 
ates divergence between Muslims and Christians. We do not fïnd the same 
language use in the mixed groups to the same extent. Pemberton writes that 
more than people of Yogyakarta, people of Surakarta are epitomes of halus- 
ness (refmement), in contrast with people of East Java who are epitomes of 
kasar-ness (harshness) (Pemberton 1994; Retsikas 2007: 970). In general our 
study confïrms Pemberton’s qualification of Surakarta people, but also suggests 
that the situation is changing.
In our FGDs we saw that the participants mostly speak Indonesian (bahasa 
Indonesia), but they sometimes switch to Javanese (basa Jawa) and then revert 
to Indonesian. Muslim participants sometimes use Arabic words or phrases. 
Thus they mix and blend languages. There is both code shifting and code mix- 
ing. It is no exception to hear participants using two or three languages in one 
utterance. Linguists speak about creole language as the language-in-between- 
languages (Cohen &Toninato 2010: 9). Young participants sometimes use 
slang. For instance, a Muslim participant used the words “ill feel” to refer to 
her female Muslim housemate wearing niqab while engaging in immoral be- 
haviour. The phrase “ill feel” here is Javanese-English slang, a creolization of 
“ilang feeling” (loss of feeling). Thus she used mocking language.
We dealt with religious identity transformation in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The 
main objectives of this research are the following. First, to gain insight into the 
relation between religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion (intemal 
objective). By doing so, second, we seelc to contribute to a theory and method
512 Regarding this metaphor, it is interesting to see M ujani’s survey. In his survey o f  democratie 
culture and Muslim political participation in the Indonesian post-Soeharto era he finds that an 
overwhelming majority (84%) object to having a communist as their neighbour. In addition 
smaller proportions objected to having Christian or Catholic (16%), Muslim (14%), Chinese 
(13%), or Hindu or Buddhist (12%) neighbours (Mujani 2003: 173).
of studying interreligious relations (extemal objective). In this chapter I present 
and discuss the conclusions of this book. I classify the conclusions in two sec- 
tions. The first concerns religious identity transformation and the second the 
contribution to the theory and method of studying interreligious relations.
1 Conclissions regard ing religieus id en tity  transform ation
In the introduction to this book I quote Giddens (1991: 54), who defines iden­
tity as a ‘narrative of the s e lf . I also refer to Burke (2009), who describes 
transformation in terms of conditions, processes and consequences of cultural 
contact. In talking about the link between the concept of transformation and the 
concept of identity and interaction Fairclough (2001: 31-32) cites an example 
from the school system (teacher-pupil relations). To a large extent the social 
system of the school determines the discourse, but in the process teachers and 
pupils either reproduce the school system unchanged or they transform it. He 
concludes that reproduction may further conservation or transformation of the 
existing order. In relation to identity transformation six points seem pertinent.
1 .H Keligious transform ation  in the  post- Reform asi era
The transformation of the political and economie fïelds (Suryo 2000: 166) that 
occurred in Indonesia in the late 1990s has contributed to transformation in 
religious field as well. The idea of freedom and liberalization, which is very 
much alive in the political arena, influences religious life in Indonesian society. 
The research participants identified religious transformations in the Reformasi 
era by comparing these with the New Order situation. They identified the Re­
formasi as an era of freedom (bebas, kebebasan), while -according to them- 
the New Order was an era of “pressure”. In the Reformasi era freedom was not 
only “opened” but also “broadened”.
Participants maintained that the govemment of the Reformasi era did not 
have as much authority as the govemment of the New Order era. The “weak- 
ness of the state” opens opportunities for extremist groups to perform acts of 
violence (kekerasan). Therefore participants said that freedom leads to vio­
lence. A Christian participant identified the emergence of radicalism in Christi­
anity after Reformasi, saying “the influence of freedom of expression enters the 
area of religion”. Ismatu Ropi (2008: 84) finds the same in one of his articles. 
Present-day Indonesia is like an ‘open free market for ideologies and move- 
ments’. He says that ‘everybody has freedom’, ‘everybody can express views 
freely’, and ‘even the hardliners posses certain rights to disseminate their 
views’. Our FGDs participants described a similar situation: nowadays “every- 
thing is free” and the extremists “can do whatever they want to.”
The influenee of the political arena on the religious arena in this study is 
reminiscent of Bourdieu’s view of society as a heterogeneous space composed 
of more or less autonomous ‘fields’ where actors or groups of actors try to 
serve their interests (make a ‘profit’, material or symbolic) by using various 
resources (forms of ‘capital’), in competition (exclusion) or collaboration (in- 
clusion) with others (Bourdieu 1990, 1991). In his theory of practice human 
society (‘social space’) is multidimensional, consisting of various more or less 
autonomous fields, in which ‘capital’ can be transferred from one field to an­
other (Bourdieu 1992: 7; Rey 2004: 332-3). The political field influences the 
religious field, and vice versa. Using Bourdieu’s terminology we can say that 
freedom is a ‘habitus’ in the Indonesian post-Reformasi era. The habitus pre- 
disposes the agent to perceive and behave in a certain fashion (Bourdieu 1997: 
22). As agents, Muslims and Christians in Indonesia constitute and are consti- 
tuted by the habitus of freedom. Besides insisting that Indonesia has more free­
dom, participants also claimed that the country has become more democratie.
There was an awakening of religion in society after the Reformasi era. This 
awakening is characterized by the emergence of extremist Muslim and militant 
Christian groups. As indicated in greater detail below, the ideas of those groups 
are said to be “new” and to come from “abroad”. This pattem was noted in all 
FGDs. Extremists and militants were described as taking advantage of the 
situation of freedom. In addition there was an awakening of ethnic, that is in­
digenous (Javanese cultural) identities (e.g. renewed study of Javanese lan­
guage), but not as strong as that of religious identities.
In this situation Christians positioned extremist Muslims as a challenge. 
They cited evidence that they were targets of violent actions by Muslim ex­
tremists, who attack Christian places of worship. In addition Christians were 
said to be discriminated against, as in the case of the requirement to have state 
permission to build a house of worship: which is implemented more rigorously 
for Christians than for Muslims. By contrast Muslim participants claimed that 
Christians threaten the political power of Muslims. Christians and Muslims 
talked about the vice mayor of Surakarta being a Catholic, but they did so in 
different ways. Throughout the FGDs we see a balancing of feelings of inferi- 
ority and superiority, being a minority or a majority. Christians (especially 
those from a Chinese ethnic background) seem to be economically superior but 
a religious minority. Muslims are a religious majority and politically superior, 
but are seen as economically inferior.
There is a link between power interests and attempts to control discourse. 
Discourse relations can thus be portrayed as power relations, which means that 
the term ‘discourse’ pertains not only to the framework of meaning but also to 
instruments of power (Foucault 1971; Van Dijk 1989: 18; Fairclough 1992: 49; 
Von Stuckrad 2010: 159). When Muslims and Christians described the vice 
mayor of Surakarta as a Catholic they used not only informative but also per-
formative language. There was a power struggle beneath the surface. Christians 
wanted to demonstrate their progress in politics by pointing out the advantages 
of freedom in the Reformasi era. However, Muslims recognized their loss of 
political authority, at least partially, by pointing out the disadvantages of free­
dom. This confirms that language is not only informative but also performative 
(Fabian 2001:29).
Whereas most Muslim participants reproduced a fear of Indonesia and/ or 
Surakarta becoming more Christian (through Christianization), Christian par­
ticipants reproduced a fear of Indonesia and/ or Surakarta becoming more 
“Syariah”. The description of the position of a Christian as vice mayor and the 
so called “decrease” of the Muslim population could be understood in this con­
text.513 On the other hand, when Christian participants positioned the Syariah 
banks as a threat (see chapter 2) it could also be understood in this context. In 
fact a Syariah bank does business regardless of the client’s religion. Non- 
Muslim business people also open Syariah banks and the clients are both Mus­
lims and non-Muslims.
1.2 Belonging to society first
When a Christian said “puji Tuhan’’ (thanks be to God) because her mother 
converted to Christianity, and when a Muslim mentioned “alkhamdulillah” 
(thanks be to God)because she and all her relatives were bom Muslim, this 
shows that for them being a Christian or a Muslim is something to be grateful 
for. There are 14 similar utterances describing participants’ gratitude to God in 
the quotations in chapters 2, 3 and 4, and there are many more in the inter­
views. Most participants in the FGDs define themselves as faithful believers. 
Being Christian or Muslim is important for them. That is why being baptized a 
Christian is considered “fortunate” by a woman participant. Yet, although they 
define themselves as faithful, pious and devout, they say that they are tolerant 
and respectful towards others, hence neither extreme nor relativistic.
In keeping with that distinction, in terms of religious identity participants -  
in both separate and mixed groups -  sometimes identified and positioned the 
others as “they” (mereka) and themselves as ‘we’ (kami). Bahasa Indonesia 
grammar has two forms of the personal pronoun ‘we’: one excludes the out- 
group (kami), the other includes it in the in-group (kita). It is a subtle difference 
with huge performative effect. Participants derive their personal identities from 
social identities which are shared by the members of a group. In this sense we 
agree with social identity theory. But social identity theorists assume that iden- 
tification with the in-group is accompanied by animosity and hostility towards 
the out-group (Tajfel & Turner 1986). Our study shows that this is not neces-
513 The religious demographic statistics (chapter 1, table 5) show a different picture. The number 
o f Muslims in Surakarta grew over time: 61.8% in 1970, 73.1% in 2001, and 75.9% in 2011.
sarily the case. Friendship with out-group members does exist (Flermans & 
Hermans-Konopka 2010: 68-70). Thus Identification is more complex, as Ta- 
jfel (1978: 63) admits, and dialogical self theory seems more adequate to ex- 
plain the current situation in Solo than social identity theory (Wijsen & Cholil 
2013). In our FGDs, even though participants sometimes identified and posi­
tioned the others as “they” (mereka) and themselves as an exclusive “we” 
(kami), they sometimes also identified the others as an inclusive “we” (kita).5'4
Muslim participants called Christians their relatives, friends, fellows, 
neighbours, brothers, sisters or classmates, and the other way round. Very 
rarely they called the other kafir (infidel), musrik (polytheist) or musuh (en­
emy). Reconciliatory terms are common, resulting in harmonious interaction in 
the group. By using reconciliatory labels they transcend sectarian differences. 
That means they used polite, respectful words when communicating with peo­
ple and thus were inclusive rather than exclusive, egalitarian rather than hierar- 
chical, and communitarian rather than individualistic (Wijsen 2013). They also 
visited and shared food with each other on religious holidays.
Hence it is not surprising that although the participants are faithful believ­
ers, they use mainly inclusive language. They shaped and were shaped by di- 
versity in their family, neighbourhood and school environments. They referred 
to processes of unifïcation and convergence in those environments. Participants 
(with a few exceptions) said they can be friends or neighbours to adherents of 
other faiths. “I could not have only Christian friends,” said a Christian partici­
pant.
At an interpersonal level participants primarily said that belonging to soci­
ety (relatives, neighbours and friends) was more important than being an ad­
herent of a religion. This preference showed that they prioritize civic rather 
than religious identity. In chapter 3 a Muslim woman described how she dis- 
tributed zakat fitrah (personal alms) to both Muslim and non-Muslim poor 
people, though she knew that it was counter to the religious rule. “Here, we 
prioritize social first,” she said. Another Muslim positioned himself as “more 
open” than the religious organization he is affiliated to.
In chapter 3 a Muslim participant identified “good” Christians as those who 
do kerjabakti (voluntary service) and appreciate social togethemess in the vil­
lage. Hence belonging to society is a criterion to identify whether someone is 
“good” or not. In analysing kerjabakti Guinness (2009: 200) notes that defer- 
ence and mutual obligation are key elements of neighbourhood community. It 
is considered an effective way to maintain social order.51'
514 For an analysis o f Pancasila as ‘Pancasila kita’ (inclusive ‘w e’) and ‘Pancasila kami' 
(exclusive ‘w e’), see Saputro (2010).
515 Guinness (2009: 93) writes that over decades kerjabakti has been responsible for the con- 
struction o f amenities such as wells, washrooms and toilet blocks, retaining walls, safety walls,
However, for a few participants, belonging to a religion is more important 
than being a member of society (peripheral discourse). In other words, they 
prioritize religious identity over civic identity. These participants want to create 
boundaries between Muslims and Christians. Several Muslim participants em- 
phasized that the greeting “assalamu ’alaikum” is exclusively for Muslims and 
it is forbidden to extend it to Christians. Some Muslims in Solo were reported 
to refuse to say “merry Christmas”. The analysis of discursive practice shows 
that it relates to religious “purification”.
1.3 Wew wave of reüSgDoass ooiemiftattBorBS
A Muslim participant in chapter 4 said that “formerly Islam was only one 
stream”, which was close to Javanese culture and was peaceful. He narrates a 
religious ideal (religion is peaceful, not “hot” like nowadays). This ideal is 
usually associated with the situation as it was in the past. But this is an “inven- 
tion of tradition” (Ranger 1993) or an “ideology of home” (Robertson 1995). 
We know from Indonesian history that there was quite a lot of violence in the 
past (Hüsken & De Jonge 2002), also informed by religion. The speaker 
wanted to highlight the current religious transformation in society, but whether 
there is more violence now than before is doubtful (Hüsken 2009). The Chris­
tian participants described that the current “hot” situation prevailed in Christian 
communities as well. In general they recognized new trends in both Islam and 
Christianity. In Christianity the new orientation is said to come from America 
and Korea, whereas in Islam it is attributed to the Middle East, Pakistan and 
Iran.
Several Christian participants identified themselves as members of Pente- 
costal movements, who perceived their task as spreading “the salvation that is 
only through the Lord Jesus”. One Muslim participant described how he had 
been involved in a protest towards an “illegal church”. Another Muslim par­
ticipant described that his group had invited Abu Bakar Ba’ashir to give an 
Islamic lecture. Both Muslim and Christian participants in general identified 
these new religious groups (not “common” Islam or Christianity, cf. “normal” 
discourse in the next subsection) as the source of worsening interreligious rela­
tions between Islam and Christianity. For Christian participants, the evangelical 
groups were “not sensitive to the surrounding [Muslims]”.
Some Christian participants talked about their conflict with evangelical 
groups. The groups were said to perceive mainline Christians’ understanding of 
the Bible as wrong. According to some participants they called for re-baptism 
of Christians from outside their group. FGD participants positioned those who 
are attracted to charismatic churches as poor people in a purely financial sense.
drains, etc. in Javanese villages. They are constructed with voluntary labour through community 
donations o f cash and refreshments, although sponsors have sometimes been found.
In her study of the evangelical/ charismatic Family of God Church (GBI-KA) 
in Solo Rodemeier (2012) found that people were attracted to the GBI-KA 
mainly because of ‘its inner cell-structure which sees everyone as a potential 
leader’. In contrast to most Javanese religious institutions, this offers opportu- 
nities for individuals to move up the hierarchical ladder.
Muslim participants from both an NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and a Muham­
madiyah background talked about conflict between them and members of MTA 
(Qur’anic Interpretation Council). An NU Muslim participant described con­
flict between NU and MTA, while a Muhammadiyah Muslim participant said 
that “Muhammadiyah should criticize” MTA. Thus, besides exacerbating inter­
religious relations, the new groups in Islam and Christianity also engender in- 
tra-religious tensions. But although NU and Muhammadiyah participants de­
scribed intra-religious tension between them and members of MTA, they rec- 
ognized that MTA is “the fortress (benteng)” against Christianization, which is 
also part of their concern. That shows the complexity of intra- and interrelig­
ious relations. In Bourdieu’s terms (1991), ‘the others’ can be both competitors 
and collaborators at the same time. Boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are not 
fixed but fluid.
We ended the previous subsection on belonging to society first with a refer- 
ence to the trend towards religious purifïcation. The participants said that the 
new groups in Christianity and Islam advocated purifïcation and fanaticism in 
their teachings. In the case of Islam, Zain’s study (2011) of MTA confirms this 
tendency. The leaders of MTA forbid their members to join in slametan, khen- 
duri, tahlilan and other local Islamic practices. MTA identifies those practices 
as bid’ah (heretical) and syirik (unbelief). Muslims practising indigenous be­
liefs are identified as ‘ijik melu agamane mbahe’ (those who still follow the 
ancestors’ religion). Whereas scholars identify purifïcation movements as pri- 
marily urban phenomena (Tamney 2008), Zain’s study of MTA shows it is a 
rural phenomenon. MTA is growing mostly in rural areas in Java, Kalimantan 
and Sumatera (Zain 2011: 2, 81-82).
Our research participants had different ideas about the source of religious 
fanaticism. The conversation about it in chapters 2 and 4 is very lively. The 
first idea identified was that the more one leams about religion, the more fa­
natical one becomes. A participant gave the example of Noordin M. Top, a 
suspected terrorist who was shot dead in Solo. A participant, a journalist, found 
many Islamic books in his hideout. By contrast, the second idea identified was 
that the more one leams about religion, the less fanatical one becomes. A par­
ticipant cited an example of radical Christian groups. “They just get to page 
two or three [of the Bible]... However, there are still hundreds of pages after 
that,” said a participant. In chapter 4 a Muslim participant argued that fanatical 
Muslims lack knowledge about Islam.
1.4 Extremists as mentally ill religious people
What we saw in our FGDs is a hegemonie struggle between dominant and pe- 
ripheral voices to defme what is considered “normal” Muslims and Christians. 
The participants primarily identified Islam as a religion of “peace” and “mercy 
to the world”, while Christianity is seen as a religion of “love”. Whereas Chris­
tian participants identified extremist (fanatical, fundamentalist) Muslims as 
abnormal, Muslim participants identified Christians who favour and practise 
Christianization as “excessive”. They positioned extremists and excessive per- 
sons as extraordinary. Thus they identified extremism as not the norm but an 
exception to the rule of religions (institutional level).
In distinguishing between “normal” and “extreme” the participants primar­
ily positioned themselves as normal or ordinary religious people who are mod­
erate. They identified those who cause conflict as neither moderate Muslims 
nor moderate Christians, but fundamentalists in their respective faiths. In cer- 
tain cases they identified the conflict as one between extreme (laskar) groups 
and non-religious gangsters. However, several participants mentioned that ac­
tually all of them were gangsters. Before they became extreme Muslims they 
had been gangsters. Here the participants tried to avoid identifying the problem 
as coming from within their religions.
The participants’ “normal”/ “not-normal” classification reminds us of Mi- 
chel Foucault’s work Madness and civilization. A society which perceives peo­
ple as mentally ill labels them accordingly and will treat them as mentally ill 
(Foucault 1965; Schatzman 1971). Put differently, we can say that some re­
search participants perceived radicals, extremists and terrorists who are identi­
fied as not-normal to be mad or mentally ill. In fact around 240 people who 
were identified as terrorists by the police were killed and many more injured in 
four major acts of terrorism in Indonesia from 2002 to 2005.Three terrorists 
were executed and 57 people suspected of terrorism were shot dead in their 
hideouts (such as Noordin, Air and Eko who were mentioned by the partici­
pants). In addition around 700 people accused of terrorism were jailed.516 Here 
we can see the link between knowledge production about terrorism and the 
treatment meted out to them (killing, imprisonment, etc.).
Foucault (1980: 39) notes that power in society is persistent and subtle in 
that it ‘reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and in- 
serts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, leaming processes 
and everyday lives’. In Christian groups the participants identified extreme 
Muslims who wear typical clothing (calf-length pants, niqab, etc.) as improper
516 These statistics are generated by BBC Indonesia, 10 October 2012, interview with Ansyaad 
Mbai (head o f National Counter Terrorism Agency) and Noor Huda Ismail (director o f Prasasti 
Perdamaian Foundation), http://www.bbe.co.uk/indonesia/laporan_khusus/2012/10/121010_lap- 
susterorisml.shtml, accessed on October 15, 2012.
and not normal. The youths in Christian groups ealled extremist and tenorist 
Muslims “lebay”, new slang for something out of the ordinary. From the Mus­
lim participants’ side, they identified Christians’ social services as “Christiani­
zation” strategies. They tended to identify Christians as always having hidden 
intentions when offering social services (e.g. to Christianize Muslims). We 
interpret FGD participants’ labels such as “improper”, “not normal”, “out of 
the ordinary”, “lebay” and “excessive” in terms of Foucault’s classification of 
mad and civilized people.
In November 2010 International Crisis Group (ICG) Indonesia published a 
policy brief entitled Indonesia: ‘Christianization ’ and intolerance. It confirms 
the Muslim participants’ voice in our FGDs about the general discourse of 
Christianization.517 The ICG report links the increase of acts of violence and 
intolerance by hardliner Muslims with the increase of acts of Christianization 
by certain Christian missionary groups. Quoting the brief, some Islamic media 
and radicals put Christianization in the framework of ‘a global Christian- 
Zionist plot to weaken Islam’, ‘oppression suffered by Muslims’, and so forth 
(ICG 2010: 15). Similar narrations can be seen in chapter 3 of this book.
ICG’s policy brief as well as the primary voice in our FGDs positioned ex- 
tremists and hardliners as “funny”, ”foolish”, “odd” and “not normal” (these 
wordings are from FGDs, not from ICG). However, from the perspective of 
extremists and hardliners, as noted in the report, they blame the Indonesian 
government for being allies of the West in its war against terrorism. ICG writes 
about ‘a conspiracy of Western Christian colonialists and their local puppets’ 
(ICG 2010: 15). In his study, Religious discourse, social cohesion and conflict 
in Tanzania, Ndaluka writes that some Muslims say that they ‘make a noise 
(pigakeleley if they feel that they are being marginalized (Ndaluka 2012: 206). 
The hardliners’ voices are suppressed because of the national and international 
war on terror. However, studies of terrorism indicate that when hardliners’ 
voices are silenced they tend to become more, not less radical (Mamdani 2004).
1.5 Effects of Pasracasila rhetoric
As a consequence of the liberalization and pluralizationof Indonesian society 
after the collapse of the New Order authoritarian regime there is a struggle to 
redefine “unity in diversity” in the post-Reformasi era. The participants’ utter- 
ance, “I come from a Pancasila family”, which I cite in the title of this book, 
expresses that their families comprise different religions yet live in harmony. 
This language use shows that Pancasila ideology rules interpersonal everyday 
life.
517 The ICG report calls Christianization a reality. The study was conducted in Banten and West 
Java.
Even though several participants said, “Since the Reformasi era Pancasila is 
no longer mentioned in societal interaction”, the ideal of Pancasila was very 
much alive and talked about by participants in almost all FGDs. In the quota- 
tions in chapters 2, 3 and 4 the word “Pancasila” occurs 24 times, and there are 
many more incidences of this word in the interviews. A participant used the 
metaphor of a broom518 to describe Pancasila’s role in keeping a diverse people 
together. Other participants reproduced a link between “Pancasila country” and 
“tolerance, respecting religious freedom”. The bhineka tunggal ika covers hid- 
den differences. In order to maintain societal unity and harmony differences are 
covered up. Culture is not a shared knowledge system but the organization of 
diversity. It is not a state of the mind but a process (Hannerz 1992: 13-14). 
Aware of the differences among them, Muslims and Christians in FGDs said 
they have the same root, being descendants of Abraham.
What we saw in our FGDs is a struggle to redefme Pancasila in the context 
of the Indonesian Reformasi era, which is characterized by an awakening of 
religious ideology. Because of the diminishing role of the state in the Refor­
masi era, the ideology of Pancasila is no longer enforced top-down, but citizens 
seem to endorse it bottom-up. Norman Fairclough (1992: 62, 186) assumes that 
discourses “can be expected to have long-term effects on the knowledge and 
beliefs, social relationships, and social identities of an institution or society”. It 
is reasonable to conclude from our case study that Pancasila rhetoric did have 
long-term effects, as people still cite these ‘culturally salient keywords’ and use 
them to interpret experiences and generate behaviour. In the New Order era the 
Indonesian govemment supported the socialization of the Pancasila idea as a 
dogma for its citizens. Some of the measures taken were the inclusion of Pen- 
didikan Moral Pancasila (PMP/Pancasila Moral Education) in school curricula 
as a core course from elementary school to university level; inculcation of P-4 
(New Order dogma on Pancasila)519 for all students and civil servants; regular 
recitation of the five pillars of Pancasila at Monday flag ceremonies; et eet-
520era.
On the Christians’ side there was a voice that Christians have a “deeper 
spirit of Pancasila” than Muslims. This was motivated by the emergence of 
Syariah discourse in public life along with Islamic “purification” and acts of 
violence by laskar groups. From the Muslim side there was a statement that 
there is no contradiction between Pancasila and the values of Islam. Some 
Muslim participants explained that the five principles of Pancasila (one God,
518 “If  we were a broom made o f  such splintered ribs, Pancasila is the string.”
515 P-4 stands for Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila (Directives for the Realization 
and Implementation o f Pancasila).
520 The Reformasi govemment abolished P-4 and changed the PMP course into civic education 
(Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan).
humanity, national unity, democracy and social justice) accord with the teach- 
ings of Islam. Most participants described Pancasila and Syariah as clearly 
opposed. By contrasting Pancasila and Syariah they reproduced an image of 
Indonesia as a pluralistic state. The primary discourse is, “Our Indonesian state 
has Pancasila, which should be prioritized.” However, the participants used the 
term “Syariah” in relation to the political vision of (some) Muslims. A Muslim 
participant explained two different areas of Syariah: the political system, and 
ritual (amaliyah). He expressed rejection of the political system of Syariah and 
advocated its ritual aspects.
In religious vocabulary there is ‘untranslatable translatability’ or ‘translat- 
able untranslatability’ (Mali 2000: 13-14; Panikkar 1999: 19-22; Moyaert 
2011: 227). As noted in the introduction to this book, in articulating the fïrst 
pillar of Pancasila (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, Belief in One Divine Lordship) 
Muslim scholars refer to the Islamic concept of monotheism (tawhid). On the 
other hand Christian scholars argue that it does not refer to the God concept of 
specific religion. The word ‘Ketuhanan’ has a vague meaning in that it refers 
not to God as such, but to something divine (yang ilahi) (Mujiburrahman 2006; 
Ichwan 2006).521 Thus they showed the ‘untranslatable translatability’ of the 
fïrst pillar of Pancasila. Soekamo acknowledged that he borrowed the princi- 
ples of Indonesian ideology from Sun Yat Sen’s (the founder of Republic of 
China) idea of San Min Chu (the three people's principles): nationalism, de­
mocracy and socialism. Soekamo invented the further principle of Ketuhanan 
to situate these principles in the Indonesian religious context, which differs 
from that of China (Darmaputera 1988).
In our case study participants demonstrated the ‘untranslatable translatabil­
ity’ of the fïrst pillar of Pancasila. According to our Muslim interviewees one 
divine Lordship refers to the Islamic concept of monotheism. Christian inter­
viewees, on the other hand, argued that it does not refer to the God concept of a 
specific religion. That means Christians can use those words. The Christian 
participants mentioned that they have their own understanding of the fïrst pillar 
of Pancasila, a different understanding from Muslims. In other words, the un­
derstanding of religious concepts by Muslims and Christians is diverse, yet
521 The difficulty also arises when people have to translate the fïrst pillar o f Pancasila into 
English. What words do they use or choose? Sita Hidayah (2006) fmds no fewer than eleven 
English translations o f the fïrst pillar o f Pancasila by the Indonesian govemment and scholars 
mainly from a Muslim or Christian background. She identifies ‘transcreation’ as an unusual 
rewording such as ‘oneness’, which emphasizes a tawhid Islamic point o f  view, while ‘one 
divine Lordship’ is a Christian version o f Adonai (and Kyrios). The eleven forms are: ‘belief in 
G od’, ‘the belief in one G od’, ‘belief in the oneness o f  God’, ‘belief in the one and only God’, 
‘belief in divine omnipotence’, ‘God’s divine omnipotence’, ‘belief in an all-embracing God’, 
'belief in one divine Lordship’, ‘the unity o f G od’, ‘a supreme Godhead’, ‘the absolute Lordship 
o f G od’ (Hidayah 2006: 242-243).
they get on with each other. They agree to disagree on this point (Beatty 1990: 
25-50). It works, in the sense that even though Christian participants have their 
own understanding, they approve of the religious spirit of Pancasila. This con- 
fïrms Mall’s (2000) theory of ‘analogous hermeneutics’, according to which 
there is neither total translatability (commensurability) nor radical untranslat- 
ability (incommensurability). He says that no culture is a windowless monad, 
so all cultures possess varying degrees of intercultural overlap (Mali 2000: 14), 
which makes communication and coexistence possible, at least to some extent.
1.6 Conflict and strategy to maintain harmony
We should not understate Indonesian violence because it could have been 
worse. The violence involves highly inflammable identities like religion and 
ethnicity. Yet the state is not the only institution that can control violence. Ac­
cording to Hüsken (2009) we should not ask why there has been so much vio­
lence in Indonesia, but rather better why there has been so little. Thus social 
institutions are needed to maintain societal convergence. I have said that my 
first objective was to gain insight into the relation between religious discourse 
and (the absence of) social cohesion. The participants found it difficult to ex- 
plain the causes of the 1998 Solo riots and earlier riots. According to them the 
riots were not about religion but only about social problems. However, they 
reported that people used words such as “China”, “Java”, “Muslim” and “Mus- 
lim-Java” during the riots. Conflicts almost always are complex and caused by 
a multiplicity of factors (Taylor & Moghaddam 1994). Yet we saw in chapter 4 
that participants argued that anti-Chinese ethnic sentiments and the economy 
were the main motives and “the strongest trigger” of conflict. However, in the 
Muslim FGDs (chapter 3)522 some participants explained clearly that the money 
of Chinese Christian empires goes to churches. This utterance connects religion 
and ethnicity.
In the broader context of Indonesia John Sidel, a political scientist, says 
much the same thing. The New Order regime, at least during the first two dec­
ades, was dominated by secular nationalists, Christians and Chinese business- 
men. Networks of Indonesian Protestants and Catholics enjoyed a privileged 
position in the Soeharto regime. In addition the army’s officer corps had long 
been dominated by men raised in secular and Christian school systems (Sidel 
2008: 44, 46). Here we see an interplay of ethnic and religious identity in 
communal conflicts. In Indonesia it is very hard to disentangle religious loyal- 
ties from ethnic backgrounds. Apart from the case of Solo, conflicts in other 
parts of Java, in North Moluccas and in West Kalimantan before and after 1998
522 FGDs permit participants to share ideas about a sensitive issue in a relaxed atmosphere more 
than mixed FGDs.
reveal this interplay of ethnic and religious identity (Sidel 2007; Van Klinken 
2007).
In chapter 3 some participants described ethnic-religious grouping in terms 
of place of residence. The participants, again in chapter 3, also identified that 
Javanese and Arabs are primarily Muslim, while Chinese are Christian. In 
chapter 1 I outlined the history of ethnic-religious grouping based on settlement 
with reference to the policy of the Surakarta sultanate before the 19th century 
and the Dutch authority in Surakarta in the 19th century. Thus the segregation 
of ethnic-religious groups has a long history in Solo. Arab settlements are 
mostly concentrated in Pasar Kliwon sub-district, especially the villages of 
Pasar Kliwon, Semanggi and Kedung Lumbu. Chinese settlements are located 
round Pasar Gede, Balong, Coyudan, Tambak Segaran, et cetera.
Studies of local conflicts in Indonesia have demonstrated that they often 
erupted because of fights over material issues (land, water and other resources) 
and that posters about religion and ethnic solidarity were used only as rallying 
mechanisms (Hüsken 2009). In chapter 4 I reproduced a picture of a banner 
about religion and ethnicity during the 1998 Solo riots. At the same time par­
ticipants reproduced a narration that the riots were triggered by a feeling that 
the Chinese are rich and the indigenous people (Javanese) are always op- 
pressed. Thus in this particular narrative context our FGD participants repro­
duced an interplay of three identities in the Solo riots of 1998: ethnic (Java, 
China), religious (Muslim, Christian), and social class (rich, poor).
As religious identity is our concern, this study found inclusive language use 
by Christian and Muslim participants to be a strategy to maintain convergence 
among themselves and in society. The NU metaphor of three brotherhoods, 
mentioned by a Muslim participant in the mixed group, is telling in regard to 
multiple identities: the brotherhoods of Islam, of the nation and of humanity. 
Muslims positioned non-Muslims as their brothers/ sisters either as fellow In- 
donesians or simply as human beings. Christian participants reproduced a com- 
parable narration of brothers/ sisters of the same faith and brothers/ sisters of a 
different faith. To maintain convergence among themselves, they reproduced a 
strategy of social inclusion. Muslim participants cited the Qur’anic verse “to 
you be your religion, and to me my religion”, which signifies peaceful coexis- 
tence while not mixing religions.
The participants constituted and were constituted by the concept of rukun 
(harmony). “We take the best, [that is] rukun,” said a Muslim participant. In 
chapter 4 a Christian mother asked her son to join a kendhuri (selametan) 
which was held by her Muslim neighbour. Hyung-Jun Kim (2007: 129) writes 
that in a village neighbours, regardless of religious and financial differences, 
are invited to and attend their neighbours’ kendhuri. In this sense the ritual 
actualizes the social norm of rukun. Via the concept of rukun people tolerate 
differences and, where necessary, make social and cultural adjustments.
Our FGD participants were keenly aware of the fact that harmony in Indo­
nesia is fragile and that conflicts erupt every now and again, such as the Solo 
riots in 1972, 1980 and 1998. After the riots people return to normal as soon as 
possible, showing that conflict is ‘not normal’. Min-Sun Kim claims that 70% 
of the world’s population have interdependent self-constructs, hence avoiding 
conflict and maintaining harmony is a normal style of conflict management 
(Kim 2002: 5, 57-58).
After the 1998 Solo riots the Solonese, among other efforts, conducted such 
rituals as ruwatan (purifying) led by a dhalang (puppeteer in traditional 
shadow play) in wayang (shadow puppet) performances. Collective experience 
was replicated in ritual and theatrical discourse. In one scene in the wayang 
performance at Beteng Plaza, a public commercial mail, the dhalang narrated:
‘Let us pray together! Besides perfonning the ruwatan tonight, let us never cease in our de- 
votions. To perform devotions is to follow religious belief with conviction. Pray to God so 
that the present situation may soon become calm. May we have peace and calm again, like 
the puppeteers who return to the rules o f performance’. (Headley 2004: 456)
ln that utterance the normal ‘rule’ is peace and calm. The Solonese showed that 
they always restore conflict to normality. There is a tendency among the par­
ticipants to identify trouble makers as “newcomers” and “outsiders”. We fmd 
15 such identifications in the quotations in chapters 2, 3 and 4, and there are 
many more in the interviews. In the case of attacks on or protests against 
churches, the participants identified the perpetrators as not “our Muslim broth- 
ers” from “here”, from “this village” or from “local society”, but from 
“pesantren Ngruki” or “outside Solo”. As for radical Muslims, participants said 
they were not Javanese Muslims from Solo but hardliners from Sukoharjo. And 
“excessive” Christians were not from the GKJ or the Catholic churches, but 
evangelicals from El-Shaddai church and the Salvation Army. In the case of the 
1998 Solo riots the actors came from outside or were “people from Jakarta”.
However, mostly the Muslims from pesantren Ngruki were Javanese, El- 
Shaddai church is based in Solo, and in fact Solonese were also involved in the 
1998 riots. The participants tried to distinguish themselves from people “out­
side Solo” and Muslim and Christian hardliners. At the same time they are 
aware that not all trouble-makers and actors in conflicts come from “outside”. 
That would contradict the reality on the ground. But they said the locals were 
just “one or two”, “few”, “newcomers” or “only ocnum” (individuals). By call- 
ing them ocnum they positioned the actors in conflict as isolated persons to 
preclude further Identification of their religious and ethnic identity. This kind 
of narration is a way to maintain harmony and a social mechanism to avoid 
further and deeper conflict.
Summarizing our findings we offer a synthesis on two axes, one with the 
religious and the secular positions as extreme poles, the other with two oppo-
site religious positions (Java Muslim/ Christian) at the centre. But as noted 
above, classifications are fluid and flexible and that applies to this one as well.
Religious identity 
(Puritan Musliuv Christian)
I
Religious-Javianese identity
Moderate Relativist
Pious -  santri -  devout Nominal
(Javanese Muslim/Christian)
I
Secnlar identity 
(Pluralist. nationalist, democratie Muslim. Christian)
Figure 12: Synthesis o f  Muslim/Christian identity
In general what we see in the FGDs is a struggle between three positions. First, 
the extreme position advocates an Islamic Syariah state or comprises militant 
Christians who are “not sensitive to the surrounding [Muslims]”. This first 
position is mono-cultural, which is a peripheral voice. Second, there is the 
moderate position (e.g. the Qur’anic text: “to you be your religion, and to me 
my religion”) or peaceful coexistence: tolerate the other but do not mix (at least 
not religions). This is a multicultural position. Supporters of multiculturalism 
are motivated by great tolerance and endorse the politics of Pancasila: unity in 
diversity. They espouse a culture of rukun (harmony). A third position, which 
is also peripheral, is relativist or nominal. Put differently, this is an intercultural 
position which stresses real, existing overlaps (“I am abangan/ kejawen”). 
From a different angle, the multicultural (religio-ethnic) identity is midway 
between two other peripheral identities: religious (“puritan” Muslim or Chris­
tian) and secular.
2 Conclusions regarding the contribution to interreligious 
studies
This last section seeks to determine the contribution of our research to a theory 
and method of studying interreligious relations, which is the external objective 
of this research project. In chapter 1 I mentioned that this doctoral dissertation 
favours a discursive study of religion (Von Stuckrad 2003: 268), which goes 
beyond the essentialist and objectivist approach. Following Flood (1999: 113),
I regard religion as a communicative or speech event. That is to say, human 
practices and artefacts become ‘religious’ because they are placed in a narrative
Extremist 
Militant, fanatic
context by the believers; they are not religious because of innate properties. I 
also said that the framework of my study is the context of religious studies in 
Indonesia. In that section I noted that it would be almost impossible to develop 
a ‘purely theoretical’ religious studies in Indonesia without any orientation 
towards practice. With due regard to these provisos I come to the following 
conclusions concerning the theory and method of studying religion.
2.1 Linking the micro and macro levels of analysis
Fairclough’s (1992) clearly specifies linking the analyses of discourse as text 
and as social practice. The two stages of analysis are linked via a third, the 
analysis of discursive practice. But Fairclough leaves a gap when he differenti- 
ates between the levels of analysis. Given the fact that we analyse interactions 
between participants in FGDs, thus at the individual and interpersonal level, 
how can we draw conclusions at a societal level? Put differently, how can we 
link the micro and macro levels of analysis?
In chapter 4 (section 1.3) the participants talked about Noordin Mohammad 
Top, a famous terrorist from Malaysia, who was shot dead by the police in a 
rented house in a working class area in Surakarta. Looking at the linguistic 
features of the text, the female FGD participant makes a radical contrast when 
she describes Noordin as both a disaster and a blessing. She also draws on typi- 
cal Islamic vocabulary associated with matters of life and death: “thanks be to 
God” and “everything comes from God”, expressing God’s omnipotence and 
humans’ duty to acquiesce in his will (meso/ institutional level), even in situa- 
tions of disaster and misfortune. In so doing she positions herself as a prag- 
matic believer (agency, micro level) who sees profit in something that in itself 
is perceived as a disaster (social practice, macro level).
When Fairclough (1992: 67, 138) talks about the relations between parents 
and children, teachers and pupils, doctors and patients, he speaks about social 
positions and social relations within the institutions of the family, schools and 
hospitals. It is in fact these institutions with their concrete practices, pre- 
existing relationships and identities, pattems and routines, which link the indi­
vidual and societal levels of analysis. These practices, relationships and identi­
ties were originally discursively constituted, but have become sedimented in 
institutions and non-discursive practices (Fairclough 1992; Jorgensen & Phil­
lips 2002: 62). In our view it is the institutional level that mediates between the 
individual and the societal level.
In our study, for example, people speak about “sameness of custom” be­
tween Muslims and Christians when they go together to the graves of the same 
ancestors. When Muslims spoke about Christianization they said that “Javanese 
Christians are not like that”. And when Christians referred to Islamic extrem- 
ism they said that “Javanese Islam is different”. Javanese language and customs 
are institutions or shared practices and pattems of behaviour that go beyond
individuals. This is the level where ethnicity (Javanese) and religion (Muslim 
or Christian) intermingle in one reality. In talking about interreligious relations 
our research finds that Javanese culture or “sameness of custom” bridges the 
gap between Muslims and Christians as individuals (micro level) and society 
(macro level), as shown in fïgure 12.
2.2 KoSe o f social cogDDiïiora in discourse amalysis
The foregoing insight brings us to a second conclusion. The pattemed behav- 
iour and routines (e.g. ‘sameness of custom’) are based on shared knowledge or 
social cognitions (e.g. ‘Javanese wisdom’). Our conclusions in chapters 2, 3 
and 4 reveal extensive general cultural knowledge of the wisdom of Javanese 
culture. This cultural knowledge -  shared presuppositions about the world -  
plays an important role in people’s understanding (Holland & Quinn: 2000).
Fairclough (1992) is ambiguous about the role of social cognition. He 
clearly rejects the “idealist conclusion that realities of the social world such as 
family merely emanate from people’s heads” (Fairclough 1992: 65). Whereas 
he is clear about the limitation of cognitive psychology, saying that it ignores 
the social condition of cognitions, he nevertheless endorses the idea that cogni­
tion plays a role in the production and consumption of text, and thus in discur­
sive change. The aforementioned “sameness of custom” is based on the Java­
nese worldview or wisdom.
Van Dijk (2005) is more explicit about cognitions. He refers to ‘knowledge 
strategy’ in which two members of the same epistemic community, by defini- 
tion, share all the general knowledge of the community. It assumes that what I 
know is also known by the recipients (in our research audiences of FGDs), and 
vice versa (Van Dijk 2005: 79-80). When Muslim participants mentioned 
Christianization they have a similar idea of projects of Christianizing Muslims. 
When Christian participants spoke about “jihad” they meant Muslim militant 
attitudes or acts of violence. Van Dijk (1987) uses the term ‘social memory’ 
which assumes that ‘language use and interaction... are possible only to this 
socially shared nature of our word meanings, rules, and action concepts’. Fur- 
thermore, he positions social memory (‘semantic memory’) as long-term mem­
ory stored in people’s cognitive framework (Van Dijk 1987: 182-183).
Although cognition plays a relevant role, Flood (1999: 58) suggests that the 
discipline of religious studies should not be trapped in a reductive cognitive 
approach which sees culture merely as a cognitive system. Culture, and espe- 
cially language, exists independently of cognition. That means that unless a 
person is nurtured in a culture and language, individual cognition would not be 
stimulated or activated.
Flood (1999: 63) writes: ‘If the study of religions is to avoid a phenomenol- 
ogical transcendentalism, on the one hand, or a reduction to the biological or- 
ganism on the other, then it must take seriously the inter subjective realm of the
cultural sign. ’ In other words, the human eognitive system always functions in 
and through the framework of culture and/ or religion. The human eognitive 
system and language/ culture/ religion are absolute conditions for each other 
(conditio sine qua non). Thus religious studies must consider shifting from a 
philosophy of consciousness, in all its varieties and complexities, to a philoso- 
phy of signs (semiotics) or language (Flood 1999: 9, 107). We need to clarify 
the relation between discursive study of religion and eognitive Science. This 
would be an interesting field for further research.
2.3 Complexity of dassifications
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 our research participants reproduced various classifica- 
tions. Such as “ordinary” and “fanatical”; “normal” and “extreme”; “abangan” 
(nominal) and “santri” (devout). Following scholars like Michel Foucault and 
Pierre Bourdieu, our research clearly showed the relevance of distinctions and 
dassifications. It also confirms Bourdieu’s (1991: 220) statement that language 
has the power to make and unmake social groups. Identities are not defined by 
intrinsic values that can be measured by objective criteria, but are social 
through and through in the sense that they are socially conditioned and have 
social effects.
But our study showed that distinctions and dassifications are not clear-cut. 
They are not fixed but flexible. For example, persons who are labelled ‘mod­
em’ in socio-economic affairs may not be modern in religious affairs. People 
who are strict in religious affairs may be respectful and tolerant towards other 
believers, like the girl from NU who said alkhamdulillah (thanks be to God) 
because she and all her relatives “were fortunately bom Muslims”. But she 
positioned herself as a tolerant person. Unlike social identity theories (Tajfel & 
Turner 1986), which define identity on the basis of intrinsic values that can be 
measured by objective criteria, we found that identities are fluid (Blommaert & 
Verschueren 1991; Antaki & Widdicombe 1998).
In a survey of nearly 300 respondents conducted by Suhadi Cholil and 
Imam Subawi in Kediri East Java, about a quarter refused to be put in a particu- 
lar box and came up with self-identifications which the researchers had not 
thought of (Ricklefs 2008: 129). In complex societies boundaries will always 
be fluid. The boundaries between abangan and santri, moderate and militant, 
good and bad, black and white, and so on, are not that strict, not only at a social 
level (Beatty 1999: 115) but also at an individual level (Kim 2002: 172). The 
data are simply too contradictory, confusing and complex (Ricklefs 2008: 133- 
134).
We can relate that conclusion to a current trend in the study of religious 
identity. It seems that in modem times religious identities were more or less 
fixed, whereas from a postmodern perspective they are more fluid, hybrid. That 
is to say, religious believers not only switch easily from one language to the
other but inereasingly mix them. This makes the postmodern situation different 
from modernity and classification or categorization becomes complex; hence 
the project of ‘exact’ Science, including science of religion, is almost impossi- 
ble (Bourdieu 1990).
2 .4  From social ideaitity to  'm u ltip le  id en tity ' theory
The aforementioned insight into the fluidity of distinctions has huge implica- 
tions for social identity theory, which is based on social classifications into in- 
group and out-group, ‘we’ and ‘they’. Those classifications showed the com- 
plexity and dynamics of participants’ voices in identifying the others and them­
selves. In our FGDs the participants described themselves and others in terms 
of group membership. Asked to complete the sentence “I am ...”, the partici­
pants would not answer, ‘I am me’, but I am Solonese, I am part of a Pancasila 
family, I am a Javanese Muslim/ Christian, I am a citizen of Indonesia, and so 
on. People develop in-group favouritism. In most (if not all) cases personal 
identity refers to social identity. In this sense it is relevant to talk about ‘social 
identity theory’ (Tajfel & Turner 1986).
Social identity theory assumes that identities are shared by members of a 
group. They unite them and distinguish them from others. In experiments con- 
ducted by social identity theorists individuals are classified as members of two 
non-overlapping groups (Tajfel & Turner 1986: 13). In studying polarization in 
Javanese society Merle Ricklefs (2008), a prominent historian on Java, initially 
saw the polarization between abangan and putihan as more or less essential. 
He writes about ‘the birth of abangan ’ in one section of his book about Islamic 
and other visions in Java in 1830-1930 (Ricklefs 2007: 84-86). Nonetheless, in 
his more recent works he recognizes that the data are simply too contradictory, 
confusing and complex (Ricklefs 2008: 133-134; Ricklefs 2012: 271-272).
Traditional models such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1986) 
view identities as essentialist and realist (Blommaert &Verschueren 1991: 3). 
Identity is ‘something’ that exists in me. The altemative models can be labelled 
social constructivist. Examples are models based on Foucault. These models 
have in common that they are anti-essentialist and anti-realist. Last but not least 
there are postmodern views of identity, or rather multiple identities. In this 
view the self is fluid and hybrid (Wijsen 2013).
When using the pronoun ‘we’ bahasa Indonesia introducés not only an ex- 
clusive ‘we’ (kami), but also an inclusive ‘we’ (kita), which our research par­
ticipants used quite often. Whereas the exclusive ‘we’ confirms social identity 
theory, the inclusive ‘we’ shows that individuals can have a multiplicity of 
overlapping identities. Our research shows that distinctions are not clear-cut, 
not fixed, but flexible and fluid. This is why the cultural collision (Blommaerts 
1991: 19) or clash of civilizations (Huntington 1992) perspectives are inade­
quate. According to them a multicultural society is a tragedy and intercultural
communication an illusion. However, our study shows that at least partial in­
tercultural or interreligious communication and understanding are in fact possi­
ble. In everyday life there is an ‘ordered ambiguity’ (Beatty 1999: 27).
2 .5  Critica! theory and ersgaged religSoys studies
Fairclough (1992) combines linguistic analysis with critical theory. That makes 
the project of discourse theory a project of ideology critique (Laclau 1996; 
Jorgensen& Phillips 2002: 186). Ideology has indeed been a fertile subject of 
investigation in CDA (Fairclough 1989, 1992; Wodak 1989; Van Dijk 1998; 
Blommaert 2005). These authors expand the defmition of ideology from ‘a 
specifïc set of symbolic representations’ (let’s call this the first category) to ‘a 
general phenomenon characterizing the totality of a particular social or political 
system, and operated by every member or actor in that system’ (second cate­
gory).
The first category includes -isms (Marxism, capitalism, socialism, etc.), 
schools and doctrines. It is ideology critique in a ‘traditional’ sense (Jorgensen 
& Phillips 2002:87). The second category, which is the concern of CDA, high- 
lights that ideology stands for the ‘cultural’, ideational elements of a particular 
social and political system, the ‘grand narratives’ characterizing its existence, 
structure, and historical development (Blommaert 2005: 158-159). As critical 
analysis CDA inherits the tradition of the critical school. Under the influence of 
postmodernism and post-colonialism it was argued that a neutral standpoint in 
academia is an illusion. Scholars of religion always adopt a certain position 
(Wijsen 2013).
In that sense CDA moves from disengaged to engaged science, which is 
relevant to the debate on religious studies in Indonesia that we started with. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this book (chapter 1, section 1.5), religious 
studies in Indonesia need to respond to a societal problem. Bagir and Abdullah 
(2011: 68-70) use the term ‘engaged religious study’ at the end of their article 
as a recommendation. But they do not investigate it further, since their main 
concern is ‘reflections’ on the development and role of religious studies in In­
donesia. They position the engagement of religious studies in societal problems 
as ‘ethical-religious concerns’, but they also wam that such engagement may 
lead to ‘religionizing’ of nonreligious problems (Bagir & Abdullah 2011: 68- 
69).
Cush (2005), one of the very few works on engaged religious study, ex- 
plores its content, methods and aims. He is very much aware of Jonathan 
Smith’s (1982) view that religion is non-essentialist (an academie artefact, not 
a reality ‘out there’). But Cush still considers the phenomenological approach 
important in religious studies simply because it adopts an impartial, objective 
position on the traditions and issues studied, and tries to understand before 
judging. Thus he assumes that methodological agnosticism is needed to avoid
premature evaluation, an attitude described as ‘epistemological humility’ (Cush 
2005: 92). Bagir and Abdullah (2011) have a similar understanding when they 
defïne the concept of objectivity in religious studies. In my view their position 
is theoretically ambiguous. In the case of the Center for Religious and Cross- 
cultural Studies (CRCS) at Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia it is clear that 
its vision is ‘to promote the development of a democratie, multicultural, and 
just society in Indonesia’ (leaflet MA Programme CRCS-UGM 2012). Thus 
CRCS is not ‘objective’, but engages in social engineering. In other words, the 
religious mission of CRCS is to endorse a democratie, multicultural and just 
society.
Having leamt from this doctoral research, it is my contention that scholars 
of religion should not lapse into theoretical ambiguity. By positioning religions 
as systems of communication and shared action we can conduct religious stud­
ies in a ‘constructivist’ paradigm which is non-objectivist. The term ‘engaged’ 
itself indicates that it is non-objectivist, not impartial, but actively involved in 
the issues to be studied. Bagir and Abdullah (2011) and Lewis (2012) show the 
profound engagement of the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at 
Gadjah Mada University with societal problems, albeit from a religious point of 
view. In a society where 99% of the population says that religion is important 
in their daily life (Gallup Poll 2008) there is no other way. In this sense reli­
gious studies in Indonesia differs from religious studies in Europe or North 
America, which sticks to methodological agnosticism. The staff and students at 
the Center are engaged in religion, but not in an apologetic way, propagating 
one religion as better than the other. This research by way of a discursive study 
of religion (Von Stuckrad 2003) and more specifically the CDA method (Fair­
clough 1992) will, I hope, contribute to theoretical clarification as well as offer 
a methodological altemative for developing engaged religious studies in Indo­
nesia.
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A p g n e n d i x  1
(A candidate fo r  the Christian young male group caneelled his acceptance. He told the research 
assistant he had an urgent personal commitment, but he gave her a handwritten letter in Bahasa 
Indonesia. Here is a translation o f  that letter.)
Sometimes I feel sorry (kasihan) for Muslims because they are fragmented into various streams. 
This is because their interpretations of the holy book differ, and because most Muslims obey 
leaders slavishly (it’s like they treat the leaders as prophets), even though their leaders may not 
be right.
Example: the santri at Pesantren Ngruki think Ba’asyir is always right, so they really look up to 
him and ignore the fact that he is a human being who has faults and weaknesses.
Second example: the Islamic paramilitary, such as FPI [Islamic Defender Front] or LUIS (Laskar 
Umat Islam Surakarta/ Surakarta Islamic Paramilitary Troops), attacked my house to disperse our 
Bible study group. From their pcrspcctive I conclude that they feel perturbed about that activity 
[Bible study], since a lot o f Muslims convert to Christianity because o f it. That is why they op- 
pose our Bible study; in their terms they call it jihad. From my point o f view, maybe it was only 
fear o f several people but then they gathered a mob to fight the Christians. Because o f the idea 
that their leaders are always right, the followers just obey their instructions, even if  it means 
going to war. Sometimes they are stupid because o f the idealism o f their leader. They are willing 
to be enslaved [by the leader],
My view of Muslims is that I pity them because they are swayed by the teachings o f certain 
individuals who make them split into different groups. I think because o f this separation Muslims 
have disputes among themselves, even when determining the fasting day and the holyday [Idul 
Fitri],
If  I were to describe Muslims, I would use an analogy o f a boat with several captains who all 
have different goals. This confiises the passengers about whom to follow. Some passengers may 
have decided whom they want to follow, but they are still confused. In the end they debate with 
each other to reach their own goals. So in the boat itself there is division and perhaps even war 
among the passengers.
Sometimes they are too fanatical. It makes them narrow-minded and think that their religion is 
the best while other religions are bad. Sometimes they force people to follow their religion, even 
using violence.
There is a saying in bahasa Indonesia: katak dalam tempurung (a frog in a coconut shell, mean- 
ing a very narrow-minded person). They are very self-absorbed and do not open themselves to 
leam or to understand other people outside their group.
PS: Mbak Ruth [the research assistant], sorry my handwriting is ugly. This is my own point o f 
view. Indeed, I used to hate them after what they did at my house, but after I opened my eyes and 
leamed to understand them, I feel very sorry for Muslims.
One thing is sure: Christ’s followers are the best because there is love and togethemess, and the 
love is not just for us but also for others outside our group. This is different from some Muslim 
groups’ perspective that says “brothers/sisters are only one (Muslim) congregation, therefore if 
you are going to help other people, help your brother/sister first, not the heathen” (the heathen 
here are people from other religions).
A p p e n c f c  2
(Some participants referred to Dewi Purnamawati when talking about Christians. She is a Mus­
lim woman by conversion and became a preacher after converting to Islam. A Muslim partici­
pant brought this bulletin written by Dewi Purnamawati and gave it to the researcher. The origi- 
nal version is in bahasa Indonesia. The capital letters are original.)
Nadianto / Dewi Purnamawati 
Arimatea Forum Solo 
Sutowijoyo St. No. 26C, Penumping -  Solo -  Central Java
Bible leads church activist to fight for Islam 
Story of a convert: Dra. Dewi Purnamawati
Asalaamu ’alaamanittabaalhudaa 
(Peace be upon those who follow the guidance)
My name is Dra. Dewi Purnamawati. I was bom  in Solo in 1962. In 1971 I followed my father, 
an air force officer, and moved to Nusa Tenggara Barat [West Nusa Tenggara]on Lombok Island. 
From elementary school to junior high school I went to Catholic schools: SD Katholik St Anto- 
nius Ampenan [elementary school], then SMP Katholik Kesuma Cakranegara (junior high 
school). I attended senior school at STM Negeri Mataram (vocational high school), graduated in 
1981, then continued my studies at IKIP Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Pedagogical College), graduat- 
ing in 1985. In 1986 I retumed to Solo and taught a course in electricity in a vocational school.
I was given a solid Christian upbringing by my mother. In 1971 my mother successfully 
converted my father, a Muslim, to Christianity and made him a vibrant and prominent evangelist 
(whose mission is to spread Christianity). My father had good interpersonal skills and was able to 
exorcise demons, although so-called supematural/ magie ability, which is considered a gift from 
God, is actually satanic.
My two siblings and I were taught to be fanatical and obedient Christians. Since our child­
hood we had been convinced by Christian doctrine to despise Islam and were anti Islam; also, we 
had to affirm ‘LOVE’ as a Christian value. We were taught to be Christian militants in order to 
Christianize Lomboknese, where Islam was the majority. We were all church activists and ac- 
tively involved in converting Muslims.
One example o f my mother’s successful teaching is my younger brother. After completing 
his m aster’s degree at the Christian Institute TIRANUS Cimahi, Bandung, he became a priest in 
Cimahi and has been one ever since. He made a deceptive impression by teaching the villagers to 
cultivate hydroponics and helping them sell these, providing therapy for Muslim teenage drug 
addicts in the rehabilitation centre, and providing problem-solving services through a Consultant 
Bureau. All those good deeds are just a means to Christianize Muslims and lead them to receive 
Jesus as God.
My younger sister is an evangelist in Madura. Sometimes on Saturday nights she would 
watch the kyai (Islamic religious leaders) leaving for Surabaya. She observed that the kyai 
changed into jeans and T-shirts and then go to the red district. This evidence can be a tooi to 
convert the kyai when the Suramadu bridge starts to operate.
During my childhood I was able to convert some of my Muslim friends. I invited them to 
eome to Sunday school, luring them with cookies, shoes, books, bags, et cetera. And in the end, 
together with me, they were baptized.
I am wondering now why their parents did not worry and did not pay much attention to such 
conversions. They did not realize that their children were being led to heil. In 1986 I married an 
HMI (Association o f Islamic Students) and pengajian (religious learning) activist, and success- 
fully converted him to Christianity. In 1987 we had child.
Even though Christianity did not allow it -  “ [Therefore] what God has joined together, let no 
one separate” -  the pastor finally let us divorce in 1992. The pastor could not find a solution for 
our marriage problem. Since then the pastor has approved many divorces: better to divorce than 
live in heil.
Since m y divorce my child has been living with my parents in Lombok. My child was taught 
to be a militant missionary Christian. Using his talents and charm, he successfully converted 
some o f his Muslim friends through music. He was not reluctant to sing Islamic songs, yet at 
Christmas he invited his Muslim friends to play music in church, also introduced them to Chris­
tian life, which was pleasant and in accordance with their youthful spirit. Slowly but surely his 
friends apostasized; he studied at the Christian University in Yogyakarta, majoring in Christian 
pastoral counseling (the graduate then becomes G OD ’S SERVANT!). In July 2007, when I went 
to Lombok for dakwah (Islamic preaching), I found my son had just delivered his girlfriends’ 
veil; he had converted his Muslim girlfriends to Christianity.
To be honest, I have had doubts about Christianity since I was child. I often wondered why 
there were so many odd, illogical and immoral stories. Every time I asked my religion teacher, 
pastor, priest, even a theologian, their answer was always yes and amen, and I was not allowed to 
ask again. 1 was often punished by my teacher and parents because I asked such questions. It was 
funny, though, because the priest exorcised me, thinking I was possessed.
Despite all the punishment 1 tried to keep my Christian faith. I kept involving m yself in 
church activities, although deep inside my heart I was restless. Converting to Islam? Wow.... 
Sorry, I never had such an idea, but I hated and undervalued Islam. Often we even despised 
Islam. Negative perceptions and opinions about Islam had already deep struck deep roots in our 
hearts: that Islam was a religion o f stupid people, weaklings, the poor and the lazy, and it was the 
provocation o f all the riots and violence; what a coincidence that in Lombok Islam only exposed 
us to this negative portrayal!
However, no one can suspend God’s hidayah (guidance). “A  good and perfect book does not 
need revision,” that is the Q ur’an. I f  the Bible was true, why did God revise it in the Q ur’an? 
This fact troubled me and shook my Christian faith. Is the Bible a holy scripture? God’s revela- 
tion? So why are there drunken prophets, even naked, who even lay with their daughters? Why 
does the Bible teil vulgar and pomographic stories? Why does it talk about adultery among sib- 
lings, children and parents and in-laws, lesbianism, even masturbation? Is the aim o f  the bible to 
nurture our faith or our lust, especially after reading such great sex adventures as those o f the 
Ohola Oholoba brothers in the book o f Ezekiel?
The Bible forbids people to drink wine but why did Jesus transform six buckets o f water into 
wine at a wedding in Cana? Why does this forbidden drink become the Symbol o f Jesus' holy 
blood in the church’s communion? It happened that a glass o f wine which was supposed to be for 
communion was drunk by one person and the person got drunk immediately. Does it mean that 
Jesus’ blood is intoxicating?
W hy did God lose when wrestling with a human being? Why did God also make a wrong 
decision and regret it? Why was God exalted in falsehood? W hy were the interest and fomicator 
payment holy before God? Why did God need to stop his work and rest? Was God tired? How 
come God was bom  o f  a human being, which means Jesus was on earth while God was in 
heaven? Besides, it is also mentioned that Jesus will sit at G od’s right hand. Clearly, it shows that
Jesus and God are two different entities. W hy is it taught that Jesus is God? Which means Jesus 
also eats, drinks and defecates, which is najis (unpure). Is it appropriate to picture the holy God 
as unclean?
Jesus claimed that he was sent [by God], which means Allah sent [him]. He also claimed that 
he had no power o f his own, which means Allah is the Almighty. Jesus only did the Father’s will, 
but Allah is the sovereign. Jesus also prayed, and Allah answered his prayer. Jesus refused to be 
addressed as kind, because Allah is the God o f kindness. Jesus gave his life to Allah, which 
means Allah was above him. So why is Jesus equal to Allah? Is it possible that the messenger is 
equal to the sender, the weak to the almighty, worker to controller, receiver to giver, giving to 
receiving? If  Jesus were God, why did not the great prophets like Adam, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, 
Ishmael, David, Solomon, Moses, Zachariah and M aria submit and pray to Jesus?
If  Jesus was God and died on the cross, where was his divine character as the life, the etemal, 
the alpha and omega, and the almighty? Who had the power to kill God? If God died, who would 
control the universe? And who would answer all the prayers? Who would replace him? Or was 
there another God ruling this universe?
W hy does God have a genealogy, even in two different versions [Matthew’s and Luke’s]? It 
means that God has parents, grandparents and ancestors. Why is Judah, who committed adultery 
with Tamar, his daughter-in-law, in Jesus’ genealogy? King David, who sneaked a peek at Bath- 
sheba and committed adultery with her, and planned to kill Uriah, Bathsheba’s husband, is also 
in the genealogy. David and Bathsheba begot Solomon, who had 700 wives and 300 mistresses; 
Solomon’s love for his wives was greater than his love for God. Is it logical that the holy God is 
the descendant o f immoral, idolatrous and adulterous people? It is even illogical, because Jesus is 
the descendant o f both Solomon and Nathan, Solomon’s older brother. Is it possible? Should 
faith overrule logic?
TAUHID (monotheism) is worshipping the only almighty God. Jesus and the prophets taught 
Tauhid. Many Tauhid verses can be found in the Bible, in both the Old and the New Testament. 
Yet Paul taught about Jesus’ godliness and the trinity concept. Jesus kept the Torah, while Paul 
didn’t. W hy do [people] believe in Paul’s teaching rather than Jesus’? It indicates that Paul has 
more power than Jesus.
Israël consisted of twelve tribes. Jesus was sent for the Israelites and forbade his disciples to 
spread the gospel outside Israël, because later on Jesus was going to judge the Israelites. Why, 
then, do missionaries decisively say that they carry out the great commission to spread the gospel 
to all nations, like the Javanese, Chinese, Bataknese, etcetera? Are those nations Israelites? If  
they were, to which Israelite tribe do they belong? In other words, the missionaries present Jesus 
as God but ignore his command.
I got more confused. There were too many whys, contradictions, immoralities and abstruse 
ideas in the Bible. I became reluctant to go to church and to read the Bible; besides, the Bible 
was revised by the Qur’an.
On Christmas Eve 1998 I forced m yself to join the Christmas service. Yet I received no 
peace but only got more entangled. Many questions were still unanswered and caused me more 
confusion. RELIGION, GOD, SCRIPTURE are all about TRUTH, not JUSTIFICATION, there- 
fore it must be the right choice because it leads to either heil or heaven!
W hen the church and Bible could not satisfy my quest, a terrible accident almost cost me my 
life. Driving fast to Madiun, I had a flat tire because my car drove over a piece of sharp metal. I 
zigzagged out o f control. I was pale and my heart beat faster. Terror o f death overwhelmed me, 
whether I would go to heil or heaven when I died. I had already left Christianity and had not 
found the right religion; thanks be to God, as he still saved me. I regained control and pulled my 
car into the middle o f a rice field far from anywhere. Suddenly I heard azan Maghrib, the call to 
prayer at sundown. It touched my heart..,”Is it the answer?” I asked myself. I had to decide what 
was my choice.
W hen a friend lent me a book called Akhlak Islam (Islamic morality] I was astonished. Islam 
put into its concern all the triviality; Islam also regulates and gives guidance about it through 
Hadits and the Q ur’an. For example, after having sexual intercourse husband and wife must take 
a bath. A woman who is having her period is not allowed to do shalat, enter the mosque and read 
the Qur’an. Another thing, a wife should have permission from her husband before leaving [the 
house], and when there is person sitting nearby, those who pass by should greet him. Just like 
these trivial things are considered, so much more is the important business. Islam is the real 
guidance from God for our lives. In a way Islam is a stark contrast to Christianity, in which the 
crucial things are not revealed, such as being a Christian, celebrating Christmas, and worshipping 
the trinity. All these teachings are human, not God’s.
After years o f  meditation, struggle and asking the real God about the right religion, in Febru- 
ary 1999 I decided to convert to Islam. I believe that Islam is the true religion, the tauhid religion 
from God, a religion which was believed and taught by prophets and apostles. The Islamic 
syariah (law) was developed from prophet to prophet and made perfect by the prophet Moham­
med peace be upon him, whereby this latest syariah is perfect and blessed by God.
Some temptations after I  became a Muslim:
1 Just after becoming a Muslim my family, friends and Christian neighbors disowned me, 
while the Muslims still questioned my Islamic faith.
2 On 14 August 2001 my doctor said that 1 only had two years left because o f my illness.
3 As I continued to leam Islamic teaching, I succumbed to heresy. I did shalat in old mosques, 
asking for a blessing either at the walis ’ (saints’) graves or at the old sacred grave. I even ate 
bread with Arabic letters imprinted on it, chanted certain mantras and wore talismans to ful- 
fill my wish. The kyai asked me to do all those things. It was said that the kyai was invulner- 
able and could hit enemies from afar. In the end it was a lie. When I had problems with peo­
ple the kyai was just sitting at his home chanting his mantra, was afraid to come out. When 
his child had an accident he was safe but his child passed away. So where was his power? He 
emphasized dzikir (chanting), wiridan (chanting) the whole night instead o f performing sha­
lat subuh (prayer at dawn) in time and together in mosque. [He performed] shalat subuh at 
10 a.m. because he often woke up late.
4 I went bankrupt because o f a kyai, who deceived me by pretending to guide and help me. I 
assumed God put his rod upon me because I ignored him and put my trust and faith in kyai.
5 My second husband was the only Muslim manager in his company, which was one o f the 
biggest automotive companies in Indonesia. He was discriminated against and was made to 
feel unwelcome by his boss, who had just been ordained a priest. His colleagues created an 
unfriendly environment in order to make him resign.
6 On 18 August 2003 my husband passed away without any disease when my Islamic faith was 
starting to grow and bloom. He was the person who led and introduced me to Islam. In fact it 
was I who was seriously ill. I was also penniless and only had IDR 10.000.
7 A week after my husband died my mom came from Lombok and urged me to return to Chris­
tianity. She gave me a choice: if  I chose Islam, I must return all the money she had spent rais- 
ing me since childhood. Thankfully, I had Allah to whom I could cling. W ith the help of 
some ustads [Islamic teachers] and friends I was able to repay my mom.
8 Being alone and a widow, I wanted to fetch my child in Lombok to live with me in Solo. 
However, my mom abandoned me unless I retumed to Christianity; I had to struggle hard 
and had three miscarriages before Ihad my son, and I also suffered great pain in conceiving 
and labor.
9 On the eve o f  Ramadan 27 in 2004 my son phoned me and asked me whether I wanted him 
or religion. I f  I chose him, 1 must return to Christianity. Without hesitation I told him I pre- 
ferred Islam. I had my shahada (declaration o f faith) and had promised Allah to follow him
faithfully. Allah deserves our love more than anything, and Allah deserves to be number one 
in our lives, more than our children and family. Allah is the solid rock for us to rely on. Since 
then I have been officially expelled from my family; my grandmother does not consider me 
her granddaughter, my uncles and aunts do not want me to be their niece, my parents do not 
receive me as their daughter, my younger sister and brother, who received my support during 
their studies, also regard me as a stranger. I f  I have to lose my family, wealth, even my life to 
defend my Islamic identity, 1 am ready as long as I still receive A llah’s ridha and rahmat 
(mercy). May Allah keep my faith strong.
10 Now I have joined Arimatea Forum in Solo to do dakwa and protect Muslims against conver­
sion and Christianization. Because o f this I often receive threats. Once I was threatened that I 
would be reported to [Kantor] kelurahan (sub-district office) for causing disharmony. I was 
also threatened that I would be reported to the police, murdered, hanged, even having my 
face scratched. Yet I was not afraid and would never back down because almighty Allah 
would keep his promise as it is written in the Qur’an, book o f Mohammed, verse 7: O YE 
WHO BELIEVE! IF YE W1LL AID [THE CAUSE OF] ALLAH, HE WILL AID YOU 
AND PLANT YOUR FEET FIRMLY. And mudharat (benefit, blessing, grace) is only from 
Allah.
Problems come to me in a row, but Allah is just and he will not let me suffer. Allah loves his 
servants. He puts his servants to the test and teaches them in order to purify them to become 
better and more acceptable persons to sit at his side. A mukmin (faithful Muslim) is beyond 
words because s/he can endure all the tests o f suffering and unhappiness gratefully, which are 
meant for his/her own goodness.
This is my up-and-down story o f being Christian for about 30 years and my struggle to main­
tain my Dienul Islam (Islamic religion). Islam is an honorable religion that teaches its followers 
to amar makruf nahi munkar (counsel goodness and prevent evil) and to have faith in Allah. 
Islam is the only way to A llah’s grace, salvation, happiness and etemal happiness, A llah’s 
heaven!
The more I study Christology, I find evidence that Christianity is not God’s revelation:
1 None o f the verses in the Bible mentions God or Jesus commanding people to be Christians. 
Even in Acts 11:26 it points out that the term ‘Christian’ came after Jesus was dead and had 
ascended to heaven. It means that Jesus never heard o f this term, never knew or taught Chris­
tianity.
2 The great commission [Christianizing the world] in Matthew 28:16-20 tum s out to have been 
an addition by a Christian evangelist in order to Christianize the world. This manipulation 
was first revealed by Hugh J. Schonfield (Nobel prize nominee in 1959) in his book The 
original New Testament and Robert Funk (a professor o f New Testament theology) in his 
book The five gospels.
3 The Christian doctrine that says “the Word was God” in John 1:1-18 tum s out to be a m a­
nipulation o f the Platonic hymn, which says “Logos [the word] is from God...” This manipu­
lation was revealed in Augustine’s book The confessions o f Saint Augustine.
4 The results o f  a Jesus seminar attended by 76 biblical experts from different field o f  study 
show that about 82% o f  Jesus’ statements and actions are doubtful, even fake; this seminar is 
held twice a year and was held in 1985-1996.
5 Jesus was positioned as God by men at the Council o f Nicea in 325. It was convened by 
Constantine the Great and attended by 318 bishops.
6 In 381 men posited the Holy Spirit as God at the Council o f Constantinople. It was convened 
by Theodosius and attended by 150 bishops. It also added the creed, “Believe that the Holy 
Spirit is God”.
7 CHRISTMAS! The merriest and most sacred service and celebration for Christians was 
never mentioned/ written in the Bible.
8 December 25 as the celebration o f Jesus’ birth is a pagan custom, according to which gods 
are believed to be bom on December 25 and was celebrated (Mithras in Persian, Bacchus in 
Greek, Krishna in India, etc.).
9 G od’s commandment that the Sabbath is on Saturday was changed to Sunday by Constantine 
the Great; it follows the sun worshipper society’s calendar ( ‘Sunday’ is from the words ‘sun’ 
and ‘day’). It means that G od’s commandment is ignored while human conduct is valued.
10 The doctrine o f  the trinity taught by Paul (not Jesus) follows paganism, which was wide- 
spread and powerful before, after and during Jesus’ time.
Example o f  trinitarian doctrine followed by Christians
Area God 1 God 2 God 3
India Brahma Vishnu Shiva
Persia Oromasdes Mithras Ahrimanes
Egypt Osiris Horus Isis
Greek Orphic Hanes Ericapeus Metis
On the other hand, the more I leam and practice Islam, the more I find it tremendous and awe- 
inspiring. Islam conforms to the human disposition, values, reason, and has never denigrated 
human reason. Clearly and importantly. Islam is from Allah, belongs to Allah, and will always be 
protected by Allah. Also it is free from human misleading interference.
After studying the Q ur’an I found many instances o f Christian heresy:
1 Christians wrote the Bible with their own hands, then claimed it was from Allah (Qs 2:79)
2 Christianity is not from Allah (Qs 3:19).
3 Allah rejects Christianity (Qs 3:85)
4 Christians are infidels and will go to heil (Qs 5: 72, Qs 5:73 and Qs 98: 6)
5 Jesus is not A llah’s son and Christianity follows the trail o f  paganism (Qs 9:30)
6 Jesus never said that he was God (Qs 5:116)
7 Jesus was never murdered and crucified, which means there is no penance (Qs 4:147)
8 God begets no son, nor is he begotten (Qs 112: 3)
9 Christianity deviates from Jesus’ teaching (QS 23: 53)
10 Jesus is only A llah’s servant and prophet (Qs 19:30)
11 Christianity over steps in religiosity (Qs 4: 171)
12 A Christian is not allowed to be appointed a leader or friend (Qs 5:51 and 57)
13 Christians will never be happy until a mukmin follows their religion (Qs 2:120)
14 Christians always fight against and convert Muslims (Q s l: 217)
15 Christians obstruct Allah’s way and distort it (Qs 3: 99)
16 Following Christianity means leading a mukmin to infidelity (Qs 3:100)
W hat would shame me would be if  Allah the creator and ruler o f the universe found me dead still 
embracing the old infidel belief. How contemptible o f me if  Allah the protector, provider and 
owner o f heaven and heil found me dead still believing in a faith that is against A llah’s guidance.
I am grateful that Allah has led me to find the right path and showed me Dienul Islam. Yet I 
still have concern for my beloved brothers and sisters who have known Islam since birth but have 
not understood it. Islam is more precious than the universe, even more precious than our lives.[If 
people] do not understand Islam, it means [they are] easily deceived by djin (neither human 
being nor spirit) and easily led to infidelity.
Finally, I pray may my husband and I always receive blessings from Allah. May our entire 
lives contribute hugely to Islam and the Muslim faith. We also pray that we will embrace Islam 
till death in husnul khatimah (ending/death in a good way) or being martyrs for Allah.
Why Islam is a must and the only
The fact is, there are many religions but only Islam is right and blessed by Allah. Islam is the 
only religion that helps us to go to etemal heaven. Islam also brings peace and blessings while 
we are still living on earth. However, when there are Muslims who do not find peace and bless­
ings in their life it is not Islam that is to blame but THE PERSON HIM/ HERSELF BECAUSE 
S/HE DOES NOT FOLLOW ISLAM RIGHTEOUSLY.
Apart from Islam, religion is heresy and misleading. It also leads to eternal heil. Although the 
majority o f the planet believes in it, even though the state approves it, non-Islam is heresy. Al­
though people keep saying that all religions are good and truthful and guarantee heaven, only 
Islam can guarantee it truthfully.
I do not mean to be fanatical, but truth should be upheld. Let us prevent heretical teachings 
that are sullying, thwarting the truth, and making the truth look bad, even bad is praised.
Again, mortal and etemal salvation is only through Islam, to die in Islam. Why?
1 Islam is the only religion approved by God the owner of heaven
Ali Imran (3): 19
Religion fo r  Allah is Islam (submission to his will)
Apart from Islam, religions are not from Allah but human. Therefore no religion mentions its 
name in their scripture except Islam. For example: the names of Judaism, Christianity, Catholi- 
cism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, etcetera are not from God but from human beings.
2 Islam is the only way to heaven
Al-An’am (6): 153
Verily, this is My way, leading straight. Follow it; follow not [other] paths: they will scatter you 
from His [great] path. Thus doth He command you, that ye may be righteous.
Allah is the creator and ruler o f  heaven and men. Islam is A llah’s path; it leads to Allah, his 
ridha (will), and his heaven. Other paths only lead men away from Allah, his ridha and his 
heaven.
3 Allah only receives Islam, non-Islam is a disadvantage in the afterlife
Ali Imran (3): 85
I f  anyone desires a religion other than Islam [submission to Allah], never will it be accepted o f  
him; and in the hereafter he will be in the ranks o f  those who have lost [all spiritual good], 
Non-Islam means violating A llah’s rule, therefore Allah, the judge, and etemal owner o f sover- 
eignty, rejects it. All the abundant charity men have ever done does not provide pahala (reward). 
It also does not bring men to heaven but to etemal heil where misery prevails.
4 Islam is the only religion for humanity, taught and believed by all prophets
An-Nahl (16): 36
For We assuredly sent amongst every people an apostle, [with the command], "Serve Allah, and 
eschew evil. "Among the people were some whom Allah guided.and some in whom error became 
inevitably [established]. So travel throughout the world, and see what was the end o f  those who 
denied [the Truth],
Al-M u’minun (23): 52
And verily this brotherhood o f  yours is a single brotherhood, and I  am your Lord and cherisher: 
therefore fear Me [and no other],
The core o f Islam is Tauhid; it worships, surrenders to Allah, and leaves taghut (idolatry or 
anything worshipped except Allah). This was taught by Prophet Muhammad to every believer. 
Islam means one religion, from Allah for men (believers). The prophet Muhammad’s disciples 
who tumed against him created new religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, etcetera (Qs. Al- 
M u’minun: 53). In addition Islam establishes different syariah for different people in different 
periods; it follows believers’ development.
5 Islam is the only perfect religion and is blessed by Allah
Al-Maidah (5): 3
...This day have I  perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and have cho- 
sen fo r  you Islam as your religion...
The development o f syariah from the early to the later prophets finally reached its wholeness. 
Allah blesses this syariah when he commanded this verse just before prophet Muhammad’s 
death.
Let us sami ’naa wa atha ’naa (we listen and we obey). Listen & DO IT!
Sumsnary
This doctoral thesis studies the relation between religious discourse and (the 
lack of) social cohesion. In this respect Indonesia is an interesting case. It has a 
long tradition of peaceful co-existence, but also a long history of violence and 
ethnic and/ or religious conflict. Muslim and Christian history in Indonesia 
paradoxically reveals growing religious convergence and divergence.
In this work I examine social identity construction through Christian- 
Muslim relations (research object) from the theoretical angle of communicative 
practice (research perspective), namely the power of language to make and 
unmake groups, thereby generating convergence or divergence between Chris­
tians and Muslims. The hypothesis is that language use is shaped by and shapes 
broader social and cultural processes. Following Norman Fairclough (1992), I 
consider critical discourse analysis an appropriate method for studying social 
change.
I explore why and under what conditions religious discourses are elevated 
above other discourses and whether or not religious diversity jeopardizes social 
unity and leads to conflict. I start with the micro (interpersonal) level of dis­
course (focus group discussions, FGDs), but am also interested in the dialecti- 
cal relation between the micro (individual) and the macro (societal) level of 
discourse, and whether the meso (institutional) level plays a mediatory role 
between the other two levels.
In this research I adopt a constructivist approach and try to find altemative 
ways of theorizing about and studying religious identity and interreligious rela­
tions. The research objectives are: (1) to gain insight into the relation between 
religious discourse and (the lack of) social cohesion (intemal objective), and by 
doing so (2) to contribute to a theory and method of studying interreligious 
relations (extemal objective).
More specifically, the main research questions are the following. First, how 
do Muslims and Christians identify and position themselves and others? Sec- 
ondly, what are the socio-cognitive effects of their identification and position- 
ing? Sub-questions relating to question one are: (a) How do Muslims and 
Christians speak about each other? (b) How do Muslims and Christians speak 
with each other? Sub-questions relating to question two are: (a) What are the 
conditions for understanding/ misunderstanding? (b) What are the conditions 
for cohesion (convergence) or conflict (divergence)?
Following Flood (1999), this study is inspired by the shift from the philoso- 
phy of consciousness, in all its variations and complexities, to the philosophy 
of signs or language. The conceptual framework is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu
(1991), who noted that ‘practical classifications are always subordinated to 
practical functions and oriented towards the production of social effects’. 
Bourdieu sees identity as a resource or Capital, by means of which people strive 
to further their interests in collaboration or competition with others.
In this study religious identity transformation is examined via interreligious, 
particularly Muslim-Christian, relations. Thus in this research identity is de- 
fined as a narrative of the self (Giddens 1991: 54). People have not just one 
identity but multiple identities (polyphonic selves). They always engage simul- 
taneously in a plurality of partly overlapping self-narratives. Religious identity 
is only one of the social identities people can have. Religion is religion because 
it is placed in a particular narrative context or speech community.
My research strategy is a single case study. Social identity constructions in 
Indonesia are studied through Christian-Muslim relations, narrowed down to 
Surakarta as a case. That is to say, I study Muslim-Christian relations in one 
particular location, Surakarta. Certain unique characteristics of Surakarta make 
it a perfect case study. The first is its religious diversity. Islam is the majority 
religion (75.9%), with Christianity (Protestants and Catholics) a significant 
minority religion (23.2%). Adherents of Christianity in Surakarta outnumber 
the national and provincial average. Surakarta is also a multi-ethnic city. The 
majority is Javanese, the others being Chinese, Arab, and so forth.
As this is a study of participants’ perspectives, the main source was the spo­
ken language of Christians and Muslims. Most of the data was generated by 24 
FGDs. Thus the primary source was FGD participants (informants). Ultimately 
a total of 150 participants attended the FGDs. Secondary data came from pam- 
phlets, brochures, banners, bulletins, letters from participants and the internet.
Critical discourse analysis was chosen as method of data analysis princi- 
pally because of the need to explore a plausible dialectic relationship between 
language and socio-cognitive effects on Muslim-Christian relations in Indone­
sia and explain the role of language in intercultural religious communication in 
the community. Fairclough (1992) develops CDA as a multi-perspective and 
poly-methodical approach of discourse analysis.
Our research participants primarily said that belonging to society (relatives, 
neighbours and friends) was more important than being an adherent of a relig­
ion. This preference showed that they prioritize civic rather than religious iden­
tity. Although they are faithful believers, they use mainly inclusive language. 
What we saw in our FGDs is a hegemonie struggle between dominant and pe- 
ripheral voices to define what is considered “normal” Muslims and Christians. 
Whereas Christian participants identified extremist (fanatical, fundamentalist) 
Muslims as abnormal, Muslim participants identified Christians who favour 
and practise Christianization as excessive. They positioned extremists and ex­
cessive persons as extraordinary. Thus they identified extremism as not the 
norm but an exception to the rule of religions.
The research participants do not understate Indonesian violence because it 
could have been worse. Our FGD participants were keenly aware of the fact 
that harmony in Indonesia is fragile and that conflicts erupt every now and 
again, such as the Solo riots in 1972, 1980 and 1998. According to them the 
Solo riots were not about religion but only about social problems. This kind of 
narration is a way to maintain harmony and a social mechanism to avoid fur­
ther and deeper conflict.
The idea of freedom and liberalization in the political arena influences reli­
gious life in Indonesian society, and the other way around. The research par­
ticipants identified the Reformasi as an era of freedom. What we saw in our 
FGDs is a struggle to redefine Pancasila in the context of the Indonesian Re­
formasi era, which is characterized by an awakening of religious ideology. 
Because of the diminishing role of the state in the Reformasi era, the ideology 
of Pancasila is no longer enforced top-down, but citizens seem to endorse it 
bottom-up. They reproduced a link between “Pancasila country” and tolerance 
and religious freedom.
Summarizing our fïndings we offer a synthesis on two axes, one with the 
religious and the secular positions as extreme poles, the other with two oppo- 
site religious positions (Java Muslim/ Christian) at the centre. In general what 
we saw in the FGDs is a struggle between three positions. First, the extreme 
position advocates an Islamic Syariah state or comprises militant Christians. 
This first position is mono-cultural, which is a peripheral voice. Second, there 
is the moderate position or peaceful coexistence: tolerate the other but do not 
mix (at least not religions). This is a multicultural position which is a main- 
stream position. A third position, which is also peripheral, is relativist or nomi­
nal. From a different angle, the multicultural (religio-ethnic) identity is midway 
between two other peripheral identities: religious and secular.
In relation to the contribution to a theory and method of studying interrelig­
ious relations (extemal objective) I conclude as the following. Fairclough’s
(1992) clearly specifies linking the analyses of discourse as text and as social 
practice. The two stages of analysis are linked via a third, the analysis of dis­
cursive practice. But Fairclough leaves a gap when he differentiates between 
the levels of analysis. Given the fact that we analyse interactions between par­
ticipants in FGDs, thus at the individual and interpersonal level, how can we 
draw conclusions at a societal level? In our view it is the institutional level that 
mediates between the individual and the societal level. For instance, in our 
FGDs we recognize that Javanese language and customs are institutions or 
shared practices and pattems of behaviour that go beyond individuals.
The foregoing insight brings us to a second conclusion. The pattemed be­
haviour and routines (e.g. ‘sameness of custom’) are based on shared knowl­
edge or social cognitions (e.g. ‘Javanese wisdom’). Although cognition plays a 
relevant role, Flood (1999) suggests that the discipline of religious studies
should not be trapped in a reduetive cognitive approach which sees culture 
merely as a cognitive system. We need to clarify the relation between discur­
sive study of religion and cognitive science. This would be an interesting field 
for further research.
Our research participants reproduced various classifications. Such as “ordi­
nary” and “fanatical”; “normal” and “extreme”; “abangan” (nominal) and 
“santri” (devout). But our study showed that distinctions and classifications are 
not clear-cut. They are not fixed but flexible. Unlike social identity theories 
(Tajfel & Turner 1986), which define identity on the basis of intrinsic values 
that can be measured by objective criteria, we found that identities are fluid. 
We can relate that conclusion to a current trend in the study of religious iden­
tity. It seems that in modem times religious identities were more or less fixed, 
whereas from a postmodern perspective they are more fluid, hybrid. That is to 
say, religious believers not only switch easily from one language to the other 
but increasingly mix them. Those classifications showed the complexity and 
dynamics of participants’ voices in identifying the others and themselves. Thus, 
it is important in religious study to shift from social identity to ‘multiple iden­
tity’ theory.
Fairclough (1992) combines linguistic analysis with critical theory. In that 
sense CDA moves from disengaged to engaged science, which is relevant to 
the debate on religious studies in Indonesia that we started with. In Indonesian 
context, religious study mainly is not ‘objective’, but engages in social engi­
neering. In a society where 99% of the population says that religion is impor­
tant in their daily life (Gallup Poll 2008) there is no other way. In this sense 
religious study in Indonesia differs from religious studies in Europe or North 
America, which sticks to methodological agnosticism. Scholars of religious 
study in Indonesia are mostly engaged in religion. This research by way of a 
discursive study of religion and more speciflcally the CDA method will, I hope, 
contribute to theoretical clarification as well as offer a methodological altema- 
tive for developing engaged religious studies in Indonesia.
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